PEOPLE v. CHATMANRespondent’s Petition for ReviewCal.September 22, 2016NRSW3974 COPy | §u the Supreme Court of the State of California THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF SUPREME COURT CALIFORNIA, EF | L E D Plaintiff and Respondent, CaseNo. SEP 2 2 2016 v. JODY CHATMAN, Frank A. McGuire Clerk Defendant and Appellant. Deputy First Appellate District, Division One, Case No. A144196 Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. C140542 The Honorable Paul Delucchi, Judge PETITION FOR REVIEW KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Chief Assistant Attorney General JEFFREY M. LAURENCE Senior Assistant Attorney General LAURENCEK. SULLIVAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General CATHERINE A. RIVLIN Supervising Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 115210 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 703-5977 Fax: (415) 703-1234 Email: Catherine.Rivlin@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Issue Presented ............00+sssesssessecuessseucuecssscssscssecssecescssssessssssesssssecsatsaeeaens 1 StalEMeNt .......cscceeccsssssssecseesceeeseeseeesssessssessseeceescscscscessscssacaceratstevstseseraecses 1 A. _— Trial court proceedingS ..........ccsscsssssssscsescecessscsesseeees 2 B. The Court of Appeal’s ruling..........cccsssssecsessesesncees 3 Reasonsfor Granting Review ...........cccscssseseseees sessecenenestenessssesescessseasaees 5 I. The conflict of authority created by the opinion below involves an important constitutionalissue that potentially affects many similar petitions for certificates of rehabilitation filed or to befiled by former felony probationers ............cccccscsssssscsscssssesecsssssaceesesees 6 Il. The Court of Appeal’s equal protection analysis requires review becauseit ignores the Legislature’s purpose in creating incentives to succeed on felony PTODALION «0... esesssescessseseecteessencscsesesesesessesscesssecesseatecseseeassesacs 7 CONCIUSION.......cscsccsssssssssscsessecenesssesesseseeseacssssssssssarscecsssesarscsutarsesscessesaeeeese 11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Cooley v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 228 0.eccecsssssessssssssesesescssssssssessssvstsessessseesetsessesaees 7 Johnson v. DepartmentofJustice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871 oo.ececsssssesessessesesesessscsssssssssestsrsasesasarscesesseseseees 7 Newland v. Board ofGovernors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 .....eesesssessesssssesecessesssssessssssscsssrssssecesarssarstsssecseasees 4 People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868 oo.eececsssessssssscsessscssssssscscseseersusesesarssesensensees 8,9 People v. Chandler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 782 .....cesccsesssscsssescssscessevsssesssereestsssasssecessesesessas 9 People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778 ....ccccceesessssssesscsscssscscssssseceesassssssescecsessesees 10 People v. Frawley (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 784 oo... cesescseseseeseessssesssesssssstecseesesssstatarseeecseees 10 People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal-App.4th 252... eeccsessesessessessssscsscscsssssssssecessesasseacsecesssees 9 People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120 ....cccccesssscsssssssssscscecesssssestseseseatees 3,4,5, 11 People v. Lockwood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 222 0... cccessccsssscsecssesestsssessesnensssseeseeesneeeeees 11 People v. Mgebrov (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 579 .....essccsessssesssccssscsssecestcsesssesesecscscscecavenees 10 People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934 oo. eeessccssessssesssscsssssesssesesessestsassvesescessseees 7 People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821 oo. cccesssssssesesesessesssscsessesssrsuececsessesesesssssesersceeses 8 li TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page STATUTES Health & Safety Code § 1522, SUDA. (8) .... ee ecesseesessesesssssscsssscsssaccarecsacsssssaseucsssssescesseceeserceeceeece 3 § 1522, Sub. (d) oo... esesssssscsssssesscsesscscsescsacssseceusssssessseserssesesesaccesecececs 3 § 1522, subd. (g)(L)(A)(ii)... eesccccecsssssssssssssesscsescssessscaseceucsccscsesccsesens 3,5 Penal Code § 211 eeeesecsssessessscscecsssecsscseeessesescsnensse vessssececssseeeeseseeseeccecsssstaceesenaes 2 § 1170, subd. (h)oeeeeesssescsscecssssesssesscesssecsssseassucsecsecsesseseesersessecees 4 § 1203.4 weccccccscsssssssccsereeecsesesssssssesscsescsessscsssscesesscacseasectetacaesesuseesspassim § 1203.4, Subd. (8) oo. ee ceeesssscsessecsecssssssssecsececssssuestssesesssssessssssceseseens 2, 10 § 4852.01, subd. (a) oo.cee cesssesesssccsssccessesescessscsescsscssssscsesceceesece 1,5, 8,9 § 4852.01, Subd. (b)oeeeecsesssescssssssesessssscsessssesesseecatseesersessesess passim § 4852.01, Subd. (C) ...e ee esessescsssssssecssscscscecsecesssesssesesssessesessecseseeceesecees 8,9 § 4852.03, subd.(a) oo. eeeeeeeeeseeeeessceeteneseeseecsasessecereesesedsersssesesesansensvaes 8 § 4852.05 vccecccseseeseccseeesbeaseevsssseeeseccsseesessoecesaceecssatecescusesuceccesaeaaaeecesseeess 8 § 4852.06 vo elecccscscccssssssscesessssssssessscssscesesessessssssssuscstsessssassccescescecseceececes 8 § 4852.13, subd. (a) wo... cccsscsesssceseccsesessssesssessasssssecsessessssecterseseeceeeecses 5,9 § 4852.16 vcesecssscsssssssessesssssssscssecssssnscsssrsssssssessseessesusscsesseseesecceceececes 5 Vehicle Code § 23108 .ccsescscsesssesssscesecsscscscssssssesscssesesesasessesssssssesessessesecscececsecsesses 2 § 23152, Subd. (D) oo... eeeesesesssssssssecscssestecsccsssssesssssssscssssesseseveestecsecececees 2 COURT RULES California Rules of Court , TUle 8.366(D)(1).....eececssesceccecssssescsecescssecsesesessssaciersssssesassesecsecsecseccesessce, 1 Tule 8.500, Subd. (D)(1) .....ceceessssessssssscssscesscsecssssssstscsssrsssssseserecseseesesceseees 5 Tule 8.500, Sub. (€)(1) oo... eesessessesesesssesessescscecscsrscsseercnsesscacssacavacesceseserens 1 OTHER AUTHORITIES Office of the Atty. General, CJSC Statistics: Adult Probation Caseload and Actions, All Counties Years 2005-2014, https://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/stats/adult-probation .........ccccsesssessscssseseees 7 lil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Probation in California (Dec. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=1173 ........cccseeeeees 6 iv The People respectfully petition for review of the decision by the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, Division One. The published opinion, attached as Exhibit A (Typed Opn.), is available at 2 Cal.App.5th 561. The opinion wasfiled on August 15, 2016. Neither party sought rehearing. This petition is timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.366(b)(1), 8.500(e)(1).) ISSUE PRESENTED Whether Penal Code section 4852.01, subdivision (b), violates the right to equal protection of former felony probationers ineligible to seek a certificate of rehabilitation due to their incarceration after the granting of a dismissal and release from disabilities under Penal Code section 1203.4. STATEMENT Penal Code section 4852.01, subdivision (a), allows formerly incarceratedfelonsto petition for a certificate of rehabilitation.’ Section 4852.01, subdivision (b), makes former felony probationerscertificate- eligible when “the accusatory pleading [on their original offense] has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4... if the petitioner has not been incarcerated in a prison, jail, detention facility, or other penalinstitution or agencysince the dismissal of the accusatory pleading, is not on probation for the commission of any other felony, andthe petitioner presents satisfactory evidence offive years’ residence in this state priorto the filing of the petition.” The Court of Appeal concluded that appellant, a former felony probationer, is constitutionally entitled to apply fora certificate " Further Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. After appellant’s petition in the superior court for a certificate wasdenied, the Legislature amendedthestatutes relating to the procedure for restoration of rights, in ways not relevantto the issue presented. (See Stats. 2015, ch. 378, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.) Like the Court of Appeal, we cite the currentversion of the statutes. (See Typed Opn.at p. 5, fn. 2.) despite his incarceration for a new offense after his earlier cases were dismissed andhis rights restored under section 1203.4. A. Trial Court Proceedings In 2001, appellant was convicted of robbery (§ 211) and placed on felony probation with a 180-day termin jail. (CT 147.) Almost two years later, he was convicted of alcohol-related reckless driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 23103. (CT 179.) The court eventually granted him a release from penalties and disabilities pursuant to section 1203.4,” with the reckless driving conviction dismissed in 2006, and the robbery conviction dismissed in 2007. (CT 170, 179.) Later, in 2008, appellant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence in violation of Vehicle Code ? Section 1203.4, subdivision (a), provides, as relevant: In any case in which a defendanthasfulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation . . . the defendant shall, at any time after the termination of the period of probation, if he or sheis not then serving a sentence for any offense, on probation for any offense, or charged with the commission of any offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere andentera plea ofnot guilty; or, if he or she has been convictedafter a plea of not guilty, the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and except as noted below, he or she shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted. ... However, in any subsequentprosecution of the defendantfor any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved andshall have the sameeffectas if probation had not been granted or the accusation or information dismissed. . . . The probationer shall be informedin his or her probation papers, ofthis right and privilege and his or her right, if any,to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. section 23152, subdivision (b) and was granted three years’ probation with a 10-day jail term. (CT 179.) The latter conviction was never dismissed. In 2014, appellantfiled a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation undersection 4852.01. The Court of Appeal characterized the petition as appellant’s attempt to avail himself of a statutory exemption from ineligibility in order to work as an administrator of a group homeforfoster and delinquent youth. (Typed Opn.at p. 2; see Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subds. (a), (d), (g)(1)(A)(ii).) In the superior court, appellant asserted a violation of his right to equal protection because his incarceration after obtaining dismissals ofhis prior convictions rendered him statutorily ineligible for a certificate. He claimed norational basis existed for rendering certificate-ineligible former probationersincarcerated after a dismissal of charges under section 1203.4, because former probationers incarcerated priorto a dismissal of a conviction are eligible. (CT 175-182.) In 2015, the court denied the petition “because the statute denies certificate eligibility to felons, such as [appellant], who have completed a sentence of probation (former felony probationers) and are subsequently incarcerated.” (Typed Opn.at p. 1.) The court agreed with respondent’s argument that People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120, 128 foreclosed appellant’s equal protection claim. (Typed Opn.atp. 2.) B. The Court of Appeal’s Ruling The Court of Appeal reversed, finding appellant’s right to equal protection violated, and remanding with directions to consider the merits of his petition. (Typed Opn.at p. 12.) Observing that section 4852.01, subdivision (b) “grants certificate eligibility to felons who have completed a prison sentence (former felony prisoners) and are subsequently incarcerated,” and that “it might make senseto denycertificate eligibility to all subsequently incarcerated former felons,” it could discern “no rationale to deny certificate eligibility only to those who have served sentences of probation.” (/d. at p. 1.) “[F]ormer felony prisoners maypetition for a certificate of rehabilitation, with no requirementthat they remain free from incarceration after the completion of their state-prison sentence (or sentence to county jail under section 1170, subdivision (h)).” (/d. at p. 5.) Indicating its analysis would be the same undereither the federal or the state equal protection clauses (Typed Opn.at p. 5, fn. 3), the court found unpersuasive the conclusion of the court in Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 120, “‘that former probationers do not have the samestatus and, therefore, are not similarly situated with former state prisoners (and those discharged from parole) for purposes ofapplying section 1203.4.” (Typed Opn.at p. 7, quoting Jones, at p. 128, italics in Chatman.) While criticizing the Jones opinion for finding former felony probationers and former felony prisoners dissimilarly situated, the court below also ~ characterized Jonesasfailing to articulate a rational basis for the differing treatment of the two groups, and as circularly examining “‘the purpose of section 1203.4 andits relation with section 4852.01.’” (Typed Opn.at pp. 7-9, quoting Jones, at p. 128.). In contrast with Jones, the Court of Appeal reasonedthat “[b]Joth groups are convicted felons seeking certificates of rehabilitation to reduce the disabilities that resulted from their prior convictions” and, hence,that those groupsare similarly situated for purposes of section 4852.01. (Typed Opn.at p. 9.) Invoking by analogy Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, where this court found norational basis to permit felons, but not misdemeanants,to seek a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01, the Court of Appeal concludedthelegislative classification between former felony probationers and former felony prisonersleadsto the “sameperverse effects . . at play here.” (Typed Opn.at p. 11.) The court explained: “A subsequently incarceratedfelonis eligible for a certificate of rehabilitation if he or she originally served a sentence of imprisonment and meets other requirements. (§ 4852.01, subd. (a).) But a subsequently incarcerated felonis ineligible for a such a certificate if he or she wasoriginally sentenced to probation, successfully completed it, and obtained a dismissal under section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (b).) We discern norationaljustification for this different treatment.” (/bid.) REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW Review is necessary to settle an important question of law and to secure uniformity of decision. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.500, subd. (b)(1).) The published opinion belowcreatesa split of authority by rejecting People v. Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 120, the decision which the superior court found dispositive in denying appellant’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. Resolution of that decisional conflict is needed to achieve proper and consistent treatment of former felony probationers seeking certificate. Absent a resolution by this court, the issue can be expectedto arise frequently with considerable attendant implications for public safety. As the Court ofAppeal correctly observed: “A certificate of rehabilitation certifies that a felon ‘has demonstrated by his or her course of conducthis or her rehabilitation andhis or herfitness to exerciseall of the civil and political rights of citizenship.’ (§ 4852.13, subd. (a).) Such a certificate serves as an application for a full pardon uponreceipt by the Governor(§ 4852.16), and it recommendsthat the Governor grant a full pardon to the petitioner (§ 4852.13, subd. (a)).” (Typed Opn.at p. 4.) Moreover, in this particular case, the relief granted by the Court of Appeal meansthat appellant “would qualify for an exemption from a disqualification for a license to work ina group home[forfoster and delinquentchildren] by securing a certificate of rehabilitation, with no requirementhe also secure a pardon from the Governor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (g)C.)(A)Gi).)” bid.) I. THE CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY CREATED BY THE OPINION BELOW INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE THAT POTENTIALLY AFFECTS MANY SIMILAR PETITIONS FOR CERTIFICATES OF REHABILITATION FILED OR TO BE FILED BY FORMER FELONY PROBATIONERS For three decades, felony probationers have known,as the superior court ruled below,that under section 4852.01, a former felony probationer whois granted a dismissal and release from penalties and disabilities, and whois later incarcerated, does not qualify for a certificate of rehabilitation. The opinion below unsettles that long understood principle of state criminal law. The split among the Courts of Appeal on that issue now rendersit unclear whether former felony probationers with records of subsequent incarceration maypetition for a certificate and what outcome can be expected if they do. Review is neededto resolve the conflict and restore certainty to the law. Theissue is important. Probation is the most widely used form of correctional supervision in California. California’s adult supervised probation population is more than twice the size ofits prison population.’ At the end of 2015, there were 221,243 California adults on active probation for a felony offense; 111,689 adults were placed on probation for a felony offense in that year alone.’ A significant portion of those who successfully complete felony probation seek and obtain a dismissal and release from penalties by filing Judicial Council of California, form CR- 180. Respondenthas not locatedreliable statistics on the numberof > Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), Probation in California (Dec. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication show.asp?i=1173. * Off. of the Atty. Gen., Crime in California (2015), Tables 41 and 42, pp. 54-55 https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/candd/cd15/cd 15.pdf. California felony probationers who received dismissals andare later reincarcerated. However, somereflection of the potential population of cases is suggested by the fact that 134,970 adults were removed from felony probation in 2014 alone, of which 58,865 (43.7 percent) involved a termination (generally a successful completion) of probation and 53,060 (38.8 percent) involved a revocation (generally an unsuccessful outcome), and the remainder of the removals included causeslike death, deportation, or a vacated sentence.” Clearly, many former felony probationersin the successful completion category maybe affected by the conflict in decisions now existing as a result of the opinion below. II. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS REQUIRES REVIEW BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE LEGISLATURE’S PURPOSE IN CREATING INCENTIVES TO SUCCEED ON FELONY PROBATION For purposesof the present case, the state and federal equal protection analyses are the same. (Johnson v. DepartmentofJustice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) A meritorious equal protection claim requires, “‘a showing that the state has adopteda classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) This inquiry concerns “not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whetherthey are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’” ([bid.) “This prerequisite meansthat an equal protection claim cannot succeed, and doesnotrequire further analysis, unless thereis some showing that the two groupsaresufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that somelevel of scrutiny is required in order to determine whetherthe distinctionis > Id. at Table 42, p. 555 & fn. 2; see also Off. of the Atty. General, CJSC Statistics: Adult Probation Caseload and Actions, All Counties Years 2005-2014, https://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/stats/adult-probation. justified. (Citation.)” (People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934, 941-942 [holding that felons eligible for rehabilitation and ex-felons whose convictions have been reduced to misdemeanors and dismissedare not similarly situated groups for the purposes of the law governingcertificates of rehabilitation].) Only if the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more groups, similarly situated with respect to the purposeof the law challenged, in an unequal manner, mustthe state show the distinction is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836-837.) The Court of Appeal opinion defines the requisite similar groups and evaluates the distinction in their treatment in terms that do not account for the Legislature’s implementation of a coherent and comprehensive rehabilitative plan for felony probationers. The cross-reference to section 1203.4 dismissals in section 4852.01, subdivision (b) does meaningful and coherent work in the criminal justice system. Indeed, the Legislature’s effort to make felony probation an engine forlasting reformation should guide the equal protection analysis. Section 4852.01 and section 1203.4 are interrelated in waysthat necessitate full consideration under a proper equal protection analysis. There are two relevant ways in whichthe statutes interrelate and inform that analysis. First, the certificate is only available to persons whoestablish they can achieve rehabilitation and will not backslide. This is true of both formerprisoners and former probationers. A certificate is available only to. convicted felons who have successfully completed their sentences, and who have undergone an additional and sustained period of rehabilitation in California during which the person must display good moral character and behavein an honest, industrious and law-abiding manner. (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 875; see §§ 4852.01, subds.(a)-(c), 4852.03, subd. (a), 4852.05, 4852.06.) “To enter an order knownasa certificate of rehabilitation, the superior court must findthat the petitioner is both rehabilitated and fit to exercise the rights and privileges lost by reason of his conviction.” (Ud. at pp. 875-876; § 4852.13, subd. (a).) Probationers in appellant’s circumstancesare not similarly situated for purposesof the challenged law to prisoners whoservetheir time, successfully complete a period of rehabilitation, and do not reoffend. “The expunging of the record of conviction [under section 1203.4] is in essence a form oflegislatively authorized certificate of complete rehabilitation based on a prescribed showing of exemplary conduct during the entire period of probation.” (People v. Chandler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 782, 788-789.) A former felony probationer, who undertakesto live an uprightlife and obey all laws on probation, and who makesa sufficient showing to the court of that willingness under section 1203.4 to obtain dismissal of the conviction, then is later reincarcerated,is not similarly situated to prisoners making their first showing to the court of their rehabilitation. Subsequent incarceration represents a broken promise to lead an upright and industrious life without further crime—a promise made in a solemnjudicial proceeding that resulted in the dismissal. Simply put, that felony probationer had his or her chance to reform and did not. Second, the Legislature’s carrot and stick approachrationally encourageslasting rehabilitation through the probation system. “The clear intent of the probation sections of the Penal Code, and especially of section 1203.4 is to effect the complete rehabilitation of those convicted of crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 261.) That purposeis evident in the mutual cross-referencing between sections 1203.4 and 4852.01. Section 1203.4 requires notice at the outset of probation that the offender’s acceptanceofthe “right and privilege” of a release from disabilities following successful completion of probation, will either enhanceor preclude opportunity to obtain a certificate— depending on whether the offender embraces the opportunity of rehabilitation as contemplated by the Legislature. If probation is successful, the probationer achievesa release from disabilities as of right, and is potentially eligible to further apply for a certificate. “A grant of relief under section 1203.4is intended to reward an individual who successfully completes probation by mitigating some of the consequencesof his conviction and, with a few exceptions, to restore him to his formerstatus in society to the extent the Legislature has powerto do so. [Citations.]” (People v. Mgebrov (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 579, 581; People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787.) Section 1203.4, subdivision (a) admonishes “however, in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant for any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the sameeffectas if probation hadnot been granted or the accusation or information dismissed.” This shows the importance ascribed by the Legislature to the offender maintaining the exemplary behavior that resulted in successful completion of probation in order to maintain the benefits of the dismissal and release from liabilities. (See People v. Frawley (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 784, 791 [section 1203.4 contains a “sweeping limitation”on therelief it offers].) Both the “carrot,” the opportunity for probation, and the “stick,” the use of the formerly dismissed conviction for enhancement and the use of subsequentincarcerationfor certificate ineligibility, are integral parts of the Legislature’s incentive plan to encourage complete, lifelong rehabilitation. With respect to certificate ineligibility, the “stick” is the rational basis for the legislative difference between former felons who complete probation and break their promise to the court as comparedto former prisoners who did not make that promise. It is also the rational basis for appellant’s ineligibility for a certificate. Appellant had a robbery and a “wet reckless” driving conviction expunged by applicationspersection 10 1203.4, only to be reincarcerated, albeit for only 10 days, when he drove underthe influence twoyears later. His promise of lasting rehabilitationif not wholly illusory was evidently something he could not abide beyond the courtroom doors. The distinction in section 4852.01, subdivision (b) rationally acts as a certificate ineligibility exception in cases of former felony probationerslike appellant. “(T]he Legislature has soughtto insure that the reformative or rehabilitative purpose of probation has continued to succeed before a former probationer is deemedeligible to seek a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon by requiring the petitioner for the additional relief provided undersection 4852.01 to meet substantially the samecriteria of law abidancethat the petitioner had to meetto obtain dismissal ofthe accusatory pleading andthe other relief provided by section 1203.4.” (Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 129; see also People v. Lockwood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 222, 230 [the “overall goalofthe [section 4852.01] [is] to restore civil and political rights of citizenship to ex-felons who have provedtheir rehabilitation”].) The Legislature presumably understoodthat providing yet another opportunity to make the promise oflifelong rehabilitation to those who have already made and brokenthat very promise, undermines incentives for probationers to reform. For the purposesof the law challenged, former probationers who demonstrably fail to reform are not similarly situated with formerprisoners, whodid not make that promise then break it. Even if the two groups were comparable, there is a rational basis for different treatment of former felony probationers who reoffended despite the admonition at the time probation wasgranted that imprisonmentafter a release from disabilities will preclude a certificate of rehabilitation. CONCLUSION Accordingly, respondent respectfully requests that review be granted. 11 Dated: September 22, 2016 Respectfully submitted, KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Chief Assistant Attorney General JEFFREY M. LAURENCE Senior Assistant Attorney General LAURENCEK. SULLIVAN Supervising Deputy AttorneyGeneral tf f mo S c MonfeCATHERINEA. RIVLIN Supervising Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Respondent SF2015400769 41598769.doc 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached PETITION FOR REVIEWusesa 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 3,337 words. Dated: September 19,2016 KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California CATHERINEA. RIVLIN Supervising Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Respondent EXHIBIT A Filed 08/15/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A144196 Vv. JODY CHATMAN, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C140542) Defendant and Appellant. Jody Chatman appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under Penal Code section 4852.01.' Thetrial court denied the petition because thestatute denies certificate eligibility to felons, such as Chatman, who have completed a sentence ofprobation (former felony probationers) and are subsequently incarcerated. Chatman contendsthat the statute denies his rights to equal protection because it grants certificate eligibility to felons who have completed a prison sentence (former felony prisoners) and are subsequently incarcerated. We agree. While it might make sense to denycertificate eligibility to all subsequently incarcerated former felons, we have been offered, and we can discern, no rationale to deny certificate eligibility only to those who haveserved sentences of probation. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand for a consideration of the merits of Chatman’s petition. I. FACTUALAND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2001, Chatman pleaded nocontest to a felony count of robbery (§ 211), and he wasplaced onfive years’ probation. About two years later, he was convicted of * All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. misdemeanorreckless driving with alcohol involved (Veh. Code, § 23103). He eventually successfully applied under section 1203.4 to have both his convictions dismissed. The reckless driving conviction was dismissed in 2006,and the robbery conviction was dismissed in 2007. In June 2008, Chatman wasconvicted of another misdemeanor,driving underthe influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). He was placed under three years’ probation with a condition that he serve 10 days in jail. Unlike Chatman’s previous convictions, this one was never dismissed undersection 1203.4. Starting around 2011, Chatman volunteered at a youth center. An executive director of a community organization became familiar with Chatman’s efforts there and offered Chatman a job as an administrator of a group homeforfoster and delinquent youth. Chatmanwasstatutorily ineligible for the position, however, because of his felony conviction. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subds.(a), (d).) Seeking to avail himself of a statutory exemption from ineligibility, Chatman appliedfor a certificate of rehabilitation in October 2014. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (g)(1)(A)(ii).) In his petition under section 4852.01, Chatman acknowledgedthat the statute rendered him ineligible for the certificate because he was a former felony probationer whohadspenttime in jail after obtaining dismissals of his prior convictions. But he argued thathis ineligibility violated his right to equal protection. The People opposed the petition and argued that Chatman’s equal protection claim wasforeclosed by Peoplev. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120, 128 (Jones). Thetrial court agreed that Jones was dispositive and denied the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. Il. DISCUSSION A, Felons May Seek Relieffrom Disabilities Resulting from Their Convictions. Convicted felons are “uniquely burdened by collectionofstatutorily imposed disabilities.” (People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934, 942-943.) “ ‘Upon[their] release from prison, . . . ex-felon{s] cannot simply resumethe life [they] led before prison as if nothing had happened. Besides the well-knowninformaldiscriminations,[they] confront[] a battery of statutory disabilities . . .” such as the loss of the right to vote, the inability to serve on petit or grand juries, and in someinstances the inability to possess a concealable weapon. [Citation.]” (/bid.) They may also be impeachedas witnesses, and their prior convictions may be used to enhance subsequentcriminal sentences. (Ibid.) And, as Chatman discovered, convicted felons are barred from certain occupations. The Legislature has enacted several methodsfor felons to remove or reduce these disabilities. One method allows felons who successfully completed a sentence of probation, such as Chatman,to have their conviction set aside and the underlying charges dismissed (§ 1203.4), which is often a step in seeking furtherrelief. (E.g., § 4852.01, subd. (b).) Another method allowsfelons to seek a pardon from the Governor on the groundsthatthey either are rehabilitated or are innocent. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8; see generally 5 Erwin etal., Cal. Criminal Defense Practice (LexisNexis 2016) Executive Clemency, § 105.03[1], p. 105-6.) Yet another method—thesubjectof this appeal— allows rehabilitated felons to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01. Typically, felons petition for a certificate of rehabilitation before seeking a pardon from the Governor. (5 Erwin, at § 105.03[1], p. 105-6.) A certificate of rehabilitation “is available to convicted felons who have ‘successfully completed their sentences, and who have undergone an additional and sustained “period of rehabilitation’ in California. (§ 4852.03, subd.(a) [imposing general minimum requirementoffive years’ residencein this state, plus an additional period typically ranging between twoand five years depending upon the conviction]; see §§ 4852.01, subds. (a)-(c), 4852.06.) During the period of rehabilitation, the person must display good moral character, and must behave in an honest, industrious, and law-abiding manner. (§ 4852.05; see § 4852.06.) (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 875.) A certificate is not available to persons serving a mandatory life parole, persons who have been sentenced to death, persons who have been convicted of variousserious crimes, or personsin the military. (§ 4852.01, subd. (c).) “[T]he purpose of section 4852.01is to afford an avenue for felons who have provedtheir rehabilitation to reacquire lost civil and politicalrights of citizenship.” (People v. Moreno, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 943.) A certificate of rehabilitation certifies that a felon “has demonstrated by his or her course of conducthis or her rehabilitation and his or herfitness to exercise all of the civil and political rights of citizenship.” (§ 4852.13, subd. (a).) Such certificate serves as an application for a full pardon upon receipt by the Governor (§ 4852.16), andit recommendsthat the Governorgranta full pardonto the petitioner (§ 4852.13, subd.(a)). (See People v. Ansell, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 876.) Some statutes provide that certain disabilities resulting from a felony conviction are removed by a Governor’s pardon, while other statutes provide that certain disabilities are removed by the issuanceofa certificate of rehabilitation alone. (/d. at p. 877 & fns. 16-17, andstatutes cited therein.) Chatman wanisrelief under the latter type of statute, whereby he would qualify for an exemption from a disqualification for a license to work in a group homebysecuring a certificate of rehabilitation, with no requirementhe also secure a pardon from the Governor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (g)(1)(A)(ii).) The basis of Chatman’s equal protection claim involvesoneeligibility differentiation for a certificate of rehabilitation. Section 4852.01, subdivision (b), covers former felony probationers such as Chatman andprovides: “A person convicted of a felony . . . , the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4, may file a petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon pursuantto the provisionsof this chapter if the petitioner has not been incarcerated in a prison,jail, detention facility, or other penal institution or agency since the dismissal of the accusatory pleading,'”! is not on probation for the commission of any other felony, and the petitioner presents satisfactory evidence offive years’ residencein this state prior to the filing of the petition.” Chatmanis ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation.under this subdivision because, although he obtaineda dismissalof the pleading underlying his felony conviction (§ 1203.4), he was subsequently incarcerated after he was ordered to spend 10 days in jail when he was again granted probation for his 2008 misdemeanor conviction of driving underthe influence. In contrast to section 4852.01, subdivision (b), subdivision (a) of the statute provides that “[a] person convicted of a felony who is committedto a state prison or other institution or agency, including commitmentto a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, mayfile a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” In other words, former felony prisoners maypetition for a certificate of rehabilitation, with no requirementthat they remain free from incarceration after the completion of their state-prison sentence(or sentence to county jail under section 1170, subdivision (h)). B. Challenges to Laws Under the Equal Protection Clause. With this eligibility distinction in mind, we turn to discuss the well-established standards governing a challengeto a statute on equal protection grounds.” “‘ “The conceptof the equal protection of the laws compels recognition ofthe proposition that personssimilarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receivelike treatment.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Thefirst prerequisite to a meritorious claim underthe equal ? This provision broadly applies to people who were “incarcerated,” without specifying that they were actually convicted of the offenses underlyingtheir incarceration. Section 4852.01 was amended andits subdivisions renumberedeffective January 1, 2016 (after the trial court ruled on Chatman’s petition), in waysthat do not affect this court’s analysis. Ourcitations are to the current version ofthestatute. > While ourstate Supreme Court can construe the California Constitution independent from the federal Constitution, there is no reason to supposethat an analysis under the federal equal protection clause in a case, such asthis one, that involves the consequences flowing from different convictions would leadto a result other than the result reached undera state analysis. (Johnson v. DepartmentofJustice (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 871, 881.) protection clauseis a showingthat the state has adopteda classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ [Citations.] Thisinitial inquiry is not whetherpersonsare similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposesof the law challenged.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253,originalitalics; see also In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530.) “In other words, weaskat the threshold whethertwoclassesthatare differentin somerespects aresufficiently similar with respect to the laws in question to require the governmentto justify its differential treatment of these classes under those laws.” (People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202.) If an equal protection claim does not satisfy this preliminary requirement, the argument mustfail. (Cooley, at p. 254.) If two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the law being challenged, we consider whetherdisparate treatmentof the two groupsis justified. (People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1207.) Thestate “is required to give somejustification for th[e] differential treatment.” (Id. at p. 1203.) “Unless the law treats similarly situated persons differently on the basis of race, gender, or some othercriteria calling for heightened scrutiny, we review thelegislation to determine whetherthelegislative classification — bears a rationalrelationshipto a legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Moreno, supra, 231Cal.App.4th at p. 939.) “ “This standardof rationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers everactually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated. [Citation.] While the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored . . . , a court may engagein “‘rational speculation’ ”as to the justifications for the legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial for rational basis review “whether or not” any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.” ’ [Citation.] To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guessits ‘ “wisdom,fairness, or logic.” ’ [Citations.]” (Johnson v. DepartmentofJustice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) C. There Is No Rational Basis for Denying Eligibility for Certificates of Rehabilitation to Subsequently Incarcerated Former Felony Probationers While Granting Eligibility to Subsequently Incarcerated Former Felony Prisoners. This case is notthe first time a court has considered the constitutionality of the eligibility discrepancy between subsequently incarcerated former felony probationers and subsequently incarcerated former felony prisoners. In Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 120, the defendant, like Chatman, was convicted of a felony, served a sentence of probation, and later obtained a dismissal under section 1203.4. (Jones,at p. 125.) After the dismissal, the defendant wasjailed for a short time (about 15 days) in connection with other offences. (/bid.) He wastherefore ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01, former subdivision (c), now subdivision (b). (Jones,at p. 125.) As Chatman argues here, he contendedthat as a subsequently incarcerated former felony probationer he was similarly situated with subsequently incarcerated formerfelony prisonersfor purposesof certificate eligibility. (Jbid.) Jones rejected his argument. In concluding that these two classes were not similarly situated, it observed that “separate and distinct statutory procedures” apply to former probationers and former parolees. (Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3dat pp. 127-128.) In reaching its conclusion, the court quoted heavily from People v. Borja (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 378, in which Division Twoofthis court held that section 1203.4, which allows probationers to vacate their convictions,did not apply to the defendant who had Spent time in prison and waslater discharged from parole. (Borja,at pp. 380-381.) Borja did not involve an equal protection analysis, but it instead involved a question of Statutory interpretation: whether a felon whohasbeensentenced to prison can take advantageof section 1203.4, which applies to former probationers and does not mention parolees. (Borja at pp. 381-382.) After relying on Borja to highlightall the procedural differences between parole and probation, Jones concluded “that former probationers do not have the samestatus and, therefore, are not similarly situated with formerstate prisoners (and those discharged from parole) for purposesofapplying section 1203.4.” (Jones,at p. 128, italics added.) In our view,this passage from Jones simply makes the uncontroversial point that the relief provided undersection 1203.4’s plain language—i.e., the ability to have a sentence vacated—is not similarly available to formerstate prisoners and former probationers. But equal protection analysis does not ask whether different groups are similarly situated for allpurposes; it asks instead whetherthey are similarly situated for purposesofthe law challenged—inthis case section 4852.01, not section 1203.4. (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.) Although Jones next asserted that there is a rational basis for treating former felony prisoners and former felony probationers differently under section 4852.01 (Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 128, 131), it did not articulate a rationale to support the assertion. Instead, the court examined “the purpose of section 1203.4 andits relation with section 4852.01.” (/d. at p. 128.) It found therestriction preventing former felony probationers from obtaining dismissals when they are currently serving a sentence (§ 1203.4, subd. (a)(1)) to be similar to, and consistent with, the restriction preventing former felony probationers from obtaininga certificate of rehabilitation if they were incarcerated subsequent to the dismissal of their felony case. (Jones, at p. 129; see current § 4852.01, subd. (b).) It further found that former felony prisonersare not similarly situated with former probationers because former prisoners have not previously benefited from dismissal of their charges and “bearthe full onus and stigmaof ex- convicts that former probationers who have previously obtained section 1203.4 relief do not share.” (Jones, at pp. 129-130.) But this observation is merely another way of saying that these groupsarenotidentical and face different procedural requirementsto obtain a certificate of rehabilitation. Indeed, as Jones explained, the Legislature had “established two separate and distinct procedures in sections 1203.4 and 4852.01 for ex-felons who seekrelief from criminal penalties anddisabilities and seek a restorationof their civil rights and the opportunity to obtain a pardon.” (Id. at p. 130.) Whenread together, the two procedures “can be seen to formpartofthe broad statutory schemefor rehabilitation and restoration of rights attending relief from criminal penalties and disabilities to all ex- felonsby setting forth the criteria of rehabilitation that the Legislature has deemed appropriate for these two classifications of former offenders.” (Id. at p. 131.) Wedonot think it follows that former felony prisoners and formerfelony probationersare dissimilarly situated for equal protection purposes just because they are required to use different proceduresto petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01. Both groups are convicted felons seeking certificates of rehabilitation to reducethe disabilities that resulted from their prior convictions. We conclude, contrary to Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at page 128, that these two groupsaresimilarly situated for purposes of section 4852.01. Wetherefore turn to examine whetherthereis a rational basis for denying certificates of rehabilitation to former felony probationers, but not former prisoners, who are subsequently incarcerated. (E.g., Newland v. Board ofGovernors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 707-708, 711 (Newland) [no rational basis under equal protection clause to permit felons, but not misdemeanants, to seek certificate of rehabilitation under § 4852.01]; Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 128 [applying rational-relationship standard].) In doing so, we must consider whether the classification bears somerational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purposeorthatthe classification rests upon a ground of difference havinga fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation. (Newland, at p. 711.) We concludethat the classification does neither. Jones concludedthat “‘a rational relationship exists betweenthe criteria of eligibility for a certificate of rehabilitation for these two classes of ex-felons and the state’s legitimate purpose of rehabilitating and restoring rights to ex-felons whoare not similarly situated.” (Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3dat p. 131.) But while Jones pointed out that the Legislature hasestablished differenteligibility prerequisites for these two classes,it failed to articulate a rationale for the different treatment. (Cf. Peoplev. McKee,supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1207-1208 [remandingto trial court to determine whetherdifferential treatment of two types of civil commitment was justified].) We considerit circular to suggest that disparate treatmentof two groupsis justified because the two groupsare treated differently. The Attorney General in this appeal similarly fails to offer a rationale for the differential treatment, except to repeat the observations contained in Jones, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 120 and to contendthat the caseis ‘settled law.” True, that case was decided more than 30 years ago and addressed the identical question presented here. But it never articulated a rational basis for the differential treatment, and the Attorney Generalall but recognizes as much by declaring that Jones “identified a ‘reasonably conceivablestate of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification’ (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. [(1993) 508 U.S. 307,] 313[]),” without explaining whatthat rational basis was. | Werecognize that rational basis review in this context is deferential. “ ‘[W]e must accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodationsthat the Legislature seems to have made.’ ” (Johnson v. DepartmentofJustice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 887.) “A Statute is presumed constitutional ..., and ‘the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might supportit,” [citations], whetheror not the basis has a foundation in the record.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320-321, italics added.) Butthe state must at some pointproffer somejustification for the differential treatment (People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1203), and it has not doneso here. Our conclusion that the statutory scheme governing eligibility for certificates of rehabilitation denies Chatmanhis rights to equal protection is supported by our Supreme Court’s decision in Newland, supra, 19 Cal.3d 705. In Newland, the petitioner had been convicted of a misdemeanorviolation of lewd conductin a public place (§ 647, subd.(a)) and hadobtained a dismissal of the charges under section 1203.4 after a brief period of summary probation that did not include jail time. (Newland, at pp. 707-709.) Helater applied for a community-college credential, but his application was rejected because a former provision of the EducationCode barredcredentials to anyone convicted of a sex offense. (/bid.) The statute allowed applicants to obtain a credential if they obtained a certificate of rehabilitation, but this meantthat only people convictedof a felony 10 qualified while people convicted of a misdemeanor, suchasthe petitioner in Newland, did not. (/d. at pp. 709-710, 712.) Newland held that there wasno rational reason to treat misdemeanants more harshly than felons for purposes of obtaining community-college credentials: “Because a misdemeanantis noteligible to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation, the [Education Codeprovisionthat permitted felons to seek a certificate of rehabilitation] works the Kafka-like perverse effect of providing that a person convicted of a felony sex crime who applies for a certificate of rehabilitation and whois otherwisefit, can obtain certification to teach in the community college system but that an otherwise fit person, convicted of a misdemeanorsex crime, is forever barred. This statutory discrimination against misdemeanantscan claim norational relationship to the protective purpose of[the provision of the Education Code regarding credentials].” (Newland, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 712,original italics.) The sameperverse effects are at play here. A subsequently incarcerated felonis eligible for a certificate of rehabilitation if he or she originally served a sentence of imprisonment and meets other requirements. (§ 4852.01, subd. (a).) But a subsequently incarceratedfelon is ineligible for a such certificate if he or she wasoriginally sentenced to probation, successfully completed it, and obtained a dismissal under section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (b).) We discern norational justification for this different treatment." In Newland, the Attorney General “virtually concede[d] that if [former] Education Codesection 13220.16 and Penal Code section 4852.01 together work[ed] to deny misdemeanantsrelief available to felons, that discrimination render[ed] either or both * The Legislature is of course free to disqualify certain felons it deems incapable of being rehabilitated. We express no opinion on whetherthere would be a justification for denying certificate eligibility to both former felony probationers and former felony prisoners whoare subsequently incarcerated. (E.g., Johnson v. DepartmentofJustice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 878, 884.) We similarly express no opinion on whetherthere would be rational basis for granting certificate eligibility to former felony probationers, but not to former felonyprisoners, who are subsequently incarcerated. 11 statutes unconstitutional.” (Newland, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 713,italics added.) In this appeal, however, respondentclaimsthat the constitutionality of section 4852.01 was “not at issue” in Newland and that Newlandis “certainly irrelevant” to Chatman’s current equal protection challenge to the statute. To the contrary, Newland addressed how section 4852.01 worked together with the Education Code to deprive applicants of community-college credentials, which is directly relevant here in evaluating whether section 4852.01 works together with the Health and Safety Code to deprive former felony probationers of the opportunity to qualify for a community-carelicense. Because Chatmanhasestablished that the statutory scheme denied him equal protection, we remandtothe trial court with directions to consider the merits of Chatman’spetition for a certificate of rehabilitation. Nothing in this opinion shall be viewed as expressing an opinion on whether the court should grant Chatman’s petition, a question the trial court never reached because it concluded that Chatman was not otherwise qualified to seek one. And nothingin this opinion should be viewedas expressing an opinion on whether Chatmanis otherwise barred from obtaining a community-care license because he was convictedof a “crime against an individual” — under Health and Safety Codesection 1522, subdivision (g)(1)(A)(i), an argumentthat the People raised below butthat has not been raised on appeal. Whether Chatman will qualify to receive sucha license is immaterial to whetherthe statutory distinctions rendering him ineligible to be consideredfor a certificate of rehabilitation violate equal protection. Il. DISPOSITION Thetrial court’s order denying Chatman’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is reversed, and the matter is remandedto the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 12 Humes,P.J. We concur: Margulies, J. Dondero,J. People v. Chatman (A144196) 13 Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court Trial Judge: Honorable Paul DeLucchi Counsel for Appellant: David Reagan Counsel for Respondent: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kevin Kiley, Deputy Attorney General . 14 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL Case Name: People v. Chatman No.: I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, whichis the office of a memberof the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the businesspractice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondenceplacedin the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. On September 22, 2016, I served the attached PETITION FOR REVIEW by placing a true copy thereof enclosedin a sealed envelope in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 addressed as follows: > David Thomas Reagan County of Alameda Law Office of David Reagan Civil Division - Rene C. Davidson 725 Washington Street, Suite 200 Courthouse Oakland, CA 94607 Superior Court of California 1225 Fallon Street, Room 109 The Honorable Nancy O'Malley Oakland, CA 94612-4293 District Attorney . Alameda County District Attorney's Office First District Appellate Project 1225 Fallon Street, Room 900 475 Fourteenth Street, Suite 650 Oakland, CA 94612-4203 Oakland, CA 94612 I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsof the State of California the foregoingis true andcorrect andthat this declaration was executed on September 22, 2016, at San Francisco, California. A. Bermudez [f' PorQ yDeclarant Signature SF2015400769 20897899.doc
