.The facts in this case are substantially different from those in Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). In Vernonia, the Court upheld a school board policy that required public high school students to consent to suspicionless drug testing in order to participate in the school district’s athletics programs.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawotomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983). The existence of a less intrusive means does not itself render a search or seizure unreasonable.
)Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.)Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-653 (1995) (typically, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on “special needs,” which are those needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement.)Bd. of Edn. of Indep. School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (random drug testing of students who participate in certain extracurricular activities is justifiable when applying a balancing test that weighs the importance of the government’s interest and the efficacy of the search policy in furthering that interest against the nature of the privacy interest involved and the intrusiveness of the search.)Merit DecisionExecutive SummaryIn this day and age, a public school policy of searching unattended bags furthers the compelling state interest in protecting students.
The only way to make sense of this mess is to interpret the use of “corporation” in Section 171 as not referring to the term as defined in Section 162.Supreme Court PearlsAs a follow up to yesterday’s post, the statement regarding divorce can be found in California Court of Appeal Justice William Bedsworth’s opinion in Laborde v. Aronson, 92 Cal. App. 4th 459 (2001). The statement regarding tailoring can be found in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 852 (U.S. 2002). The statement regarding raisins was made in Chief Justice John Roberts in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 192 L. Ed. 2d 388 (U.S. 2015).
The School Board has an obligation to provide a safe environment for its students. See, e.g., Va. Code § 22.1-279.6 (school boards will have “policies on alcohol and drugs, vandalism, trespassing, threats, search and seizure, disciplining of students with disabilities, intentional injury of others”) (emphasis added); 8 VAC 20-131-260 (requiring schools to have procedures “for responding to violent, disruptive or illegal activities by students on school property or during a school sponsored activity” as part of their program for student safety); compare Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (2002) (“the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children”) (citation omitted). The School Board’s enforcement of its policy against fighting in this case “furthers the district’s legitimate interest in maintaining a safe environment and is rationally related to that interest.”