Filed January 30, 2015
To establish a claim based upon the purported leveraging of monopoly power in one market to influence another, Plaintiffs must first demonstrate Defendants’ monopoly power over the relevant market by establishing their ability to control the price of physical WTI crude oil. See AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 231; Rome Ambulatory Surgical Center v. Rome Memorial Hospital, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 389, 415 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). Yet Plaintiffs have not introduced any evidence that the price of WTI physical barrels or WTI forward contracts increased due to Defendants’ trading activity, or that Defendants were able to sustain those price levels.
Filed May 23, 2014
When they do so, these ventures “can fairly be regarded as single entities, whose ... decisions are not [considered] price-fixing conspiracies [or] boycott conspiracies.” AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 234 (quoting 7 Areeda, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1477, at 348). The principle that some collaborative agreements are not subject to Section 1 is nearly as old as the Sherman Act itself.
Filed January 9, 2014
Now that discovery has concluded, Rule 56 and the relevant case law impose a higher burden on the plaintiffs and require that plaintiffs meet that burden as to each defendant. AD/SAT, Inc., 181 F.3d at 234. Because the plaintiffs cannot do so as to Intel, summary judgment must be entered in Intel’s favor on plaintiffs’ federal and state10 antitrust claims.
Filed January 29, 2016
AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc., 181 F.3d at 234. Second, Association Defendants’ communications to Rancher Defendants should resolve any doubt about whether the Complaint alleges plausible antitrust claims against Rancher Defendants.
Filed November 19, 2015
Cross-elasticity of demand exists if consumers would respond to a slight increase in the price of one product by switching to another product.” AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 227. Plaintiffs here allege a market consisting exclusively of “pre-checkout” “third-party” ISP.
Filed March 9, 2015
The AD/SAT court held that the fact the defendant continued negotiations with the plaintiff until the action was filed was merely additional evidence supporting defendants’ argument that their conduct was legitimate business activity and not an unlawful conspiracy. 181 F.3d at 237. Here, by contrast, Anderson has adduced a wealth of evidence that defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy.
Filed November 7, 2014
In a multi-defendant case, plaintiffs must prove participation in the conspiracy by each individual defendant. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1965) (A defendant's "participation must be proved by evidence relating to its participation"); see also AD/SAT, A Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (proving conspiracy "require[s] a factual showing that each defendant conspired in violation of the antitrust laws") (emphasis added). "The scope of each defendant's participation in [the unlawful] agreement, if any, must be determined individually from the evidence proved as to that defendant."
Filed June 20, 2014
838 F.2d 268, 276 (8th Cir. 1988). Markit also cites AD/SAT, 181 F.3d 216, but that case, among others, only stands for the irrelevant proposition that “membership in [an] association will not automatically involve all members in [the] violation” of the antitrust laws. Id.
Filed March 4, 2019
“[T]he absence of a rational motive to engage in the alleged conspiracy is ‘highly relevant to whether a genuine issue for trial exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e);’ if the defendants have ‘no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy.’” AD/SAT v. AP, 181 F.3d 216, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596-97). Here, rather than depending on the other first filers to join a supposed conspiracy, each generic manufacturer would have achieved a better outcome if the other first filers acted contrary to the interests of the alleged conspiracy by negotiating an earlier date and thereby triggering the Generic Entry Acceleration Clause.
Filed July 23, 2018
under which an association has the 2 Nor is BofA and WFB’s membership in PayCo or the Association, or participation in Askeladden, sufficient to establish an agency relationship. See AD/SAT v. AP, 181 F.3d 216, 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (liability for wrongful acts of trade association cannot be imputed to a member absent evidence of actual knowledge and participation); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass’n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (same). Case 2:17-cv-04248-JMV-JBC Document 73 Filed 07/23/18 Page 11 of 24 PageID: 1591 5 power to present claims on behalf of its members.