State v. Terzian, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 98 (June 23, 2017):This Court recognizes that, in the context of apparent authority, “room must be allowed for some mistakes on [the officer’s] part.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). However, “the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.”
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174—176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 1035 (1878).23 And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, supra.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) In People v. Del Vecchio, 277 AD2d 927, The Fourth Department applied the “Terry” standard in suppressing evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful frisk:The court erred, however, in denying that part of defendant's motion seeking suppression of the evidence seized during the frisk search.
A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).” Id.
Id. at 742 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).
Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949)FACTS: On March 3, 1947, Malsed, an investigator with the Alcohol Tax Unit (Oklahoma) and another officer, were parked on a highway in northeastern Oklahoma, about five miles from the Missouri state line. They spotted Brinegar driving past.
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). It is, instead, "a practical, nontechnical concept," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949), that refers to the amount of proof that would "warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being [or has been] committed," id. at n.4.
These rules are historically grounded rights in our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.” See: Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1959).The Supreme Court in Winship recognized that the reasonable doubt standard protects three fundamental interests.
These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard [persons] from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).The full panoply of criminal trial rights may not be appropriate at all phases of a capital sentencing, given the mandate to fashion an individualized sentence, based on a broad range of information.