Filed October 7, 2011
This is precisely the type of injury “the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes [the proposed transaction] unlawful.” Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. Second, Defendants’ argument overlooks the fact that Sprint is bringing only a claim for injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, not an action for damages under Section 4.
Filed December 5, 2016
In short, Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating any injury to competition or to consumers in the form of decreased output or higher prices. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; see also Larry Pitt & Assocs. v. Lundy Law, LLP, 57 F. Supp. 3d 445, 452-53, n.29 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (defendant’s “alleged success in attracting clients, at the expense of its competitors” thus Case 2:16-cv-01207-JS Document 28-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 16 of 20 12 resulting in lost revenue did not violate Section 2).
Filed September 30, 2011
The Clayton Act does not provide a remedy for all adverse effects of unlawful mergers; it does so only for those adverse effects that are directly connected to “the reason the merger was condemned” under the antitrust laws. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487. Sprint therefore cannot establish standing based on injuries that flow from a preservation or enhancement of competition.
Filed July 12, 2017
But Front St. Marine's parochial desire to displace Cal-Shell as a competitor is of no concern to antitrust law—antitrust laws "were enacted for the protection of competition not competitors." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quotes omitted); Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 90 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1056 (1997) ("Over and over, we stress that antitrust is designed to protect consumers from producers, not to protect producers from each other or to ensure that one firm gets more of the business.
Filed May 24, 2017
Carlino’s representatives allegedly making statements that it intends to open a supermarket does not rise to the level of anticompetitive conduct – if anything, Plaintiff’s complaints about Carlino’s “predatory” development demonstrate its own aversion to competition. See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488 (“The antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors.”).
Filed January 6, 2017
Id. at 429 U.S. at 488. Likewise, Plaintiff here could have been excluded (and still could be excluded) by the City and the County under Section 1797.
Filed December 29, 2016
Id. at 429 U.S. at 488. Likewise, Plaintiff here could have been excluded (and still could be excluded) by the City and the County under Section 1797.
Filed December 29, 2016
Id. at 429 U.S. at 488. Likewise, Plaintiff here could have been excluded (and still could be excluded) by the City and the County under Section 1797.
Filed October 31, 2016
at 489. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O- Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 241.
Filed January 8, 2016
Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate antitrust standing if they would have suffered the same injury even without the alleged antitrust violation. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487 (noting that acquisitions that “brought a ‘deep pocket’ parent into a market of ‘pygmies’” did not cause plaintiffs any antitrust injury because they “would have suffered the identical ‘loss’ . . . had the acquired centers . . . been purchased by ‘shallow pocket’ parents . . . .”); see also Lucas Auto. Eng’g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that competitor’s gain in market share through acquisition of manufacturing and distribution rights did not result in antitrust injury because plaintiff would have suffered the same injury if a small business acquired the distribution rights); Alta.