Filed April 7, 2009
Despite the placement of Proposition 64’s requirements, California Courts have broadly applied these requirements to all claims brought under the false advertising laws. See, e.g., Branick, 39 Cal. 4th at 240 (Proposition 64 applies to 9 In their argument regarding Proposition 64, plaintiffs repeatedly discuss the intent of the legislature. The intent of the legislature is immaterial to the discussion of Proposition 64, which was adopted by California voters in 2004 to prevent the very type of suit that plaintiffs are attempting to bring.
Filed October 12, 2007
The cases it cites have absolutely nothing to do with standing in this sense. See Palmer v. Stassinos, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (it was “undisputed” that plaintiffs did not satisfy the UCL standing requirement in this case that straddled the pre- and post-Proposition 64 period); Branick, 39 Cal. 4th at 235 (explaining that someone without injury could not sue on behalf of the general public under the UCL). Case5:07-cv-01700-RMW Document59 Filed10/12/07 Page19 of 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 731695.
Filed October 10, 2016
; Comm. on Children’s Television v. Gen.l Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983) (first-person reliance “should not be a prerequisite to liability; it should be sufficient that defendant makes a misrepresentation to one group intending to influence the behavior of the ultimate purchaser, and that he succeeds in this plan”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Branick v. Downey Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 138 P.3d 214, 242 (Cal. 2006). Thus, at least two courts have sustained negligent misrepresentation claims in factual scenarios similar to the one presented here.
Filed November 24, 2009
Solutions, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (C.D. 7 Plaintiff also purports to bring her claim in her capacity "as a private attorney general," (SAC ¶¶ 91-92), though such standing is no longer available. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204; see also Branick v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 39 Cal. 4th 235, 240-41 (Cal. 2006) (discussing same). 8 Plaintiff also has not identified any legal basis to hold RBS accountable for supposed violations by an unrelated third-party lender.
Filed February 13, 2009
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535; see also Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass’n, 39 Cal. 4th 235, 240-41 (2006) (noting that Prop. 64 limited standing under the FAL to governmental entities and plaintiffs who had lost money or property as a result of violations of the statute). Federal courts have interpreted Proposition 64 to require that a plaintiff bringing a cause of action under the FAL must allege reliance on the false advertising as an element of the claim.
Filed November 21, 2008
Indeed, Plaintiff’s standing to bring suit under Section 17200 is contingent on the injury she allegedly experienced as a result of clicking on the AdWords advertisement. Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan, 39 Cal. 4th 235, 241 (Cal. 2006) (standing under Section 17200 requires “injury in fact”). 6 Plaintiff argues her Section 17200 claim constitutes an “enforcement” of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) and thus falls outside of Section 230.