Filed March 11, 2013
The Sixth Circuit applies this rule unequivocally and has held that intended beneficiaries of a consent decree, other entities within the "zone of interests" protected by a consent decree, and other parties to litigation do not have standing if they were not a party to the consent decree. Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1168 (holding that intended third party beneficiaries lack standing to enforce the teinis of the consent decree); Dollar Gen. Corp., 378 F. App'x at 515 (holding that other litigants who were not parties to the consent decree do not have standing to enforce it); Sanders, 113 F. App'x at 650 (rejecting the argument that entities within the decree's "zone of interests" have standing). This Court has also applied the Sixth Circuit's rule.
Filed March 11, 2013
The Sixth Circuit applies this rule unequivocally and has held that intended beneficiaries of a consent decree, other entities within the "zone of interests" protected by a consent decree, and other parties to litigation do not have standing if they were not a party to the consent decree. Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1168 (holding that intended third party beneficiaries lack standing to enforce the terms of the consent decree); Dollar Gen. Corp., 378 F. App'x at 515 (holding that other litigants who were not parties to the consent decree do not have standing to enforce it); Sanders, 113 F. App'x at 650 (rejecting the argument that entities within the decree's "zone of interests" have standing) This Court has also applied the Sixth Circuit's rule. In Ragland v. City of Chillicothe, Judge Frost noted: Though other Circuits have distinguished Blue chip Stamps and held that intended third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree have standing to enforce it in federal court, the Sixth Circuit has notably refused to follow suit. . . .
Filed September 22, 2017
Case 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb Document 50 Filed 09/22/17 Page 6 of 8 PageID 566 7 4848-0770-5679 v2 2545600-000213 09/22/2017 The law in the Sixth Circuit is well settled that even an intended third party beneficiary of a consent decree lacks standing to enforce that decree. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994). Since its decision in Aiken, the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its holding in at least two other instances.
Filed January 29, 2016
. See also Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1168 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The plain language of Blue Chip indicates that even intended third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree lack standing to enforce its terms”). 13.
Filed October 27, 2015
. See also Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1168 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The plain language of Blue Chip indicates that even intended third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree lack standing to enforce its terms”). 8.
Filed November 20, 2014
The Sixth Circuit has consistently and unequivocally held that a non-party lacks standing to enforce a consent decree. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1167-1168 (6th Cir. 1994); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992); S.E.C. v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 378 F. App’x 511, 514-516 (6th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Republic Servs. of Kentucky, LLC, 113 F. App’x 648, 650 (6th Cir. 2004).
Filed April 3, 2014
2 Navistar has previously raised and continues to maintain its position that the SBC lacks standing to assert a breach of contract claim based on the Consent Decree because it was not a party to the settlement agreement, and in fact did not exist at the time the agreement was entered. See, e.g., Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1167-1168 (6th Cir. 1994); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992); S.E.C. v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 378 F. App’x 511, 514-516 (6th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Republic Servs. of Kentucky, LLC, 113 F. App’x 648, 650 (6th Cir. 2004).
Filed October 17, 2013
The SBC Lacks Standing to Assert a Breach of Contract Claim In addition, Navistar seeks dismissal of Count I pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(1) on the grounds that the SBC, which was not a party to the Consent Decree and did not exist at the time the Consent Decree was entered, lacks standing to enforce the Decree. See, e.g., Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1167-1168 (6th Cir. 1994); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 2 The Amended Complaint also raises substantial issues as to the timeliness of some or all of the claims being asserted by the SBC in light of the 30 day limitations period established by the PSP and the applicable statutes of limitations. (Dkt.