Bram v. United States

12 Citing briefs

  1. USA v. Robson et al

    MEMORANDUM in Support

    Filed July 17, 2015

    or to refuse to answer” the FCA’s questions, their statements to the FCA constitute compelled testimony. Id.; Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies extraterritorially, and that a violation of that privilege occurred when foreign authorities coerced a confession from an individual suspected of having committed a crime): see also United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa. 320 F.3d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Amendment voluntariness analysis to statements made to foreign law enforcement agents and finding those statements admissible only if voluntary); United States v. YouseJ 327 F.3d 56, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003) (where defendant is questioned by foreign police without the right to remain silent, the Fifth Amendment precludes the use of the defendant’s statements, unless they were offered voluntarily).

  2. The People, Appellant,v.Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed September 18, 2014

    The privilege against self-incrimination guarantees that no confession that has been extracted by threats or violence, direct or implied, or coerced may be admitted at trial. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 ( 1897) . It “serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”

  3. The People, Appellant,v.Eugene Polhill, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed September 18, 2014

    The privilege against self-incrimination guarantees that no confession that has been extracted by threats or violence, direct or implied, or coerced may be admitted at trial. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 ( 1897) . It “serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”

  4. The People, Appellant,v.Jermaine Dunbar, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed September 18, 2014

    The privilege against self-incrimination guarantees that no confession that has been extracted by threats or violence, direct or implied, or coerced may be admitted at trial. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 ( 1897) . It “serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”

  5. PEOPLE v. CASE

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed June 14, 2013

    As shown bytheauthorities cited in appellant’s openingbrief, it has long been held thatit is unlawful for officials to extract a statement “by any direct or implied promises, howeverslight.” (Bram v. United States (1987) 168 U.S. 532, 542-543; AOB 81-82.) The record showsthat at the very outset, appellant unequivocally and unambiguously refused to talk about the sole subject of the interrogation.

  6. PEOPLE v. CASE

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed April 11, 2011

    A statement is also involuntary whenit has been “extracted by any sort of threats...” (Hutto v. Ross (1976) 429 U.S. 28, 30.) Officials may not extract a confession “by any sort of threats or violence, nor... by any direct or implied promises, howeverslight, nor by the exertion of any improperinfluence.” (Bram v. United States (1897) 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, quoted in Malloy, supra, 378 U.S. at p. 7.) “[I]n carrying outtheir interrogations the police must also avoid threats of punishmentfor the '® (...continued) coercive.

  7. PEOPLE v. SPENCER

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed December 19, 2010

    A confession must “not be extracted by any sort ofthreats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion ofany improperinfluence.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (quoting Bram v. United States (1897) 168 U.S. 532, 542-43) (emphasis added). “The use in a criminal prosecution of a confession, admission or statement which is obtained by force, fear, promise of immunity or reward is a denial ofthe state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process of law.”

  8. PEOPLE v. LINTON (DANIEL A.)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 12, 2009

    (SSCT 4) Almost immediately, the police and district attorney interrogators repeated the false assurance that appellant faced no criminal exposure for any prior incident with Melissa, rendering in admissible his subsequent comments, admissions, and ultimate confession. (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611-612, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672, overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 510, fn. 17, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037; see also Bram v. United States (1897) 168 U.S. 532, 542-543, cited with approval in Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 753-754.) At the same time, the authorities began to conflate what Melissa’s parents had told them about a nightmare two months earlier, with the sleepwalking incident appellant described as having occurred twoor three weeksearlier: Stotz: “Okay,... like I said, you’re not going to get in trouble for what happened two weeks ago, okay? Linton: Whynot? Stotz: Well becauselike I told you last night, that’s that’s water underthe bridge.

  9. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 17, 2005

    U.S. CONST., AMDT. 5. See Bram v. United States (1897) 168 U.S. 532. The Supreme Court recognized the Clause’s applicability to state cases in Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1. It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to 140 refuse to testify against himself at a criminaltrial in which he is a defendant, but also “privileges him not to answerofficial questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”

  10. PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (COREY)

    Respondent's Brief

    Filed June 25, 2010

    Having failed to secure a ruling on the voluntariness issue, or renew the claim in his motion for new trial, appellant has forfeited his claim for purposes of appeal. Assuming, arguendo, appellant did not forfeit the claim, his claim fails because his confession was voluntary. There are two federal constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary before it can be admitted into evidence: (1) the Fifth Amendmentright against self-incrimination (see, e.g., Bram v. United States (1897) 168 U.S. 532, 542); and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U.S. 278).° (Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 433.) Byits text, the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment(Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 12), protects an individual from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’ (U.S. Const., amend. V). “The due process protection stems from the principle that ‘tactics for eliciting inculpatory statements mustfall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of fundamental fairness.’