Filed July 1, 2011
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and other courts generally refer to § 922(g)(1) as the “felon-in-possession” statute, though the statute itself does not use that terminology. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18, 23 (2010) (GINSBURG, J.); Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2234, n.1 (2010) (SOTOMAYOR, J.); Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2010) (THOMAS, J.); see also Def. Br.
Filed March 11, 2011
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and other courts generally refer to § 922(g)(1) as the “felon-in-possession” statute, though the statute itself does not use that terminology. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18, 23 (2010) (GINSBURG, J.); Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2234, n.1 (2010) (SOTOMAYOR, J.); Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2010) (THOMAS, J.); see also Defs.’ Br.
Filed September 27, 2010
The Amendment uses only the present tense; it does not extend to prohibiting research involving embryos that “had been” or “were” destroyed in the past or to any potential incentive for destructions in the future. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (June 1, 2010) (holding that the use of present tense, rather than past or present perfect, “reinforces the conclusion” that the plain language of an act does not include past actions); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“Because the phrase ‘substantially limits’ appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.”), superseded by Pub.
Filed September 27, 2010
The Amendment uses only the present tense; it does not extend to prohibiting research involving embryos that “had been” or “were” destroyed in the past or to any potential incentive for destructions in the future. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (June 1, 2010) (holding that the use of present tense, rather than past or present perfect, “reinforces the conclusion” that the plain language of an act does not include past actions); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“Because the phrase ‘substantially limits’ appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.”), superseded by Pub.
Filed March 2, 2017
Courts “look[] to Congress’ choice of verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach,” as well as to the instructions of the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1. Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010). “‘In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words used in the present tense include the future as well as the present.”
Filed May 6, 2011
See, also, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783 at 56 (1970) (CAA Conference Report), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 5388 (citizen suit is barred if “abatement action is pending and is being diligently pursued”). As the Supreme Court has stated, “Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992). The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, provides, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise…words used in the present tense include the future as well as the present.” “By implication, then, the Dictionary Act instructs that the present tense generally does not include the past.” Carr v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010). 20 Case 4:10-cv-04969 Document 21 Filed in TXSD on 05/06/11 Page 20 of 35 for a Better Env’t-Cal v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1996) (state action no longer being “prosecuted” within the meaning of CWA provision once consent order was issued); Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D. N.J. 1991) (same). Here, EPA resolved its case against the Baytown refinery five years before Plaintiffs filed this suit, and most of the requirements of the resultant consent decree have long since expired.22