BANNING RANCH CONSERVANCY v. CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH (NEWPORT BANNING RANCH)

Appellants, City of Newport Beach and City of Newport Beach City Council, and Real Parties in Interest, Newport Banning Ranch, LLC, Aera Energy, LLC, and Cherokee Newport Beach, LLC, Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.July 21, 2015

$227473 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA BANNING RANCH CONSERVANCY, Plaintiff and Appellant, SUPREME COURT rHLED V. - JUL 21 2015 CITY OF NEWPORTBEACH,et al., Defendants and Appellants, Frank A. McGuire Clark NEWPORT BANNING RANCH LLC,et al., Deputy r “BC ‘ Real Parties in Interest and Appellants. Ve 2510); "acco DEFENDANTS, REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, AND APPELLANTS’ ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW After a Decision by the Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District, Division Three Case No. G049691 Reversing a Judgmentofthe Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Orange, The Honorable Robert Louis Becking, Temporary Judge. Case No. 30-2012-00593557 OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY REMY MOOSE MANLEY, LLP CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH *WHITMAN F. MANLEY,SBN 130972 *A RON HARP, SBN 190665 JENNIFER S. HOLMAN, SBN 194681: City Attorney 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800 LEONIE MULVIHILL, SBN 184851 Sacramento, California 95814 Assistant City Attorney Telephone: (916) 443-2745 P.O. Box 1768 Facsimile: (916) 443-9017 Newport Beach, California 92658 wmanley@rmmenvirolaw.com Telephone: (949) 644-3131 Facsimile: (949) 644-3139 aharp@newportbeachca.gov Attorneysfor Defendants and Appellants City ofNewport Beachetal. (Counsel continued on next page) S227473 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA BANNING RANCH CONSERVANCY, Plaintiff and Appellant, Vv. CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH,et al., Defendants and Appellants, NEWPORT BANNING RANCH LLC,etal., Real Parties in Interest and Appellants. DEFENDANTS, REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, AND APPELLANTS’ ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW After a Decision by the Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District, Division Three Case No. G049691 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Orange, The Honorable Robert Louis Becking, Temporary Judge. Case No. 30-2012-00593557 OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY REMY MOOSE MANLEY, LLP CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH *WHITMAN F. MANLEY, SBN 130972 *A RON HARP, SBN 190665 JENNIFER S. HOLMAN,SBN 194681 City Attorney _ 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800 LEONIE MULVIHILL, SBN 184851 Sacramento, California 95814 Assistant City Attorney Telephone: (916) 443-2745 P.O. Box 1768 Facsimile: (916) 443-9017 Newport Beach, California 92658 wmanley@rmmenvirolaw.com Telephone: (949) 644-3131 Facsimile: (949) 644-3139 aharp@newportbeachca.gov Attorneysfor Defendants and Appellants City ofNewport Beachetal. (Counsel continued on next page) *Susan K. Hori, SBN 91429 Benjamin G. Shatz, SBN 160229 MANATT PHELPS & PHILLIPS 695 Town Center Drive, 14th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: (714) 371-2500 Facsimile: (714) 371-2550 shori@manatt.com Attorneysfor Real Parties in Interest Newport Banning Ranch LLC; Area Energy LLC; Cherokee Newport Beach, LLC TABLE OF CONTENTS Page — TABLE OF CONTENTS....0....cccccececeesceeseeeeeeeeesetseseresseesssecesscessasceasesesaaoenees i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..0.....eeeeceeccseseeceneeeseeteseeeeaeeeceseeeesseesesessaseesseeenees ii I. INTRODUCTION 0... ceccececscecesceeteecteeeeeaceceeeeeeasecseeenecssesaeeeseaesesasaas 1 Il. OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REVIEW oceeeeceeceeceeeeereeees2 A. _Douda v. California Coastal Commission is not in conflict with, or even in tension with, the Opinion.............e3 B. The Opinion does not contravene section 30336 ofthe Coastal AcCto....cccccccccccssseccsseecsssececeeeeeseeeeessacescsssesssesseessaeeeeesseees 5 C. The Opinion does not conflict with Rancho Cordova.............6 D. The Opinion is consistent with settled law regarding CEQAceccccssssescsssecssseerssecesssececessescssuesssssecessueesssssssssstssssevessnees9 Ill. CONCLUSION ..cseccsseeesescseescsessseteeenessuseessussersescesecieseessusessaessesees 11 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT\veecccsssesssstscssseeessseesssssseeeeeveeessseessees 12 TABLEOF AUTHORITIES California Cases Page(s) Anderson First Coalition v. City-ofAnderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173 oo... ee ececessececeeeerneeeseeeeeessseeseesesesessceeesneseaes 8 Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209ooo.cecceeeeseeeeeeeeeerrenessrseeeatene 2, 3,9, 10 California Native Plant Society v. City ofRancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603 0...ceesceeeecneeteeeseeerseeeseeseeseeeseesenees 3, 6, 7,8 Douda v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th L181 oo.ceeececeeeeneeceeeeneseeeessseeeesensaeees 3,4,5 Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County ofOrange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777 oo... eseescseseereteeeessesssessssssessesessesseseesseesseatenes 8 Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural etc. County v. Board ofSupervisors (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332 oo. cecceeeccesceneceeeeseeseessessesssseseesssenseeceseeaseess 8 Jamieson v. City Council ofCity ofCarpinteria (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 755 ....ceeeeeeeeeeseees deseaecuceeseeaceatsaeseeesesseeaeeneesatenees 8 Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board ofSupervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99 occeeeeeeeeesseneeneees soseseneaneneeneeneentenencenedieeneaees 1,8 Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City ofOakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704 oo... cecccescceeesecreeseesseeseesseseesseeeeeeeseeeetsesssseeeeeney 8 Woodward Park HomeownersAssn., Inc. v. City ofFresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683 occceceseeseeececeeeeseeecrecseeseseeseseseesesecseeseenaees 8 li TABLE OF AUTHORITIES California Statutes Page(s) Public Resources Code section BOQoo.ceceeneeeeeeetereceeneeeteeeeeeee4 30336 ...ccsccscccsccsssssessesseeessseenses 5,6 California Rules of Court Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)...........ccccccccessceesseeteteseeecesseeesneesnseeees 2,11 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(C)(1)ee eeeeeeceeeesseeteereeeseeeseeetesneeeaseeeeaecine4 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(C)(2)eee eeeceessceessseeeeesseseeseseeesensneeneees 4,5 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(G)(1) .....ceeceecceseeceeeceeseeseeeesseseecneetsaeesesaeoens 12 ili 1. INTRODUCTION The Court of Appeal’s well-reasoned Opinion ! does not conflict with established case law interpreting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Planning and Zoning Law or the California Coastal Act. Nordoes the Opinion raise any important legal questions. The Opinionis not “contrary” to any existing precedent. Banning Ranch Conservancy (BRC)scoffs at the notion advanced by the Court of Appeal — that courts ought to defer to those decisionmakers in the interpretation of their own planning documents - noting that courts are called upon to makelife-and-death decisions daily, and thus are capable of interpreting a local agency’s planning document. (Petition for Review,p. 29, citing Opn., p. 28.) The problem with this argumentis notthat the courts are incapable of such review,but that the searching review advocated by BRC would be improper. Case law uniformly recognizes that somedecisionsare properly committed not to the courts, but to local officials who are directly accountable to those who elected them.(See, e.g., Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board ofSupervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 142.) The Court of Appeal’s decision in this case merely reflects a straightforward application ofthis settled principle. BRC’s other grounds for review are similarly misguided. BRC advances two theories based on the Coastal Act, even though BRCalleged ' Citation to the Opinion (Opn.) are to the Slip Opinion. Theofficial published decision is available at 236 Cal.App.4th 1341. no claims under the Coastal Act, and even though BRC pursued none of these argumentsat trial or on appeal. BRCalso seeks review of the Court ofAppeal’s ruling on its CEQA claim. Here, too, review is unwarranted. The court’s CEQA ruling is entirely consistent with, if not compelled by, a published decision in earlier litigation involving these sameparties. (Banning Ranch Conservancyv. City ofNewport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1233-1234 (Banning Ranch Conservancy 1), petition for review denied March 27, 2013.) I. OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REVIEW BRCfails to demonstrate that Supreme Court review is warranted underthe rules of court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b).) BRC devotes little attention to the application of these principles. BRC advances four issuesthat, in its view, warrant review. Noneis persuasive. The first two issues arise under the Coastal Act and were not previously raised in either the trial court or the Court of Appeal. - The second two,arising under the Planning and Zoning Law and CEQA,werelitigated, but do not warrant review. In the trial court, BRC originally prevailed on the Planning and Zoning Law claim. Thetrial court granted BRC’s petition based on its conclusion that the Projectis inconsistent with the City’s General Plan, particularly Strategy “[LU] 6.5.6, in that the City failed to coordinate and work with the Coastal Commission in identifying which wetlands and habitats present in Banning Ranch would be preserved, restored or developed, prior to its approval of the Project.” In particular, the court held that the City had to “coordinate” with the Coastal Commission to identify “environmentally sensitive habitat areas” (ESHA) on the project site prior to the City’s approvalofthe project. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court cited California Native Plant Society v. City ofRancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603 (Rancho Cordova). (Opn., p. 17.) Thetrial court denied BRC’s CEQAclaim,citing Banning Ranch Conservancy I, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1233-1234,for the proposition that the City did not need to predictin its environmental impact report (EIR) where the Coastal Commission would find ESHA onthesite. (Opn., p. 17.) The Court of Appeal affirmed on the CEQAissue, but reversed on the Planning and Zoning law claim, finding that the City’s interpretation of its own general plan was reasonable and notarbitrary and capricious. This determination was consistent with abundant case law. As explained below, no ground for review exists here. There is neither a split of authority, nor an important question of law at issue. There is nothing new,novel, or important warranting this Court’s attention. The Petition should therefore be denied. A. Douda v. California Coastal Commission is not in conflict with, or even in tension with, the Opinion. BRC arguesthat the Opinion is purportedly in irreconcilable conflict with Douda v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1181 (Douda). The Court need not consider this argument. As the Court of Appeal observed, “[w]e have not been pointed to any authority indicating that the City is required under the Coastal Act to identify ESHA in a projectnot coveredby a coastal land use plan.” (Opn., p. 23, fn. 13.) That statementis accurate. BRC did not cite Douda, or any other case, for that proposition. BRC’s appellate briefing spanned 133 pages, yet BRC cited Douda zero times. BRC thus seeks review based on a purported conflict with a case BRC hasnever before discussed on an issue it neverraised. This Court will not consider an issue that was not raised during the briefing on the merits or at the very least in a petition for rehearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(c)(1), (c)(2).) Those policies apply with full force to this case. Moreover, Doudais inapplicable. Douda is a Coastal Act case, not a CEQAcase. The Court ofAppeal specifically. noted that there are no claims pending under the Coastal Act here. (Opn., p. 23, fn. 13 [“there is not a Coastal Act claim before this court’’].) Douda does not even mention CEQA,nordoesit discuss a local agency’s duty under CEQAto forecast future Coastal Act determinations when an agencyis not and cannotact as a decisionmaker under the Coastal Act. Whether habitat constitutes “ESHA”is a determination made under the Coastal Act. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30240.) Simply put, nothing in Douda even suggests that a local agency has to makegratuitous, non-binding ESHA predictions in the context of CEQA — whichis essentially the allegation here. In short, Douda is irrelevant. B. The Opinion does not contravenesection 30336 of the Coastal Act. BRCalso argues that the Opinion “contravenes”section 30336 of the Coastal Act and conflicts with Douda’s interpretation of this provision. There are four reasons why review ofthis issue is unwarranted. First, BRC did not bring any alleged errors with respect to section 30336 to the Court of Appeals’ attention. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) Second, as the Opinion notes, none ofBRC’s claimsarises under the Coastal Act. (Opn., p. 23, fn. 13.) Third, Douda does notcite, muchless discuss, section 30336,so its relevance to BRC’s argumentis obscure. Fourth, on its own terms, section 30336 stops far short of requiring the City to predict where the Coastal Commission would find ESHA on Banning Ranch. That section states: The commissionshall, to the maximum extent feasible, assist local governments in exercising the planning and regulatory powers and responsibilities provided for by this division wherethe local governmentelects to exercise those powers and responsibilities and requests assistance from the commission, and shall cooperate with and assist other public agencies in carrying out this division. Similarly, every public agency, including regional and state agencies andlocal governments, shall cooperate with the commission andshall, to the extent their resources permit, provide any advice, assistance, or information the commission may require to perform its duties and to more effectively exerciseits authority. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30336.) A general duty to “cooperate” cannot be construed as a legal obligation to predict permitting decisions that will be 5 madebythe Coastal Commission some dayin the future. (See Opn., p. 23, fn. 13 [rejecting the notion that section 30336 required the City to forecast “ESHA designationsin its EIR’’].} C. The Opinion does not conflictwith Rancho Cordova. BRCarguesthat the Opinion is inconsistent with in Rancho Cordova, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 603. BRC is wrong. The Opinion found that the City’s interpretation of, and adherenceto, its general plan was not arbitrary and capricious. (Opn., p. 28.) The Rancho Cordova court applied the same standard of review, and reached the opposite conclusion based on a different policy and a different record. Thereis no split in authority. The Opinion explained the policies at issue in Rancho Cordova were not substantially similar to the policies at issue in this case. In Rancho Cordova, the Court ofAppeal considered Rancho Cordova General Plan Action NR.1.7.1, which stated: [F]or those areas in which special-status species are found or likely to occur or where the presence of species can be reasonably inferred, the City shall require mitigation of impacts to those species that ensure that the project does not contribute to the decline of the affected species populations in the region to the extent that their decline would impact the viability of the regional population. Mitigation shall be designed by the City in coordination with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)and the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), and shall emphasize a multi-species approach to the maximum extent feasible. This may include developmentor participation in a habitat conservation plan. (Rancho Cordova, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 635, emphasisin original.) The Rancho Cordova court held that this measure required more than mere “consultation” with USFWS and CDFG,which is normally understood as notice and opportunity to submit comments. The word“coordination” implies something more — a measure of “cooperation.” The court left open how much more cooperation would be required tosatisfy this policy, except to note that the policy did not require the city to “subordinate itself to state and federal agencies by implementing their comments and taking their direction.” (/d. at pp. 641-642.) BRCargues that Rancho Cordova compels a similar conclusion here. As the Court of Appeal noted, however, the “strategy” at issue here is substantially different from the policy in Rancho Cordova. Rancho Cordova’s policy NR 1.7.1 required (1) that the city “coordinate” with specific agencies, (2) that the city coordinate on a specific task, and (3) that, by its very nature, the city had to complete the task — adoption of mitigation — prior to approving the project. (Opn., p. 26.) The City’s Strategy LU 6.5.6 is muchless specific: [{] Work with appropriate state and federal agencies to identify wetlands and habitats to be preserved and/or restored and those on which developmentwill be permitted. The strategy does not even mention the Coastal Commission. The strategy uses the term “work with”rather than “coordinate.” And the strategy provides no specific time frame for completing this obligation. (Opn., p. 26.) The Court of Appeal concludedthat the City’s interpretation — that its work with the various agencies is an ongoing processthat did not have to be fully satisfied before project approval — was not arbitrary and capricious: “Our review of the general plan and the recordin this case leads us to concludethat the City’s interpretation of the process contemplated by LU 6.5.6 and its ensuing consistency finding are reasonable.” (Opn., pp. 18- 22.) The court concluded that the general commitmentto “work with” agencies could not be read to impose more without inventing obligations “out of thin air.” (Opn., p. 28.) The Opinionis entirely consistent with Rancho Cordova, and with the decisions ofall the other appellate districts addressing the standard of review governing claims under the Planning and Zoning Law.? Review is unwarranted. ? See, e.g., Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City ofOakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 717 (First District: noting strong presumption in favor of agency’s interpretation; reviewing only for abuse of discretion); Jamieson v. City Council ofCity ofCarpinteria (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 755, 763 (Second District: noting great deference due to the local agency’s consistency determination; “the body which adopted the general plan policies in its legislative capacity has unique competenceto interpret those policies when applying them in its adjudicatory capacity” and such a determination cannot be overturned except on showing abuseofdiscretion); Families Unafraid to Uphold Ruraletc. County v. Board ofSupervisors (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1338 (Third District: local governing body’s determination that a project is consistent with a general plan is subject to judicial review underthe abuse ofdiscretion standard); Anderson First Coalition v. City ofAnderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1192 (Third District: an agency’s decision for consistency with its own general plan,is accorded great deference; if the agency’s decision is not arbitrary, capricious, unsupported, or procedurally unfair, it is upheld); Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County ofOrange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 782 (Fourth District: applying “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review to Planning and Zoning Law claim); Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City ofFresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 706 (Fifth District: deferential standard governs city’s determination that the project was consistent with the general plan; such a determination can be overturned only on abuse ofdiscretion); Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board ofSupervisors, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141-142 (Sixth (Continued) D. The Opinien is consistent with settled law regarding CEQA. BRCargues that the Opinion departs from established law on CEQA. BRC’spetition, however, does not even cite the main decision relied on by boththetrial court and the Court of Appeal: Banning Ranch Conservancy I, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 1209. This omissionis particularly startling because Banning Ranch Conservancy I involved the sameparties, and becausethe trial court in this case sharply criticized BRC for ignoring the casein itstrial briefs. BRCargues that under CEQAthe City was required to identify ESHA in the EIR, citing the general obligation that the EIR must use best efforts to disclose “all it reasonably can” in the EIR.(Petition for Review, p. 32.) The Opinion upheld the EIR’s discussion ofthis issue, noting that the issue had already been resolved in Banning Ranch ConservancyI, which involved the same parties, an adjacent property, and indistinguishable contentions by BRC. (Opn., p. 30.) In that case, BRC argued there that the city had to identify ESHA in an EIR prepared for a park project ona parcel next door to Banning Ranch. The Banning Ranch Conservancy I court held that the city was not required to speculate about whether the Coastal Commission would find ESHA onsite. The city merely had to identify potential inconsistencies with the Coastal Act, which it did. (Continued) District: noting unique competence of local agencyto interpret its own general plan; reviewing for abuse of discretion in that light). (Banning Ranch Conservancy I, supra, at pp. 1233-1234.) BRC sought review in that first case, which was denied. In this case, the court concluded that the City complied with CEQA. The court noted the extensive and thorough environmental review prepared for the Project. (Opn., p. 12.) The City opted not to “speculate” about “potential ESHA,” but “CEQA doesnot require the City to prognosticate as to the likelihood ofESHA determinations” during the Coastal Commission’s review under the Coastal Act. (/d., p. 31.) In reaching this conclusion, the court merely applied the settled rule established by Banning Ranch Conservancy I. (Ibid.) ? //1 | //I //1 /// /// //1 //1 3 Underlying BRC’s CEQAargumentis the contention that the City suppressed a report prepared by Glen Lukos in 2008. (Petition for Review, pp. 32-33.) The 2008 Lukos Report was madepublic, and in fact BRC submitted comments on the report. For reasons that are discussed at length in the Clerk’s Transcript, the report wasinitially not included in the Administrative Record. The Court ofAppeal, however, indisputably included the 2008 Lukos Report in the Administrative Record, and considered the report in reaching its conclusions. (Opn., p. 11, fn. 10.) Thus, the record belies BRC’s arguments pertaining to the Lukosreport. 10 Because BRC’spetition ignores settled law, and points to no important question or lack of uniformity requiring Supreme Court review, the Court should deny BRC’spetition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500 (b).) Tit. CONCLUSION This Court should deny review. Dated: July 20, 2015 REMY MOOSE MANLEY LLP By: Mirus!Manley Whitman F. Manley Attorneys for Defendants andeae CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH,etal. 11 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1)) I, Whitman F. Manley, declare as follows: 1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before the courts of the State of California, and am oneofthe attorneys for the CITY OF NEWPORTBEACH,et al., in this action. 2. California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1), states that an answerto a petition for review produced on a computer must not exceed 8,400 words, including footnotes. 3. This Answerto Petition for Review was produced on a computer using a word processing program. This Answerconsists of 2,692 words, including footnotes but excluding the caption page, tables andthis certificate, as counted by the word processingprogram. Dated: July 20, 2015 REMY MOOSE MANLEY LLP By: edudranaol, Whitman F. Manley Attorneys for Defendants andZL CITY OF NEWPORTBEACH,etal. 12 Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beach etal. California Supreme Court Case No. 8227473 (Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three, Case No. G049691) (County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2012-00593557-CU-WM-CXC) PROOF OF SERVICE SERVICE LIST I, Angela Powers, am a citizen of the United States, employedin the City and County of Sacramento. Mybusiness address is 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800, Sacramento, California 95814. My email addressis vwood@rmmenvirolaw.com.I am overthe age of 18 years and nota party to the above-entitled action. I am familiar with Remy Moose Manley, LLP's practice whereby the mail is sealed, given the appropriate postage and placed in a designated mail collection area. Each day's mail is collected and deposited in a U.S. mailbox after the close of each day's business. On July 20, 2015, I served the following: DEFENDANTS, REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, AND APPELLANTS’ ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW O Onthe parties in this action by causing a true copythereofto be placed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing mail addressed as follows;or MI Onthe parties in this action by causing a true copy thereofto be delivered via Federal Express to the following person(s)or their representative at the address(es) listed below; or O As a courtesy copy on the parties in this action by causing a true copy thereof to be electronically delivered via the internet to the following person(s) or representative at the electronic mail address(es) listed below: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST | I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Proof of Service was executed this 20th day of July, 2015, at Sacramento, California. Angela Powers Banning RanchConservancy v. City ofNewport Beach etal. California Supreme Court Case No. 8227473 (Fourth District Court ofAppeal, Division Three, Case No. G049691) (County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2012-00593557-CU-WM-CXC) PROOF OF SERVICE SERVICELIST John G. McClendon David H. Mann LEIBOLD McCLENDON & MANN 23422 Mill Creek Drive, Suite 105 Laguna Hills, CA 92653 Telephone: (949) 457-6300 Facsimile: (949) 457-6305 Email: _ John@cega.com Kamala D.Harris ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA Jamee Jordan Patterson SUPERVISINGDEPUTYATTORNEYGENERAL 600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 San Diego, CA 92186 P.O. Box 85266 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 645-2023 Facsimile: (619) 645-2010 Email: Jamee.Patterson@doj.ca.gov Hope Schmeltzer, Chief Counsel Louise Warren, Staff Counsel California Coastal Commission 45 FremontStreet, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94105 Email: Hope.Schmeltzer@coastal.ca.gov Warren.Louise@coastal.ca.gov Honorable Kim G. Dunning Orange County Superior Court 751 West Santa Ana Boulevard Department CX104 Santa Ana, CA 92701 Attorneysfor Petitioners Banning Ranch Conservancy Attorneysfor Respondent and Cross-Appellant Banning Ranch Conservancy VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS AttorneysforAmicus Curiae California Coastal Commission VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beach etal. California Supreme Court Case No. $227473 (Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three, Case No. G049691) (County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2012-00593557-CU-WM-CXC) PROOF OF SERVICE SERVICE.LIST Clerk of the Court VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS California Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division 3 601 West Santa Ana Boulevard Santa Ana, CA 92701 Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beachetal. California Supreme Court Case No. 8227473 (Fourth District Court ofAppeal, Division Three, Case No. G049691) (County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2012-00593557-CU-WM-CXC) AMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE SERVICELIST I, Angela Powers,am citizen of the United States, employedin the City and County of Sacramento. My business address is 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800, Sacramento, California 95814. My email addressis vwood@rmmenvirolaw.com. I am overthe age of 18 years and not a party to the above-entitled action. I am familiar with Remy Moose Manley, LLP's practice whereby the mailis sealed, given the appropriate postage andplacedin a designated mail collection area. Each day's mail is collected and deposited in a U.S. mailbox after the close of each day's business. On July 20, 2015, I served the following: DEFENDANTS, REAL PARTIESIN INTEREST, AND APPELLANTS’ ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW a On theparties in this action by causing a true copy thereof to be placed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing mail addressed as follows; or Vv Onthe parties in this action by causing a true copy thereof to be delivered via Federal Express to the following person(s)ortheir representative at the address(es) listed below;or Asacourtesy copy onthe parties in this action by causing a true copy thereofto be electronically delivered via the internet to the following person(s) or representative at the electronic mail address(es) listed below: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoingis true and correct and that this Proof of Service was executed this 20th day of July, 2015, at Sacramento, California. Angela Powers Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beachetal. California Supreme Court Case No. 8227473 (Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three, Case No. G049691) (County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2012-00593557-CU-WM-CXC) AMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE SERVICE LIST John G. McClendon David H. Mann LEIBOLD McCLENDON & MANN 23422 Mill Creek Drive, Suite 105 LagunaHills, CA 92653 Telephone: (949) 457-6300 Facsimile: (949) 457-6305 Email: John@ceqa.com Kamala D. Harris ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA Jamee Jordan Patterson SUPERVISINGDEPUTYATTORNEYGENERAL 600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 San Diego, CA 92186 P.O. Box 85266 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 645-2023 Facsimile: (619) 645-2010 Email: Jamee.Patterson@doj.ca.gov Hope Schmeltzer, Chief Counsel Louise Warren, Staff Counsel California Coastal Commission 45 FremontStreet, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94105 Email: Hope.Schmeltzer@coastal.ca.gov Warren.Louise@coastal.ca.gov Honorable Robert Louis Becking Orange County Superior Court 751 West Santa Ana Boulevard Department CX104 Santa Ana, CA 92701 Attorneysfor Petitioners Banning Ranch Conservancy Attorneysfor Respondent and Cross-Appellant Banning Ranch Conservancy VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS AttorneysforAmicus Curiae California Coastal Commission VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beachetal. California Supreme Court Case No. 8227473 (Fourth District Court ofAppeal, Division Three, Case No. G049691) (County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2012-00593557-CU-WM-CXC) AMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE SERVICE LIST Clerk of the Court VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS California Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division 3 601 West Santa Ana Boulevard Santa Ana, CA 92701