In an effort to satisfy his pleading requirements, the plaintiff provided two allegations. The first simply parroted this statutory language, thus running afoul of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) andAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff also alleged that Lyft used equipment that has the capacity to send messages without human intervention.
 For a helpful analysis, see B. Feldman & I Salceda, “After Cyan: Some Prognostications,” available athttps://www.dandodiary.com/2018/03/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-cyan-prognostications/.  550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
P. 8(a) still requires “a short and plain statement of the claim,” the Supreme Court’s rulings in Iqbal and Twombly effectively overruled the decades-old interpretation of the federal pleading standard announced in Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41 (1957). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twobly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).Ohio Civ. R. 8(a); Wells Fargo Bank,N.A. v. Horn, 142 Ohio St.3d 416, 2015-Ohio-1484, 31 N.E.3d 637, ¶ 13.
Otherwise, “a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim [would] be allowed to take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”Id., at *1 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)) (internal citations omitted).
In 2007, however, the U.S. Supreme Court changed the existing interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court adopted a more strict, "plausibility" standard. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court provided guidance as to how lower courts should apply the Twombly test: "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions…Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
It may be that these decisions’ release dates might have something to do with busy judges putting off these time-consuming decisions to the end of the year, but wanting to get them out before they became part of year-end unresolved case statistics. But that would only be a guess.In any event, major decisions have recently come down at the federal level from the 3rd and 11th Circuits, and on the state level from Florida’s 4th District Court of Appeal.The 4th DCA’s decision in MYD Marine Distributor, Inc. v. International Paint Ltd. (released on December 14, 2011) takes on the U.S. Supreme Court’s major decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which requires plaintiffs pleading claims based on antitrust conspiracies to include detailed factual allegations supporting the assertion that the defendants entered into an unlawful agreement, and Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), which set down standards for pleading that a conspiracy harmed competition. The 4th DCA held that both decisions apply to cases filed in Florida state court asserting claims under the Florida Antitrust law.
At the pleading stage, the plaintiffs’ factual allegations must ‘cross the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
McLain appealed.In reviewing the district court’s decision last week, the Fourth Circuit reiterated Twombly’s familiar teaching that, “to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient ‘facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” McLain, No. 14-1816 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court then confirmed that, “[i]n this context, ‘Rule 9(b) requires that an FCA plaintiff must, at a minimum, describe the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.
In a seminal pair of decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim to relief “that is plausible on its face.” Neither Twombly nor Iqbal addressed, however, whether this “plausibility” standard also applies to denials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b).
The defendants argued, therefore, that the facts as pleaded failed to raise an inference that the product was ineffective for its advertised purpose. In short, the complaint failed to comply with the minimum federal pleading standard as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).Whether the studies cited by the plaintiff were accurate or not, the Court noted that Mr. Toback’s complaint failed to address the efficacy (or non-efficacy) of the product as a whole or the many other ingredients contained in the product.