Filed February 22, 2019
Even if there were such a practice, it could not trump the FCA’s plain and unambiguous language—courts must “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992), so the “inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous,” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). But of course there is no such counter-textual practice.
Filed May 8, 2017
“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires [courts] to presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). And courts must “read[] the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute.”
Filed October 13, 2016
When the text’s plain meaning is unambiguous, the inquiry ends and the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute’s terms. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004). 8 Section 402 contains an exception to the public disclosure requirement that allows the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to waive the requirement if the DNI makes a determination that public disclosure would harm national security.
Filed February 4, 2015
Case3:14-cv-04785-EMC Document33 Filed02/04/15 Page16 of 34 Opp. to Motion to Dismiss – 14-cv-04785-EMC Page 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (1984) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). In the same vein, the Court may “presume that ‘Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.
Filed May 2, 2014
Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 158 L. Ed. 2d 338 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Reviewing this statute, we conclude that the statutory text is clear and unambiguous.”
Filed December 6, 2013
Section 215 authorizes the FISC to order “production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). The meaning of the word “tangible,” as understood at the time the statute was enacted, see BedRoc, Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004); cf. Pls.’ Mem.
Filed September 13, 2013
Id. (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 158 L. Ed. 2d 338 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Reviewing this statute, we conclude that the statutory text is clear and unambiguous.
Filed November 16, 2012
B. The Legislative History Of Section 3(m) Confirms The Clear Congressional Intent Not To Restrict Tip Pooling When An Employer Takes No Tip Credit Where, as here, a statute is not ambiguous or its meaning is discernable in light of canons of construction, a court should not resort to examining legislative history. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 117-18 (2001); see also BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 186 (2004) (a court has no occasion to resort to legislative history absent a statutory ambiguity). Given the unambiguous language of section 3(m), it is not necessary to resort to legislative history.
Filed July 12, 2012
Whenthe statutory ‘languageis plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 399not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.291, 296 (2006) (citation omitted); BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 229-230 (Cal. 1973). The District Court agreedin the instant action, stating “the statute [section 56041] is clear enough on its face that the Court [need] not reach the legislative history.”
Filed November 18, 2009
Analysis of the plain meaning of the statute thus demonstrates its meaning, and the Court need not examine legislative history or other extrinsic sources to glean any further intent. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 186. However, two courts in other jurisdictions have examined this statute and reached the opposite conclusion.