Filed February 2, 2007
EEOC, 857 F.2d at 393 (“Although statutes of limitations protect defendants from the burden of defending stale claims, this interest may be outweighed ‘where the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights.’”) (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 426). As it is clear that the equitable tolling provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies to the Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Plaintiffs have filed their Complaint within the statutory 10-year period provided by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f), this Court should deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Filed August 29, 2008
“Both federal and state jurisdictions have recognized the unfairness of barring a plaintiff’s action solely because a prior timely action is dismissed for improper venue after the applicable statute of limitations has run.” Burnett, 380 U.S. at 430. Even the California courts have recognized that a statute of limitations should yield to fairness: As Justice Holmes observed, “when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied.”
Filed January 31, 2008
Moreover, the courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Specifically, statutes of limitation, 7 Plaintiffs state that the Buonocore and Vine are both on appeal and that Vine “is expected to be overturned.”
Filed December 5, 2006
Critically, as the Supreme Court succinctly stated, this is a case in which plaintiffs have “slept on their rights.” Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (1965). 4 Defendants specifically deny the factual allegations asserted in the Complaint.
Filed December 13, 2016
Statutes of limitation characteristically embody a “policy of repose, designed to protect defendants.” Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). To the extent DPA may argue for suspension of the statute of limitations during the pendency of its motion to Case 1:14-cv-00225-AKH Document 68 Filed 12/13/16 Page 10 of 22 762-000-00001: 10738231_4.doc
Filed April 30, 2015
As a general matter, statutes of limitations exist to protect parties against claims where time has eroded access to probative evidence, see generally Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970); Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. R. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (the statute of limitations is "designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared"); Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1950); Ehud Guttel & Michael T. Novick, A New Approach to Old Cases: Reconsidering Statutes of Limitations, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 129 (2004); or after the passage of time unduly imposes on the courts, see Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (the 8 statute of limitations protects the courts by relieving "the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights"). Although these policy concerns almost never tell us what the optimal time period would be for designing a statute of limitations for a class of claims in practice, New York's commitments to formalistic contract law and providing repose to human affairs suggest a thumb on the scales in favor of applications of statutes of limitations that contribute to the certainty, predictability, and finality of commercial transactions among parties under New York law.
Filed May 6, 2014
Norex’s construction of the interplay of CPLR 205(a) and CPLR 202 respects the complementary ways in which these two provisions further the overarching goal of New York’s statute of limitations, while the First Department’s construction manifestly does not. A. Both CPLR 205(a) and CPLR 202 Serve the Purpose of the Statute of Limitations to Ensure that Plaintiffs Put Defendants on Notice in a Timely Manner “Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants.” Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
Filed December 16, 2013
To hold otherwise would be unfair to Defendants because “‘the right to be free of stale Case 2:13-cv-02093-TLN-DAD Document 44 Filed 12/16/13 Page 59 of 61 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 43 claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’” Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (citation omitted). IV.
Filed November 22, 2013
Statutes of limitations “are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants” and serve important interests of repose and fairness, particularly in actions by the government seeking penalties. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); see also Gabelli v. S.E.C., 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1223 (2013) (“[I]t ‘would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws’ if actions for penalties could ‘be brought at any distance of time.’” (quoting Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, (1805)).
Filed November 5, 2012
Statutes of limitation serve to "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise." Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971)); Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913)). As noted by Chief Justice Marshall, "[i]n a country where not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be supposed that an individual would remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture."