Filed August 5, 2016
See id. “The [Executive Director] could not be explaining or clarifying the Act’s language,” id., because the Supreme Court previously interpreted the NVRA as allowing the EAC and states to require “‘only such identifying information . . . as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant,” ITCA, 133 S. Ct. at 2259 (emphasis added) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1)), and Congress rejected the notion that documentary proof of citizenship was necessary within the meaning of the NVRA. Conf.
Filed August 19, 2016
Case 1:16-cv-00236-RJL Document 105 Filed 08/19/16 Page 12 of 48 4 III. Supreme Court in ITCA The issue in ITCA was whether the “Arizona law requir[ing] voter-registration officials to ‘reject’ any application for registration, including a Federal Form, that is not accompanied by concrete evidence of citizenship” was inconsistent with the instruction of the NVRA that States “accept and use” the Federal Form. 133 S. Ct. at 2251. The Supreme Court decided that issue in the affirmative.
Filed May 2, 2017
This argument must be rejected. Congress’ power to regulate the conduct of federal elections under the Elections Clause is broad, ITCA, 133 S. Ct. at 2253, and the constitutionality of the NVRA and its preemption of inconsistent state procedures has been repeatedly upheld. Id.
Filed December 5, 2016
For that reason, such a requirement is pre- empted on the Federal Form. Id, 133 S. Ct at 2260. Even with the DPOC law, Defendant Kobach admits that the State uses attestation and accepts such sworn statement as sufficient when a voter does not have documentary proof-of- citizenship available.
Filed June 10, 2016
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court have consistently treated mandamus and § 706(1) as equivalent. See, e.g., Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2260 n.10; Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (explaining that § 706(1) “carried forward” the traditional mandamus remedy); Village of Bald Head Island v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 714 F.3d 186, 195 (4th Cir. 2013); In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 884 (4th Cir. 1994); Ibrahim v. Chertoff, 529 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (“[C]laims under the APA . . . are subject to the same standard as those under the Mandamus Act.”).
Filed February 19, 2016
The district court reversed the Acting Executive Director’s denial, holding as follows: “Consistent with ITCA, because the states have established that a mere oath will not suffice to effectuate their citizenship requirement, ‘the EAC is therefore under a nondiscretionary duty’ to include the states' concrete evidence requirement in the state-specific instructions on the federal form” Id. at 1271 (D.Kan. 2014) (quoting ITCA, 133 S. Ct. at 2260). The Tenth Circuit reversed.
Filed June 10, 2016
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Ariz. v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). “[I]n examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a challenged voting practice results in [discrimination] on account of race,” the court “consider[s] how the practice ‘interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.
Filed June 16, 2014
at 5 That the Attorney General has completely ignored any consideration of the constitutional harm caused by his action only compounds the problem, since the exercise of even validly conferred discretion must avoid such serious constitutional doubt. Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2259 (2013) (“That is because we think that – by analogy to the rule of statutory interpretation that avoids questionable constitutionality – validly conferred discretionary executive authority is properly exercised . . . to avoid serious constitutional doubt.”).
Filed September 16, 2015
Indeed, the Court's recent decisions ‘ show that the Court has not hesitated to overrule its prior precedentsto incorporate into its Sixth Amendmentjurisprudence a fidelity to the Framers’ intent. (See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 1 [Alleyne], overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 608 [Ring], overruling Walton v. Arizona (1990) 497 U.S. 639; Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 US. 36 [Crawford], overruling Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56.) From Jonesv. United States (1999) 10 526 U.S. 227, 245-248 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 477, to Ring, Crawford, Blakeley v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 301, 306-308, and Alleyne, the Supreme Court has sought to connect Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to the historical roleof juries and the intent of the Framers in adopting the Sixth Amendment. Unlike these recent cases -- which specifically consider the Framers’ intent when interpreting the Sixth Amendment's protections -- the substantial impairment test announcedin Adamsdid not consider the Framers' intent and contradicts the intent and understanding of the Framers of the Sixth Amendment, thus violating that amendment Instead, the Court's death qua