Filed February 7, 2012
56,668, 56,770 (Sept. 16, 2010)), the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule, holding that the agency failed “adequately to assess [its] economic effects.” Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. In opposing a stay in the D.C. Circuit, the Commission sought to blame its failure to con- duct an adequate cost-benefit analysis on members of the public, complaining that “commenters provided little quantitative data.”
Filed February 1, 2017
See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151–52 (vacating SEC rule because its cost-benefit analysis “discounted the costs of” the Rule “but not the benefits” and “duck[ed] serious evaluation of [certain] costs”). Fourth, and finally, the Rule fails to determine whether the cost of regulating vaping products is justified by the benefits associated with such regulation.
Filed July 18, 2016
This omission removes any rational support for the conclusion that moving fixed indexed annuities into the BIC exemption is cost-justified. See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155 (agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to “adequately address the probability the rule will be of no net benefit as applied to” entities already subject to Case 3:16-cv-01476-M Document 56 Filed 07/18/16 Page 35 of 44 PageID 4232 28 regulation). The Department’s decision to revoke the 84-24 exemption for fixed indexed annuities was therefore arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside.
Filed April 28, 2017
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152. Case 1:14-cv-00263-RDM Document 84-1 Filed 04/28/17 Page 28 of 34 24 At bottom, CMS never considered the alternative of a rate increase. The King & Spalding commenters explained why many of the agency’s proposed methodologies and assumptions were unsupportable.
Filed May 2, 2013
The Commission’s error thus replicates a fatal defect in Business Roundtable, where the SEC ignored the data that was readily available to it. 647 F.3d at 1150. By conducting the fleeting and superficial cost-benefit “analysis” that it did, the Commis- sion also failed to properly address the specific factors set forth in the CEA, including the Rule’s effects on “competitiveness,” “efficiency,” and the “public interest.”
Filed August 8, 2016
The Department’s ex post facto re- characterization of these earlier statements was arbitrary, capricious, and precisely the sort of “opportunistic[]” treatment of economic evidence that requires vacatur. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Third, and related, DOL failed to give appropriate weight to an economic analysis demonstrating that the loss of advice caused by the Rule could cost savers as much as $80 billion in a single major stock market correction.
Filed August 8, 2016
In short, the BICE does not satisfy the statute’s specific “administrative feasibility” requirement. The Department’s “ipse dixit” that the BICE is administratively feasible, AR59, was insufficient on this record, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2011). B. The Department Failed To Account For The Harm To Consumers From Decreased Access To Annuity Products Even if the BICE somehow satisfied the “administrative feasibility” standard, the Department’s treatment of variable and fixed indexed annuities is arbitrary and capricious Case 3:16-cv-01476-M Document 62 Filed 08/08/16 Page 36 of 45 PageID 4630 30 because the Department failed to acknowledge, much less justify, its decision disproportionately to hamper consumers’ access to variable and fixed indexed annuities.
Filed July 22, 2016
See AEP Texas N. Co., 609 F.3d at 441. Even if these conclusory statements were 20 See also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By ducking serious evaluation of the costs that could be imposed upon companies from use of the rule by shareholders representing special interests, particularly union and government pension funds, we think the Commission acted arbitrarily.”); AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 609 F.3d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious where it “did not consider whether railroads and investors actually or reasonably could have relied on . . . [the agency’s] 2005 [annual] cost of capital determination” and instead “rel[ied] only on generalized conclusions about how industry players rely on cost of capital determinations . . . .”)
Filed July 18, 2016
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Third, and related, DOL failed to give appropriate weight to an economic analysis demonstrating that the loss of advice caused by the Rule could cost savers as much as $80 billion in a single major stock market correction.
Filed July 18, 2016
In short, the BICE does not satisfy the statute’s specific “administrative feasibility” requirement. The Department’s “ipse dixit” that the BICE is administratively feasible, AR59, was insufficient on this record, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2011). B. The Department Failed To Account For The Harm To Consumers From Decreased Access To Annuity Products Even if the BICE somehow satisfied the “administrative feasibility” standard, the Department’s treatment of variable and fixed indexed annuities is arbitrary and capricious because the Department failed to acknowledge, much less justify, its decision disproportionately to hamper consumers’ access to variable and fixed indexed annuities.