JACKS v. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA

Respondent’s Response to Amicus Curiae Brief

Cal.Nov 25, 2015

$225589 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ROLLAND JACKS and ROVE ENTERPRISES,INC., Plaintiffs and Appellants vs. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA, Defendant and Respondent. ANSWERTO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF HOWARDJARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION After a Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Division Six, Case No. B253474 Reversing a Judgmentof the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Barbara, Case No. 1383959 Honorable Thomas P.Anderle, Judge Presiding ARIEL PIERRE CALONNE, MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) City Attorney (110268) MColantuono@chwlaw.us TOM R. SHAPIRO, *RYAN THOMAS DUNN(268106) Asst. City Attorney (127383) RDunn@chwlaw.us TShapiro@santabarbaraca.gov LEONARD PASLANIAN (278327) CITY OF SANTA BARBARA LAsianian@chwlaw.us PO. Box 1990 COLANTUONO,HIGHSMITH &WHATLEY,PC Santa Barbara, CA 93012 300 S. Grand Avenue,Suite 2700 Telephone: (805) 564-5326 Los Angeles, California 90071-3137 Facsimile: (805) 897-2532 Telephone: (213) 542-5700 Facsimile: (213) 542-5710 Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent City of Santa Barbara 157109.5 $225589 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ROLLANDJACKS and ROVE ENTERPRISES,INC., Plaintiffs and Appellants vs. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA, Defendant and Respondent. ANSWERTO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF HOWARDJARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION After a Published Decision of the Second Appellate District, Division Six, Case No. B253474 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Barbara, Case No. 1383959 Honorable Thomas P.Anderle,Judge Presiding ARIEL PIERRE CALONNE, MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) City Attorney (110268) MColantuono@chwlaw.us TOM R. SHAPIRO, *RYAN THOMAS DUNN(268106) Asst. City Attorney (127383) RDunn@chwiaw.us TShapiro@santabarbaraca.gov LEONARDPAScw AN (278327) ITY OF SANTA BARBARA anian@chwlaw.us © PO. Box 1990 COLANTUONO,HIGHSMITH &WHATLEY,PC Santa Barbara, CA 93012 300 S. Grand Avenue,Suite 2700 Telephone: (805) 564-5326 Los Angeles, California 90071-3137 Facsimile: (805) 897-2532 Telephone: (213) 542-5700 Facsimile: (213) 542-5710 Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent City of Santa Barbara 157109.5 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 0...csssessscsecsesssssesscscssessssssescsssssesscscesssnssessessnesnsesssssessnseneeeeaee 5 I. LIKE JACKS,AMICI IGNORE THAT SCE CONTRACTED TO PAY A 2 PERCENT FRANCHISE FEE TO USE CITY RIGHTS OF WAY1.00...cecsesssssssescsecssssnesssssnesscsececsssnsssenessenscusensccessesseneseeees 5 II. PROPOSITION 218’S LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION INSTRUCTION IS OF NO AID HERE BECAUSE THE MEASURE DOES NOTDEFINE “TAX?”useseceseecsscsesseeeceeneeeenes 6 Hl. =AMICPS POLICYARGUMENTS DO NOT PERSUADOE...................... 7 IV. AMICI,TOO, OFFER NO SERVICEABLE DISTINCTION OF TAXES AND FEESuu...cssesscssssssssssssssssssessesccssesscsnsesecsecessnseesensseseseeerees 10 A. A DISTINCTION BASED ON USE OF REVENUESIS OVER-INCLUSIVE......ecsscssssssscecscsssssssesssssssssssecscsesnssesscsessessueenecaesacaseacens 10 B. A DISTINCTION BASED ON ECONOMIC INCIDENCEIs BELIED BYTHETERMS OFTHE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT............000+5 12 C. A DISTINCTION BASED ON HISTORICAL FRANCHISE FEES DISREGARDS INFLATION ANDTHE CONSIDERATIONTOSCE........ 13 Vv. AMICI’S ANSWERTO THECITY’S PROPOSITION 26 ARGUMENT DOES NOT PERSUADE0.000.ceeeccccscsesesssesesceseeees 14 CONCLUSIONuuucccecsccecscccssscccccccssssscssessessscsscsssssssesssssesesscearseccerscsenees 16 2 157109.5 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES State Cases Apartment Ass’n ofLos Angeles County,Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830.00... csessssseesssetseseessesssseneees Citizens Assn. of Sunset Beach v. Orange County Local Agency Formation Com. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1182.....cccssssssssssssusssssssssssssssssssusssses Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371 sescsssssccssssssssssssssssssssssssssesssessssssecsssssesssee Moorev. City ofLemon Grove (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 363 ..cccccccsssssssssssssssssscsecescecssseeee Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 940 ..sssssssssssssssssssesusssssssssssssssnsuseest Schmeer v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.Ap.4th 1310 0...cecceesssseessesesseseteeseeeensees Tulare County v. City ofDinuba (1922) 188 Cal. 664 cecsssssssssssssssssssssessssssssssssssesssssssssseeesssssessen Statutes Public Utility Code, § 6205.00.00...ccccssseessseeseeeeeseeeeeeeeseseees California Constitution Article XL, § 5 oo. ccceeessesssseccsesecsseeecesseccacsseacesseessasessessssaneses Article XI, § 9, subd. (Db) 0.0... eeseeeceesesescsssecesseeseasesseensrassens Article XID, § 8.00... cccessccscescececeesescecssecssseseseesessessessesessessees 157109.5 Page(s) sessesesseneeseee6 seseeessecesoes15 seseessaceessees8 seseesaneeceees 11 seeesseees 8,15 eceeesseseeeees9 seveseeaes 8, 14 seseeeseseseeees7 seveereesaes 6, 7 seceecesensenees7 seceseeseeeseeses8 Article XITE Co.ccecceeesesesssscssscscsseccssssssessseseseeesseeneeeesesnessas 7,10, 14 Article XUI D wo.eccssceseeceeceeceeceecsescnsescssssesesessesessesesssesseseeseensees 7,10 Article XIII C, § 1, subds. (€)(1) & (2)... ecccsccsscssssssseesessesseeneeesneeeees9 Article XIII C, § 1, subd. (€)(3) 0...eeesssssceescesssesseneeeeeretseeeseenessene8 Article XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(4) on.eeeeesssesscsscsseesesenessesesesseeees 9,15 4 157109.5 INTRODUCTION Like Appellants Rolland Jacks and Rove Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Jacks”); Amici Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and California Taxpayers Association (collectively, “Amici”) ignore the languageof the franchise agreement contested here to find a utility tax instead of an agreementto pay for the right to use City rights of way. Moreover, Amici argue from Proposition 218’s liberal construction provision to assert their opposition to the City’s constitutional power to negotiate a franchise fee in excess of the 1 percent to which generallaw cities and counties are limited. However, they provide neither authority for their claims nor a serviceable test that can distinguish a tax requiring voter approval from a fee which a city council may establish in negotiation with a utility. Their brief is as empty of answers to the City’s arguments as Jacks’. The result must be the same —; this Court should affirm the trial court judgmentfor the City and reverse the Court of Appeal’s finding the franchise fee to be a tax based on its economic incidence. I. LIKE JACKS, AMICI IGNORE THAT SCE CONTRACTEDTO PAYA 2 PERCENT FRANCHISE FEE TO USE CITY RIGHTS OF WAY Amici assert, without citation to the record — and with resolute refusal to engage the language of the franchise agreement in 157109.5 issue — that Southern California Edison (“SCE”) is a mere tax collector and that Ordinance No. 5135 imposesa tax on electricity customersin the City. (Amici Brief (“AB”)at p. 2.) Similarly, they bravely assert — again without evidence — that Ordinance No. 5135 “expressly and directly obligates each and every ratepayer to pay the surcharge.” (ABat p. 7.) This is simply wrong. The City’s principal briefs and the amicusbrief of the League of California Cities lay out the evidence demonstrating that the parties agreed that SCE would pay 2 percentof the value ofits sales in the City for use of the City’s rights of way and that SCE would lose its 30-year franchiseif it did not. (See Opening Brief (OB) at pp. 29-30, 41; Reply Brief (Reply) at pp. 9-12; Brief of Amicus Curiae Leagueof California Cities (League Br.) at pp. 9-11.) Ignoring the evidence andthe principalbriefs’ treatmentof it does not persuade. Repeating an unsupported assertion is not persuasive, either. ll. PROPOSITION 218’S LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION INSTRUCTION IS OF NO AID HERE BECAUSE THE MEASURE DOES NOTDEFINE “TAX” Amici recite Proposition 218’s uncodified section 5 calling for liberal construction of the measure to achieve its purposes. (Amici Brief (AB) at pp. 3-4.) However, as this Court has observed, this rule is not license to add wordsto our Constitution or to overlook those included. (Apartment Ass’n ofLos Angeles County,Inc. v. City ofLos 157109.5 Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 844-845 [declining to rely on § 5 when plain languageofarticle XIII D “unambiguously limited” to burdens on landowners].) Amici concede Proposition 218 provides no definition of the “taxes” subject to its voter approval requirement. (ABatp. 6.) Thus, the meaning of that term must be gleaned from earlier case law and can be inferred from Proposition 26’s subsequent amendmentof Article XIII C. (OB at pp. 33-34; Reply at p- 26.) No rule ofstrict or liberal construction can supply what Proposition 218 has entirely omitted. i. AMICI?S POLICY ARGUMENTS DO NOT PERSUADE Amici fear the established rule that franchise fees are not taxes — and Proposition 26’s rule that fees for use of governmentproperty are not limited to cost — will jointly allow local governments to “outsource any governmental function they desire packaged with franchise fee agreements in any amount.” (AB at pp. 9-10.) This fear is baseless. Asdiscussed in Santa Barbara’s briefing on the merits and in the Brief of Amicus Curiae League of California Cities, chartered cities like Santa Barbara havestatutory and constitutional authority to set franchise fees in excess of prevailing rates in utility’s service area. (See Pub. Util. Code, § 6205; see also Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5 [chartered cities not subject to general laws except on matters of 157109.5 statewide concern];id., at art. XI, § 9, subd. (b) [permittingcities to prescribe terms and conditions for operation of utilities]; id., at art. XII, § 8 [local control of terms and conditionsof local franchises].) And, franchises have historically been awarded to the utility willing to pay the highest fee. (Tulare County v. City ofDinuba (1922) 188 Cal. 664, 670 (City of Dinuba).) Yet the mass outsourcing- for-profit Amici fear has not occurred. Santa Barbararelies on long-established law that those who use public property in a private, for-profit enterprise can agree to payfor the privilege. (E.g., Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn.v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 940, 950; City ofDinuba, supra, 188 Cal. at p. 670.) It does not seek to license its regulatory functions — like land use or building safety regulation — and earna fee for the privilege. Proposition 26 would forbid fees that exceed the cost of these regulatory services, in any event. (Cal. Const., art. XII C, § 1, subd.(e)(3) [regulatory fees limited to “reasonable costs” ].) Nordoes the City seek to franchise its police and fire services; doing so would be an unlawfuldelegation ofits police power.(E.g., Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371 [“the legislative body cannot delegate its power to make a law”].) Evenif it did, no fee could be imposed underthe “nofree riders” provisions of Proposition 26, which allow fees for governmentbenefits and services onlyif “a specified benefit [is] conferred or privilege granted directly to the 157109.5 payorthatis not provided to those not charged”or “a specified governmentservice or product[is] provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subds. (e)(1) & (2).) Proposition 26 does, of course, does notlimit fees for use of governmentproperty to cost. (Id., at subd. (e)(4).) The City’s claim here is limited and conceals no paradeof horribles. Amici also argueprivatization makes good public policy only if costs to tax- and fee-payors are reduced.(ABat p. 10.) They cite no authority that makesthis policy controlling here, and nothing in Proposition 218 orits ballot materials states such a rule. While it is true that franchise fees increasethe costof utility service to customers, so do myriad other operationalcosts that affect utility rates. The merefact that some municipalaction has the eventual market result of increasing the prices a consumerpaysfor goodsorservices does not render that action a tax. (Cf. Schmeerv. CountyofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 [plastic bag ban requiring retailer to charge $0.10 for paper bags not subject to Prop.26 becausethe fee did not fund government].) As discussed in Santa Barbara’s briefing on the merits, a municipal action requiring paymentby utility may be a tax on the utility or its customersorit may be someotherkind of charge not subject to constitutional limitation — like a franchise fee. (OB at pp. 28-32; Reply at pp. 13- 14.) The bare fact a charge may increase consumerprices does not 157109.5 renderit a tax. (OB at pp. 28-29; Reply at pp. 20-21.) Amicicite no authority holding otherwise, nor does any appear. Noris there anything nefarious aboutthe City’s effort to maximize for taxpayers the price obtained for private use of public property, as Amici suggest. (AB at p. 10.) Indeed,it is not clear how the goals of fair return to tax- and fee-payorsis served by allowing SCE to makeprivate use of public rights of way — acquired and maintained at taxpayers’ expense — for free or for less than it agreed to pay. In any event, absent any languagein Articles XIII C and XIII D to require privatization only when consumercosts are reduced,this Court need not impose Amici’s policy preferences on California’s local governments. iv. AMICI,TOO, OFFER NO SERVICEABLE DISTINCTION OF TAXES AND FEES Like Jacks, Amici suggest several waysto distinguish taxes from fees. Like Jacks’ suggestions, none is workable. A. A DISTINCTION BASED ON USE OF REVENUESIS OVER-INCLUSIVE Amici suggest a revenue measureis a tax if it “is explicitly intended for general government revenue purposes.” (ABat pp.2, 7.) The principal briefing demonstrates this test to be over-inclusive. 10 157109.5 (OBat pp. 36-37.) Nor doesit accountfor Jacks’ proffered distinction between the historical 1 percent franchise fee — also used by the City for general revenue purposes and which Jacks claimsis not a tax — and the 1 percent surcharge which Jacks claimsis a tax. Moreover, manyfees recognized as other than taxes under precedents old and new can be used for any lawful purpose of the City. (Ibid.; see also Moore v. City ofLemon Grove (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 363, 372 [upholding under Prop. 218 reimbursementto general fund of costs incurred for benefit of sewerutility].) Under Amici’s theory, use of franchise fee revenues only for street maintenance would make a franchise fee not a tax but use for general fund purposes would makeit a tax. Such a theory would significantly change California law and require public votes on many municipal revenues, far beyond those Proposition 218 andits ballot materials implicate. For example, suppose a city developed a park that included a museum anda live music venue and charged admission to the museum andrented out the music venue.If the city directed the revenue from the admission fees and rental charges to its general fund (in which accounting principles requireall discretionary revenues of a governmentto be accounted), then Amici’s test would make taxes of these fees and charges. Butif the city used that revenue solely for park purposes(or, perhaps, only for museum or music venue purposes), it would remain a fee. So, too, wouldprofits from the sale of souvenirs and concessionsat the 11 157109.5 museum and music venue be considered taxesif they were directed to the general fund. And the status of a revenue measure would depend notonthe legislation which imposesit, but subsequent decisions on howto spend the proceeds. Conceivably, a revenue measure could bea tax in onefiscal year and a fee in another. Nothing in Proposition 218 compels such an impractical rule. B. A DISTINCTION BASED ON ECONOMIC INCIDENCE Is BELIED BY THE TERMS OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT f “utAmici also reduce Sinclair Paint’s “primary purpose”test to a two-prong inquiry as to “(i) who is paying the tax, and (2) whatis that person receiving in return (i.e., for what purpose is the revenue used)?” (ABat p. 7.) Even werethis a faithful summary of Sinclair Paint (whichit is not), it does not makea tax of the City’s franchise fee — SCE paysthefranchise fee for use of public rights of way in its search for profits. The evidence for this — which Amici do not engage — lies in the stipulated facts and the terms of Ordinance No. 5135 (the franchise agreement). (OB at pp. 15-18, 28-29; Reply at pp. 14-17; LeagueBr. at pp. 9-11.) A fuller accounting of the Sinclair Paint rule demonstrating that the franchise fee here complies with that test appearsin the principal briefs and the League of California Cities Brief. (OB at pp. 42-44; Reply at p. 10; League Br. at pp. 9-11.) We neednotrepeatit here. 12 157109.5 C. A DISTINCTION BASED ON HISTORICAL FRANCHISE FEES DISREGARDS INFLATION AND THE CONSIDERATION TO SCE Amici suggest the franchise fee is a tax because the City and SCE agreedto increaseit from 1 percent to 2 percent without providing SCE any greater consideration for the new franchise than did prior franchises agreed at the 1 percent rate. (ABat p. 8.) Thus, they imply that any increase in a revenue measure which does not provide “any greater service”is a tax. The point, obviously, proves too much. The City did grant consideration for the surcharge — a 30- year franchise it would not have granted for less than a 2-percent franchise fee rate. SCE could haverefused this offer but did not, demonstrating that the correct price of the right to operate this chartered city’s electricity franchise for 30 years is 2 percent of SCE’s revenues from customersin the City. Further, the reality of inflation is a matter of such common knowledgethatit can be judicially noticed as a legitimate basis for the changein the City’s fee over time. As has beentrueof every fiat currency knownto history, moneyloses value over time. The pennies-per-gallon cost of gasoline of an earlier era is no more. Prices rise while service remains the same; fees must, too. No one would arguethat the value of the land underlying the City’s streets 13 157109.5 andrights of way is now worth less than 59 years ago when the City conferred the earlier franchise. Vv. AMIC?SANSWERTOTHECITY’S PROPOSITION 26 ARGUMENT DOES NOT PERSUADE Amici answer the City’s Proposition 26 argument, as Jacks did not. (AB at pp. 11-12.) However, they misstate it. The City does not argue that Proposition 26 “transformed sometaxes into fees.” (Id. at p. 11,fn. 2.) The City argued the reverse — it made taxes of what had previously been fees. Proposition 26 confirmed that franchise fees, rents and other charges for the use of public property are not taxes and thusare not limited to cost. Like other landowners, a city’s charge for use of property is limited only by what the market will bear. The City noted in its principal briefs that it seems unlikely voters would amendarticle XIII C in 2010 to make a fee of what had previously been a tax under that samearticle, given— as Amici concede — that Proposition 26 was intended to narrow, not broaden,local revenue authority. (ABat p. 5, citing Schmeer v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1322.) If Proposition 26 allows franchise fees not limited to cost, and it narrows the revenueauthority local governments had underProposition 218, then Proposition 218 allows such franchise fees, too. (OB at pp. 33-34.) 14 157109.5 Amici’s claim also suggests that negotiated compensation for the use of public property in private, for-profit activity must be limited to the cost of some service. Whatservice is provided to one whousespublic property? None need be provided for the licensee or franchisee to receive value for which they willingly pay. Use of property is not a service. It does not have cost, although it certainly hasa value.It is likely for this reason — as well as a desire to protect the public fisc — that Proposition 26 imposesno cost-of-service limit on fees for use of governmentproperty, as it does for service and regulatory fees. (Compare Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd.(e)(4) [no cost-of-service limit for fees for use of property] with id., at subds.(e)(2) and (3) [service and regulatory fees limited to cost of service].) For this same reason, such fees are not taxes under Proposition 13. (Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 950.) Nor under Proposition 218, as that measure maintains Proposition 13 precedents it does not overrule. (Citizens Assn. of Sunset Beach v. Orange County Local Agency Formation Com. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1194-1195.) In reply, Amici suggest the City assumesrather than proves the franchise fee is negotiated consideration for use of public property. (AB at p. 12.) The suggestion simply overlooks muchof the City’s principal briefs, which quote the franchise agreement and stipulated facts to prove the point. (OBat pp. 15-18, 28-29; Reply at 15 157109.5 pp- 14-17.) Thus, Amici purport to answerthe City’s arguments by ignoring them. Obviously, such an answeris not persuasive. Indeed, Amici concedethis case by writing: “If one accepts this characterization of the surcharge [as “intended to compensate the City for the useofits infrastructure”], it passes muster under Proposition 218.” (AB at p. 12.) Precisely so. CONCLUSION Thus,like Jacks, Amici ignore the languageof the franchise agreementandthe stipulated facts to find what they wish to see — a non-voter-approvedtax. Attention to that language, and to the other evidence marshalled by the City’s principal briefs, however, demonstrates the franchise fee is what it purports to be — a negotiated paymentforthe right to use City rights of way. It does not lose that character due to subsequentdecisions of SCE and the Public Utilities Commission to require SCE to recoverthatcostofits business from its customersin the City. Amici addlittle here that can persuade. The City respectfully urges this Courtto affirm the trial court judgmentfor the City and to reverse the Court of Appeals’ decisiontoset it aside. 16 157109.5 DATED:Nov.24, 2015 157109.5 ARIEL PIERRE CALONNE,City Attorney TOM R. SHAPIRO,Asst. City Attorney COLANTUONO, HIGHSMITH & WHATLEY, PC > MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO RYAN THOMAS DUNN LEONARDP. ASLANIAN Attorneys for RespondentCity of Santa Barbara 17 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CAL.R. CT. 8.520(C)(1) & 8.204(C)(1) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.520(b), 8.520(c)(1), and 8.204(c)(1), the foregoing Reply Brief by Respondent and Appellant City of Santa Barbara contains 2,856 words(including footnotes, but excluding the tables and this Certificate) and is within the 14,000 wordlimit set by California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(c)(1). In preparing this certificate, I relied on the word count generated by Word 2013 version 15, included in Microsoft Office 365 Pro Plus. DATED:Nov.24, 2015 ARIEL PIERRE CALONNE,City Attorney TOM R. SHAPIRO,Asst. City Attorney COLANTUONO, HIGHSMITH & WHATLEY, PC AS MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO RYAN THOMAS DUNN Attorneysfor Respondent City of Santa Barbara 18 157109.5 PROOF OF SERVICE Rolland Jacks, et al. v. City of Santa Barbara California Supreme Court Case No. 5225589 I, Ashley A. Lloyd, declare: Iam employed in the County of Nevada, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business addressis420 Sierra College Drive, Suite 140, Grass Valley, California 95945-5091. On November 24, 2015,I served the document(s) described as ANSWER TO AMICUS CURIAEBRIEF OF HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONontheinterested parties in this action as by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressedas follows: SEE ATTACHED oyMAIL: The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. Iam readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Grass Valley, California, in the ordinary course of business. Iam awarethat on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalidif the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than onedayafter service of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsof the State of California that the aboveis true and correct. Executed on November Z , 2015, at Grass Valley, California. A Ashley A. Llofd ON : 19 157109.5 157109.5 SERVICE LIST RollandJacks, et al. v. City of Santa Barbara California Supreme Court Case No. $225589 David W.T. Brown Paul E. Heidenreich Huskinson, Brown & Heidenreich, LLP 1200 Aviation Blvd, Suite 202 RedondoBeach, CA90278 Courtesy Copy to: Ariel Pierre Calonne, City Attorney Tom R.Shapiro, Asst. City Attorney City of Santa Barbara P.O. Box 1990 Santa Barbara, CA 93012 Telephone:(805) 564-5326 Facsimile: (805) 897-2532 acalonne@santabarbaraca.gov tshapiro@santabarbaraca.gov Clerk of the Court Santa Barbara County Superior Court For The Honorable ThomasP. Anderle Santa Barbara Superior Court P.O, Box 21107 Santa Barbara, CA 93121 20 James Ryan Cogdill HowardJarvis Taxpayers Association 921 11th Street, Suite 1201 Sacramento, CA 95814 Clerk of the Court Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six 300 S. Spring Street 2nd Floor, North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013