Filed October 28, 2016
The Excessive Fines Clause “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993) (quoting Browning- Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265) (emphasis added by Austin). Thus, the Excessive Fines Clause only applies to payments that are required to be made as a civil or criminal punishment, rather than as a remedial measure.
Filed January 4, 2010
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at1227. 11 While, the Supreme Court has rejected the application of the Excessive Fines Clause to non- statutory punitive damages paid to private parties, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989), the question has not been addressed in the context of statutory damages. Id.
Filed December 15, 2016
AsJustice O’Connorobserved, the threat of enormous awards “has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products,” particularly pharmaceuticals. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissentingin part). In response to expandingtheories oftort liability, prescription drug manufacturers have “decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a newpill or vaccine into the market.”
Filed June 11, 2015
org/Data-and-Reports/State-Manufacturing- Data/2014-State-Manufacturing-Data/Manufacturing-Facts--California/. [even] criminal sanctions for the same misconduct, as well as a steady rise in the severity of those sanctions” in manyareasof the law). 7 See, e.g., David Lieber, Eighth Amendment — The Excessive Fine Clause, (1994) 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 805; Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., (1989) 492 U.S. 257, 300-01 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating courts should give “substantial deference” to the legislature in determining appropriate levels of civil fines); Courtney M. Malveaux, OSHA Enforcement of the “As Effective As” Standard for State Plans: Serving Process or People?, (2011) 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 323, 337 (noting increased penalties for violations can lead to an increase in litigation and divert funds from workplace safety compliance programs). 18 The State must be allowed to consider whether the competitive disadvantage of allowing follow-on UCL actions is worth the risk of manufacturers leaving, or not opting to moveto, California.
Filed April 14, 2014
The Court further noted: “This -14- aspect of passion and prejudice review has been recognized in many opinions of this Court.” (id. at p.425, fn.4, citing Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. (1989) 492 U.S. 257, 272; Haslip, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 21, fn. 10; id. at p. 27 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); TXO, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 467 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); id. at pp. 476-478 (dis. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) By prohibiting review of the size of punitive damages awards, Oregon failed to ensure adequate mechanisms to enable appellate courts to detect awards that were tainted by passion or prejudice. “Oregon’s abrogation of a well-established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivation of property raises a presumption that its procedures violate the Due Process Clause.
Filed January 12, 2011
at 433-34; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), the Supreme Court considered but rejected a challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause on the 1 These cases are the rule, not the exception. See also Leavey v. Unum Provident Corp., 295 F. App’x 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “[t]he district court did not err in reducing the jury’s $15 million punitive damages award to $3 million” because a ratio of 7.5:1 was excessive); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470, 488 (6th Cir. 2007) (characterizing 9.1:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages as “large” and unconstitutional in light of the compensatory award, which at $366,939 was itself “very large”); Bach v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 486 F.3d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a 6.6:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages based on $400,000 compensatory award was “alarming”); Ojeda-Rodriguez v. Zayas, 666 F. Supp. 2d 240, 266 (D.P.R. 2009) (“this Court finds [ratio of
Filed December 10, 2010
Cook County, Ill., 538 U.S. at 130. 21 The Seventh Circuit has expressed doubt as to whether the Excessive Fines clause applies to civil penalties under the FCA, see Rogan, 517 F.3d at 453, citing Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), for the proposition that punitive damages were not considered “fines” under the Eighth Amendment). 22 Both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court have cited favorably to Bajakajian in evaluating Excessive Fine Clause determinations under state civil statutes.
Filed February 8, 2010
The existence of a statutory range also precludes application of the punitive damages case law for a second reason. The Court’s Gore line of cases emphasized that “substantial deference [should be given] to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue,” 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This recognition of the heightened deference given to statutory damage awards, and the correspondingly lower deference owed a jury’s unbounded punitive damage award, is included within the third guidepost established by the Gore Court, which judges the propriety of punitive damages by examining the disparity between a punitive damage award and the “civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”
Filed January 21, 2010
The Excessive Fines Clause, however, does not apply in this case because the action was instituted by private parties and the United States does not have a right to receive a share of the statutory damages award. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (holding the Eighth Amendment does not “constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded”). 6 The Sixth Circuit did use an objective ratio test in Zomba and found that a ratio of 44:1 of statutory damages to actual damages did not violate due process given that the ratio in Williams was 113:1.
Filed January 19, 2010
The Excessive Fines Clause, however, does not apply in this case because the action was instituted by private parties and the United States does not have a right to receive a share of the statutory damages award. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (holding the Eighth Amendment does not “constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded”). 6 The Sixth Circuit did use an objective ratio test in Zomba and found that a ratio of 44:1 of statutory damages to actual damages did not violate due process given that the ratio in Williams was 113:1.