Filed January 31, 2013
890 A.2d at 1003-04. Case 8:11-cv-01733-FMO-MLG Document 77 Filed 01/31/13 Page 63 of 71 Page ID #:1295 44 _ PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT CASE NO. 8:11-cv-01733-FMO-MLG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 supra; pp. 22-23, supra (duty to disclose); Cambridge Plating Co. v. NAPCO, 876 F. Supp. 326, 337-38 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d, 85 F.3d 752 (1st Cir. 1996).82 Oh.: While recognizing that a plaintiff need only “show a material misrepresentation, deceptive act or omission that impacted his decision to purchase the item at issue” to assert a claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”), ORC Ann. §§ 1345.01 et seq., MTD, p. 39 (citations omitted), Defendants nonetheless argue that Bathon fails to “identify any offending conduct” by Defendants, id.
Filed November 3, 2010
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B); Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 760 (1st Cir. 1996). Defendants assert that they are requesting a new trial based upon three allegedly erroneous jury instructions.
Filed September 4, 2007
; see Kannavos, 356 Mass. at 49-50, 247 N.E.2d at 712-13 (a plaintiff is “not barred . . . from recovery merely because [it] ‘did not use due diligence when [it] could readily have ascertained from records what the true facts were”). 150 See Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. NAPCO, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 326, 338 (D. Mass. 1995) (defendant’s failure to disclose relevant information in its possession attained a “level of ‘rascality’ warranting a finding of liability under” chapter 93A”), aff’d in relevant part, 85 F.3d 752 (1st Cir. 1999). 151 Cablevision of Boston v. Public Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184 F.3d 88, 106 (1st Cir. 1999) (“One can commit a chapter 93A violation without behaving like a ‘rascal,’ if one violates consumer protection or public safety laws.”)
Filed June 7, 2006
Rule 7(b)(1) provides that an application for an order “shall be by motion, . . . shall be made in writing, and shall state with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). To be sufficiently particular under Rule 7(b)(1), a motion must afford “notice of the grounds and prayer of the motion to both the court and to the opposing party, providing that party with a meaningful opportunity to respond and the court with enough information to process the motion correctly.” Registration Control Systems, Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also stCambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 760-61 (1 Cir. 1996).
Filed July 6, 2005
Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Saco Defense, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 159, 166 (D. Mass. 1998), and the amount of its damages to a reasonable certainty, see, e.g., Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 771 (1st Cir. 1996), it is clear that Diomed’s “evidence” is insufficient to warrant a jury trial: 1) Diomed claims “ lost sales” due to the marked sheath, but its witnesses could only identify one customer who supposedly converted to VSI because of the marked sheath. That testimony was inadmissible hearsay from an unnamed “purchasing” person.