Becerra
v.
State

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Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, HoustonFeb 7, 2008
No. 01-06-00840-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 7, 2008)

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No. 01-06-00840-CR

Opinion issued February 7, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 23rd District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 50,848.

Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, HIGLEY.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


Appellant, Hector Becerra, Jr., was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. In his sole appellate point, appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.

Ineffective Assistance

A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed punishment at 40-years confinement. On appeal, appellant claims that, based on the totality of the representation, his trial counsel was ineffective.

Standard of Review

In considering whether counsel's assistance was so ineffective that a reversal of the conviction is warranted, we follow the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Under the Strickland standard, we determine (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

Analysis

We need not address the merits of his ineffective assistance claim, because appellant has failed to specifically address prejudice under Strickland's second prong. The only parts in his brief which arguably bear on prejudice are statements that the prejudicial effects of the elicited testimony are "unmeasured," "disastrous," and "overwhelming," and that, in his closing argument, "counsel acknowledges that the prior allegations are damning to the defense without acknowledging that he is the one that [sic] put them in front of the jury." These assertions, however, are not proof that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Failure to provide proof of prejudice precludes relief. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). We therefore overrule appellant's issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.