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Beaver v. Berryhill

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION
Dec 28, 2018
C/A No. 2:17-cv-02586-MGL-MGB (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2018)

Opinion

C/A No. 2:17-cv-02586-MGL-MGB

12-28-2018

TERRY BEAVER, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Terry Beaver ("Plaintiff"), brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration regarding his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends the Court affirm the Commissioner's decision.

RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff initially filed applications for DIB and SSI on July 14, 2008, alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2008. (R. at 123-33.) Plaintiff claimed disability due to limited use of his left hand, as the result of a stroke, and a seizure disorder. (R. at 149.) Plaintiff has a limited education and past relevant work as a millwright, a pipefitter, and a set up person. (R. at 551.)

Plaintiff's application was denied initially on June 10, 2010. (R. at 15-23.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Beaver v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., D.S.C. Civil Action No. 2:12-1810-MGL. On August 12, 2013, the District Court remanded the action for further proceedings consistent with its Order (R. at 657-71); Beaver, No. 2:12-cv-1810-MGL. Following the District Court's Order, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's June 10, 2010 decision and remanded the matter to the ALJ. (R. at 672-75.)

In the interim, Plaintiff filed a subsequent SSI application on September 7, 2010, amending his alleged disability onset date to August 14, 2012. (R. at 535.) On October 1, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was "disabled" as of August 14, 2012, the amended alleged onset date. (R. at 652-56.) The Appeals Council did not disturb the favorable decision with respect to Plaintiff's subsequent claim for SSI, but instructed the ALJ to adjudicate the issue of disability from July 1, 2008, the initial alleged onset date, through August 13, 2012. (R. at 674.)

On July 25, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined in the Act from July 1, 2008 through August 13, 2012 (R. at 680-95). On February 2, 2016, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review and remanded the case to back to the ALJ. (R. at 701-04.) On August 3, 2016, the ALJ held a second hearing at which a vocational expert again testified. (R. at 560-74.) On September 16, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act between July 1, 2008, and August 13, 2012. (R. at 535-52.) On August 14, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (R. at 510-12), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.

In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:

(1) The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act from July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2009.

(2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 1, 2008, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

(3) The claimant has the following medically determinable severe impairment: status post cerebrovascular accident (CVA) with residual left arm/hand weakness (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

(4) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he could only use his left non-dominant hand to occasionally lift no more than 10 pounds, to finger, to feel, to manage hand controls, and to push and pull. He had no restriction on the use of his right, dominant hand. He could never climb ladders, tolerate exposure to unprotected heights or to dangerous machinery. He could have no exposure to extreme heat or to outside work.

(6) The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

(7) The claimant was born on July 13, 1960 and was 47 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date. On July 13, 2012 the claimant changed age category to closely approaching advanced age (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

(8) The claimant has at least a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

(9) Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because the Medical-Vocational Rules support a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

(10) Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

(11) The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 1, 2008, through August 13, 2012, the period at issue (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(R. at 535-52.)

APPLICABLE LAW

The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). "Disability" is defined in the Act as the inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than" twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of "disability" to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (DIB context); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (SSI context). If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1981).

A plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act if he can return to past relevant work as it is customarily performed in the economy or as the claimant actually performed the work. See SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his inability to work within the meaning of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); He must make a prima facie showing of disability by showing that he is unable to return to his past relevant work. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).

Once an individual has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden is on the Commissioner to come forward with evidence that the plaintiff can perform alternative work and that such work exists in the national economy. See Monroe, 826 F.3d at 180. The Commissioner may carry the burden of demonstrating the existence of jobs available in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform despite the existence of impairments which prevent the return to past relevant work by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Id.

The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the findings of the Commissioner "are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied." Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires the court to uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance." Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court does] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ]," not on the reviewing court. Id. However, "[a] factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law." Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find him disabled. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ "failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence" of two physicians, Dr. Carol Kooistra and Dr. Petra Warren. (Dkt. No. 11 at 14.) Plaintiff argues that these physicians "provided consistent opinions that [Plaintiff] was limited to sedentary work," and the ALJ failed to properly consider these opinions when finding that Plaintiff's RFC was limited to light work, rather than sedentary work. (Id. at 14-17.)

Under the regulations of the Social Security Administration, the Commissioner is obligated to consider all medical evidence and the opinions of medical sources, including treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. The regulation, known as the "Treating Physician Rule," imposes a duty on the Commissioner to "evaluate every medical opinion we receive." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). The medical opinion of a treating physician is entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, "[b]y negative implication, if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. "Under such circumstances, the ALJ holds the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178.). The regulations recognize that the nature and extent of the treatment relationship may also affect the weight afforded by an ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). Opinions by physicians regarding the ultimate issue of whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the SSA are not given controlling weight because the decision on that issue is reserved to the Commissioner alone. Id. at § 416.927(d).

The undersigned notes that the "Treating Physician Rule," which applies in the instant action, applies only to claims filed before March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c; see also Marshall v. Berryhill, Case No. 16-cv-00666-BAS-PCL, 2017 WL 2060658, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2017).

If the ALJ decides a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the following non-exclusive list of factors to determine the weight to afford the physician's opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examinations; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the evidence with which the physician supports his opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion; (5) whether the physician is a specialist in the area in which he is rendering an opinion; and (6) other factors that support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The Commissioner must provide specific reasons, supported by the record, for the weight afforded a treating physician's medical opinion. SSR 96-2p.

A. The ALJ Decision

In her decision, the ALJ discussed in exhaustive detail the available opinion evidence, including that of Dr. Kooistra and Dr. Warren. (R. at 546-51.) With respect to Dr. Koositra, the ALJ specifically recognized "her area of specialty is neurology." (R. at 546.) The ALJ discussed the evidence in the record detailing Dr. Kooistra's specific interactions with Plaintiff at Carolina Neurology: a diagnostic testing performed on September 15, 2010 and a "new patient visit" dated December 15, 2010. (R.at 546.) Plaintiff was initially referred to Carolina Neurology by his attorney "for an electromyogram and nerve conduction study of the upper extremity, based on his allegation of numbness and nerve tingling in his left arm and left leg." (R. at 543.) After quoting Dr. Kooistra's account of Plaintiff's medical history, the ALJ explained in detail why Dr. Kooistra's account was "inconsistent with the medical record." (R. at 546-47.) Upon a thorough review of the evidence in the record relevant to Dr. Kooistra, the ALJ made the following findings:

I can assign only partial weight to her opinion. While I assign some weight to her opinion that the claimant would be limited to occasional fine and gross manipulation, she does not specific [sic] which hand, and the record shows only left hand limitations. Both Dr. Warren and Ms. Suddeth observed left, but not right, manipulative limitations.

I assign no weight to her opinion that he is limited to sedentary work, because there is only minimal evidence of left leg limitation. When seen at SRMC on July 1, 2008, the claimant reported left leg numbness and weakness over one day. Examination, however, showed full strength in his bilateral lower extremities, and he denied any further change in numbness or weakness during his hospitalization. On discharge, he was referred to SRRS exclusively for left upper extremity strength and grip therapy (Ex. 1F). When seen there on July 15, 2008, the claimant said he had leg numbness and a fall ("sat down") on July 1, 2008 when his daughter found him and took him to the emergency room. While he did receive occupational therapy for his left upper extremity, there was no observation or treatment for any lower extremity problem, nor evidence of occasional falls. To the contrary, the claimant denied any lower extremity difficulty (Exs. 2F, 6F), and told Ms. Suddeth that he had no difficulty with steps, and had returned to driving. Ms. Suddeth concluded his only limits on return to work were his upper left extremity problems (Ex. 2F). Similarly, on September 30, 2008, Dr. Hutto-Bond stated that, other than a left hand control problem, the claimant had 'no current stroke symptoms.' Examination was normal other than decreased left hand grip strength, and there was no evidence of any musculoskeletal or neurological impairment (Ex. 3F). While on November 11, 2008 he complained of burning in his bilateral legs from hips to knees, he said it mainly occurred when on his feet. Examination showed normal reflexes and no weakness or decreased sensation in either lower extremity (Ex.12F). Similarly, examination at CFMC on December 2, 2008, showed no focal neurologic deficits and normal gait (Ex. 13F). When seen at Upstate Carolina on February 3, 2010, examination showed no motor or sensory deficit, normal lower extremities, and the claimant ambulated independently. He reported that he performed activities of daily living
independently (Ex. 15F). During both the March 11, 2010 hearing (Ex. 11B/10) and the April 13, 2010 supplemental hearing (Ex. 12B/7) the claimant testified that he had no problem with standing or walking. While on November 30, 2010 Dr. Slater observed a residual left upper extremity deficit, examination was otherwise normal (Ex. 16F.)

Notably, while all prior lower extremity examination had been normal, during Dr. Kooistra's examination on December 15, 2010 the claimant exhibited increased tone in the left lower extremity, with 4+/5 weakness of the left leg in a pyramidal distribution, slowed fine motor rapid alternating movements, and foot tapping on the left. Reflexes were brisker on the left with a left extensor response. Gait testing demonstrated reduced stride length on the left with mild circumduction and reduced left arm swing. 'He is mildly unstable on turns and tandem gait is moderately affected.' She diagnosed 'late effect CVA—Hemiplegia. Gait abnormality' (Ex. 18F).

In contrast, during a subsequent examination on April 4, 2011, Dr. Cheng commented that while the claimant complained of 'a burning sensation on his anterior thighs after he stands for about an hour,' he nonetheless 'stands without moving for the entire duration.' Examination showed 'no tenderness on plapation of thighs, full range of motion of all joints. Sensation intact bilateral upper and lower extremities' (Ex. 19F).

While there is again no evidence of any additional visit or treatment, on August 14, 2012, almost two years after her examination, Dr. Kooistra completed another opinion, adding that the claimant would have problems standing and walking because of his right hemiparesis (Ex. 24F). But again, his SRMC stroke records specifically state that he had no lower extremity weakness, nor does the medical record establish any, other than his presentation during her single examination.
(R. at 546-548.)

Melissa Suddeth was Plaintiff's occupational therapist with Spartanburg Rehabilitation Services from July 2008 through October 2008. (R. at 541.)

SRMC stands for Spartanburg Regional Medical Center.

SSRS stands for Spartanburg Regional Rehabilitation Services.

CFMC stands for Center for Family Medicine Chesnee.

Dr. Jack Cheng treated Plaintiff at CFMC in 2011 and diagnosed Plaintiff with seizure disorder. (R. at 545.)

With respect to the opinion of Dr. Warren, the ALJ similarly engaged in a detailed analysis of Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. The ALJ noted that Dr. Warren saw Plaintiff three times between November 2008 and August 2009 at the Center for Family Medicine Chesnee (CFMC) and that Plaintiff was "primarily treated by resident physicians, whose work [Dr. Warren] reviewed." (R. at 548.) In assigning "no weight" to Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff was restricted to sedentary work, the ALJ noted the "persuasive contradictory evidence" in the record:

For example, while she restricted him to sedentary work, when seen in her office on September 30, 2008 for a CVA follow up, the claimant specifically denied any current stroke symptoms other than a left hand control deficit (Ex. 3F). While she stated, "he sometimes complained of a burning sensation on his anterior thigh," when she examined him on November 11, 2008 she documented this complaint, as well as her own observation of 'no weakness or decrease sensation both lower extremities' (Ex. 12F). While on November 24, 2009 the claimant reported that the 'tingling on the anterior aspect of his right thigh' improved off Pravastatin, other than decreased grip strength on the left, examination was normal (Ex. 12F). On December 2, 2008 his physical examination, including extremities, was normal, with a normal gait. 'No focal neurologic deficits' (Ex. 13F). Examination on August 7, 2009 was again normal except for 'decreased strength in fingers of left hand' (Ex. 14F). There was no further mention of a burning sensation in his thigh until April 4, 2011, when Dr. Cheng's examination showed 'no tenderness on palpation of thighs, full range of motion of all joints. Sensation intact bilateral upper and lower extremities, but residual weakness on left side, more so in upper extremity' (Ex. 19F). While Dr. Warren stated he 'also had seizure disorder most probably related to the residuals of his strokes,' her office records show this condition was controlled by medication (Dilantin), consistent with the claimant's testimony (Ex. 19F). Thus, her restriction to sedentary work either because of CVA residuals or seizures is unsupported, and I can assign it no weight.
(R. at 549.)

The ALJ proceeded to assign "controlling weight" as to Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff "should not work around dangerous machinery or hazardous conditions," finding this opinion to be reasonable given Plaintiff's history of stroke and seizures. (R. at 549.) Likewise, the ALJ assigned controlling weight to Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff "would not be able to use his left hand any more than occasionally during the work day," finding this opinion to be reasonable based on Dr. Warren's clinical observations of impaired grip strength and similar observations by other physicians. (R. at 549.) The ALJ incorporated these opinions into her RFC finding.

B. Analysis

Here, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting these physicians' opinions that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that "the record clearly shows a mix of positive and negative findings" as to Plaintiff's ability to perform sedentary work, and that the ALJ failed to provide "any explanation for choosing negative findings over the positive findings." (Dkt. No. 11 at 16.) Plaintiff also relies on the recent case, Hill v. Berryhill, Case No. 0:15-cv-05091-JMC, 2017 WL 2703971 (D.S.C. June 23, 2017), to argue that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinion evidence. (Dkt. No. 13 at 5.)

In Hill, the district court considered the claimant's allegation that the ALJ erred in his RFC analysis both in his "one-sided" descriptions of the treatment notes and in his failure "to explain how the treatment notes in the record and Plaintiff's reports of his daily activities related to his subjective statements of pain and other symptoms." Id. at *4-5. The district court found that the decision recently issued by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2017), was potentially applicable to Hill. Hill, 2017 WL 2703971, at *6-7. Specifically, the district court noted that the Lewis decision

underscored two principles regarding an ALJ's RFC assessment under the two-step analysis set out above. First, . . . "'[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.'" Id. at *8 (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)). . . . Second, . . . when assessing a claimant's subjective claims of pain or other symptoms, if an ALJ relies on the results of objective medical examinations reported in a treatment note to find that the claimant's claims are inconsistent with those results, the ALJ must explain how those results are inconsistent with the claims.
Hill, 2017 WL 2703971, at *6. The court then recommitted the case to the magistrate judge for consideration of "Plaintiff's arguments in the first instance in light of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Lewis." Id. at *7.

Plaintiff argues that here, as in Hill, the ALJ "cherry-picked the records." (Dkt. No. 13 at 5.) In support, Plaintiff contends that the prior ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary work when considering whether Plaintiff was disabled from his amended onset disability date of August 14, 2012, and he relied on a consultative examination from 2010 and Dr. Kooistra's August 14, 2012 opinion to do so. (Dkt. No. 11 at 16; R. at 654.) The ALJ, however, expressly noted the prior ALJ's finding that "as of August 14, 2012, [Plaintiff's] CVA symptomatology limited him to sedentary work." (R. at 539.) The ALJ found, however, that "the prior record does not" support finding Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work during the period at issue: from July 1, 2008 through August 13, 2012. (R. at 535, 539.) While it appears that both ALJs may have considered some of the same records and come to different conclusions, that does not, in itself, mean the ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinion evidence in this instance. The prior ALJ's decision, highlighted by Plaintiff, consists of less than one page of analysis devoted to his RFC finding. (R. at 654.) In contrast, the ALJ here devoted over eleven pages to his analysis of Plaintiff's RFC. (R. at 539-50.) In addition, the ALJs were responsible for determining whether Plaintiff was disabled during different time periods.

Here, Plaintiff is referring to ALJ Paul C. Armitage's decision dated October 1, 2012, in which he found Plaintiff was disabled from August 14, 2012 through the date of his decision. (R. at 652.) --------

Plaintiff offers no other specific examples of "cherry-picked" evidence by the ALJ, and the undersigned finds no reason to remand on this basis. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the ALJ provided detailed, concrete reasons to reject the opinion evidence at issue, as demonstrated above. For example, the ALJ highlighted the evidence in the record indicating that "there is only minimal evidence of left leg limitation." (R. at 547.) The ALJ further cited evidence indicating that Plaintiff's residual stroke symptoms did not appear to significantly limit Plaintiff's lower extremities. (R. at 549.) While Plaintiff argues that there is evidence in the record to support the opinions of Dr. Kooistra and Dr. Warren that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work, such reweighing of the evidence is not within the province of this Court. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a reviewing court should not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the opinion evidence.

CONCLUSION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/_________

MARY GORDON BAKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE December 28, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina


Summaries of

Beaver v. Berryhill

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION
Dec 28, 2018
C/A No. 2:17-cv-02586-MGL-MGB (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2018)
Case details for

Beaver v. Berryhill

Case Details

Full title:TERRY BEAVER, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the…

Court:DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Date published: Dec 28, 2018

Citations

C/A No. 2:17-cv-02586-MGL-MGB (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2018)