SAN BUENAVENTURA, CITY OF v. UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICTAmicus Curiae Brief of Santa Ynez River Water Conservation DistrictCal.November 23, 2015SUPREEME CCURT COPY No. 8226036 Exempt From Filing Fee - [Gov. Code §6103] In the Supreme Court - ofthe SUPREME COURT State of California _ : FIL ED City of San Buenaventura | NOV 23 2015 / Plaintifh Cross-Defendant and Respondent/Cross-Appellant Frank A. McGuire Clerk vs. Deputy United Water Conservation District and Board of Directors of United Water Conservation District Defendant, Cross-Complainants and Appellants/Cross-Respondents APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE AN AMICUS CURIAE | BRIEF AND ACCOMPANYINGAMICUS CURIAEBRIEF IN SUPPORT OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATIONDISTRICT Of a Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Case No. B251810 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California County of Santa Barbara, Case Nos. VENCI00401714 and 1414739 Honorable Thomas P. Anderle, Judge Presiding THE LAW OFFICES OF YOUNG WOOLDRIDGE, LLP Ernest A. Conant (SBN 089111) Jeffrey J. Patrick (SBN285553) 1800 30% Street, 4% Floor Bakersfield, CA 93301 Telephone: 661-327-9661 Facsimile: 661-327-0720 Email: econant@youngwooldridge.com jpatrick@youngwooldridge.com Attorneys for Applicant and Amicus Curiae Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District 38390.000 1 No. 8226036 | Exempt From Filing Fee . 7 [Gov. Code §6103] In the Supreme Court ofthe State of California City of San Buenaventura Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent/Cross-Appellant VS. United Water Conservation District and Board of Directors of United Water Conservation District. Defendant, Cross-Complainants and Appellants/Cross-Respondents APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE AN AMICUS CURIAE | BRIEF AND ACCOMPANYINGAMICUS CURIAEBRIEF IN SUPPORT OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT Of a Published Decision ofthe . Second Appellate District, Case No. B251810 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California County of Santa Barbara, Case Nos. VENCI 00401714 and 1414739 Honorable ThomasP.Anderle, Judge Presiding THE LAW OFFICES OF YOUNG WOOLDRIDGE,LLP Ermest A. Conant (SBN 089111) Jeffrey J. Patrick (SBN285553) 1800 30® Street, 4" Floor Bakersfield, CA 93301 Telephone: 661-327-9661 Facsimile: 661-327-0720 Email: econant@youngwooldridge.com jpatrick@youngwooldridge.com Attorneys for Applicant and Amicus Curiae Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District 38390.000 L CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 8.208 and 8.488, the undersigned counsel for Applicant and Amicus Curiae Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District certifies that there are no interested entities or persons that must be listed under Rule 8.208. Executed this 17"day ofNovember, 2015, in Bakersfield, California. J] Lf UZ ve P ajfigVi TO THE HONORABLETANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE: | Amicus Curiae, the Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District (“SYRWCD”) hereby requests, per California Rule of Court, Rule 8.520(f)(1), permission to file the attached brief in support of United Water Conservation District in this matter. SYRWCD,as one of only eleven water conservation districts in the State of California, has a significant stakein the outcome ofthis case and, in particular, this Court’s resolution of the applicability of Water Code section 75594’s mandatedrate ratios to SYRWCD’s groundwater charges imposed pursuant to Water Code section 75500 et seg. SYRWCD imposes groundwater charges pursuant to Water Code section 75594 to fund groundwater managementactivities within its jurisdiction and has done so for the past 37 years. SYRWCDwill be significantly affected by this Court’s determination ofwhether groundwater charges are subject to Proposition 218 or Proposition 26 requirements. Pursuant to California Rule of Court, Rule 8.520, subdivisions (£)(4)(A)G andii) and (f)(4)(B), SYRWCDdeclares that Musick, Peeler & Garret, LLP, attorneys for United Water Conservation District provided commentary on the accompanying brief but that no party nor any counselin the pending appeal made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or submission ofthe accompanying brief and that no other personorentity, other than SYRWCDand counselin this appeal, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission ofthe accompanyingbrief. 1. As Water Conservation Districts are Mandated to Impose Water Code Section 75594’s Rate Ratio as Part of their Groundwater Charges, SYRWCDhas a Significant Interest in the Outcome of this Appeal. SYRWCDhasbeen imposing a groundwater charge pursuantto Water Code section 75500 et seq. and, specifically, Water Code section 75 594, forthe past 37 years. SYRWCDrelies on fees from these chargesto fund groundwater managementactivities within its jurisdiction. This Court’s determination on the constitutionality of Water Code section 75594 and whether water conservation districts need to comply with Proposition 218 or Proposition 26 when imposing groundwater charges will significantly affect SYRWCD’s daily and ongoing administration, budget, _ operations and groundwater managementactivities. 2. The Amicus Curiae Brief Assists this Court by Succinctly Discussing the Legal and Practical Defects in Characterizing Groundwater Charges as Property Related Services Fees Subject to Proposition 218 and the Legal and Practical Merits of Characterizing the Fees as Regulatory Fees Subject to Proposition 26. The accompanying Amicus Curiae Briefprovidesanalysis of both the practical and legal defects of characterizing a groundwater charge as a property related service fee pursuant to Proposition 218 and the difficulties such a characterization would place on public agencies that impose groundwater charges to fund groundwater managementactivities. The brief analogizes groundwater charges to current regulatory fees and contrasts groundwater managementfrom traditional property related services. The brief further demonstrates that legally, practically and as a matter ofpublic policy, groundwater charges are properly characterized as regulatory fees underProposition 26 and that the Appellate Court’s holding should stand. 4 Dated: November 17, 2015 Respectfully submitted: The Law Offices of Young Wooldridge, LLP J. Patrick, Esq. rneys for Applicant and Amicus Curiae: Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District No. $226036 Exempt From Filing Fee [Gov. Code §6103] In the Supreme Court of the State of California City of San Buenaventura Plaintiff; Cross-Defendant and Respondent/Cross-Appellant VS. United Water Conservation District and Board of Directors of United Water Conservation District . Defendant, Cross-Complainants andAppellants/Cross-Respondents AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATIONDISTRICT Of a Published Decision ofthe Second Appellate District, Case No. B251810 Reversing a Judgmentofthe Superior Court of the State of California _ County of Santa Barbara, Case Nos.VENCI 00401714 and 1414739 Honorable Thomas P. Anderle, Judge Presiding THE LAW OFFICES OF YOUNG WOOLDRIDGE, LLP Ernest A. Conant (SBN 089111) Jeffrey J. Patrick (SBN 285553) 1800 30" Street, 4" Floor Bakersfield, CA 93301 Telephone: 661-327-9661 Facsimile: 661-327-0720 Email: econant@youngwooldridge.com jpatrick@youngwooldridge.com Attorneys for Applicant and Amicus Curiae Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION.....ccccccscssscsesesscsessesececeesesesesecseseseensassnssacersesscavsseeesessensass 11 I. GROUNDWATER CHARGES ARE NOT PROPERTY IL. RELATED FEES PURSUANTTO PROPOSITION218......... 12 A. Groundwater Charges are Imposed Differently from, and for a Different Purpose than, Property Related Service Fees 12 . The Purpose of Property Related Service Fees Under Proposition 218 is to Fund a Service that Directly Benefits an Identifiable Parcel oteeeeeseessesssecseeseesessesssaeessessenens 13 . The Purpose of Groundwater Chargesis to Fund - Groundwater Management Activities that Conserve the Viability of the Groundwater Basin as a Public Resource.... 14 . The Proportional Cost of Groundwater Management Cannot be Attributed to a Parcel as Required by Proposition 218 without that Attribution Being an Arbitrary Figure.............. 16 As UWCDdoesnot Provide a Property Related Service, it is Irrelevant Whether or not Groundwater Chargesare Chargedas an Incident of Property Ownership .................... 19 GROUNDWATER CHARGES ARE REGULATORY FEES UNDER ARTICLE XIIIC, SECTION 1, | ‘ SUBDIVISIONS(e)(1), (€)(2) AND (€)(3) .... ee eeeeteeeeeeeeeeeees 20 A. UWCD’s Groundwater Charges Funda Specific Benefit and Privilege Only Available to Fee Payors ...........eee 20 B. Groundwater Charges Fund Specific Services that Benefit Only Fee Payor... ceseescccseecsceesceeeecsesscesssetseseseseeseesonseesnes 2D C. Groundwater Charges Fund UWCD’s Well Registration and Monitoring Programs..............:csssscsssceseesnseeesesaseeseneeeees 24 D. UWCD’s Groundwater Charges do not Exceed the Reasonable Costs to UWCDofProviding the Benefits and Services and the Fee Ratio Mandated by Water Code Section 75594 is Constitutional as Applied...ee 25 E. Public Policy Favoring Conservation Requires Groundwater Charges be Characterized as Regulatory FOES oo... eceseccceeseceesceeesseeessenceseesneecessaeesesseesessscesessenessnssassenssees 26 Ill. CLARITY REGARDING GROUNDWATER CHARGESIS PARAMOUNT1...ceesseeeecneessessecessseessessssseecsnssasseneseeeseeneen 28 _ IV. SUBSTANTIALEVIDENCE IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS......ee eecesceeeceeecsectsessessseessasessssessseeseseness 29 CONCLUSION..........sesseeeateaceseesseasesesasesaeseesseneeeseeeeseesesneateseeatenssesaeeneees 32 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES California Cases Apartment Association, Richmond v. Shasta Community Services District (2004) 32 Cal4th 409 occecssseessssssssseeeseessssseeneseneseseressseseseesseseseasseneesees 19 Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 217 oo... eecseessceesecsesseeseseeseneeccessesessseoseeeseseaes 14, 18 Capistrano Taxpayers Association v. City ofSan Juan Capistrano (2015) 235 CalApp.4th 1493oo.ceeesccsessesseesseteeeeesessersasseseseenereaes 26, 28 Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564...ecscsesscssceceesecesetserecnecseeseeseseseeascsaseseeneesaerenees 30 Lowev. California Resource Agency (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149...eeeeeeeteseeeeteneeneesteeteteeeneeneees 31-32 McCoyv. Heart Corp. 7 (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 842.esessceseeescesseeesetssesceesssseseeseesseseserseteneees 31 Moorev. City ofLemon Grove (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 363.0... esecscseceseeseteeeseescsersesssessessneeeass 29, 30, 32 Morgany. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 912.0... ceccessseseseeeserseeteeserssseeeesscsseeseeeaes 30 Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency v. Amrhein (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1391 ooeeeeeeseereeereeneeenees 15, 19, 22, 28 San Bernardino v. Riverside (1921) 186 Cal. 7, 29...ccceccccsesecsecseesseesecesecesceneeeessecseeaseneseeeessesseeeenes 19 Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1997) 15 Cal4th 866, 870 oo...eceseseeseeeesseeseeseesesseseseeesesseessaseeseseenenenes 22 Treatises 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) | Real Prop, § 958, p.1152 oo... ceecccssssssessecseeeseecesseeenaceeeesesaesseeeaseneeneseneeseens 19 9 Slater, Cal. Water Law and Policy (1995) § 2.01, p. 2-8 oo...eeeeeeeteeee 19 . State Statutes Code of Civil Procedure § 860..........:...ccccssecscessecetsecseecesneesssseeeeseeecesnneeseaes 29 Water Code§ 100..sssssssssssstessssasssssmnssssssisetanseesnstesanseeetensteeste 22, 26 Water Code § 370-374 sccsssssssssssssssssesssseseeee ssesstssassssssusesesasssseevse 22, 26 Water Code § 10700... .cccsccsscsseccsseceeesssescesesesesseeessneseaseeessaeeeseseneeesaeeens 17 Water Code § 10730(a) vcccccccccsccsscssssessssssssssescssseseessssessseseesseeeees 18, 29 Water Code § 10730.2ecsscssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssseeeeenseccusssssssusnessenn 18, 29 Water Code § 10730.2() .....ccecesecessssereccsseseseeseeessseseeeeesceectseessaeessseesneees 18 Water Code § 10730.2(a)(3) ou... .ccccssccessssessesseessceceseessnceessaceereeesnesssseesers 18 Water Code § 12992... ceecsssssesseresssssessssnenssesesssesneeesnseesseeseaseneesaeens 22, 26 Water Code § 75500 cceesccsesee seoseeeeee secsssuecesssssssessssuucesssssuvecesuetsssssniseeesssasee 11 Water Code § 75501... ccccsessssssescssssesssesesesesesesesecsesesescseseseneaeseeserssesseeee 13 Water Code § 75503........cccssscsscssseccsssecesssecessssnesteceenees veseseseeseeeaeneneaneeeees 13 Water Code § 75504.....cssescscecserseecnseneessninsssanessnueessnnessnressseesssnneeeneeen 13 Water Code § 75522...sssssssestessissinssststustnstinstisetisssinseissinetestie 1B Water Code § 75594...ceeeseeseeeeeseeaceeenseeseeceeaceecteeseeeeeeeneeeesenss 12, 25, 26 Water Code § 75640...seseeseeereeeeees sscsusstsesansannastsesnasneen 20, 24 Water Code § T5641 eccccsesscssssscssssscssecsnecsesuscsssesssssceuessaeseseeesseneeeseesseses 20, 24 Water Code § 75642...cc cccsccsssssceccsseceesssseessnssecsseeseseessnssesesasensceseeeaes 20, 24 Water Code § 78500.2 00... cc cccssccssccssseceesssseessecessescesessesseecesenessesseeseeats 22, 26 10 INTRODUCTION This Amicus Curiae Brief is submitted on behalf of the Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District (““SYRWCD”). Like United Water Conservation District ““UWCD”), SYRWCDis oneof only 11 water conservation districts in California and is uniquely affected by the outcome of this case. | SYRWCDformedin 1939 to protect the rights of water users downstream of the United States Bureau ofReclamation’s CachumaProject on the Santa Ynez River. Included within the boundaries of SYRWCDare the cities of Solvang, Buellton and Lompoc, and the communities of Santa Ynez, Los Olivos and Ballard, along with over 30,000 acres devoted to irrigated agriculture which produce a widevariety of crops, including vegetable crops and grapes. SYRWCD’s principalactivities are to work with various agencies and participate in administrative proceedings to ensure the continuance of unimpaired state-mandated “water rights releases” from the Bradbury Dam that constitute Santa Ynez River flows that would have flowed downstream in the absence of the Cachuma Project. SYRWCD’sactivities protect water users downstream of the Bradbury Dam and within SYRWCD boundaries and groundwater resources within the region. For the last 37 years, SYRWCDhas imposed a groundwater charge - pursuant to Water Codesection 75500 et seq. to fund a significant portion of its groundwater managementactivities. SYRWCD’s groundwater managementactivities, including its investigation and monitoring activities, provide invaluable information to assist SYRWCDwith its ongoing groundwater management. Like UWCD, SYRWCDis bound to impose regulatory fees for groundwaterextraction at the ratio set by the Legislature in Water Code 11 section 75594. This Court’s determination ofwhether groundwater charges are property related service fees subject to Proposition 218 or regulatory fees subject to Proposition 26 and its determination of the requirements of Water Code section 75594 are of significant importance to SYRWCD’s long-term conservation efforts and daily operations. ARGUMENT I. GROUNDWATER CHARGES ARE NOT PROPERTY RELATED FEES PURSUANT TO PROPOSITION 218 A fee must be manythings to be a property related service fee subject to Proposition 218. Article XIIID, Section 6 of the California Constitution! requires a property related servicefee to: 1. Be chargedto an identifiable parcel; 2. Be charged for a service that is actually used by or immediately available.to the ownerofthe identifiable parcel; and 3. Be charged as an incident of property ownership. If a fee does not meet all of the above requirements, thenit is not subject to Proposition 218 and is either a tax under Proposition 13 ora regulatory fee under Proposition 26. Ontheir face, the groundwater charges imposed by UWCD do not satisfy any—let alone all—ofthe prerequisites that make a fee a property related service fee requiring adherence to Proposition 218. A. Groundwater Charges are Imposed Differently from, and for a Different Purpose than, Property Related Service Fees UWCD’s groundwater charges—referred to by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and within the industry as “groundwater extraction 1 All further referencesto articles or sectionsofarticles are to the California Constitution. 12 charges”—are feesfor the extraction of groundwater. (Joint Appendix of Exhibits (“JAE”), Vol. 5, Ex. 50, pp. 922-935; JAE, Vol.10, Ex. 88, pp. 2123-2158; JAE, Vol. 12, Ex. 105, pp. 2501-2518; see Water Code §§ 75522, 75503, and 75504 [emphasis added].) That the fees charge for extraction rather than receipt of delivered water signifies both the regulatory nature of the fee and separates the fee from any notionthatit is service based. The fee is an extraction fee. The onus ofthe fee is on the extractor and their purposeful actions and activities. (Water Code § 75501.) Such fees are imposed only on operators of “water-producing facilities” and those operators are engaged in an action of taking—notreceiving. (Water. Code § 75 504.) A groundwater charge does not fund the delivery ofa commodity orservice to a parcel; instead,it is simply a fee that must be paid forthe privilege of engagingin theactivity of extracting groundwater. (Water Code § 75522.) | B. The Purpose of Property Related Service Fees Under Proposition 218 is to Fund a Service that Directly Benefits an Identifiable Parcel Considera traditional property related service fee subject to ‘Proposition 218: a water delivery fee. With a water delivery fee the service being procured—the delivery of water—isclearly identifiable and easily _ understood. The onus of a water delivery fee is on the fee payor’s receipt of delivered water—anindisputable service. The payor does not need to take or engagein any action to receive water from the deliverer other than to pay the delivery fee. . Witha water delivery fee, a homeowner turning on a faucet receives an immediate benefit from paying the fee: a useable andquantifiable amountofwater. The water delivery fee goes directly towards paying for 13 the amount of water received. The homeownercanreview bill and know and understand exactly what services she has received and how her property has benefited. If the homeownerturns the faucet and no water comesout, that homeownercancall its water delivery service and expect that a service technician will be sentto their hometo diagnose and correct the problem.It is the water delivery service’s duty to ensure that when that faucet is turned, water is available. | Forits services, the water deliverer charges the homeownera fee ~ based on the homeowner’s consumption. Each parcel that subscribes to the water delivery service receives this benefit and pays only for the cost to deliver water to their parcel and not their neighbors. Water is delivered to an identifiable house, the service is both actually used by and immediately available to the homeowner. Theservice is incident to property ownership because the parcel and homeowner are the only onesthat benefitfrom the delivery ofwater to the parcel. | Water delivery fees where a parcel owner paysonly for the actual quantity. ofwater deliveredto it are the type of consumption-based fees that rightfully fall under Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 217. UWCDis not obligated to import or recharge water on a one-to-one ratio to groundwater charges paid or to recharge water in any specific quantities and thus, its groundwater charges cannot be held to fund a consumption-basedservice. . C. The Purpose of Groundwater Charges is to Fund . Groundwater ManagementActivities that Conserve the Viability of the Groundwater Basin as a Public Resource The duty of a water conservation district, and the purpose of a groundwater charge, is markedly different. The duty is notto the homeownerorparcel, but to the basin. A water conservation district plays | 14 no part in ensuring that any particular faucet will spout water on command or more aptly, that any well will pump water. . For example, ifUWCD were unable to import supplemental water for recharge purposes or otherwise perform rechargeactivities in any given year, the City wouldstill be required to pay UWCD’s groundwater charge if it were pumping groundwater. The charge is dependent only onthe City’s extraction of groundwater and does not fund the delivery of water or guarantee a supply. Hypothetically, if one of the City’s well pumps burnsoutor a well collapses or the water-table lowers below the depth of their well, UWCDis under noobligation toreplace the pump,re-drill the well, or provide an alternative supply of water. Throughout this hypothetical downtime ofthe City’s well, the City would not pay a groundwater charge because it would not be extracting groundwater. It would resume paying the groundwater charge only onceit resolved its own issues with the well and chose to actively engagein the action of taking groundwater. Continuing with the hypothetical, during the time the City ceased pumping andtherefore ceased payingthe groundwater charge, UWCD’s groundwater management activities would not differ from normal. If groundwater management weretruly substantially similar to a water delivery fee as suggested in Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency v. Amrhein (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1391 (“Pajaro I’), UWCD would be able to stop providing the property related service and benefit during the hypothetical downtime. But that is not the case with a groundwatercharge: UWCDwould not cease performing groundwater managementor providing a benefit to the basin (and, in fact, could not stop as the benefits from its managementare notrealized immediately)—it would simply lose a source of funding for thoseactivities. 15 Asacorollary, ifUWCD dissolved, groundwater extractorslike the City would notice no immediate change. Pumps would continueto pull groundwater up from the basin and the City could continue supplying water to its inhabitants for municipal and commercial purposes until the basin runs dry. | Groundwater charges are simply not used to fund any of the hallmarks of a property related service like ensuring or delivering a water supply. The City’s groundwater charge payments do not buy groundwater from UCWD like a dollar buys a bottle of water from a store—orlike a water delivery fee buys a quantifiable supply of delivered water. D. The Proportional Cost of Groundwater Management Cannot be Attributed to a Parcel as Required by Proposition 218 without that Attribution Being an Arbitrary Figure Proposition 218 requires that a parcel only be charged the _ proportionalcost attributable to it of providing the property related service. Thus, on its face, Proposition 218 only applies to charges where such attribution is possible. Determining the proportional cost of groundwater managementattributable to a parcel is a practically insurmountable, if not impossible, task. Therefore, Proposition 218 could not have been intended to apply to fees to fund groundwater managementactivities. With a water delivery service, the deliverer knowsthecostit will take to obtain the water and deliverit to the customer. Determining the proportionalcosts attributable to a parcel is a simple mathematical equation. In contrast, as the Trial Court determined andtheCity freely acknowledged, costs of sroundwater managementactivities cannot be apportioned on a parcel-by-parcel basis. (JEA, Vol. 10, Ex. 88, pp. 2146- 2149; City’s Reply Brief, p. 34.) 16 The main issue—and one that spawns several sub-issues—is the complexity of the hydro-connectivity among subbasins of a main basin. As the Trial Court determined, all pumping within the main basin affectsall other basins to some degree and groundwater recharge and management activities in one subbasin affect the main basin andall other subbasins to some degree. (JEA, Vol. 10, Ex. 88, p. 2146.) To what degreeactivities in the various subbasinsaffect other subbasins is the unanswerable question that prevents proportional attribution of costs to a parcel. (JEA, Vol. 10, Ex. 88, pp. 2148-2149.) Groundwaterrechargeis not readily quantifiable like the amount of delivered water. Effects of recharge activities in one subbasin may not show themselves in another for multiple years. Calculating the flow of any particular recharged water molecule becomes even moredifficult due to the ; fact that pumping continues during the recharge process. Calculating the proportional cost of the service to any parcel is nearly impossible because groundwater extraction on that parcel could cease before any benefits from payingthe groundwater chargeare realized. Further, in addition to the problem of having multiple subbasins with various levels of connectivity, there.can be—and,in fact, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act will require there to be—places where multiple public agencies with control over groundwater will have overlapping jurisdiction over the same basin for groundwater management purposes. (Water Code §§ 10700 et seg.) How can a public agency properly determinethe proportional cost to any one parcel where there are so many variables completely out of its control? The Sustainable Groundwater ManagementAct implicitly recognized this challenge. Groundwater sustainability agencies are authorized to impose Proposition 26 regulatory fees to fund their 17 groundwater management activities and Proposition 218 property related service fees where they are supplying waterdirectly to parcels. (Water Code §§ 10730(a) and 10730.2(a).) Water Code section 10730.2, subdivision (a)(3) requires a groundwater sustainability agency to charge Proposition 218 property related service fees only where it seeks to recoverits costs for the “supply, _ production, treatment or distribution of water.” (Water Code § 10730.2(a)(3).) | Supplying, producing,treating and distributing waterare all water delivery service costs and not the costs of groundwater management. As water delivery service costs, the costs are easily attributable to a parcel and are subject to Proposition 218 as consumption-based services. (Bighorn- Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 217.) The Legislature’s provision oftwo options for imposing groundwater charges—one subject to Proposition 26 and the otherto Proposition 218—demonstrates that groundwater charges are properly characterized as regulatory fees when they fund groundwater management and are only Proposition 218 property related service fees when they fund water delivery services. | In the instant case, the City—as a groundwater extractor—supplies and producesits own waterthrough pumping from its water producing facilities, treats the water itself if necessary anddistributes that water to itself and then its customers. Thus, UCWD’s groundwater management activities and groundwaterchargesfall outside of the Legislature’smost recent declaration ofwhen a groundwater charge is subject to Proposition 218. (Water Code § 10730.2(a).) 18 E. As UWCDdoesnot Provide a Property Related Service,it is Irrelevant Whether or not Groundwater Chargesare Charged as an Incident of Property Ownership Inconcluding groundwater charges were subject to Proposition 218, Pajaro I stated that extraction of water from a groundwater basinis “in some ways more intimately connected with property ownership than is the — mere receipt of delivered water.” (Pajaro [, supra, 150 Cal.App.4that p. 1391.) While this maybetrue,it is irrelevant due to the lack of the receipt ofa property related service. The law is clear that a charge to owners of a parcelis not in-and-of-itself a property related service fee. (Apartment Association, Richmond v. Shasta Community Services District (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409.) What’s more, Pajaro [’s determination ignores that prescriptive and appropriative groundwaterrights (like the City’s) are not dependent on property ownership. (JAE, Vol. 5, Ex. 50, p. 929; San Bernardinov. Riverside (1921) 186 Cal. 7, 29; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Prop, § 958, p. 1152 [discussing overlying, appropriative, and prescriptive groundwater rights]; Slater, Cal. Water Law andPolicy (1995) — § 2.01, p. 2-8 [“[T]he appropriative right does not arise out of land ownership, but by the action of the appropriatorin taking and applying waterto a beneficial use.”].) | . | Assuming arguendo that groundwater charges are charged as an incident of property ownership, they still do not fund an immediately available and actually used service attributable to an identifiable parcel. Becausenotail the perquisites to be a property related service fee under Proposition 218 are met, UWCD’s groundwater charges cannot be property related service fees. To the extent Pajaro I holds otherwise, it is wrongly 19 decidedas indicated by the Appellate Court. (Appellate Court Opinion, pp. 16-24.) Il. GROUNDWATER CHARGES ARE REGULATORYFEES UNDER ARTICLE XITIC, SECTION 1, SUBDIVISIONS (e)(1), (€)(2) AND (e)(3) | Groundwater charges are properly classified-as regulatory fees pursuant to Article XIIIC, Section 1, subdivisions (e)(1), (e)(2) and (e)(3). Those sections provide that the following charges are nottaxes: (1) A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or -privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege; (2) A charge imposed for a specific government service or product provideddirectly to the payorthat is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government ofproviding the service or product; and (3) A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory costs to a local governmentfor issuing licenses and permits, performing investigations, inspections, and audits, enforcing agricultural marketing orders, and the administrative enforcement and adjudication thereof. - A groundwater charge like UWCD’sfunds multipleregulatory "purposesandfits neatly into all three of the above exceptions: A. UWCD’s Groundwater Charges Funda Specific Benefit and Privilege Only Available to Fee Payors . Groundwater charges provide both a privilege and a specific benefit to payors of the fee in accordance with Article XIIIC, Section 1, subdivision (e)(1). Within UWCD,landowners cannot pump groundwater unless they register their wells with UWCDandpaythe established groundwater charge. (Water Code §§ 75640, 75641 and 75642.) Thus, only 20 those landownersthat pay the fee—and noneofthose that do not—enjoy the privilege of exercising their rights to pump groundwater from the basin. Becauseonly fee payors may extract groundwater, those fee payors alone experience the specific benefits that result from UWCD’s groundwater managementactivities. Fee payors benefit from a higher groundwater table due to UWCD’s groundwater management, includingits importation of surface water and coordination of groundwater recharge efforts. Fee payors directly benefit from lowered energy costs topump water and by avoiding the need to deepentheir wells. .. Perhaps more importantly, fee payors benefit from the regulation of other groundwater extractors. Without UWCD’sregulation, no fee payor could be assured that other groundwater extractors were acting reasonably with respect to the basin without resorting to legal action. Charging groundwater extractors a fee per acre foot pumped, monitoring their pumping, and requiring registration of their wells restricts an otherwise unrestricted (or nearly so) right and promotes responsibility and conservation of groundwater as a natural resource. Both benefits prevent, or at least delay, the need for landowners to engage in a costly groundwater adjudication by increasing the amount of available groundwater and mitigating potential overdraft scenarios. If UWCDdid not impose a groundwater charge, unregulated and unmitigated pumping could lead to overdraft and at that point, groundwater users such as the City could face curtailmentoftheir use to constitutionally reasonable levels within the safe yield. (Article X, § 2.) Thus, the groundwater charges imposed by UWCDprovide groundwater extractors the benefit of continued pumping of groundwaterat levels made reasonable because of UWCD’s efforts—a benefit they could not enjoy without paying the groundwater chargefor the privilege. 21 B. Groundwater Charges Fund Specific Services that Benefit _ Only Fee Payors . . Groundwater charges fund a specific governmentservice that is not available to those that do not pay the fee in accordance with Article XIIIC, Section 1, subdivision (e)(2). Pajaro I characterized this service (managementofthe basin as a natural resource) as a property related service subject to Proposition 218. (Pajaro I, supra, 150 Cal.App.4thatp. 1381.) But this determination, rejected by theAppellate Court in the instant case, misconstrues the “service” being provided by groundwater managementas well as the intended beneficiary. (Appellate Court Opinion, p. 17.) A water conservation district does not engage in groundwater managementactivities for the benefit of any individual landowner or parcel; rather, it performsits duties solely for the benefit of the region and in protection ofthe interests of the State of California.” The service being provided is mitigation of the payor’s actions and such a service is not akin to a water delivery charge or a property related service fee. This Court has previously determinedthat mitigation of a fee payor’s actions can be considereda valid regulatory service. (Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866, 870.) In addition, the final, unnumbered paragraph of Article XTIIC, Section 1 states that the regulatory fees may be imposed based on “the payor’s burdenson...the governmentalactivity.” (bid. ) In addition, consider the analogy between the operation of a California State Park and management of a groundwater basin. Proposition * California has a constitutionally stated public policy favoring the conservation of groundwateras a natural resource. (see Article X, § 2; Water Code § 100, 370-374, 12992 and 78500.2.) 22 26 specifically provides that park entrance fees are not taxes or property related service fees, (Article XTIIC, § 1, subd. (e)(4).) The park’s land—just like groundwater supplies—is ownedin trust by the State of California for the benefit ofits citizens. Generally, every citizen has a right to access the park, just like every landownerhasa right to extract groundwater for reasonable uses. | But a citizen may not freely enter the park; instead, she must purchasea ticket. The fees paid by those wishing to enter the park allow the government to maintain the park for the benefit ofall of its citizens—even those whowill never exercise their right to enter the park. Employeesofthe park perform services, such as repaving roads, clearing brush andotherfire hazards, monitoring thewildlife, etc. While these actions are services, they are servicesto the park and notthe visitor. People who paythe fee do experience the benefits of these services, but the true and only intended beneficiary is the parkitself. The fee paid by the visitor ensures that the government can continue to maintain the park for the benefit of future fee payors. In essence, the fee mitigates the negative impacts to the park of allowingvisitors to enter. From an accounting standpoint, the actual entrance fee dollars paid by the visitor cannot pay for any servicesthe visitor will receive while in the park as they will remain in a cash register; thus, the entrance fee pays only for continuing services for the benefit of the park. What matters is that the entrance fee ensures that the park remains in a condition to be enjoyed. Groundwater managementactivities such as requiring registration of groundwater extraction facilities, monitoring extractions, importing water for groundwater recharge, regulatory compliance and funding studies and investigations on groundwater use and availability are all services to the basin, and not the groundwaterextractor. Just like with a park entrance fee 23 where.a visitor must pay a fee to enjoy the park, a groundwater extractor must pay a fee to pumpgroundwater. The groundwater charge does not pay for a service received, but funds the continuation of groundwater managementservices to mitigate the fee payor’s actions for the benefit of the basin. The fee payor then enjoys those benefits upon paying the fee to exerciseits privilege. | A groundwaterextractor may pump groundwateroneyear, pay the associated groundwater charges and then never pump groundwater or pay groundwater charges again. Such a groundwater extractor would be analogousto a citizen whovisited the park only one time. The park entrance fee and groundwater chargesfund the managementofthe resource to ensure its continued viability, even if the payor chooses never to exercise | its privilege to visit the park or pump groundwater again. The fee funds the mitigation necessary to provide the privilege and the payor need only to pay the fee to exerciseits privilege again. While specifically called out asits own exception in Proposition 26, a park entrance fee meets all the requirements of Article XIIIC, Section 1, subdivisions (e)(1), (e)(2), and (e)(3). A groundwater charge functions in exactly the same mannerasa park entrance fee and, likewise,fits neatly into the other exceptions of Proposition 26. (Article XTIIC, § 1, subds. (e)(1), (€)(2) and (€)(3).) | C. Groundwater Charges Fund UWCD’s Well Registration and Monitoring Programs It is illegal to pump groundwater within UWCDwithoutregistering the water producing facility and paying a groundwater charge to UWCD. (Water Code §§ 75640, 75641 and 75642.) A portion of the groundwater charges go towards registration and monitoring of wells and performing 24 investigations and inspections related to groundwater managementofthe basin in accordancewith Article XIIC, Section 1, subdivision (€)(3). D. UWCD's Groundwater Charges do not Exceed the ' Reasonable Costs to UWCD of Providing the Benefits and Services and the Fee Ratio Mandated by Water Code Section 75594 is Constitutional as Applied Because groundwater charges are properly characterized as regulatory fees rather than property related fees, the amountofthe fee charged doesnot need to be proportionalto the benefit received by any particular payor; instead, so long as the fee is reasonably related to the governmentregulation and does not generate a surplus for general revenue purposes, the fee meets the requirements of Proposition 26. (Article XIIIC, § 1.) Theratio that requires groundwater charges for municipal and commercial waterbe set at a higherrate than agricultural water is mandated _ by the Legislature. (Water Code § 75594.) In adopting Water Code section 75594, the Legislature determine that for policy reasons, municipal and commercial users should bear a greater proportional percentage ofthe regulatory burden of groundwater management. Becauseregulatory fees | under Proposition 26 are notrequired to be proportional to any particular fee payor’s benefit or burden,it is immaterial that Water Code section 75594 requires municipal and industrial users to pay more towards regulation so long as the overall fees collected from UWCD’s groundwater charges do not exceedthe costof its regulatory activities. The City argues that Section 75594 is over 50 years old and should be ignored whereasthe eight year old Pajaro J is established and should be followed. (City’s Opening Brief, pp. 62-64 and 35-37.) However, time alone does not make a good law badjust like it does not set a judicial 25 determination in stone: age is a poor argument against the validity of Water Code section 75594. | Asadmitted by the Trial Court and the City, UWCD continues to be constitutionally mandated to impose Water Code section 75594’s rate requirements until it is deemed unconstitutional. (JEA, Vol. 12, Ex. 105, pp. 2504; City’s Reply Brief, p. 43.) The Trial Court admittedto this | unfairness, but chose to impose an inequitable remedy. (JAE, Vol. 12, Ex. 105, p. 2511.) Even if groundwatercharges are determined to be property related service fees, Water Code section 75594 is constitutionally valid as it discriminates against types of use and not parcels and it would be properto allow UWCDthe opportunity to demonstrate compliance on remand. E. Public Policy Favoring Conservation Requires Groundwater Charges be Characterized as Regulatory Fees. California has a constitutionally stated public policy favoring the conservation of groundwaterasa natural resource. (see Article X, § 2; Water Code § 100, 370-374,12992 and 78500.2.) This Court recently denied a request for depublication of Capistrano Taxpayers Association v. City ofSan Juan Capistrano (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1493 (“Capistrano”). As a result of Capistrano,classification of groundwater charges as regulatory fees is one of the only monetary methodsleft to encourage conservation. (Ibid. ) Capistrano made two holdings that inconvenience groundwater conservation efforts. (Capistrano, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 1493). First, it _held that if property related service fees are charged in tiers, Proposition 218 requires that charges to the higher consumptiontiers not exceed the proportional cost of providing service to that tier. (/d. at pp. 1504-1511.) Should this Court determine groundwater charges are property related 26 service fees, this holding in Capistrano will have a chilling effect on promoting groundwater conservation. It is true, theoretically, that a user in a higher consumption tier could pay more for water. However, there is no guarantee a public agency imposing the fee will have the confidence to imposea tier structure given the difficulty of adequately demonstrating that servicing those higher consumptiontiers actually does cost more than servicing basetiers (especially given the difficulties in doing any proportionality analysis for groundwater managementactivities as discussed in Section I(D) of this brief). As an example of the chilling effect, ifa public agency had sufficient water available to it at a fixedrate,it likely could not justify imposing consumption-based tiers underthe current interpretation of Proposition 218’s requirements because the water it purchased would never cost more than the fixed rate. A further issue is that even if tiered pricing is imposed, the high consumption user never pays more than the actual cost of the water. Such a scenario wouldbe analogous to a consumerbeing able to purchase any vehicle from the dealer at the dealer’s cost, which is a much better deal on a fully loaded vehicle than it is on a base model. While the higher consumptive user pays more, it receives more value from whatit does pay than a low consumptive user. Essentially, the more a user consumes, the better a bargainshe receives due to the public agency’s organization and efficiency in keeping costs low. The bargain only gets better the more efficient the public agency becomesat supplying water. Second, Capistrano held that the penalty provision of Proposition 26 could not be relied upon to encourage conservation as this would open up 27 too big a loophole in Proposition 218. (Capistrano, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th | at pp. 1514-1515; Article XIIIC, §1, subd. (e)(5).) Thus, after Capistrano, regulatory fees are the only remainingfiscal method to promote conservation. Luckily, regulatory fees are also the best and most fair method to promote conservation. Groundwater charges promote the public policy interest in conservation by charging groundwater extractors the costs of the regulatory programsnecessary to mitigate the negative effects on the groundwater basin caused bythe fee payor’s exercise of its privilege to extract groundwater. The fees mustberelatedto the regulation, imposed to provide a privilege, benefit, service or registration requirements, and cannot be used to generate a surplus for general revenue purposes. Therefore, classification of groundwater charges as regulatory fees provides the perfect mix of protection to fee payors between Proposition 218 and the penalty provision of Article XIIIC,Section 1, subdivision (e)(5). . iil. CLARITY REGARDING GROUNDWATER CHARGESIS PARAMOUNT Should this Court determine that UWCD’s groundwater chargeis subject to Proposition 218, its guidance on how toproperly proportion the © costs attributable to the parcel is desperately needed due to the issues discussed in Section I(D) ofthis brief. In addition, while not directly before this Court, it would be very helpful if this Court would discuss examples of whena groundwater charge could qualify as a regulatory fee as suggested in Pajaro I. (Pajaro I, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1390.) Such guidance would be greatly beneficial not solely to water conservation districts, but to all public agencies with groundwater managementauthority and particularly to groundwater sustainability agencies, whose principal act provides the option of charging fees either 28 under Proposition 218 or Proposition 26. (Water Code§§ 10730 and 10730.2.) IV. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS THE PROPER STANDARD | OF REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS The proper standard of review regarding factual determinations madebythe Trial Courtis at dispute and bears mention as the Trial Court’s factual determinations support a determination that UWCD’s groundwater charges were constitutional as applied. TheCity challenged the constitutional compliance ofUWCD’s groundwater charges by traditional writ of mandate, by administrative writ of mandate, by complaint for declaratory relief, and by complaint for determination of invalidity pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 860 et seq. (a reverse validation action). (JAE, Vol. 10, Ex: 88, p. 2134.) The Trial Court concluded that the City could notbringits challenges as a reversevalidation action andtried the case as traditional writ of mandate. (JAE,Vol. 10, Ex. 88, p. 2137; Appellate Court Opinion, p. 11, fn. 6.) In a writ of mandate action, whetherthe fee violates a constitutional provision is reviewed de novo, as both UWCDandCity agree. However, as both the City and the casesit relies on readily admit, de novo review over a Trial Court’s factual determinations is not appropriate where the evidence is in conflict; in those instances, substantial evidence review applies. (City’s Opening Brief, p. 25; City’s Reply Brief, p. 12.) In Moore v. City ofLemon Grove (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 363, cited favorably by City, a sanitation fee ratepayer appealed a judgment denying his petition for writ ofmandate challenging the Lemon Grove Sanitation District’s transfer of certain sewer service fees to the City ofLemon Grove as violating Proposition 218. (/bid.; City’s Opening Brief, p. 26.) The 29 Moore Court acknowledged that whether a fee violates Proposition 218 is subject to de novo review; however, it clarified that that the trial court’s judgmentis presumed correct and that “even when we exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the record, we do not decide disputed issues offact.” (Moore, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 368-369 citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 and Morganv. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 912 [“the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding offact.”}) The record contains evidence on the hydrology ofthe basin and subbasins in UWCD’sboundaries that lendsitself to conflicting inferences. The City cites to evidence supporting its theory that the subbasinsare not sufficiently connected to support the establishmentofa district-wide Zone A. (City’s Opening Brief, pp. 18-23.) UWCDcites to evidence supporting its argument thatall basins are sufficiently connected such that pumping or recharge in one benefits or affects all others to some degree. (UWCD’s AnswerBrief, pp. 12-14.) The Trial Court weighed the competing evidence and determined that: “The record amply demonstrates that the basins are hydrogeologically interconnected. The interconnection isnot simple, such as if each person pumping water was pulling from the same well or as if UWCDwasreplenishing the water to that same well. The interconnection is also not completely understood or precisely modeled.” (JAE, Vol. 10, Ex. 88, p. 2138; see also JAE, Vol. 10, Ex. 88, pp. 2125- 2126.) In addition, the Trial Court reviewed evidence as to the use of Zone A funds and determined the fees met Proposition 26’s 30 reasonableness requirements and did not generate a surplus for general revenue purposes: “Viewed from the perspective of UWCD’sdistrict-wide mission of water conservation within the interconnected basins underits jurisdiction, the fees meet the reasonable costs of regulation without generating surpluses for general revenue purposes.” (JAE, Vol. 10, Ex. 88, p. 2140.) The Appellate Court determined that substantial evidence in the record supports the Trial Court’s factual conclusions and,as required, relied on those conclusions in forming its decision. (Appellate Court Opinion,pp. 12 and 26). The City makes two arguments for de novo review ofthe facts: that the facts were “constitutional” and that the record was “cold.”(City’s Opening Brief, p. 25; City’s Reply Brief, p. 12). If constitutional facts are present, de novo review appliesonly to the . extent those facts exist and are relevant to determining whethera constitutional violation occurred—the remainderofthe factual conclusions are still subject to review for substantial evidence. (McCoyv. Heart Corp. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 842 [“this court must make an independent assessmentofthe entire record, but only asitpertains to actual malice. Issues apart from this constitutional question need not be reviewed de novo and are subject to the usual rules of appellate review.] [emphasis added].) The City makes no effort to distinguish which facts have constitutional significance. . | The Appellate Court correctly dismissed the City’s “cold” record argument. (Appellate Court Opinion,p. 12, fn. 7.) Generally in traditional mandamus, the court reviews an administrative agency’s quasi-legislative . determination for abuseofdiscretion and gives great deferenceto that agency’s conclusions. (Lowev. California Resource Agency (1991) 1 31 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1149.) However, as Moore v. City ofLemon Grove demonstrates, that is not the case where the traditional mandamusaction concernsthe constitutional compliance of the agency. (Moore, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 368-369.) | The Trial Court did not give deference to UWCD:instead,it reviewed the conflicting evidence in the record independently and reached its own conclusionsasto the facts. The Appellate Court correctly reviewed the Trial Court’s independent factual determinations for substantial evidence and exercised its independent judgmentonly as to the legal issues. To the extent this Court needs to consider the Trial Court’s factual determinations to answerthe issues beforeit, it should rely on those conclusions supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the subbasin must be | considered interconnected and the regulatory fees must be determined to be reasonable and to not general a surplus for general revenue purposes under Proposition 26. CONCLUSION Forall the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court’s decision should be affirmed. Dated: November 17, 2015 Respectfully submitted: The Law Offices of Young Wooldridge, LLP By: ‘ftey J. Patrick, Esq. - Attorneys for Applicant and Amicus Curiae: Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District 32 | CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Counsel of Record hereby certifies that pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(1) of the California Rules of Court, the enclosed Amicus Curiae Briefis produced using 13-point Roman type including footnotes and contains approximately 6,067 words, whichis less than the total words permitted by the rules of court. Counsel relies on the word count of the computer program usedto preparethisbrief. Dated: November 17, 2015 33 DECLARATION OF SERVICE I declare that I am, and wasat the time of service hereinafter mentioned,at least 18 years of age and not a party to the aboveentitled action. My business address is 1800 30" Street, 4" Floor, Bakersfield, CA 93301. I am citizen ofthe United States and am employedin the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern. On November17, 2015, I caused to be served the following document(s): | APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE AN AMICUS CURIAE ~ BRIEF AND ACCOMPANYING AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT Uponthe parties in this action by placing a true and correct copies thereofin a sealed envelope(s) as follows: FOR COLLECTIONVIA UNITED PARCEL SERVICE: Clerk of the California Supreme Court 1 Original plus 8 Copies 350 McAllister Street (E-File Courtesy Copy) San Francisco, CA 94102-4797 Amicus Brief FORCOLLECTIONVIA U.S. MAIL: Clerk of the Santa Barbara County 1 Copy Superior Court Anacapa Building P.O. Box 21107 Santa Barbara, CA 93121 Clerk of the Court ofAppeal 1 Copy Division 6 200 E.Santa Clara Street Ventura, CA 93001 Office of the Attorney General 1 Copy Consumer Law Section 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102 34 Gregory G. Diaz Assistant City Attorney City of San Buenaventura’ P.O. Box 99 Ventura, CA 93002-0099 Michael G. Colantuono David J. Ruderman Michael R. Cobden Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 ° Anthony H. Trembley Musick, Peeler, & Garrett LLP 2801 Townsgate Road, Suite 200 Westlake Village, CA 91361 Jane Ellison Usher Cheryl A. Orr Musick, Peeler, & Garrett LLP 624 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2000 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Dennis Larochelle Arnold Bleuel LaRochelle Mathews 300 Esplanade Drive, Suite 2100 Oxnard, CA 93036 1 Copy Attorneysfor Respondent and Cross-Appellant City ofSan Buenaventura 1 Copy Attorneysfor Respondent and Cross-Appellant City ofSan Buenaventura 2 Copies Attorneysfor Defendant and Appellant United Water Conservation District and Board of Directors of United Water ConservationDistrict 1 Copy Attorneysfor Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant Pleasant Valley Water District I declare underpenalty ofperjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true andcorrect and that this declaration was executed on November 17, 2015, at Bakersfield, California. 35 Kinen®Md Kristen L. Moen
