First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case "by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." 476 U.S., at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). [FN4] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the "burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion" by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
Finding that Soria has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny the COA."Relying on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), Soria asserts that the state trial court's refusal to require the prosecutor to provide racially neutral explanations for peremptorily challenging two Hispanic venire members resulted in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To evaluate a Batson claim, we look to the following framework: (1) the petitioner must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory strikes on the basis of race; (2) the burden of production then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for challenging the venire member; and (3) finally, the trial court must decide whether the petitioner has sustained his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
The Equal Protection Clause protects a criminal defendant against "purposeful racial discrimination" in the selection of his venire. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). "As in any equal protection case, the burden is, of course, on the [criminal] defendant who alleges discriminatory selection . . . to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination."
The trial court denied Miller-El's request for a new jury, and his trial ended with a conviction and the imposition of the death sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court released Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), holding that discrimination by a prosecutor on the basis of race in selecting a defendant's jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment. On remand, the trial court found no showing that prospective African-American jurors were struck because of their race.
The first is that the Florida Supreme Court did not engage in proper sentencing-factor reweighing or harmless-error analysis after striking aggravating factors, thus contravening the Eighth Amendment principles enunciated (for instance) in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2123 (1992). The second is that the prosecution exercised race-based peremptory strikes, thus entitling King to a new sentencing hearing under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986)."A. Sochor ClaimThe State argues, and we agree, that a procedural default bars this claim.
State v. Courtney J. James, 2014AP2230-CR, District 1, 8/25/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)The prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike to remove an African-American from the jury did not violate Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), because none of the three parts of the Batson are satisfied in this case.To succeed on a Batson claim, a defendant first must make a prima facie case that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was solely race-based.State v. Lamon, 2003 WI 78, ¶28, 262 Wis. 2d 747, 664 N.W.2d 607.
Question presented:Did the Georgia courts err in failing to recognize race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case?Lower court opinion: Foster v. Humphrey, 1989-V-2275 (Butts Co., GA, Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2013) (no link available)DocketScotusblog pageThis will be an important case, even though the circumstances are extraordinary. Briefly, at Foster’s capital murder trial the prosecutor struck all four black prospective jurors, providing about a dozen “race neutral” reasons for the strikes.
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005):"[T]he rule in [*8] Batson provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. 476 U.S., at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.  at 339, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 [(2003)]. It is true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 106, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J., concurring), and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is.
Rosales was tried in 1985. The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), which is central to a decision in this case, was decided in 1986. Rosales' case on direct appeal was decided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1992.
App. E at 2-4. But the sole authority cited for this rule was Matthews v. State, 768 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), a case decided nine years after Mr. Banks’ trial holding (for the first time) that claims based upon Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) would be treated as defaulted in the absence of a trial objection. It relied upon no case pre-dating Mr. Banks’ trial placing trial counsel on notice that a Swain claim would be defaulted if not raised at trial.