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Calloway v. Hensley

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Lubbock Division
Aug 16, 2004
Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-256-C (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-256-C.

August 16, 2004


ORDER


Plaintiff, Willie A. Calloway, acting pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He named Roy Hensley, Health Administrator of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID") Preston Smith Unit; Dr. Paul A. Moran, physician at the Smith Unit; Dr. John C. Womble, physician at the Smith Unit; Dr. William E. Gonzales, Medical Director of the TDCJ-CID; and Arthur Y. Anderson, Warden of the Smith Unit, in their individual capacities, as Defendants. Plaintiff requested "5 years of free medical care," monetary damages, and injunctive relief.

The complaint was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for judicial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. The Magistrate Judge conducted a Spears evidentiary hearing by televideo conferencing on March 9, 2004, to determine whether service of process should issue. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The Plaintiff appeared in person and testified under oath. See Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that testimony from a Spears hearing becomes part of the complaint). Pursuant to the Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing, TDCJ-CID provided copies of Plaintiff's prison grievance records, classification records, and medical records relevant to his complaint. See Martinez v. Aron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) (approving the use of relevant prison records to evaluate § 1983 complaints by prison inmates). After Plaintiff refused to consent to have the Magistrate Judge hear his complaint, the Magistrate Judge returned the instant civil rights action to this Court's docket by Order dated March 11, 2004.

MOTIONS

Plaintiff filed motions for leave to supplement his complaint on October 14, 2003, and November 13, 2003, and a motion requesting the appointment of counsel on November 13, 2003, but these motions were not ruled on by the Magistrate Judge prior to the Spears hearing.

(1) Motions for Leave to Supplement Complaint

In the letter/motion filed on October 14, 2003, Plaintiff stated that he had failed to attach copies of the Step 1 and Step 2 grievances to his complaint form. He requested that the complaint form be returned to him so that he could attach the grievances and asked for instructions about what to do to correct this omission.

In the "Motion [for] Leave to File Supplemental . . . Complaint . . ." filed on November 13, 2003, Plaintiff (1) requested that the grievances attached to the motion be "incorporated into the records" of his original complaint; (2) asked that Ismeal C. Castro, Food Service Manager of the Smith Unit, Castro's staff in the kitchen at the Smith Unit, and James O. Peterson, Jr., Safety Officer at the Smith Unit, be added as defendants to his complaint; and (3) invoked the jurisdiction of the district court to hear his state claims as well as his federal claims. Plaintiff argued that Castro, Peterson, and the unnamed officers knew that there was water on the dining hall floor on May 17, 2003, but "consciously disregarded an excessive risk" to an "older physically handicapped offender," which resulted in his suffering severe physical and mental pain. Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Civil Complaint on November 13, 2003, in which he expounded on his complaints that Defendants were negligent under state law. Although Plaintiff has requested permission to "supplement" his complaint, it appears that he is requesting permission to amend his complaint by adding defendants and state law claims. In view of the deference accorded to pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, the Court shall treat Plaintiff's November 13 motion as a request to amend his pleadings. See McGruder v. Phelps, 608 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a district judge should have treated a pro se pleading as an amended complaint or an addition to his complaint in the nature of an amendment regardless of how the pleading was titled). Furthermore, even though Plaintiff did not attach a complete amended complaint to his request, the substance of his proposed amendment is clear. See Zaidi v. Ehrlich, 732 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a pro se request to amend a complaint should not be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to attach a complete amended complaint to the request because the substance of the proposed amendment was clear). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's November 13 motion should be construed to be a request to amend his complaint.

"Although leave to amend pleadings `shall be freely given when justice so requires,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend is not automatic." Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1991). "[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Because Plaintiff requested permission to supplement and amend his complaints before the Magistrate Judge conducted the Spears hearing and before a responsive pleading was filed by the Defendants, his requests to supplement and amend his § 1983 complaint should be granted.

(2) Motion for Appointment of Counsel

On November 13, 2003, Plaintiff filed a letter/motion requesting that counsel be appointed to assist him with the prosecution of the instant civil rights complaint.

"A civil rights complainant has no right to the automatic appointment of counsel," and appointment of counsel is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. Akasike v. Fitzpatrick, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994). Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) provides that a court may request an attorney to represent any person claiming an in forma pauperis status, the courts are not empowered to make compulsory appointments in civil actions. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 196, 301-302 (1989).

In making a determination as to whether to appoint counsel in a § 1983 case, the Court may base its decision on several factors, including:

1. the type and complexity of the case;

2. the petitioner's ability adequately to present and investigate his case;
3. the presence of evidence which largely consists of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in presentation of evidence and in cross-examination; and
4. the likelihood that appointment will benefit the petitioner, the court, and the defendants by "shortening the trial and assisting in just determination." Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 293 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Texas, 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991)).

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's pleadings and finds that Plaintiff has not shown an inability to set forth his claims for relief nor has he shown that extraordinary circumstances are involved which would justify the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel should be denied.

BACKGROUND

The Court has construed Plaintiff's pleadings liberally, including his supplemental complaints, and assumes that all facts pleaded by the Plaintiff are true. See Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d at 600 (holding that the court must accept facts pleaded by the Plaintiff as true). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is part thereof for all purposes.").

On May 17, 2003, Plaintiff slipped and fell in the Smith Unit dining hall because of water that was standing on the floor. He was transported to the infirmary in a wheelchair and complained of back and neck pain. Because he fell on a Saturday, there was no physician in the infirmary, but Plaintiff was examined by a nurse, who contacted the physician (Dr. Talley) that was on call. Pursuant to the physician's instructions, Plaintiff was prescribed ibuprofen and robaxin for seven days and instructed to see the physician on Monday, May 19, 2003. Plaintiff left the infirmary with the use of crutches.

Plaintiff acknowledges that he had back, knee, and ankle surgery prior to being incarcerated in TDCJ-CID and the records show that he was issued crutches when he was admitted to TDCJ-CID. He alleges that he fell because the water standing in the dining hall caused his crutches to slip out from under him and this fall aggravated his pre-existing back and knee conditions. Plaintiff argues that Defendants were (1) deliberately indifferent to his safety because they allowed water to stand on the dining hall floor and (2) deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition because they have failed to provide him with knee or back surgery to correct his physical problems.

The Court understands Plaintiff to raise the following complaints:

1. Although Plaintiff advised Roy Hensley, the Smith Unit Health Administrator, both in writing and in person, that Drs. Moran and Womble were not providing adequate medical care or responding to his grievances, Defendant Hensley deliberately ignored his complaints.

2. Dr. Moran knew that Plaintiff was scheduled to have knee surgery before he was transferred to the Smith Unit, but he disregarded the prior order and delayed the surgery. Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Moran wanted to provide treatment for his back following the fall but complains that Dr. Moran lied to him regarding his back x-rays and did not provide proper treatment.

3. Dr. Womble never did any testing after the fall, failed to provide treatment for Plaintiff's back and knee problems, deliberately delayed or prevented his surgery, lied to him about his back x-rays, refused to refer him to a specialist, and prevented Dr. Moran from treating him.

4. Dr. Gonzales was made aware of Plaintiff's medical problems, his need for surgery, and his need to see a specialist, but failed to take any action to correct the inadequacies of the treatment provided by Drs. Moran and Womble.

5. Warden Anderson failed to take any actions to correct the Smith Unit's deficient medical treatment of Plaintiff and unsafe conditions despite having been notified of both by Plaintiff's grievances.

6. Food Service Manager Ismeal Castro and his staff were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health and safety because they failed to remove the water from the dining hall floor or post warnings that the water created a safety hazard.

7. Safety Officer James Peterson failed to prevent Plaintiff from slipping and falling on a wet floor and failed to investigate Plaintiff's complaints.

Plaintiff states that he is suing the Defendants in their individual capacities only.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"As part of the screening process of prisoner complaints under § 1915A, a trial court is directed to `dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint — (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.'" Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a trial court shall review an in forma pauperis complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a district court shall on its own motion or the motion of any party dismiss a complaint by a prisoner regarding prison conditions if the court is satisfied the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant).

A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999)). "A complaint has no arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted "if as a matter of law `it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. . . .'" Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327 (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). An in forma pauperis complaint is not, however, frivolous simply because it may fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Id. at 331.

Although a district court should hold a pro se complaint to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by [a] lawyer[,]" Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. (2002), a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations, Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). A district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff `might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

The Defendants have not been served, but after reviewing the pleadings, the video recording of the Spears hearing, and the TDCJ-CID prison records, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d at 507 (holding that a prisoner's testimony at a Spears hearing becomes part of his pleadings and must be considered in evaluating his claims under § 1915).

DISCUSSION

"Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action[,]" Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983), and a supervisory official cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on any theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior, Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1987). See Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, a supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 only if a plaintiff demonstrates that the official "affirmatively participate[d] in acts that cause[d] constitutional deprivation," or he "implement[ed] unconstitutional policies that causally result[ed] in plaintiff's injury." Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). To the extent, therefore, that Plaintiff complains that Defendants Hensley, Gonzales, and Anderson failed to properly supervise other TDCJ employees and he has not demonstrated that any of these Defendants implemented unconstitutional policies, his complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. To the extent, however, that Plaintiff complains that Defendants Hensley, Gonzales, and Anderson "affirmatively participated in acts that caused constitutional deprivation," he has raised complaints of personal liability. See Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995) ("In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged."); Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1986) ("There is no supervisory liability without primary liability.").

"[Section] 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere." Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1999). "A claim for relief under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 must allege the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a defendant acting under color of state law." Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d at 734 (citation omitted).

Although "the Constitution does not require that custodial inmates be housed in comfortable prisons," the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide "humane conditions of confinement," including adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Amendment also requires prison officials to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). "In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement, an inmate must establish: first, that the deprivation alleged was sufficiently serious (i.e., an official's act or omission must have resulted in the denial of `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities'); and second, that the prison official possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d at 664 (citation omitted). To demonstrate the requisite "culpable state of mind," an inmate must show that prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" to his health or safety. Id. "To find that an official is deliberately indifferent, it must be proven that `the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d at 734 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837). "Deliberate indifference cannot be inferred from a prison official's mere failure to act reasonably, i.e., it cannot be inferred from negligence alone." Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262-63 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).

To the extent that Plaintiff's complaint about his slip and fall in the dining hall sounds in negligence, § 1983 is not a general tort statute and negligence is not a theory for affixing liability under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1989). Many acts that might constitute a violation of state tort law simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 complaints about negligence should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mitchell v. West, 554 F. Supp. 1215, 1217 (N.D. W.Va. 1983)) ("Simply put, `[a] "slip and fall,"' without more, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. . . . Remedy for this type of injury, if any, must be sought in state court under traditional tort law principles.").

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to raise negligence claims under state law, however, his claims should be dismissed without prejudice to his right to raise those claims in state court. See Reed v. Gonzalez, 2001 WL 640788 at *6 (N.D. Tex. 2001) ("Because it appears that the underlying claims under federal law which supported the Court's original jurisdiction over this matter should be dismissed, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and such claims should be dismissed without prejudice.").

To the extent that Plaintiff's complaint can be construed to argue that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety because there had been water on the floor on prior occasions, Plaintiff has presented no facts sufficient to demonstrate "deliberate indifference." Indeed, "[d]eliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind." McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997). "[T]he `failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not' is insufficient to show deliberate indifference[,]" Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 838), and "negligence is insufficient to support a finding of [deliberate indifference]." Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 2003). See Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm."). "Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet[,]" Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d at 756, and Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the standard.

As for Plaintiff's complaints regarding his medical treatment at the Smith Unit, Plaintiff has likewise failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. To state a claim for the denial of medical care cognizable under § 1983, an inmate "must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need is one that is "either obvious to the layperson or supported by medical evidence." Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995). See Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a serious medical need is one that "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's treatment"). To demonstrate deliberate indifference to his medical needs, an inmate must show that a defendant official refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated the inmate incorrectly, or "engaged in any similar conduct that would evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical need." Domino v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d at 756.

"[A]lthough inadequate medical treatment may, at a certain point, rise to the level of a constitutional violation, malpractice or negligent care does not." Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999). See Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Unsuccessful medical treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action" nor does "mere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice."). "It is firmly established that negligent or mistaken medical treatment or judgment does not implicate the eighth amendment and does not provide the basis for a civil rights action." Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993).

A delay in medical care can only constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment "if there has been deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm." Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).

Moreover, an inmate's mere disagreement with his physicians and treatment does not state a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d at 181. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated that

[n]either inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, nor carelessness, nor even deliberate failure to conform to the standards suggested by experts is cruel and unusual punishment. The Constitution does not command that inmates be given the kind of medical attention that judges would wish to have for themselves, nor the therapy that Medicare and Medicaid provide for the aged or needy. . . . [T]he essential test is one of medical necessity and not one simply of desirability.
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1149 and 1149 n. 159 (5th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted and quotation omitted).

"Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate's allegations of deliberate indifference." Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995).

Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff's back and knee problems were serious medical conditions, there is simply no evidence in the records to support Plaintiff's claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his problems. The medical records clearly indicate, and Plaintiff does not disagree, that Plaintiff was seen immediately after his slip and fall on May 17, 2003, and was examined by a physician on May 19, 2003. The records also indicate that Plaintiff was seen in the infirmary on many occasions following his fall and he received x-rays, numerous medications for pain, a back brace, and special tennis shoes. Plaintiff was also provided crutches because of knee injuries that were sustained before he was incarcerated. The records also indicate that a request was made for Plaintiff to have a consultation with an orthopedic specialist. Plaintiff disagrees with his medical treatment and requests examination by other physicians, but he has not demonstrated that Defendants "wantonly disregarded" his medical problems.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaints about deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED that

1. Plaintiff's motions for leave to file supplements and amendments to his complaint (Dkt. Nos. 4 and 8) are granted.

2. Plaintiff's motion requesting the appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 10) is denied.

3. Plaintiff's state law tort claims are dismissed without prejudice to his right to raise them in the state courts.

4. Plaintiff's complaint and all claims alleged therein under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

All pending motions not previously ruled on are hereby denied.

This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff is advised that if he appeals this Order, he shall be required to pay the appeal fee of $255.00 pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and he must submit an application to proceed informa pauperis and a certified copy of his 6-month Certificate of Inmate Trust Account along with his notice of appeal.

A copy of this Order shall be mailed to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas, 78711, and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77342-0629.


Summaries of

Calloway v. Hensley

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Lubbock Division
Aug 16, 2004
Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-256-C (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2004)
Case details for

Calloway v. Hensley

Case Details

Full title:WILLIE A. CALLOWAY, TDCJ-CID No. 606572, Plaintiff, v. ROY HENSLEY, et…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Lubbock Division

Date published: Aug 16, 2004

Citations

Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-256-C (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2004)