Bedroc Ltd. v. United States

19 Citing briefs

  1. United States of America, ex rel Michael J. Fisher v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

    REPLY to Response to Motion re MOTION for Summary Judgment / Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Under Public Disclosure Bar

    Filed February 22, 2019

    Even if there were such a practice, it could not trump the FCA’s plain and unambiguous language—courts must “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992), so the “inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous,” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). But of course there is no such counter-textual practice.

  2. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Price et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 8, 2017

    “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires [courts] to presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). And courts must “read[] the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute.”

  3. Electronic Frontier Foundation v. United States Department of Justice

    Cross MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed October 13, 2016

    When the text’s plain meaning is unambiguous, the inquiry ends and the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute’s terms. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004). 8 Section 402 contains an exception to the public disclosure requirement that allows the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to waive the requirement if the DNI makes a determination that public disclosure would harm national security.

  4. Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T Mobility LLC

    RESPONSE

    Filed February 4, 2015

    Case3:14-cv-04785-EMC Document33 Filed02/04/15 Page16 of 34 Opp. to Motion to Dismiss – 14-cv-04785-EMC Page 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (1984) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). In the same vein, the Court may “presume that ‘Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.

  5. Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc.

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION for Reconsideration re Order on Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 2, 2014

    Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 158 L. Ed. 2d 338 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Reviewing this statute, we conclude that the statutory text is clear and unambiguous.”

  6. First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles et al v. National Security Agency et al

    MOTION to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed December 6, 2013

    Section 215 authorizes the FISC to order “production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). The meaning of the word “tangible,” as understood at the time the statute was enacted, see BedRoc, Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004); cf. Pls.’ Mem.

  7. Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc.

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION for Summary Judgment Yahoo! Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed September 13, 2013

    Id. (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 158 L. Ed. 2d 338 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Reviewing this statute, we conclude that the statutory text is clear and unambiguous.

  8. Oregon Restaurant and Lodging Association et al v. United States Department of Labor

    Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment 25 , and Response in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 26 . Oral Argument requested.

    Filed November 16, 2012

    B. The Legislative History Of Section 3(m) Confirms The Clear Congressional Intent Not To Restrict Tip Pooling When An Employer Takes No Tip Credit Where, as here, a statute is not ambiguous or its meaning is discernable in light of canons of construction, a court should not resort to examining legislative history. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 117-18 (2001); see also BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 186 (2004) (a court has no occasion to resort to legislative history absent a statutory ambiguity). Given the unambiguous language of section 3(m), it is not necessary to resort to legislative history.

  9. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GARCIA

    Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 12, 2012

    Whenthe statutory ‘languageis plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 399not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.291, 296 (2006) (citation omitted); BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 229-230 (Cal. 1973). The District Court agreedin the instant action, stating “the statute [section 56041] is clear enough on its face that the Court [need] not reach the legislative history.”

  10. Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp et al

    MEMORANDUM

    Filed November 18, 2009

    Analysis of the plain meaning of the statute thus demonstrates its meaning, and the Court need not examine legislative history or other extrinsic sources to glean any further intent. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 186. However, two courts in other jurisdictions have examined this statute and reached the opposite conclusion.