Filed May 16, 2016
Both circumstances implicate Teague’s animating concern: “validat[ing] reasonable, good faith interpretations of existing precedents made by [lower] courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). 2.
Filed June 14, 2010
Accordingly, the “new rule” principle of Teague “validates reasonable, good faith interpretations of existing precedents made by [lower] courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). “Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, . . . or if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”
Filed April 23, 2010
Stated another way, because Lockhart had not relied on the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time of trial, he could not complain that he was being penalized by the court’s reliance on subsequent federal authority. Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372-73, citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1990). Nor did Lockhart have an argument that, at the time of his trial, he had articulated his claim under the predominantly-used constitutional framework for such an argument, but that he could also have articulated his claim of fundamental unfairness under another constitutional rubric had he had any reason to believe that such an alternative claim might be necessary or appropriate.