Filed May 30, 2017
The Third Circuit has repeatedly affirmed summary judgment where a plaintiff alleges, but produces no record evidence of, any similarly situated individuals outside of the protected class who received more favorable treatment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, et al., 297 F.3d 242, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of discrimination claim for failure to establish that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 645-57 Case 3:15-cv-02496-MEM Document 47 Filed 05/30/17 Page 17 of 28 - 13 - (3d Cir. 1998); Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med. Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 322 (3d Cir. 2000)); Ade v. KidsPeace Corp., 401 Fed. Appx. 697, 703-04 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential); Ramos v. EquiServe, 146 Fed. Appx. 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2005) (not precedential).
Filed April 21, 2017
If the DLA meets its burden of production, to avoid summary judgment, McMullen must prove that 4 In an ADEA suit, McMullen must demonstrate (1) he was at least forty years old, (2) “qualified for the position at issue[,]” (3) “suffered an adverse employment action[,]” and (4) “was replaced by a sufficiently younger person, raising an inference of age discrimination.” Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2002). McMullen can state a prima facie age discrimination claim because (1) he was at least 40 years old when he was not selected for the position (SMF ¶2), (2) he was qualified for the position (id.
Filed October 18, 2013
E.g., id. (citing Walden, 126 F.3d at 513); Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2002). To demonstrate indirect evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
Filed May 8, 2009
See, e.g., Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 1337, 1346 (D. Del. 1997) (“Napolitano and Brodsky where similarly situated because both were candidates for termination in the 1994 RIF and were subject to the same scrutiny. . . Hercules admits the same supervisor, Ken Steller compared Napolitano and Brodsky before the 1994 RIF and selected Brodsky for termination. In essence, then, Brodsky and Napolitano were in direct competition for retention of their jobs) (internal citations omitted); see also Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 250 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the court should look to how a company actually approaches employment decisions in determining whether employees are similarly situated). Thus, PQ employees must be considered to be similarly situated to Plaintiffs if any of the following factors are present: (1) they were similarly situated vis-a-vis Defendant’s alleged non- discriminatory justification, see, e.g., C.A.R.S., 527 F.3d at 366-367; (2) they were directly compared to Plaintiffs during the RIF process, see, e.g., Brodsky, 966 F.Supp. at 1346 ; or (3) their job was at a roughly equivalent level and involved roughly equivalent job duties to those carried out by the Plaintiffs , see, e.g., Monaco, 359 F.3d at 305-06.