When his trial began on December 1, 2008, he asked the trial judge to address his motion to dismiss. Rather than analyze the speedy-trial issue by applying the Barker v. Wingo factors, the trial judge provided the following dismissive remarks: Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). THE COURT [Judge Tomie Green]: I’ll give you time to argue because I want us to hurry up and finish with this.
seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief in 2008AP2735-CRNM (summary order)Habeas Review – Speedy Trial Habeas relief denied on speedy trial challenge to 14-month delay between filing of complaint and scheduled start of trial, applying familar 4-part test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Although the first three aspects of the test work in West’s favor (length of, reason for, and assertion of right to, delay), his claim ultimately founders on the fourth part, actual prejudice:Thus, this case boils down to the fourth question: whether the delay prejudiced West.
According to Knox, "[h]ad the trial occurred eleven months earlier, Wilson would have been available to testify." He suggests that Wilson would have testified that Knox was working on a Motel 6 construction job in Richmond, Virginia on the date of the murders.InBarker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test for determining whether a defendant received a speedy trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. UnderBarker, a court must consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted his right; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.Id.
In May 2015, Tigano finally got the jury trial he had been requesting for nearly seven years, and was convicted on five of the six counts with which he was charged.The Sixth Amendment Analysis In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court held that the question whether a defendant’s speedy trial right has been violated must be resolved through a “difficult and sensitive balancing process,” which takes account of four principal factors: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” 407 U.S. 514, 516 (1972). The Second Circuit concluded that all four of these factors favored a conclusion that Tigano’s rights had been violated.First, as to length of delay, the Court noted that the seven-year lapse between Tigano’s arrest and his trial was, to its knowledge, “the longest delay recorded in the Sixth Amendment case law of our Circuit.”
. . . The prejudice analysis consists of three sub-factors: (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) impairment of defense—with the third sub-factor being the most significant. State v. Urdahl, 2005 WI App 191, ¶¶12, 26, 33, 34, 286 Wis. 2d 476, 704 N.W.2d 324 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).For all the details on who caused which part of the delay in this case, feel free to read ¶¶18-22 of the opinion.
Chester O’Quinn v. Tom Spiller, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-1836, 11/25/15The state appellate court reasonably applied Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the controlling Supreme Court precedent for Sixth Amendment speedy‐trial claims, when it rejected O’Quinn’s claim that the 42-month delay in holding his trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.The 42-month delay is presumptively prejudicial and thus triggered the full-blown Barker analysis, and O’Quinn asserted his speedy-trial right, so two of the four factors figure in O’Quinn’s favor. (Slip op.
Prejudice is assessed by considering pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the defendant, and impairment of the defendant’s ability to present a defense. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 532 (1972).Jahnke was arrested for OWI in March 2008 but was not charged until November 2010.
Jonathan Edward Boyer v. Louisiana, USSC 11-9953, 4/29/13United States Supreme Court order and opinions, dismissing, as improvidently granted, the writ of certiorari to review State v. Boyer, 56 So. 3d 1119 (La. Ct. App. 2011).As explained in our post on the grant of certiorari, the issue was whether and how the state’s failure to fund indigent defense should count against the state in analyzing the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). It took seven years to bring Boyer to trial.
It concluded Shepard's speedy trial rights were violated and dismissed the case. The State asks us to reverse and reinstate the prosecution since the statute of limitations has not yet run.In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the COA reviewed the case using the four factors from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The court held: 1) that the delay between arrest and the preliminary hearing was presumptively prejudicial; 2) that the delay was the result of the neglect of the State (and that the dismissals were actions to gain tactical advantage- so as to be successful in the prosecution); 3) that the defendant had asserted the claim at the preliminary hearing; and 4) that the defendant was prejudiced by the “time-consuming and costly” preparation that resulted from having three preliminary hearings.
Id. at *3 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972)). Mr. Seltzer, along with a co-defendant, David Ortego, was indicted on November 2, 2006, in federal court on charges of counterfeiting and felon in possession of a firearm.