Filed January 28, 2013
Thus the Court has recognized that previously valid contracts or agreements made illegal by federal antitrust laws are unenforceable. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 212 (1899). Likewise, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911), the Supreme Court held unenforceable an agreement, “valid when made,” for free transportation in exchange for a release of a claim for damages, after Congress subsequently outlawed such agreements.
Filed August 6, 2008
This was not reducing competition, but was only securing the seller against an increase of competition of his own creating. 85 F. 271, 280-81 (6th Cir. 1898) (emphasis added), aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Over sixty years later, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Filed July 17, 2008
Indeed, the NHL’s own cases decisively refute the NHL’s revolutionary claim that joint venture members may freely agree not to compete with the venture. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), expressly holds that, before such an agreement can be upheld, “the court must find that the restraints attempted thereby are reasonably necessary . . . to the legitimate ends of the existing partnership.” Id.
Filed June 2, 2008
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168 (1964); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (upholding such agreements not to compete because their objective is to secure each partner's "entire effort in the common enterprise"), aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985).12 Accordingly, one of MSG's major premises is simply 11 It is no answer that the Amended Complaint asserts in various conclusory ways that the NHL should be viewed as a "limited purpose" venture whose narrow scope is to schedule games, negotiate a labor deal and (oddly) enter into non-exclusive national broadcasting agreements as long as there are no more than eight Rangers games. The NHL Constitution–which is incorporated into the Amended Complaint and by which MSG concedes it is "bound" (see Am. Compl.
Filed March 21, 2018
Opp’n at 23:8. But the burden to plead sufficient and plausible facts rests with the plaintiff, 12 Citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Aya accuses AMN of “misapplying” 120 years of antitrust law. Given Aya’s failure to cite even a single case on point in response to AMN’s challenge, AMN respectfully would suggest that Aya is ignoring 120 years of antitrust jurisprudence.
Filed September 5, 2012
Courts have understood, for more than a century, that Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars trade restraints that are not reasonably necessary (or “ancillary”) to a legitimate purpose. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).44 In NCAA, the Supreme Court applied this framework, holding that “a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved. … The specific restraints on football telecasts that are challenged in this case do not, however, fit into the same mold as do rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of participants, or the manner in which members of a joint enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the benefits of the total venture.”
Filed September 5, 2012
Courts have understood, for more than a century, that Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars trade restraints that are not reasonably necessary (or “ancillary”) to a legitimate purpose. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).44 In NCAA, the Supreme Court applied this framework, holding that “a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved. … The specific restraints on football telecasts that are challenged in this case do not, however, fit into the same mold as do rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of participants, or the manner in which members of a joint enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the benefits of the total venture.”