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Boyce v. General Railway Signal, Co.

United States District Court, W.D. New York
Jun 10, 2004
No. 99-CV-6225T (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 10, 2004)

Opinion

No. 99-CV-6225T.

June 10, 2004


DECISION ORDER


PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By order dated November 3, 2003, the above-captioned matter has been referred to the undersigned for the supervision of pre-trial discovery, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(A) and (B). (Docket # 34). Currently pending is defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docket # 38). On January 30, 2004, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), for purposes of rendering a decision on the defendant's motion to dismiss. (Docket # 37).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 28, 1999, plaintiff David Boyce (hereinafter "Boyce"), filed a Complaint in the above-captioned matter alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (Docket # 1). Boyce contends that his former employer, General Railway Signal Company, currently known as Alstom Signaling, Inc., discriminated against him on the basis of his gender. Specifically, Boyce contends that he was harassed and denied promotions due to the length of his hair, and that female employees were not subjected to similar grooming standards. (Docket # 1). According to Boyce, on several occasions management informed him that he "that [he] would not be promoted due to [his] hair length." (Docket # 1).

Boyce's Complaint further asserts that on July 4, 1996, he suffered a nervous breakdown caused by the discrimination he endured due to his hair length. As a result of his condition, Boyce was admitted into Parkridge Hospital and has been diagnosed as totally disabled due to his condition. Boyce also claims that he continues to suffer mental and physical pains every day. (Docket # 1).

This action does not, however, include claims for unlawful termination or discrimination based upon his disability. On July 22, 1999, Boyce filed a separate action, 99-CV-6312T, against defendant and co-defendant Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. That complaint was dismissed by United States District Judge Michael A. Telesca on December 22, 1999. The only claim raised by Boyce in the instant case is for gender discrimination based upon hair length. (Docket # 1).

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Boyce's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docket # 38). According to defendant, even if plaintiff's factual allegations are true, allegations based upon a male employee's hair length do not give rise to a sustainable claim under Title VII. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted. A. Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6): When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and take all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Miree v. DeKalb Co., Georgia, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2 (1977); 2 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.34[1][b], p. 12-58; Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Legal conclusions, deductions or opinions are not afforded the same presumption. Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1995); Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (quoted in Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992)).

Additionally, a pro se complaint must be read liberally and should not be dismissed without granting leave to amend "when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoted in Winston v. Coughlin, 789 F. Supp. 118, 119 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)). B. Boyce's Title VII Claim: For purposes of the pending motion, this Court assumes, as it must, that Boyce was in fact discriminated against by defendant for having long hair. The question remaining is whether discrimination based upon a male employee's hair length gives rise to an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a question which the Second Circuit has expressly answered in the negative.

Boyce filed his Complaint in this matter pro se on May 28, 1999. On July 11, 2003, the case was administratively closed because Boyce filed for bankruptcy protection. See In re David Boyce, 97-23957N (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.). Upon the conclusion of his bankruptcy proceedings, Boyce filed a pro se motion dated July 29, 2003, seeking to reopen this case. Finding that the interest in this suit was abandoned by the Bankruptcy Trustee, United States District Judge Telesca granted Boyce's motion to reopen and appointed Matthew Fusco as counsel. (Docket # 33).

In a case directly on point, Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229 (1997), the Second Circuit held that an employer's policy requiring male, but not female, employees to have short hair did not violate Title VII. In that case, the plaintiff was terminated for failing to comply with a male hair-length policy. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the policy discriminated on the basis of gender because it imposed no similar restriction on female employees. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit affirmed, reiterating its earlier decision in Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976), in which it held that "requiring short hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII." Id. at 908; see also Sietz v. O'Connor, 1995 WL 745012, *2 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing complaint of gender discrimination based upon hair-length policy for men); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding policy that prohibited employees from wearing an all-braided hair style); Klotzbach v. Callaway, 473 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (grooming policy for male national guard technicians did not violate equal protection).

As noted by the court in Tavora, every other federal court of appeals that has considered the issue of male hair-length policies has upheld such policy, finding either that the policy did not conflict with the statutory goal of equal employment or that it had only a de minimis effect on employment opportunities. Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (different hair length and styling policies for men and women employees did not constitute gender discrimination); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) ("sex-differentiated hair length regulation that is not utilized as a pretext to exclude either sex from employment does not constitute an unlawful employment practice as defined by Title VII"); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) ("minor differences in personal appearance regulations that reflect customary modes of grooming do not constitute sex discrimination"); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) ("a hiring policy that distinguishes [between men and women based upon] grooming codes or length of hair is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business than to equality of employment opportunity); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974) ("a private employer may require male employees to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such does not constitute an unfair employment practice"), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Title VII was never intended to encompass sexual classifications having only an insignificant effect on employment opportunities").

In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, Boyce contends that those courts — including the Second Circuit — which have previously considered this question have decided it incorrectly. This Court, however, is of course bound by Second Circuit president, see Christ the Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert, 644 F.Supp. 1490, 1496, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("federal district court is bound by the rule of the circuit in which it is located"), aff'd, 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987), and thus I find that Boyce's allegation of discrimination based upon hair length does not constitute a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.

Boyce also argues that a cause of action is established in this case pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). (Docket # 39). This Court disagrees. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court articulated the standard to be applied in a mixed-motive case in which an adverse employment decision is based upon both legitimate and illegitimate motives. Here, Boyce has not submitted any evidence to suggest that defendant was motivated, even in part, by a desire to deny employment opportunities to male employees. Indeed, in Tavora, 101 F.3d at 907 — a decision issued seven years after Price Waterhouse — the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that Title VII applied to "any employment policy with any difference between men and women, no matter how trivial" and found that a hair-length policy did not significantly affect the plaintiff's terms of employment. Id. at 908.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is my Decision and Order that defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Docket # 38) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Boyce v. General Railway Signal, Co.

United States District Court, W.D. New York
Jun 10, 2004
No. 99-CV-6225T (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 10, 2004)
Case details for

Boyce v. General Railway Signal, Co.

Case Details

Full title:DAVID A. BOYCE, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL RAILWAY SIGNAL, CO., Defendant

Court:United States District Court, W.D. New York

Date published: Jun 10, 2004

Citations

No. 99-CV-6225T (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 10, 2004)

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