Filed September 4, 2007
To be sure, the Supreme Court has recited incarceration as one fact among others that might support granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. See, e.g., Ackerman, 340 U.S. at 200-01; Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 613-15. Here, however, other factors demonstrate that, unlike the petitioner in Klapprott where the Supreme Court found extraordinary circumstances, petitioners’ incarceration is not an impediment to them challenging their detention.
Filed October 13, 2016
Courts will not “rescue” a litigant from an improvident “litigation choice” because “Rule 60(b)(6) is not an opportunity for unsuccessful litigants to take a mulligan.” Kramer, 481 F.3d at 792; see also Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) (A movant may not obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) from “free, calculated, [and] deliberate choices”). It is thus not “manifestly unjust” to deny Plaintiff a chance to belatedly make its new argument after judgment already has been entered.
Filed February 5, 2016
Courts will not “rescue” a litigant from an improvident “litigation choice” because “Rule 60(b)(6) is not an opportunity for unsuccessful litigants to take a mulligan.” Kramer, 481 F.3d at 792; see also Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) (A movant may not obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) from “free, calculated, [and] deliberate choices”). It is thus not “manifestly unjust” to deny Plaintiff a chance to belatedly make its new argument after judgment already has been entered.
Filed May 1, 2015
For example, the Supreme Court has held that a party that makes “a considered choice not to appeal … cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was probably wrong ….” Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950). In another case, the Supreme Court held that respondents could not become “windfall beneficiaries of an appellate reversal procured by other independent parties” where the respondents “made a calculated choice to forgo their appeals.”
Filed October 9, 2013
V. Firetog, 94 N.Y.2d 477, 484, 727 N.E.2d 1220, 706 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (2000): once the Attorney General "embarked on a strategic litigation" course he was precluded 21 from changing his position by disowning it. See, too, Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S. Ct. 209, 95 L. Ed. 207 (1950). In Ackerman the Supreme Court affirming the denial by the courts below of a motion that denied a motion brought by the defendant to overturn a final judgment he did not appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6), that allows for overturning final judgments for "any other r
Filed November 21, 2012
Relief from an order of dismissal under Rule 60(b) may be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances." S¿¿ Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950); see also Nemaizer v. Baker,793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1986). "When a pafty makes a deliberate, strategic choice to settle, a court cannot relieve him of that choice simply because his assessment of the consequences was incorrect.
Filed November 9, 2009
Thus “extraordinary circumstances” have occurred that require relief under Rule 60(b)(6) as an equitable remedy “‘to accomplish justice.’” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988), quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949); see also, Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1950). Plaintiffs’ argument otherwise should be rejected.
Filed October 10, 2007
Wright, et al., 11 Federal Practice and Procedure (1995), § 2864, pp. 359-360. See also Ackermann v. United States, supra, 340 U.S. at 198 (the petitioner cannot be relieved of his decision not to appeal “because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision * * * was probably wrong”); Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Rule 60(b)(6) motions are not substitutes for timely appeals”). Plaintiff has missed his opportunity to appeal the dismissal of Count V.
Filed April 4, 2006
B. The Commission Has Failed to Act in a Timely Manner “In our adversary system of justice, each litigant remains under an abiding duty to take the legal steps that are necessary to protect his or her own interests.” Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Ackerman, 340 U.S. at 197). This bedrock principle prohibits a party from using Rule 60(b)(6) as a “back-door substitute” to cure its failure to act in a timely manner.
Filed December 18, 2015
Rule 60(b)(6) permits modification “for any other reason that justifies relief,” but both the Supreme Court and this Circuit have cautioned that Rule 60(b)(6) “should [ ] be applied [only] in extraordinary circumstances,” and “only sparingly used.” Liljeberg v. Health Svcs Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950)); Salazar ex rel Salazar v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1110, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005); Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Moreover, as this Court has previously held, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is not available “unless the other clauses [of Rule 60(b)], (1) through (5), are inapplicable,” Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F.Supp.2d 43, 48 (D.D.C. 2004), since “clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) are mutually exclusive.”