Buell v. Mitchell

3 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed October 16, 2006

    Moreover, since the abolition of the death penalty is not a customary norm ofinternational law, it cannot have risen to the level that the international community as a whole recognizes it as jus cogens, or a norm from which no derogation is permitted. (Buell v. Mitchell, supra, 274 F.3d at p. 373.) Therefore, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the abolition of the death penalty is a customary norm ofinternational law orthat it has risen to the higher status ofjus cogens.

  2. PEOPLE v. NELSON (SERGIO DUJUAN)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed April 17, 2006

    (See People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126; People v. Bolden (2000) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567; People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.Ath at p. 511; Peoplev. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 462; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1055; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 778-779; see also Buell v. Mitchell (6th Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 337, 370-376 [upholding Ohio’s death penalty scheme againstclaims that it violated international law].) This Court has also rejected appellant’s contention that California’s use of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendmentto the federal Constitution.

  3. USA v. Sampson

    Opposition

    Filed July 31, 2015

    (marks in original). Case 1:01-cr-10384-MLW Document 2041 Filed 07/31/15 Page 13 of 29 14 who had written a law review article on a subject at issue in the litigation not required to recuse); United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 626–27 (2d Cir.1993) (judge who had given a lecture to government agents and prosecutors, including advice on how to increase the prospects of a conviction in narcotics cases, not required to recuse herself from narcotics prosecution); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 2001) (judge who previously, as a legislator, supported a bill restoring the death penalty was not required to recuse himself from a death penalty case); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1560 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a judge’s personal views on legal issues may not serve as a basis for a motion to disqualify that judge; judge’s previous statements regarding marijuana distribution as a serious and pervasive social problem did not require recusal); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denying a motion that he disqualify himself due to previous testimony before Congressional Subcommittee); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1476 (9th Cir. 1991) (“expertise on and exposure to a subject, such as Payne alleges the judge had by virtue of his service on the Commission, does not necessitate recusal”); S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It is well established, however, that a judge is not disqualified merel