Filed September 4, 2014
By citing these two factors, the Federal Defendants and the Ione Band clearly seek to bring themselves within the relatively expansive interpretation of “under federal jurisdiction” advanced by Justice Breyer in his Carcieri concurrence, upon which they rely so heavily. In that concurrence, Justice Breyer (writing for himself alone, and not for the Court) identified several examples of (what he regarded as) “a 1934 relationship between the Tribe and Federal Government that could be described as jurisdictional, for example, a treaty with the United States (in effect in 1934), a (pre-1934) congressional appropriation, or enrollment (as of 1934) with the Indian Office.” 555 U.S. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Case 2:12-cv-01710-TLN-CKD Document 85 Filed 09/04/14 Page 56 of 61 ___________________________________________________________________________________ AMADOR COUNTY’S COMBINED REPLY & OPPOSITION CASE NO. 2:12-cv-01710-TLN-CKD BRIEF RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 46 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 As to the failed treaty negotiations in the 1800s, even if one accepts as true that members of the Band are descendants or “successors in interest” to those Indians that negotiated Treaty J, that fact has little bearing on whether the Band was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. The “Ione Band” was indisputably not a party to any “treaty with the United States (in effect in 1934).” Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Filed July 3, 2014
The statement is otherwise correct. Carcieri Analysis On January Il, 2071, I sent a memo to Chad Broussard, who at the time worked for Analytical Environmental Services, the environmental consultant who assisted the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") in the preparation of the extensive environmental impact statement ("ETS"), explaining my opinion as to why the Supreme Court decision in Carcieri v. ,\alazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009) does not affect the Secretary's authority to take land into trust for the Tribe. In that memo.
Filed January 18, 2013
On July 19, 1983, several parties to the litigation, including North Fork, entered into a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, restoring and confirming the status of seventeen rancherias to the same status that they possessed prior to the distribution of assets under the Case 1:12-cv-02039-BAH Document 30 Filed 01/18/13 Page 15 of 45 As Justice Breyer notes in his concurring opinion in Carcieri, the IRA does not require a tribe to/7 be federally recognized in 1934, because the word “now” in the IRA modifies “under Federal jurisdiction” not “recognition,” and concluded that the IRA “imposes no time limit upon recognition.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 397-98. 16 Rancheria Act and placing them on the Federal Register list of recognized tribes.
Filed October 16, 2009
As an alternative basis for vacating the judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Carcieri, held that Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. “§ 479 limits the Secretary [of Interior]’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.” 129 S. Ct. at 1061 (emphasis added). Documents authored by the federal government, and attached to the Wilton Miwok Rancheria’s complaint (as Exhibit J), demonstrate that the Wilton Rancheria was not formally organized as a tribe until 1935.
Filed April 24, 2017
Rather, “absent a clearly expressed congressional intention,” courts must give full effect to allegedly competing federal statutes unless they are “in irreconcilable conflict.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009) (quotation omitted). Thus, when considering two federal statutes that contain no express preclusion, “it is the duty of the courts ... to regard each as effective”
Filed October 8, 2013
at 2-3 (collecting cases). Comcast argues that there is a difference between a decision to reverse and to remand, citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). Defs.’
Filed May 9, 2013
Even if the Plaintiff had challenged the status of the Tribe’s Indian lands, however, its challenge would fail on the merits because Carcieri did not operate retroactively to divest the United States of title to lands that it holds in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385 n.3 (indicating that the status of 1800 acres 7 To the extent that the State’s argument, even in the context of its putative state law claim, is that IGRA incorporates state laws through 18 U.S.C. § 1166 and thus makes them applicable to tribal gaming, that argument is addressed and refuted in the discussion of the State’s federal law nuisance claim, infra.
Filed March 19, 2010
An agency regulation cannot be interpreted in a manner that places it in conflict with the controlling statute. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (no deference owed to agency actions that conflict with the governing statute); see also Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063–64 (2009) (Where a statute is unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation; it must be applied according to its terms.).
Filed March 24, 2017
Courts often find the terms of such statutes to be plain. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). Plaintiff also claims, without any supporting caselaw, that the mere fact that an agency promulgated or revised regulations or issued informal guidance concerning a statutory provision means that the 1 Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue that a DPF is not “an adjunct or an accompaniment” to a truck, which is a commonly understood meaning of an “accessory.”
Filed September 8, 2016
Courts may not resort to legislative history where the statutory language at issue is unambiguous. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (stating that if “the statutory text is plain and unambiguous … we must apply the statute according to its terms”); Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). Section 106 is not Case: 3:16-cv-00122-jdp Document #: 37 Filed: 09/08/16 Page 10 of 31 11 ambiguous: it makes clear that authorizing, as well as doing, any of the enumerated acts is infringement. Even if the language of § 106 at issue were ambiguous, Subafilms’ conclusion that Congress added the word “authorize” solely to address contributory infringement reads too much into the 1976 Report.