RAND RESOURCES v. CITY OF CARSON

Appellants’ Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.July 29, 2016

Fer WITH PERRiS! N Case No. S235735 SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA RAND RESOURCES,LLCetal., Plaintiffs and Appellants, Vv. LEONARD BLOOM,et al., Defendants and Respondents. ANSWERTO PETITIONS FOR REVIEW On Appeal From the California Court of Appeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One LASC CASE NO. BC564093 APPELLATE CASE NO. B264493 JOSEPH YBARRASeas Bar No. 218130) AARONM. MAY(State Bar No. 207751) HUANG YBARRA SINGER & MAY LLP 550 South Hope Street, Suite 1850 Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560 Telephone: 213) 884-4900 Facsimile: (213) 884-4910 Attorneysfor Plaintiffs and Appellants RAND RESOURCES, LLC AND CARSON EL CAMINO, LLC Case No. 8235735 SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA RAND RESOURCES,LLCetal., Plaintiffs and Appellants, V. LEONARD BLOOM,etal., Defendants and Respondents. ANSWERTO PETITIONS FOR REVIEW On Appeal From the California Court of Appeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One LASC CASE NO. BC564093 APPELLATE CASE NO.B264493 JOSEPH YBARRA (State Bar No. 218130) AARON M.MAY(State Bar No. 207751) HUANG YBARRA SINGER & MAY LLP 550 South Hope Street, Suite 1850 Los Angeles, CA_ 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 884-4900 Facsimile: (213) 884-4910 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants RAND RESOURCES, LLC AND CARSON EL CAMINO, LLC TABLE OF CONTENTS T. Introduction...cececeeseeseeseeeesecenecseeseesesseeeeesseseesessaeessessessccseacsacesereceaeeeareases 1 II. Background and opinion below ...0.....eccceessesssssessessecssccessescssessescssssesssessersaceaees 3 III. Statement pursuant to rule 8.504(C) 0... ccccesscescssseessecessessssssssssessaeecseseseseenes 7 IV. The petitions should be denied. 0...cscssesceseseeseseeseseeseessesssecsssssseaeeesees 8 A. The Court ofAppeal Correctly Held That Communications Regarding the Identity of the City’s Agent Are Not of Public Importance........... 8 B. The Court ofAppeal Correctly Held Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Based on Conduct, Not Speech. .......ccecccccscssesssessessesseceteesseesecsesseecsescsecesseeeseeees 1] C. The Bloom Defendants’ Petition Should Be Denied .......0... 13 V. COnCIUSION ooo. eee ee eceseeseesessecseeeeseeesseessessesseeeseacseesasessassessecsecsececeesenseeseeseseaens 14 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc. (2003) 110 CalApp.4th 26 ccc ccccccssssscseccsssssssessesseccsssssessessecseseseseasers 1,2, 7, 10 Consumer Justice Center y. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 595 cccccccccccsscssscsssssecssssesscsassececsesssessesensuesessusessenes 9 Friends ofShingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County ofEl Dorado, (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470 occccccscscsssesccsesssssecessecstessssecssscsaseenseesueetaceseess 15 Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City ofPico Rivera (2010) 181 CalApp.4th 1207 oo... ce cccecssesssesssessceecsssecssstesseesessesssusecenes 3, 6, 12, 13 Renewable Resources Coalition, Inc. v. Pebble Mines Corp. (2013) 218 CalApp.4th 384 ooo cccccssesecsssesessessseeessseeeecssscsecsssecssesseesseesseseess 13 Rivero v. American Federation ofState, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL- CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913 oo... cc cccccssesseessseseeseesssesseeeescessecseccssenssusssaseessasenarenees 9 Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal-App.4th 1219 ooo. ccccccecscesesscsseessecessseecesecenessseusensesees 2,8, 12, 13 Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal-App.4th 790 oo... ccccccccccssseseeessesscesscsseecsseecsecssseseesessscseeseesserens 12,14 RULES Code Civil Procedure § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) ....... cee eeessecccccsssessseccescccecesssernascessneess 10 Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 oo. ccccsscsscsscetsesecesssssssesseessecssscesssscecsevssersnsens 7 Rule 8.504(C)..ccccecsesssecssscesssseeeseesscesseeesesseessesseesecsessesseesesesesessssescaecssacseaceaearsuecasensens 9 ii I. INTRODUCTION Although the factual genesis of this case is unique (namely, the City of Carson’s failed effort to lure one or more National Football League franchises), the legal question at issue—whetherthe anti-SLAPPstatute is triggered by a commercial dispute involving claims for breach of contract and interference—has been addressed by the California Court of Appeal several times. The decision below is firmly in line with those prior decisions, and thus the petitions should be denied. Qn the City’s first issue for review, the Court of Appeal correctly heldthat, whereasbringing an NFL team to Carsonis a matter of public interest, the selection of the City’s agent for dealing with the NFL—theissue in dispute here—is not, and thus the anti-SLAPPstatuteis not triggered. (/bid, (quoting Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 26, 34).) Rather than address this holding—whichis plainly correct—Petitioners create a straw-man, claiming that the Court of Appeal issued a blanket ruling that “can EAA [exclusive agency agreement] regarding the development of an NFL stadium wasnot an issue of public interest.” (City Petition at 2.) But the Court of Appeal made no such ruling; it merely distinguished between the importance of the good beingsold (here, an NFL expansion opportunity), which is not at issue in this case, and the mechanics of the sale (the identity of the City’s agent), which constitutes the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims. Such a distinction is supported, indeed required, by established California case law. (Commonwealth, supra, 110 Cal.App.4that 34 [‘Just because youare selling somethingthat is intrinsically important does not meanthat the publicis interested in the fact that you areselling it.”].) Moreover, the Opinion does not conflict with Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219. As explained by the Court of Appeal, the communicationsat issue in Tuchscher involved the building of an actual, planned real estate development. (Op.at 14-15; Tuchscher, 106 Cal.App.4th at 1233.) Here, by contrast, the communicationsat issue are “not communications pertaining to the actual developmentofreal estate, but who represented the City in luring an NFL team to moveto the City—a condition precedentto the development.” (Op. at 15 (emphasis added).) On the City’s second issue for review, Petitioners again attempt to manufacture a decisional conflict with Tuchscher where noneexists. In Tuchscher, the moving parties’ communications(the Port District Commissioner’s discussions with the City or other defendants regarding the proposed development) formed the basis for their potential liability. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ interference claims turn on the actions of the City Defendants and Bloom Defendants—actionsthat constituted breach of an exclusive agency agreementand interference with that contract, respectively. Although communications mayberelevant to prove the Defendants’ liability (as would be the case with virtually any interference claim), that does not, in and ofitself, trigger the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Graffiti Protective Coatings, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1224 (“Although the City’s communications may be of evidentiary value in establishing thatit violated the law,liability is not based on the communications themselves.”].) Finally, Bloom’s sole additional issue for review entirely misses the mark, as Bloom asks the Court to review a question concerning the secondstep ofthe anti- SLAPP analysis—Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success. The Court of Appeal reversed on Prong One of the anti-SLAPPtest; it did not reach Prong Two. Thus, even if Bloom’s substantive argument werecorrect(it is not), there is nothing in the Opinion on this point for the Court to address. In short, Petitioners fail to identify any split in decisional authority or even address the actual reasoning of the Court below, instead creating a straw-man Opinion that the Court ofAppeal did not issue. The Petitions should be denied. I. BACKGROUND AND OPINION BELOW' Richard Randis a real estate developer and the sole or controlling owner of plaintiffs Rand Resources, LLC and Carson El Camino, LLC (collectively, “Rand’’). ' Unless otherwise stated,all facts are taken from the Backgroundsection of the Opinion below, whichrelies on the factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and accepts them astrue in light of the procedural posture. 3 Following a complexseries of events, the City appointed Rand “asits sole and exclusive agent” for the purposes of “coordinating and negotiating with the NFL for the designation and development of an NFL football stadium... in the City.” Although the agreement was to expire in September 2014, Rand was promisedthat, so long as Rand showedreasonable progress with respect to bringing an NFL franchise to Carson, the [agreement] would be renewed.” Rand worked diligently on bringing an NFL franchise to Carson and spent hundreds of thousands ofdollars and a significant oe oftime in doing so. Unbeknownst to Rand, however, the City undercut him and violated the agreement by allowing defendants Leonard Bloom and U.S. Capital LLC (collectively, “Bloom’”’) to act as the City’s defacto agent in the same negotiations that Rand was supposed to be conducting. The City forwarded confidential documents to Bloom and otherwise violated its duties to Rand. Bloom,for its part, encouraged this breach—ghostwriting letters on behalf ofthe City’s mayor, using promotional materials derivative of those Rand had developed, and creating a new entity called Rand Resources, LLC, presumably to impersonate Rand. When Rand asked the City’s mayor about Bloom, the mayorlied to Rand,telling him that he did not know Bloom and that Rand’s position as exclusive agent was secure. When the agency contract was up for renewalin late 2014, the City did not renew it notwithstanding Rand’s progress. The FACstates causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) tortious breach of contract, (3) promissory fraud, (4) fraud, (5) intentional interference with contract, and (6) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Defendants brought anti-SLAPP motionsto strike causes of action two through six under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which thetrial court grantedin their entirety. As relevant here, Defendants claimed that the FAC sought to hold them liable for communications involving the developmentofthe subject property, and claimed that such communications were matters of public importance triggering the anti-SLAPP Statute. The Court of Appeal unanimously reversed. It held, first, that the five causes of action at issue are based on conduct and not on protected speech; thusthe anti- SLAPPstatute did not apply. (Op. at 13 [Second Cause ofAction “is not premised upon protected free speechor the right to petition for redress of grievances, but upon the City's conduct in carrying out (or not) its contract with Rand Resources.”]; id. at 16 [“[T]he gravamen ofthe [third] cause of action is the manner in whichthe City conducteditself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City’s exercise of free speech or petitioning activity.”]; id. at 16 [“The gravamenofthe fourth cause of action with respect to the City is ... the City’s violation of the terms of the EAA by allowing someone other than Rand Resources to act as its agent ... not the City’s exercise of free speech or petitioning activity.”]; id. at 17 [“The alleged wrongful conductat the heart of[the fifth and sixth causes of action] is again the Bloom defendants’ efforts to usurp Rand Resources’s rights and role under the EAA.”].) The Opinion relied on a line of California cases holding that the court must “distinguish between (1) speechorpetitioning activity that is mere evidencerelated to liability and (2) liability that is based on speech or petitioning activity.” (Jd. at 10 [quoting Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214—-1215].) Next, the Opinion held that even if Rand’s claims were based onpetitioning speech (and they were not), the speech wasnot of public importance becauseit concernedthe identity of the agent that would represent the City in negotiations. (/d. at 13.) In so holding, the Opinion recognized that the question is not whether an overall project or developmentis of public importance, but rather whether the specific matter givingrise to liability is of public importance. It was required to draw this distinction by Commonwealth, supra, which explained the distinction as follows: “Just because you are selling somethingthat is intrinsically important does not mean that the public is interested in the fact that you are selling it.” (/d. at 14 [quoting Commonwealth, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at 34].) Following Commonwealth, the Opinion held as follows: While having an NFL team,stadium, and associated developments in Carson is no doubt a matter of substantial public interest, plaintiffs’ complaint does not 6 concern speech or conduct regarding large scale real estate development or bringing an NFL team to Carson and buildingit a stadium.It instead concernsthe identity of the person(s) reaching out to the NFL andits teams’ ownersto curry interest in relocating to Carson. The identity of the City's representative is not a matter of public interest. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the City was not paying Rand Resourcesforits services or even reimbursing Rand Resourcesfor its expenses. Furthermore, the particular communications alleged in the cause ofaction, i.e., the false representation that the EAA would be renewed, Dear’s false denial about knowing Bloom, and communicationsentailed in meetings between the defendants, are also not matters of public interest. (Id. at 14.) The Opinion considered and distinguished Tuchscher, the case relied upon by Petitioners, on the groundsthat (i) unlike this case, Tuchscher involved communications about the specifics of an actual planned development; and(ii) the parties there actually conceded that the developmentin interest was an issue of public interest. (/d. at 14-15.) Because Petitioners had notsatisfied the first prong of an anti-SLAPPanalysis, the Opinion did not address the secondstep, Plaintiff's probability of success on their claims. (/d. at 18.) I. STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE8.504(c) In the event this Court grants the petitions, Plaintiffs seek review ofall issues raised in Plaintiffs’ appellate briefs, including but not limited to the issues of whetherPlaintiffs have a probability of success on their claims and whetherthetrial court should have permitted discovery on that issue. Iv. THE PETITIONS SHOULD BE DENIED. A. The Court of Appeal Correctly Held That Communications Regarding the Identity of the City’s Agent Are Not of Public Importance. To trigger the anti-SLAPPstatute outside the context of an official proceeding, the protected activity must concern a “public issue.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)). In making this determination,the trial court must focus on the importance ofa particular communication to the public; it is not enough that the communication berelated to selling something of public importanceor that the generalities that could be extracted from a communication would hold significance. So, for example, union fliers falsely accusing a janitorial supervisor employed at a UC Berkeley residence oftheft, bribes, and abusive treatment of inferiors do not concern a public issue, even though laborrelations generally and the use of public funds are matters of important public policy debate. (Rivero v. American Federation ofState, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 925) Likewise, while the efficacy of herbal supplementsin general may be important, specific advertising claims regarding a particular product are not. (Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003) 107 8 Cal.App.4th 595, 601.) As the Court of Appeal explained in Commonwealth, “[j]ust because you are selling somethingthat is intrinsically important does not mean that the public is interested in the fact that youareselling it.” (110 Cal.App.4that p. 34.) The Opinion below is squarely in line with these authorities. As it recognized, bringing the NFL to Carsonis an issue of great public significance. But, as between tworival individuals vying to act as the City of Carson’s agent in dealing with the NFL,the public at large has no particular interest. (Op. at 15) Such matters do not “go beyondthe parochial particulars of the given parties,” and as such do not implicate the anti-SLAPPstatute. Ud. at 14 [quoting Commonwealth, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at 34].) Petitioners appear to concede this point, nowhere claiming that the identity of the City’s agent is a matter of public import. Instead, they spill muchink onthe undisputed point that bringing the NFL to Carson was important, and then quickly pivot to the fallacious argument that any communication “bringing up the NFL” must — logical consistency and factual accuracy notwithstanding —be of equal significance. (City Petition at 11.) Petitioners’ fantastic argument — which would sweep in not just the communications here but also millions of barbeque and barbershop conversations around the country — has already been rejected by multiple California Courts of Appeal, and there is no reason for this Court to give it any further credence by granting the Petitions. (.e., Commonwealth, supra, 110 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 34 [When analyzing the public interest requirement, “[t]he part is not synonymouswith the greater whole.”].) Attempting to create the appearance ofa decisional split, the Petitions cite to Tuchscherfor the proposition that any communication relating to an exclusive development agreementis a matter of public interest. (City Petition at 11-16.) Tuchscher did not so hold, and it would have been wrongif it had. As the Opinion below recognized, Tuchscher involved an actual planned development of a mixed- use project in Chula Vista, California. (106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227) Plaintiff Tuchscher DevelopmentEnterprises (“TDE”) had a 1.5-year exclusive right to negotiate a development agreementfor the project before the project opened up to other developers. (/bid.) During that exclusive period, the defendants allegedly had a number of conversations and communications regarding whether TDE was capable of completing the project, and how the project might look (including which specific roadways would be constructed, which parcels demolished, and whichparcels developed) if given to another developer. (/d. at p. 1229-30.) TDE sued,alleging that those particular communications interfered with its exclusive negotiating right. (Id. at p. 1227-28.) Perhaps not surprisingly given the facts, neither any party nor the Court of Appeal drew any distinction between the overall importance of the project and the importance ofthe particular issues under discussion: there was no distinction to be drawn in Tuchscher. 10 In subsequentcases where, as here, a distinction exists between the importance of a developmentand the importance of a particular communication, courts have distinguished Tuchscher and focused on the particular facts of the case. (E.g. Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 803 [distinguishing Tuchscher and holding that applying for environmental permits associated with a development was not a matter of public importancetriggering the anti-SLAPPstatute].). That is exactly what the Opinion below did, consonant with both Tuchsher and subsequentcaseslimitingit to its particular facts. (Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City ofPico Rivera (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1224 [explaining that the Court of Appeal has “essentially limited Tuchschertoits facts — the developmentof scenic Bayfront property.”].) B. The Court of Appeal Correctly Held Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Based on Conduct, Not Speech. Petitioner’s second attempt to manufacture a decisional conflict—which contends that, because the renewal of the agency agreement would ultimately be the subject of legislative action, any lawsuit that relates to or uses as evidence communications about the agency agreement must be barred by the anti-SLAPP statute (City Petition at 17-19)—is equally tortured. 11 To implicate the anti-SLAPPstatute, the “acts on whichliability is based” must consist of protected speech. (Renewable Resources Coalition, Inc. v. Pebble Mines Corp. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 384, 387.) In making that determination, the trial court must “distinguish between (1) speechorpetitioning activity that is mere evidencerelated to liability and (2) liability that is based on speechorpetitioning activity.” (Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City ofPico Rivera (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214-1215.) In Tuchscher, as described above,the plaintiff alleged that “communicating with the mayor and other agents and employeesofthe city” and “facilitating communications and meetings between defendants” were the basis of liability. (Tuchscher, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228) Hence the gravamen of the complaint was communication,and the anti-SLAPPstatute applied; this does not appear to have been even disputed. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ interference claims turn on the actions ofprivate citizens (the Bloom Defendants), who served as a competing, defacto agent for the City at a time whenPlaintiffs were contractually entitled to be the City’s exclusive agent for dealing with the NFL, and the Defendants’ fraud in covering up that interference. Although communications maybe relevantto proveliability, that is not enoughtotrigger the anti-SLAPPstatute. (See Wang, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at 808 [reversing trial court order striking claims for breach of contract and fraud arising out of a real estate development becausethe alleged wrongdoing arose from 12 Defendants’ conductin “carrying out...contractual duties, seeking to extend escrow, requesting the execution of documents, and other practices within the scope ofthe parties’ contractual relationship.”]; Graffiti Protective Coatings, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1224 [“Although the City’s communications maybe of evidentiary value in establishing thatit violated the law,liability is not based on the communications themselves.”’].). The Opinion below understood and engagedwith this distinction, recognizing that Plaintiffs’ claims are based on conduct and therefore do nottrigger the anti- SLAPPstatute. Moreover, the mere fact that the City would later decide whetheror not to renew the Exclusive Agency Agreementis entirely immaterial to Petitioners’ breach of (and interference with) that agreement while it was in place. Nothing in Tuchscher states otherwise, and no intervention by this Court is needed to harmonize or reconcile the cases. Cc. The Bloom Defendants’ Petition Should Be Denied The Bloom Defendants seek review of two issues. Thefirst is substantively identical to the City Petition’s first issue, and should be denied for the same reason. Second, the Bloom Defendants contend that Rand’s claim is doomedto fail because Rand Resources, LLC was a suspended corporation and therefore purportedly lacks standing to pursue the claimsat issue here. But even if that argument had a shred of merit (it does not), it would comeinto play at the second stage of an anti-SLAPP 13 analysis, which analyzes Plaintiffs’ probability of success. The Court of Appeal reversedat the first stage and stopped there. (Op. at 18.) Thus, there is nothing in the Opinion about Rand’s corporate status for this Court to correct, harmonize,or . 2 otherwise address. Vv. CONCLUSION The Court of Appeal’s decision belowis firmly in line with California jurisprudenceand presents no conflict with Tuchscher or other decisions. The Petitions should be denied. DATED:July 25, 2016 Respectfully submitted, HUANG YBARRA SINGER & MAY LLP JOSEPH J. YBARRA AARON M. MAY By: LIKES OSEP YBARRA Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants RAND OURCES, LLC AND CARSON EL CAMINO, LLC * To the extent the Bloom Petition attempts to recast this argument in terms of Rand’s standing to proceedin the courts at all, Bloom is wrong. Whatever Rand Resources’s former corporatestatus, it is presently in good stead and has the power to sue in court. (See, e.g., Friends ofShingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado, (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1484 [holding that once the delinquent taxes have been paid, corporate powersare restored, including the powerto sue and defend].) 14 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT (Cal. Rule of Court 8.204) Thetext of this brief consists of 3,236 words, as counted by the Microsoft Word program used to generate this brief. DATED:July 25, 2015 Respectfully submitted, HUANG YBARRA SINGER & MAY LLP JOSEPH J. YBARRA AARON M. MAY By: YS LA_— SEPHTYBARRA Attorneys|fof Plaintiffs and Appellants RAND OURCES, LLC AND CARSON EL CAMINO, LLC 15 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES J am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am overthe age of 18 and nota party to the within action. My business address is: 550 South Hope Street, Suite 1850, Los Angeles, California 90071. On July 25, 2016, I served the foregoing document(s) describedas: ANSWERTO PETITIONS FOR REVIEW; APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE JOINT ANSWER on the interested parties in this action by placing true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICELIST [] BY FIRSTCLASS MAIL. I placed such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion ofthe party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. [x]. BY OVERNIGHT COURIER. J am familiar with thepractice at my place of usiness for collection and processing of packages for overnight delivery by Federal Express. Such correspondence with delivery fees paid will be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by Federal Express for receipt on the next business day. > [] BY ELECTRONIC MAIL. I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from email address yvonne.godson@hysmlaw.com to the personsat the email addresseslisted on the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic messageor other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. [] BY PERSONAL SERVICE. I caused the documents described aboveto be served on the parties to this action by requesting that a messenger from ASAP Legal Solution Attorney Services deliver true copies of the above-named documents, enclosed in sealed envelopes. 16 Executed on July 25, 2016, at Los Angeles, California. [X] (State) I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsofthe State of California that the above is true and correct. ve Ponpepoce 17 SERVICE LIST RAND RESOURCES, LLC and CARSONEL CAMINO, LLC v. LEONARD BLOOM, ETAL. LASC CASE NO. BC564093 APPELLATE CASE NO. B264493 Counsel for Defendants/Respondents City of Carson and James Dear Sunny Soltani Christine Burrows ALESHIRE & WYNDER LLP 2361 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 475 El Segundo, CA 90245 Email: cburrows@awattorneys.com Counsel for Defendants/Respondents Leonard Bloom and US Capital LLC John V. Tamborelli TAMBORELLI LAW GROUP 21700 Oxnard Street, Suite 1590 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 Email: Jtamborelli@lawtlg.com 18