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Alcegaire v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.
Mar 1, 2022
588 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2022)

Opinion

Case No. 8:21-cv-2244-KKM-TGW

2022-03-01

Johnathan I. ALCEGAIRE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

Carol A. Wright, Gregory W. Brown, Federal Public Defender's Office, Tampa, FL, David Dixon Hendry, Cortney Hackett, James L. Driscoll, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Middle Region, Temple Terrace, FL, Gerod John Hooper, Wesley Chapel, FL, for Petitioner.


Carol A. Wright, Gregory W. Brown, Federal Public Defender's Office, Tampa, FL, David Dixon Hendry, Cortney Hackett, James L. Driscoll, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Middle Region, Temple Terrace, FL, Gerod John Hooper, Wesley Chapel, FL, for Petitioner.

ORDER

Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, United States District Judge

Congress provides federal funding for appointment of counsel to state prisoners sentenced to death "[i]n any post conviction proceeding under section 2254." 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Although earlier cases have hinted, none have held that this right materializes before the conclusion of state postconviction proceedings at a time when a federal district court could not entertain unexhausted federal claims. Indeed, binding Eleventh Circuit precedent—although a subsequent case diminished some of its reasoning—remains clear: a petitioner who "has not exhausted all available state remedies" is not entitled to appointed counsel under the federal statute. In re Lindsey , 875 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Despite Lindsey , the commonplace practice within this District is for the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Middle District of Florida (CHU) to seek appointment at the conclusion of direct review in state court. These requests are regularly granted, (Doc. 8 at 10–11), though likely because they go unchallenged.

So too here. The CHU, acting on behalf of Johnathan Alcegaire, moves for appointment as Alcegaire's federal habeas counsel. (Doc. 1.) But Alcegaire's appointed counsel in state court, the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region (CCRC-M), objects, arguing concurrent counsel is not in Alcegaire's best interest. (Doc. 5.) While CHU's motion was pending, Alcegaire, acting pro se, filed a separate motion requesting appointment of federal habeas counsel. (Doc. 11.) Setting aside Alcegaire's waiver of any potential conflict of dual representation and whether the CCRC-M is already providing "adequate representation," 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), the Court denies the motion without prejudice because Alcegaire has not yet exhausted his state postconviction remedies and therefore the request is both premature as a statutory matter and not ripe as a constitutional one.

I. BACKGROUND

Alcegaire was sentenced to death after a state court jury convicted him of three counts of first-degree murder. On September 9, 2021, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Alcegaire's convictions and sentences. Alcegaire v. State , 326 So. 3d 656 (Fla. 2021). A few days later, on September 21, 2021, CHU filed the motion to be appointed as federal habeas counsel. (Doc. 1.) As they acknowledge, Alcegaire recently began "new state post-conviction proceedings." (Id. at 3.)

Due to Alcegaire's indigency, the State of Florida has appointed and paid for his counsel in state court since 2016. (Id. at 1.) Though his state post-conviction proceedings were ongoing and Alcegaire was represented at the time, CHU consulted with Alcegaire regarding appointment of federal habeas counsel. (Id. at 4.) At that meeting, Alcegaire expressed his desire that CHU be appointed for any future federal habeas claims. (Id. ) Proceeding with that authorization, CHU filed this motion. (Id. )

Alcegaire's current counsel in state court objects to the appointment. (Doc. 5 at 1). CCRC-M claims that CHU did not talk with Alcegaire's counsel prior to meeting with him and that they were not present to inform Alcegaire of the dangers of concurrent representation. (Id. at 3.) After CCRC-M's objection, to which Alcegaire consented, (Doc. 9 at 2), CHU met with Alcegaire again—and again without the permission or presence of his current counsel, (Doc. 8 at 5; Doc. 9 at 2). At that meeting, Alcegaire "reaffirmed" his desire that CHU represent him in federal habeas proceedings. (Doc. 8 at 5.) Most recently, Alcegaire wrote a letter to CCRC-M, repeating his desire for CHU's appointment, (Doc. 10 at 2), and filed a separate pro se motion requesting appointment of federal habeas counsel, (Doc. 11). Alcegaire's motion does not specify whether he would prefer CHU, CCRC-M, or some other entity appointed as his federal habeas counsel.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

An indigent state prisoner who challenges his death sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is entitled to federally funded counsel:

In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation ... shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with subsections (b) through (f).

18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). The statute conditions the entitlement to counsel on the existence of a "post conviction proceeding under section 2254." Id. However, it does not define a "post conviction proceeding" or "state how such a proceeding shall be commenced." McFarland v. Scott (McFarland I ), 512 U.S. 849, 854, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994). Interpreting this phrase, the Supreme Court has determined that "the right to appointed counsel adheres prior to the filing of a formal, legally sufficient habeas corpus petition." Id. at 855, 114 S.Ct. 2568.

III. ANALYSIS

CHU requests that this Court appoint it as counsel for Alcegaire's potential future federal habeas claims. CHU claims that § 3599 entitles Alcegaire to court-appointed counsel because he is indigent and has received a capital sentence. Although Alcegaire has other counsel who are pursuing his state postconviction remedies, CHU argues that it is necessary to appoint federal habeas counsel now due to the complexity of his case. Preparing now might be prudent. Even so, the law does not permit this Court to appoint counsel (and authorize payment from the federal fisc) for an anticipated federal habeas petition—a petition that is not ripe and may be years away from becoming so.

The CHU may track the one-year statutory deadline for filing a federal habeas petition under § 2254 without an appointment or federal funding.

A. Alcegaire Has Not Demonstrated That He is Entitled to Counsel

CHU's and Alcegaire's motions raise a little discussed question. Namely, whether a state prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel under § 3599 before he has exhausted any of his state postconviction remedies. This Court answers that question in the negative.

To reach this conclusion, the Court need not decide whether CCRC-M has "standing" to object to the appointment. See Booker v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 22 F.4th 954, 956–57 (11th Cir. 2022) (concluding that the State of Florida did not have standing to appeal a district court's order appointing CHU as counsel under § 3599 to represent the defendant in state court and exhaust a Brady claim so that the defendant could pursue that claim in a successive habeas petition in federal court). That said, it is not evident CCRC-M needs standing any more than any attorney does. Since CCRC-M purports to object on Alcegaire's behalf, they ostensibly may assert any rights or injuries Alcegaire himself could. The warring positions by CHU and CCRC-M display the inherent conflicts with dual representation, but they do not inform the Article III standing or the statutory inquiries.

A state prisoner is procedurally barred from federal habeas relief until he has "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). These remedies include postconviction relief. Ordinarily, district courts must dismiss unexhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509, 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (holding pre-AEDPA that a "district court must dismiss" unexhausted claims); Rhines v. Weber , 544 U.S. 269, 274, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005) (reasoning that post-AEDPA, a court may stay unripe claims in extraordinary circumstances). Alcegaire is litigating his case in state court. Accordingly, Alcegaire could not file a viable federal habeas petition now. And the Eleventh Circuit has held that a petitioner who "has not exhausted all available state remedies" is not entitled to appointed counsel. Lindsey , 875 F.2d at 1506 (reasoning that a "proceeding" cannot begin prior to exhaustion). This holding squarely forecloses Alcegaire's motion.

Alcegaire argues—or at least assumes—that he is entitled to counsel regardless. Perhaps Alcegaire does not know of Lindsey . He certainly does not cite it in either motion. Or perhaps he believes it was overruled by the Supreme Court's later holding in McFarland I . If so, Alcegaire is mistaken.

In McFarland I , the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death by a Texas court. See McFarland I , 512 U.S. at 851, 114 S.Ct. 2568. After his conviction was affirmed on direct review, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. McFarland filed a pro se motion in a state trial court requesting appointment of counsel and a stay of execution. The trial court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied McFarland's request. At this juncture, with less than ten days remaining before his scheduled execution, the state courts had denied all of McFarland's requests. He had no ongoing state court proceeding. As far as Texas was concerned, the only "proceeding" left was McFarland's execution. To stave off this result, McFarland—without first filing a § 2254 petition—moved for appointment of counsel and a stay of execution in a federal district court.

The question presented at the Supreme Court was "whether a capital defendant must file a formal habeas corpus petition in order to invoke th[e] statutory right [to counsel]." Id. at 851, 114 S.Ct. 2568. The Court held that, for purposes of the statute, "the right to appointed counsel adheres prior to the filing of a formal, legally sufficient habeas corpus petition." Id. at 855, 114 S.Ct. 2568. To address the triggering language in the statute, the Court concluded that "a ‘post conviction proceeding’ ... is commenced by the filing of a death row defendant's motion requesting the appointment of counsel for his federal habeas corpus proceeding." Id. at 856–57, 114 S.Ct. 2568. It reasoned that a petitioner was not required to file a federal habeas petition "without counsel in order to obtain counsel." Id. at 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568. In other words, it decided "how a capital defendant's right to counsel" was invoked. Id. at 855, 114 S.Ct. 2568. The Court did not purport to address when a petitioner may invoke that right. Nor did the Court consider whether a failure to exhaust state court remedies is an independent reason to deny appointed counsel. Since McFarland I did not address the question decided in Lindsey , the latter remains controlling. See King v. Moore , 312 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Lindsey after McFarland I ); Lugo v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 750 F.3d 1198, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2014) (same).

McFarland I was decided under a predecessor statute that is substantially identical to § 3599 for present purposes.

As a matter of statutory interpretation, there are not insubstantial grounds upon which to question McFarland I ’s reading of the term "post conviction proceeding." See McFarland I , 512 U.S. at 864–70, 114 S.Ct. 2568 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining why a "post conviction proceeding" is initiated only with the filing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus). The Court primarily rested on congressional purpose and the effect of its ruling "as a practical matter," rather than on the statute's text. Id. at 855, 114 S.Ct. 2568 (majority opinion). Despite these outdated modes of statutory interpretation, one must wonder if the later enactment of AEDPA, which marks a sea change in congressional attitude toward postconviction proceedings, washes away much of McFarland I ’s reasoning.

The same day that McFarland I was decided, the Court denied a petition for certiorari in McFarland's related case. See McFarland v. Scott (McFarland II ), 512 U.S. 1256, 114 S.Ct. 2785, 129 L.Ed.2d 896 (1994). Justice Blackmun, the author of the McFarland I opinion, dissented. He explained his belief that the "right to qualified legal counsel in federal habeas proceedings" recognized in McFarland I "is triggered only after a capital defendant has completed his direct review and, generally some form of state postconviction proceeding." Id. at 1263, 114 S.Ct. 2785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

This Court is not free to disregard Lindsey ’s holding simply because McFarland I creates some tension with Lindsey ’s reasoning. A court is "not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on point and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the Supreme Court." Fla. League of Pro. Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs , 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996). A Supreme Court opinion must be "clearly contrary " to constitute an overruling. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs. , 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). As explained above, McFarland I is not clearly contrary to Lindsey . Therefore, this Court must apply both.

And even if McFarland I overruled Lindsey , it is factually distinguishable from this action. Alcegaire is unlike McFarland in several important respects. Alcegaire has ongoing state court proceedings that may eliminate or reduce his sentence. Alcegaire has appointed counsel in his state proceedings. Alcegaire is not facing an imminent execution that would require or justify immediate federal court intervention. Alcegaire is not anticipating that he will file a § 2254 petition in the immediate future. Instead, he may wait months or years for the termination of his state postconviction proceedings. See Death Row Prisoners of Pa. v. Ridge , 948 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (" McFarland should not be read to support the proposition that a would-be habeas petitioner is entitled to [ § 3599 ] counsel at any time, no matter how remote his habeas action may be."). Given these factual differences, McFarland I does not control the result here.

CHU requests appointment, in part, to "monitor" deadlines, (Doc. 8 at 8)—deadlines that it acknowledges depend exclusively on matters within CCRC-M's responsibility as state-appointed counsel, (id. at 9–10). Yet neither CHU nor Alcegaire argue that CCRC-M is not "adequate representation" for Alcegaire's state postconviction proceedings. § 3599(a)(1) ; cf. Booker , 22 F.4th at 960–962 (Lagoa, J., concurring specially) (explaining that a district court must first find state-appointed counsel inadequate before appointing additional counsel).

Alcegaire also cites the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lugo. See Lugo v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 750 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2014). In response to a concurring opinion, the majority noted that "indigent state capital inmates are entitled to the appointment of federally funded counsel to assist them in the preparation and filing of a § 2554 federal habeas petition." Id. at 1213. That unremarkable statement fairly summarizes McFarland I . The court then went on to suggest that, "perhaps," this entitlement "even [arises] before they have sought state collateral relief." Id. at 1213. This comment does not require granting Alcegaire counsel here.

First, it is a statement made in passing "that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential." Dictum , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In other words, it is dicta. The court itself acknowledges as much. In the paragraph preceding the quotation above, the court noted that its reasoning up to that point "dispose[d] of this appeal." Lugo , 750 F.3d at 1213. The court explained that it wrote "more" simply "in response to [the concurring opinion]." Id. at 1213.

Even without an admission, the statement is clearly dicta. No one in Lugo requested counsel on an unexhausted state claim. In fact, appointment of federal habeas counsel was not an issue in the case at all. There is no sign that the parties, who were disputing whether Lugo's habeas petition was properly denied as time barred, addressed the issue. Since no party raised appointment of counsel and it was not necessary to the judgment, the statement is not binding. Even if Lugo ’s aside was part of its holding, the panel could not overrule prior panel precedent. See, e.g. , Garrett , 344 F.3d at 1292 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit must sit en banc to overrule a prior panel). Nor did it purport to overrule Lindsey , a case that it cited with approval on another point. See Lugo , 750 F.3d at 1214.

Second, even if the statement was binding on this Court generally, it would not clearly answer the question here. All the court in Lugo did was raise the possibility that the entitlement to counsel extends to unexhausted state claims. It did not purport to decide the issue, or even to give an opinion. The word "perhaps" suggests a possibility, not a requirement.

Alcegaire also points to a handful of district court orders from the Middle District of Florida appointing counsel in similar situations. Of course, district court orders are only persuasive authority. This Court does not find those orders persuasive because they do not address Lindsey or how a failure to exhaust state remedies interacts with an entitlement to counsel. A number of district courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have also come to the opposite conclusion, reasoning that McFarland I ’s holding does not extend to a petitioner who has unexhausted state remedies. See, e.g. , United States ex rel. Whitehead v. Page , 914 F. Supp. 1541, 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ; Death Row Prisoners of Pa. v. Ridge , 948 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ; Moseley v. Freeman , 977 F. Supp. 733, 734 (M.D.N.C. 1997) ; Velazquez v. Schriro , No. CIV 07-1044, 2007 WL 2206907, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2007).

Accordingly, Alcegaire has not pointed this Court to any controlling law addressing appointment of federal habeas counsel for unexhausted claims. Even if this Court was not bound to follow Lindsey , Alcegaire has not established that he is entitled to the relief he requests. Therefore, this Court denies Alcegaire's motions.

B. Alcegaire's Petition is Procedurally Barred

Even if McFarland I ’s reasoning undermines Lindsey to the extent that it does not control, this Court would still find that Alcegaire is not entitled to counsel based on post- McFarland I caselaw.

The right to appointed counsel under § 3599 is not absolute. A court may deny an otherwise eligible petitioner's request for counsel when a procedural bar restricts the underlying claim. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 742 F.3d 940, 946 (11th Cir. 2014). For example, a prisoner is not entitled to counsel if his claims are "time barred" or "could not form the basis for federal habeas relief." Lambrix v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 756 F.3d 1246, 1259 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying Chavez ’s reasoning to substitution of counsel under § 3599 ); see In re Hearn , 376 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "procedural bars"—like a statute of limitations—"may be so conclusive that the right to counsel under [ § 3599 ] becomes unavailable"); Cantu–Tzin v. Johnson , 162 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). In short, denial of counsel is appropriate when the underlying petition "would clearly be barred for a reason unrelated to the merits of any substantive claim for relief." Chavez , 742 F.3d at 946. Such is the case here. Alcegaire's underlying petition is "barred for a reason unrelated to the merits." Id. at 946. He has not exhausted his state remedies.

"[E]xcept in limited circumstances, district courts must dismiss § 2254 petitions without prejudice until the petitioner has fully exhausted his state postconviction remedies." Lugo , 750 F.3d at 1214 (first citing Rose , 455 U.S. at 519–20, 102 S.Ct. 1198 ; and then citing Rhines , 544 U.S. at 275–79, 125 S.Ct. 1528 ). Exhaustion is a procedural bar "unrelated to the merits." Chavez , 742 F.3d at 946. Alcegaire has admitted that he is currently pursuing state court relief. Thus, his claims remain unexhausted. See § 2254(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, Alcegaire is not entitled to appointed counsel because his claim is procedurally barred at this time. See Tucker v. Scott , 66 F.3d 1418, 1419 (5th Cir. 1995) (dismissing habeas proceeding and motion for appointment of counsel because petitioner had not exhausted state court remedies).

Finally, while § 3599 provides federally funded counsel for federal habeas claims, there is no entitlement "to have federally paid counsel assist [a petitioner] in the pursuit and exhaustion of his state postconviction remedies." Lugo , 750 F.3d at 1213 ; see King , 312 F.3d at 1368. Appointing federal counsel before the state proceedings are exhausted presents the significant possibility of misuse of federal funds. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that it would be an abuse of discretion for a district court "to appoint federal habeas counsel to assist a state prisoner in exhausting his state postconviction remedies." Lugo , 750 F.3d at 1214. So too, any funds spent preparing a federal petition will be wasted if Alcegaire succeeds in his state postconviction proceedings. Given that Alcegaire is not entitled to appointed counsel and doing so poses risks of misspent federal funds, this Court denies Alcegaire's motions.

There are exceptions to this rule. See, e.g. , Booker , 22 F.4th at 960–962 (Lagoa, J., concurring specially) (explaining that appointing federal counsel to exhaust federal claims in state court may be permitted when it is in the "interests of justice" and the petitioner otherwise lacks "adequate representation"). CHU does not argue any exceptions apply here.

C. Alcegaire's Petition is Not Ripe for Adjudication

Ripeness presents an independent bar to Alcegaire's motions. The ripeness doctrine "originate[s] from the Constitution's Article III requirement that the jurisdiction of the federal courts be limited to actual cases and controversies." Elend v. Basham , 471 F.3d 1199, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2006) ; see Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) ("The ripeness doctrine is ‘drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’ " (quoting Reno v. Cath. Soc. Servs., Inc. , 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) )). Under this doctrine, a "claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Texas v. United States , 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (cleaned up and quotation omitted).

Alcegaire's § 2254 petition is not ripe, so his motions to appoint counsel to prepare that petition are premature. Alcegaire is pursuing postconviction relief in state court. A final decision there may be years away, as the district court actions that Alcegaire cites illustrate. See, e.g. , Murray v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , No. 3:19-cv-777 (M.D. Fla.) (ongoing state proceedings two years after motion to appoint counsel); King v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , No. 3:18-cv-0818 (M.D. Fla.) (ongoing state proceedings more than three years after motion to appoint counsel). And a favorable decision there may eliminate Alcegaire's prospective federal habeas claims. Cf. Nat'l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami , 402 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that plaintiff's claim was unripe because it "failed to obtain a final denial of its applications"). So too, Alcegaire may simply decide not to file a federal habeas petition or not to exhaust his state court remedies. The claim, thus, "rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Texas , 523 U.S. at 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (cleaned up and quotation omitted). Alcegaire acknowledges as much, citing only the "possibility of filing in federal court." (Doc. 1 at 3.) All told, such a "possibility," (id. ), lacks "sufficient concreteness to evidence a ripeness for review," Digit. Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation , 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997).

IV. CONCLUSION

CHU requests appointment as federal habeas counsel for Alcegaire under § 3599. Alcegaire pro se seeks appointed federal habeas counsel as well. The Court denies the motions without prejudice. CHU has not demonstrated that Alcegaire, who has not exhausted his state postconviction remedies, is entitled to appointed counsel at this time. Nor is the matter ripe for Article III purposes. CHU may refile the motion once Alcegaire exhausts his state postconviction remedies.

If CHU later refiles the motion, its motion must include a signed letter from Alcegaire stating that he desires federally appointed counsel and that he wishes that CHU be the entity appointed. The Court also expects that CHU will inform Alcegaire's state-appointed counsel of any attempts to contract its client and that his counsel will participate in any conversations between Alcegaire and CHU.

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Alcegaire's motions for appointment of counsel are DENIED without prejudice . (Doc. 1; Doc. 11.)

2. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE any pending motions and deadlines and to CLOSE this case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 1, 2022.


Summaries of

Alcegaire v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.
Mar 1, 2022
588 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2022)
Case details for

Alcegaire v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

Case Details

Full title:Johnathan I. ALCEGAIRE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF…

Court:United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

Date published: Mar 1, 2022

Citations

588 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2022)

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