Filed July 9, 2008
Accordingly, a denial of certification under § 437h is appropriate grounds for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 591 10 Case 1:08-cv-00248-JR Document 34-2 Filed 07/09/2008 Page 14 of 16 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1979) (accepting review under § 1292(b) of an order denying certification under § 437h), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 577 (1982). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its order denying their motion for certification and take one of the following steps: (1) Vacate the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for certification and certify questions under § 437h as soon as possible, rather than waiting for the parties to conduct discovery.
Filed March 5, 2008
Moreover, if the plaintiffs pursue this relief, the Court will need to develop a factual record for the en banc court of appeals. Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982). See Khachaturian v. FEC, 980 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (remanding to district court for further proceedings); Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (same).
Filed December 23, 2013
847 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1988) ............................................................................................19, 20 Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. Jamsostek, 600 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2010) ..........................3 Aurum Asset Managers, LLC v. Bradesco Companhia de Seguros, 441 F. App’x 822 (3d Cir. 2011) ...........................................................................................................................................14 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998) ...........................................................................12 Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 892 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D.D.C. 2012) .......14 Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982) .............................................................4 Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc., 124 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) .........................................13 Cruz v. TD Bank, NA, 2013 N.Y. LEXIS 3188 (N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) ..............................................6 Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) ..........................................................14 Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) ...............................................................................................12 Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011) ....................................2 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) ...........................................................................................10 Ferndowsi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113791 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2009) .............................................................................................................
Filed July 2, 2010
C, ¶¶ 6–7. But an after-the-fact affidavit of a lobbyist asserting his client’s intended meaning of a statute’s language should be given no weight by the Court. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982) (expressly refusing to give probative weight to after-the-fact affidavit of amendment sponsor regarding legislative intent). JCS argues that “courts may properly consult affidavits of legislators or others involved in the passage of a bill to construe statutory language.”
Filed January 16, 2009
No one legislator has sufficient personal knowledge to declare the overall intent of the Virginia General Assembly. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982) (expressly refusing to give probative weight to after-the-fact affidavit of amendment sponsor regarding legislative intent); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1978) (“post hoc observations by a single member of Congress carry little if any weight”). Instead, the Court should conclude that the Virginia General Assembly meant exactly what it said.
Filed July 18, 2008
Another is that district courts must determine whether any plaintiffs seeking to invoke section 437h belong to one of the statute’s three expressly enumerated classes of plaintiffs: “[t]he Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President,” 2 U.S.C. § 437h. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 581 (1982) (“Bread PAC”).2 The district court’s role in similar provisions in other statutes were repealed because “[t]he courts are, in general, in the best position to determine the need for expedition in the circumstances of any particular case, to weigh the relative needs of various cases on their dockets, and to establish an order of hearing that treats all litigants most fairly.” H.R. Rep. No. 98-985, at 4 (1984).
Filed December 20, 2007
In fact, courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of creating a full factual record before resolving constitutional challenges, like the one here, to the federal campaign finance statutes. See, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (district court is required to make findings of fact before certifying constitutional question to en banc court of appeals under 2 U.S.C. § 437h); California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 192 n.14 (1981) (“[I]mmediate adjudication of constitutional claims through a section 437h proceeding would be improper in cases where the resolution of such questions required a fully developed factual record.”)
Filed April 14, 2006
In fact, courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of creating a full factual record before resolving constitutional challenges, like the one here, to the federal campaign finance statutes. See, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (district court is required to make findings of fact before certifying constitutional question to the en banc court of appeals under section 437h of FECA); California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 192 n.14 (1981) (“immediate adjudication of constitutional claims through a section 437h proceeding would be improper in cases where the resolution of such questions required a fully developed factual 2 See e.g., Ada v. Guam Soc.