Filed August 15, 2011
Maricopa County Med. Soc J;, 457 U.S. at 352 ("Even if a fee 12 schedule is therefore desirable, it is not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing"). 13 Third, Defendants assert that the Maximum Price Rules enhance output because ASRM chose to 14 pennit some compensation rather than bar payments entirely.
Filed December 2, 2013
¶¶470, 475. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 347-48 (medical foundation establishing a maximum fee schedule that doctors agreed to charge for services was price-fixing). It was well known by Insurer Conspirators that the industry standard was “HIAA 80%”.
Filed January 18, 2008
Such an assertion “indicates a misunderstanding of the per se concept.” Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle.
Filed March 3, 2016
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39 (1977). That standard, which is based on considerations of ‘business certainty and litigation efficiency,’ Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982), allows a court to presume that certain limited classes of conduct have an anticompetitive effect without engaging in the type of involved, market-specific analysis ordinarily necessary to reach such a conclusion. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (‘Certain categories of agreements, however, have been held to be per se illegal, dispensing with the need for case-by-case evaluation.’)
Filed March 2, 2009
Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 n.15, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (recognizing that a tying arrangement may be an unreasonable restraint on trade under Section 1). In particular, Section 1 encompasses unilateral tying arrangements where defendant agrees “‘to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchasers a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.
Filed August 6, 2008
The Court's joint venture cases have involved either scrutiny of the venture's formation, e.g., Timken, 341 U.S. 593, or scrutiny of a restraint on non-venture conduct or conduct in a market in which the venture owners remained in competition. E.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985); NCAA, 468 U.S. 85; Maricopa County, 457 U.S. 332; Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). None of these circumstances is at issue in this case.
Filed March 24, 2008
See Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. at 348 n.18 (“[H]orizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints.”).
Filed January 11, 2008
As explained in Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, this argument “indicates a misunderstanding of the per se concept.” Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351. Claims of procompetitive benefits, whether plausible or implausible, are irrelevant to deciding whether a particular restraint is illegal per se.
Filed July 24, 2006
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351. The court further rejected the argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation because it “ignores the rationale for per se rules, which is in part to avoid ‘the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation. . . .’” Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351. Like the medical society in Maricopa, the defendants hope to justify their anticompetitive conduct by somehow fashioning an argument that Medicaid would pay more for Ovcon if a generic version were available.
Filed November 19, 2004
In unequivocal terms we stated that, “[w]hatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike. 457 U.S. at 349. The plaintiff municipal systems, which are directly injured by, but are not parties to 16 Case 1:04-cv-00940-RWR Document 31 Filed 11/19/04 Page 25 of 48 the price-fixing conspiracy, have standing to establish that the concerted action by the defendants constitutes an anticompetitive price-fixing conspiracy that harms the plaintiffs as competitors in the retail natural gas market or as buyers in the wholesale market.