CITIZENS FOR FAIR REU RATES v. CITY OF REDDING

Respondent’s Response to Amicus Curiae Brief

Cal.September 28, 2015

SUPREME COURT COPY Exemptfrom Filing Fees No. $224779 Government Code § 6103 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITIZENS FOR FAIR REU RATES,ET AL. Plaintiffs and Appellants, Vv. CITY OF REDDING,ET AL. SEP 28 2015 Defendants and Respondents Frank A. iets, Depuiy ANSWERTO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS OF CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, GLENDALE COALITION FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT, HOWARDJARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION,AND PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION Review of a Published Decision of the Third Appellate District, Case No. C071906 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Shasta, Case No. 171377 (Consolidated with Case No. 172960) Honorable William D. Gallagher, Judge Presiding *MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) MColantuono@chwlaw.us MICHAEL R. COBDEN(262087) MCobden@chwlaw.us MEGANS. KNIZE (257970) MKnize@chwlaw.us © COLANTUONO,HIGHSMITH &WHATLEY, PC 420 Sierra College Drive, Suite 140 GrassValley, California 95945-509 | Telephone: (530) 432-7357, Facsimile: (530) 432-7356 | Attorneys for Respondent City of Redding 155131.9 Exempt from Filing Fees No. $224779 Government Code § 6103 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITIZENS FORFAIR REU RATES,ET AL. Plaintiffs and Appellants, V. CITY OF REDDING,ET AL. Defendants and Respondents ANSWERTO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS OF CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, GLENDALE COALITION FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT, HOWARDJARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION,AND PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION Review of a Published Decision of the Third Appellate District, Case No. CO71906 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County ofShasta, Case No. 171377 (Consolidated with Case No. 172960) Honorable William D. Gallagher, Judge Presiding *MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) MColantuono@chwlaw.us MICHAEL R. COBDEN (262087) MCobden@chwlaw.us MEGANS. KNIZE (257970) MKnize@chwlaw.us COLANTUONO, HIGHSMITH & WHATLEY, PC 420 Sierra College Drive, Suite 140 GrassValley, California 95945-509 | Telephone: (530) 432-7357 Facsimile: (530) 432-7356 Attorneys for Respondent City of Redding 155131.9 TABLE OF CONTENTS © INTRODUCTION.ussscsscssscsssscesessesnsssssssesstssssesssssscessssssenasssssstsseunecseese 7 © DISCUSSION...vssssssssscssnsonteresnsuetetnsiatietstusnstitieisiasssiussiusseeeeeee 9 |. GCBG MAKES ONE USEFUL POINTANDTWO ERRORB............ 9 A. PROPOSITION 26 REGULATES ELECTRIC CHARGES, NOT THE EXPENDITURE OF PROCEEDS OF THOSE CHARGEG........ccccscssssssssssssseseseseessees 9 B. GCBG MISUNDERSTANDSPROPOSITION 26’S NON-APPLICATION TO EARLIER LEGISLATION.............. 10 IT. CITIZENS’ AMICI MISTAKENLY ASSERT ELECTRIC RATES FUND THEPILOT..u000..... scesssessccnsssssesssceseesecsessesssessssssesssseerecerees 13 Hl. CITIZENS’ AMICI SELECTIVELY RECITE LEGISLATIVE HISTORYTO OBSCURE PROPOSITION 26’S INTENTTO PRESERVE EARLIER LEGISLATION............cccssssssscsessesesssssssessescsecsesssess 15 IV. CITIZENS’ AMICI ARGUE IRRELEVANT LAW ....0....ccccscescceeeseesses: 18 A. PROPOSITION 13 HAS NO APPLICATION HERE.............. 18 B. NOR DOES PROPOSITION 218 APPLY HERE...............0...... 19 C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY FROM PROPERTY TAXESIS ALSO IMMATERIAL...esssesscsesesstsssscssssnesacsecsseceseessssssesenssesees 19 V. PLF AND CAL.TAX MISUNDERSTANDTHECITY’S BURDEN OF PROOF.0000...ecsssescsesssssssnsscssecsnesassassssssssesssesssscerucaracereees 23 VI. CITIZENS’ AMICI CONFLATE PROPOSITIONS218 AND26.......26 Vil. =HJTAAND CAL.TAX ERRTO ARGUE THE CITY REENACTED THE PILOT 0...eecescesscsssscsssccsseessssessesssssessssssssccseresscensees 29 © CONCLUSION.0.0.eesssssccseessscnsessscsssssascssessssecsssseessnscssnesssesessusssscensesrsneesseseswe dd 2 155131.9 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES State Cases Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086.0...ceccecsesssecesseessesssssseseseeseeseeseeeees Brooktrails Township Community Services District v. Board ofSupervisors ofMendocino County (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 195....ccssssssssssssssesesssssssessssseeseeeen California Building Industry Association v. State Water Resources Control Board (2015) 235 Cal-App.4th 1430....cccssssssssssssuesesssesssesssssseeeseeeen California Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 420cccecccsccssssscscescccccesessssssssssssseesessuseeeseees California State Teachers’ Retirement System v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 216 Cal-App.4th 41 o...ccccccccsssssssssssusesesssrsssesssssssseseeen Capistrano Taxpayers Association v. City of San Juan Capistrano (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1493 ..cccccccssscssssssssesessesssssssssseesssesee Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City ofRedding (2015) 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722 veccccssssssssssssssssssssessssseessesereeeeceee City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 554.ceeeeeececseessesseeesesessensesseeeeenens City ofLos Angeles v. Inyo County (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 736 csccsscessssneseseseesesesestenseceee Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 ...ccccsssssssssssssssssscssssessssssssesveesesesssseeeeee 155131.9 Page(s) seeeseseoesees24 seseseesesease 11 eseaseneeseee 24 sessseeeseeees24 eeeeens22, 23 ne28 sesenD, 26 sect20 ven20 | n Elliott v. City ofPacific Grove (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 53...ccssssseseeeseceessscecesecesesssseaeseaseeeeesnseees24 Gately v. Cloverdale Unified School Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App. 4th 4870...eeesesesessenseeeseecsescseseneseseatessenees27 Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1172...eescsssesesesssseseereeseeneeeeeeeeeeeees 18, 20, 21, 23 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City ofFresno (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 914.00.eeeeeeeseeceeeeeeseeeeteeees 12, 18, 28, 29 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Roseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637 .......ccscescsssssessseerseetereeeeeeeeeseeseneseeeeees 12, 28 Moore v. Lemon Grove (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 363.00.essseseseseseseeseseseseeseseeesseseseerente 13, 25 Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892.00... ccccssssssesseessceeceescsessssereeseseeeeeeeesens25 Oneto v. City ofFresno (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 460 uo...ceeesecssssseseseeeeseeeeeseeesesteasaesees passim Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1187uo.eceseesescssseeseeeecsseceseesseseseeseseseseees32 Richmond v. Shasta Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409...ecsesscessssesscresssessetsenesessseneesacseseeaseaeeseesees 21 Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 6970... eceeessssscssssesesseseceessceneeeeseresseessseseseees25 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1132 ....cscscsssssecssssseessssssesssseeesseessssseeessesso28 San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified School Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 154...ccccsescsessesescsessesesssessasseseceeeeseeteasaeeseeeneeees 21 4 155131.9 Schmeer v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310.00... cccccscssssecsessssesssssesseesteereseeseesees25, 27 Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal4th 866.00...ccecesssesseesssesssesessssnsscsesstssssseeseeneeees 15, 28 Southern California Edison Co. v. P.U.C. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 172.00... eceeccccesssssessecsesessssssssstesssessssessesssecaees30 White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal4th 528.0... eeesessessessssessecsessesssscsestcssssussseseessteresessess33 Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190...eeeesecsesessessssessessesseesssescsssscsssessusseececsessceneas24 Yes on 25, Citizensfor an On-Time Budget v. Superior Court (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1445ooo ecccessesssssesscsescsscsssssssssesescecsesseasees30 Statutes Government Code § FOOD oeseeeececssessseseesesscssssssccsccsscsesacsssecsessesstassusseessessecssseseracectecsecceccees30 § 16304 ooo. cescssescececsssssscsscsscsccsccscsceessssssssssesecscesssssecseresstececesececceseees33 California Constitution Article VI oo. eecesccsseceescsecscsssesesesesesessesesssssscsesscasecsrevacaesestesesaeseeeesesasans26 Article XTIL, § 3 o.ecccccscsssssesessssssssssssvscscssecessssssssesssasssscacssssscaceeseseceses21 Article XII, § 3, subd. (a) ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssesesstieseseseeeesee22 Article XII, § 3, subd. (b).sccsssssssssssssssssssssssssssssesseseusesseee8, 21, 23 Article XYD, § 11 weeccccscssssscsssssscssssscsessssreseesesessesssaessatstssssesesecseserees20 Article XII A, § 3, Subd. (D) cseseesscsssssscssssssssssessusssssstsnseseeeeececeu Article XTII C, § 1, Subd. (€) .cecccccccsssscssssssssessesessesesecsuessecsessssees passim Article XIII C, § 1, subd. (€)(2) cevscsssssesssnesssssessssssssssesiseecsiee.22, 27 Article XUIE D essssssssssssssssessessssssssssstssssssssssssssessssesee vevssnenee2d, 25 Article XIII D, § 3, UDG. (D) o...eseeescessesesssssssssscscsecsesscesscsecsecsesssscsnses 19 Article XIII D, § 6 ......ccccccssssssssessssssssseseesscssesseacsseecaceseeseessessseseseresssses2 Article XIII D, § 6, subd. (b)(1)......ccecccscssesssssescsececcscsessecessceesaveesenees27 Article XII D, § 6, subd. (b)(3) -ssccsssssssssssssssssssssesessessnseuseeeeseee27 5 155131.9 Article XIII D, § 6, SUDA. (b)(5)...scsscssssssssssssssssssssseesesessssssessesssnsensnssee24 Article XIII D, § 6, SUD. (d) ou... ecceesssescesereeseseesseeneaseeeeeees 10, 27, 30 Other Authorities 22 Stats. 2013 (AB 75), §§ 21 ...ecesscsssssseesescessessessescsesseesssesseseessenseeeeesees32 25 Stats. 2014 (SB 852), § 1.80, subd.(a) oo... eesessesssetseeeesseeseeeeveceeeevene 32 25 Stats. 2014 (SB 852), § 1.80, subd.(Db)........eeceseesessesessseeesescecesseeeenees32 74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 6 (1991)on.eeesceseseseceesseecscerseseceecerstnenenes20, 21, 22 6 155131.9 cs | INTRODUCTION The Court granted review of these questions: 1. Is a paymentin lieu of taxes (PILOT) transferred from the city utility to the city general fund a “tax” under Proposition 26 (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (1)(e))? 2. Does the exception for “reasonable costs to the local governmentof providing the service or product” apply to the PILOT (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd.(1)(e)(2))? 3. Does the PILOTpredate Proposition 26? Amici curiae Glendale Coalition for Better Government (GCBG), California Taxpayers Association (Cal. Tax), Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (HJTA), andPacific Legal Foundation (PLF) (collectively, “Citizens’ Amici”) filed briefs in support of Plaintiff and Appellant Citizens for Fair REU Rates (“Citizens”). These briefs dolittle to assist decision here — not least because they do not addressthe questions on review. Citizens’ Amici addressthe last question in only conclusory terms. GCBG goessofar asto labelit “irrelevant.” (Brief of Amicus Curiae GCBG [“GCBG Br.”]at p. 8.) In fact, the question is determinative here, as the trial court concluded. Because Proposition 26 is not retroactive and because the City’s PILOT predates Proposition 26 and has not been changedsincethat measure’s 2010 adoption, the PILOT survives review. 7 155131.9 Citizens’ Amici do make twohelpfulpoints: First, GCBG points out that only Redding’s electric service rates could be a tax “imposed”on its customers; the PILOTitself is an accounting transfer from the Redding Electrical Utility (“REU”) to the City’s general fund that is not “imposed” on anyone. This successfully critiques not only the reasoning of the Court of Appeal majority below,but the Cal. Tax brief, too. Second, HJTA acknowledgesthat the PILOTis grandfathered by Proposition 26, but mistakenly concludes, as did the Court of Appeal majority and as does Cal. Tax, that Redding reenacted the PILOT post-Proposition 26. Citizens’ Amici’s arguments are otherwise either off-topic — such as those from Proposition 13 andarticle XIII, section3, subdivision (b)’s exemption of public property from property tax — or mistaken — suchastheir unthinking analogy to Proposition 218 in construing Proposition 26 despite the pointedly different languageof the measures. Noneof Citizens’ Amici engages the languageof Proposition 26 or notes its necessarily meaningful differences from that of Proposition 218, which it amends. Indeed, Cal. Tax faults the City’s careful reading of the Constitution as “microscopically dissecting.” (Brief of Amicus Curiae Cal. Tax [“Cal. Tax Br.”] at p. 6.) Yet that close reading is precisely what is demandedbythis Court’s ample precedents — and Cal. Tax’s own argument —the 155131.9 meaning of our Constitution is foundfirst and principally in its language. In sum, Citizens’ Amici are of butlittle help here and,for the reasonsdetailed in the City’s principal briefs, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeal and affirm thetrial court’s judgments for the City in both casesat bar. DISCUSSION I. GCBG MAKES ONE USEFUL POINT ANDTWO ERRORS A. PROPOSITION 26 REGULATES ELECTRIC CHARGES, NOTTHE EXPENDITURE OF PROCEEDS OF THOSE CHARGES GCBG makesoneuseful point: that Proposition 26’s provisions distinguishing taxes from other local government revenues“refer to the fees chargedto rate payers for providing electric rates and not how thosefees are ultimately expended.” (GCBG Br. at p. 1 [Application to File Amicus CuriaeBrief] {original emphasis].) GCBG alsoargues the Court of Appeal majority erred to evaluate the PILOTrather than charges imposed on City power customers. The City agrees. This refutes not onlythe Courtof Appeal majority’s analysis (Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding (2015) 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 730-732), but Cal. Tax’s too. 155131.9 (Cal. TaxBr. at pp. 12, 14.) Thus, Proposition 26 applies to fees charged, not the use of proceedsof those charges. B. GCBG MISUNDERSTANDS PROPOSITION 26’S NON-APPLICATION TO EARLIER LEGISLATION GCBG makestwoerrors asto the effect of Proposition 26 on earlier legislation. First, GCBG argues the City must abandon the PILOT whenit raises powerrates post-Proposition 26. (GCBGBr.at p. 3.) Curiously, GCBGstates (without any persuasivebasis), that the City could lawfully increase the PILOT’s share of rate proceedspost- Proposition 26 providedit does not raise energy rates themselves. GCBG's position assumes Proposition 26 applies retroactively to voidearlier local legislation requiring the PILOT. Yet Proposition 26 is in pari materia with Proposition 218, and omits the provision of the earlier measure — article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (d) — that makesit retroactive so as to terminate the effectivenessof earlier legislation. That section states: “Beginning July 1, 1997,all fees or charges shall comply with this section.” Because Proposition 26 has no similar provision, it cannot have the sameeffect. The City’s principal briefs amplify the point. (Opening Brief [OB] at pp. 39, 44; Reply Brief [RB] at p. 19.) The framers of Proposition 26 plainly excluded any analog toarticle XIII D, 10 155131.9 section 6, subdivision (d) from:the measure, and Citizens’ Amici are entirely silentas to the implications of that drafting decision. Under the usualrules of construction, the City’s PILOTis grandfathered by Proposition 26 and may continueevenif the City could not enact or increase that PILOTafter 2010. Second, GCBGarguesthe PILOTis not a lawful cost of service after adoption of Proposition 26 because it expresseslocal rather than state or federal policy. (GCBG Br. at pp. 7-8.) Cal. Tax makes the sameclaim.(Cal. Tax. Br. at pp. 15, 17.) Neither provides authority for this distinction. Nothing in the text or context of Proposition 26 suggests voters intended to grandfather non-cost- justified elements of powerrates arising from state and federal law (like compliance with A.B. 32 greenhouse gas mandatesorfederal workplace safety standards), but not from local law. Rather, Proposition 26is entirely prospective in its application to local government. (Brooktrails Township Community Services District v. Board of Supervisors ofMendocino County (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 195.) GCBGargues Proposition 26's “purpose” wasto allow voters to control local government. Cal. Tax simply asserts the City andits utility are one legal person and one cannotcharge the otherfor services. Both pointsfail. Proposition 26’s text makes plain it was intendedto regulate the state and local governments alike. (Compare Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 3, subd. (b) with art. XIII C, § 1, subd.(e) - 11 155131.9 [Proposition 26’s substantially identical provisions for state and local government].) Thus the text of the measure providesnojustification for disparate treatmentoflocal versusstate and federallegislation. Cal. Tax argues costs imposed by local governments cannot be includedin service charges they impose.(Cal. Tax Br. at p. 17.) This would meanthatthe costs for complying with the manystate statutes which impose operational and construction costs on all levels of government(e.g., the California Environmental Quality Act) could only be includedin fees charged bylocal agencies, not state agencies. This argument would end a rangeof state and local legislative policies like low-incomeand seniordiscounts and public goodscharges, as argued by Amicus Curiae California Municipal Utilities Associationin its Letter in Supportof Petition for Review. (Letterat p. 7.) Similarly, Cal. Tax confuses a fee — which government imposesonprivate actors subject to its authority — with cost allocation within a government. (Cal. Tax Br. at p. 15.) Even under the more demanding standardsof Proposition 218, a local governmentcan recoverthe full cost of its services and can also repayits general fund for services that fund providesfor the benefit of the utility. (E.g., Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Roseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 650-651 (Roseville) [city could | recovercostof police, fire and street services from water and sewer charges subject to Prop. 218]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. 12 155131.9 City ofFresno (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 914, 926 (Fresno) [same]; and Moore v. Lemon Grove (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 363, 376-77 (Lemon Grove) [sewerutility could repay general fund its share of personnel costs and resulting funds could be used for any lawful purposeof the city].) Under Proposition 26, the City may similarly require its utility to repay the general fund — via a PILOT — forthe valueofits servicesto thatutility. il. CITIZENS’ AMICI MISTAKENLY ASSERT ELECTRIC RATES FUND THEPILOT PLFasserts the PILOTis funded bytheelectric rates challenged here, withoutcitation to the record or to authority. (Brief of Amicus Curiae PLF [PLFBr.] at p. 2.) Cal. Tax makes the same, erroneous claim. (Cal. Tax Br. at pp. 5, 11.) However, the trial court found otherwiseas a matterof fact. (3 CT 741 [“[T]here is no evidence that the PILOT is paid out of customer’s rates”].) Moreover, the City demonstrates that finding to be supported by substantial record evidence. (OB at pp. 35-36; RB at p. 6-7; see IV AR Tab 145, p. 831; IV AR Tab 149, p. 873; XIII AR Tab 205, p. 2975].) Thus, Citizens’ Amici are simply wrong onthis point. The sum total of record supportfor Citizens’ argument, as Cal. Tax also notes, is that a December 2010 City Council resolution increasing powerrates referred to “transfers authorized by law”as among the costs the increases wereto cover. (Cal. Tax Br. at p. 12; . Citizens’ AnswerBrief [Ans. Br.] at p. 12.) As detailed in the City’s 13 155131.9 Reply Brief, however, the PILOTis not the only transfer from the electric utility to the general fund. Other lawful transfers account for shared costs, such as general overhead.(RB at pp. 6-7; see IV AR, Tab 159, pp. 1030-1034 [Nov.19, 2010 staff report]; IV AR, Tab 166, pp. 1065-1098.) Other record evidence demonstrates the December 2012 electric rate increase was not required to fund the PILOT and that, indeed, the PILOT need notbe funded byratesatall, as the trial court found. (3 CT 741.) Cal. Tax makes noeffort to refute the finding. Cal. Tax further arguesthat, even if the PILOTis not funded from rates, the PILOTis a tax requiring voter approval becauseit does notfall within any of the seven exceptions to Proposition 26’s definition of “tax.” (Cal. Tax Br. at p. 12.) As GCBG points out, Cal. Tax erroneously treats the PILOTas a revenue measure imposed ona third party.It is not. It is a fund transfer internal to the City. Accordingly it is not “imposed” on third party soasto trigger Proposition 26 — electric rates are. (Cal. Const., article XIII C, § 1, subd.(e) [“As usedin this article, ‘tax’ means any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposedbya local government, except the following: ...”] (emphasis added).) Cal. Tax reads “impose” out of the Constitution, a reading which would makeevery general fund expenditure a tax, which cannot havebeen voters’ intent. 14 155131.9 B a g h § Ae wh o Hl. CITIZENS’ AMICI SELECTIVELY RECITE LEGISLATIVE HISTORYTO OBSCURE PROPOSITION 26’S INTENTTO PRESERVE EARLIER LEGISLATION PLF, HJTA, and Cal. Tax quote selectively from Proposition 26'sballot materials to argue the measure was intended to broadly reduce local governments’ revenue authority. (PLF Br. at pp. 12~13; Brief of Amicus Curiae HJTA [HJTA Br.] at p.1; Cal. Tax Br. at pp. 9-10.) Proposition 26 wasintendedto narrowthe authority of state and local governmentsto impose fees in somerespects. However, the measure’s proponents argued vigorously it would not displace existing laws that protect consumers and the environment. Earlier ballot measures seeking to undermine this Court's ruling in Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866 (Sinclair Paint) had been defeated by environmental and consumer opposition and, indeed, the arguments against Proposition 26 reflected those same concerns. (1 CT 279-280.) Thus, the voters who approvedProposition 26 were apparently persuaded it would not undermineexisting laws that protect consumers and the environment. This, of course, supports the City’s argumentthat Proposition 26 grandfathers the PILOT alongwithits discounted. «.:..: powerrates for low-income and senior householdsand similar deviations from the cost-of-service principles that serve othersocial andlegislative objectives. (1 CT 279-280.) For what language in 15 155131.9 Proposition 26 allowsselective retroactivity depending on the contentof the earlier policy? None, of course. A more complete review of relevantlegislative history is appropriate to supportthe claim that Redding’s PILOTsurvives the adoption of Proposition 26. Proposition 26’s legislative history demonstratesa clear intent the measure not haveretroactive effect. For example, the Legislative Analyst’s Impartial Analysis told voters the measure would apply only prospectively: [M]ost other fees or charges in existence at the time of the November2, 2010 election would not be affected unless ... [t]he ... local governmentlater increases or extendsthe fees or charges. (1 CT 277.) Ballot arguments in favor of Proposition 26 also disclaim any retroactiveeffect: PROPOSITION 26 PROTECTS ENVIRONMENTAL AND CONSUMER REGULATIONS AND FEES Don’t be misled by opponents of Proposition 26. California has someof the strongest environmental and consumerprotection lawsin the country. Proposition 26 preserves those laws and PROTECTS LEGITIMATE FEES SUCH AS THOSE TO CLEAN UP ENVIRONMENTAL OR OCEAN DAMAGE, FUND | NECESSARY CONSUMER REGULATIONS, OR. 16 155131.9 PUNISH WRONGDOING,andforlicensesfor professionalcertification or driving. (1 CT 279, original emphasis.) The proponents’ rebuttal to the “no” argument wasto the sameeffect: Prop. 26 protects legitimate fees and WON’T ELIMINATE OR PHASE OUT ANY OF CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENTAL OR CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS,including: —Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act —Hazardous Substance Control Laws —California Clean Air Act —California Water Quality Control Act Lawsregulating licensing and oversightof Contractors, Attorneys and Doctors “Proposition 26 doesn’t change or underminea single law protecting ourair, ocean, waterwaysor forests — it simply stops the runawayfees politicians pass to fund ineffective programs.” — Ryan Broddrick, former Director, Department of Fish and Game (1 CT 280, original emphasis.) Thus, Proposition 26’s legislative history demonstrates neither its proponents nor voters intendedit to displace existing laws advancing importantsocial policies. By ignoring these passages, 17 155131.9 Citizens’ Amici present an incomplete and misleading picture of Proposition 26. | GCBGalso quotes the League of California Cities’ Proposition 26 Implementation Guide, which explainsthat costs imposed pursuantto legislation which predates Proposition 26’s adoption are grandfathered. (GCBGBr.at p. 7.) Yet, GCBG nonetheless dismisses without substantive argumentas “irrelevant” the third question on which this Court granted review — whether Redding’s PILOTpredates Proposition 26. (GCBGBr.at p. 8.) GCBG’s claim is unpersuasive. IV. CITIZENS’ AMICI ARGUE IRRELEVANT LAW A. PROPOSITION 13 HAS NOAPPLICATION HERE Citizens’ Amici rely on Proposition 13, even though Citizens does not sue underit and even thoughthis Courtlimitedits grant of review to questionsarising under Proposition 26. (PLF Br. at pp. 2-3; HJTABr. at pp. 2-3.) Moreover, Proposition 13 would not forbid the PILOTin issue here. (See Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1172, 1181-1184 (Hansen) [allowing city to earn reasonable return on investmentin water utility]; Oneto v. City ofFresno (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 460, 468 (Oneto) [city could earn return on its water utility in the form of a PILOT even though charter prohibited city — from generally profiting from it]; cf. Fresno, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 18 155131.9 p. 926 [same PILOTviolated Prop. 218 as applied to water and sewer utilities].) B. NOR DOES PROPOSITION 218 APPLY HERE Citizens’ Amici argue from Proposition 218 even though that measure expressly exemptselectric rates. (PLF Br. at pp. 10~13; HJTA Br. at pp. 6-9). Article XIII D, section 3, subdivision (b) provides: For purposesofthis article, fees for the provision of electrical or gas service shall not be deemed charges or fees imposedas an incident of property ownership. Proposition 218’s proponents (including HJTA) assured voters “{ljifeline rates for elderly and disabled for telephone, gas, and electric services are NOT affected” by that measure.(2 CT 349, original emphasis.) Thus, Proposition 218 cannot answer the questions on review. C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY FROM PROPERTYTAXES IS ALSO IMMATERIAL Cal. Tax and PLF arguethe constitutional immunity of public property from the ad valorem property tax authorized by. Proposition 13. (Cal. Tax. Br. at pp. 21-25; PLF Br.at p. 4.) However, Citizens do not argue — and neither lower court found —the PILOT 19 155131.9 is a tax on utility assets. As GCBGcorrectly argues, the issue hereis whetherthere is proof the City uses the proceeds of charges for electric service to fund the PILOTand,if so, whether doing so violates Proposition 26. (GCBG Br.at pp. 1, 3.) Moreover, both Cal. Tax and PLF overlook article XIII, section 11 of our Constitution, which allows taxation of city property located outside the county in whichthecity is located. For example, Redding’s share of generation and transmissionassets of joint powers authorities are located outside Shasta County (RT 73 line 4 - RT 74 line 6; XI AR Tab 203, p. 2469), as are Los Angeles’s Owens Valley assets of Chinatown fame (City of Los Angeles v. Inyo County (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 736 [assessmentof taxable water rights ownedby City located in Inyo County]) and San Francisco’s airport (City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 554, 567 [dispute over property tax on airport land in San Mateo County ownedbySan Francisco].) Cal. Tax’s authorities on this point bear discussion.It cites an Attorney General opinion concluding the Legislature could not tax properties ownedbythe California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“PERS”) to fund local governments that serve those properties. (74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 6 (1991).) However, the case at bar does not involve a tax imposed by the Redding City Councilona | third party underits police or tax powers. Instead, it involves a legislative decision of the City — authorized by Hansen and Oneto — 20 155131.9 to earn a return onits investmentinits electric utility and to reflect the value of City servicesto the utility. (Hansen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1181-1184; Oneto, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 460, 468.) Thus, the PILOTsimply does not implicate the exemption underarticle XIIL, section 3, subdivision (b) of some (but notall) REU property from the 1 percent property tax authorized by Proposition 13. For similar reasons, this Court foundarticle XIII, section 3, subdivision(b) oflittle use in construing the property related fee provisionsofarticle XIII D, section 6. (See Richmond v. Shasta Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409, 422 [water connection fee not an “assessment” in violation of article XIIL, section 3, subdivision (b)].) Richmond distinguished San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified School Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 154 [capital componentof waterdistrict’s rate was illegal tax on school property] and its discussion ofarticle XIII, section 3, because: the characteristic that [this Court] found determinative for identifying assessments in San Marcos—that the proceedsof the fee were used for capital improvements — formsnopartof article XII D’s definition of “assessments. (Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 422.) So, too, here. The determinative factor in the Attorney General’s analysis is that the fee in question was forgeneral governmental services. (74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.6, at p.*3 (1991).) However, that point is not 21 155131.9 germane to Proposition 26, which looks to the reasonable cost to government of providing a service, even if those costs are repaid toa city’s general fund. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(2).) Moreover, the rationale of the Attorney General’s opinionis not persuasivehere.It found the Legislature imposed a tax on PERS because the imposition wasinvoluntary and triggered by PERS’ ownership of property alone. (74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.6, at p.*3 (1991).) Again, here we deal with the 1988 legislative decision of the Redding City Council to earn a return onits investmentinits electric utility measured by the amountof the 1% property tax; it imposesnotax. Evenif the PILOT were funded fromelectric rates (contrary to the trial court’s finding), it is not imposed on mere property ownership, butonelective decisions to purchase powerfrom the City whether those decisions be made by property ownersor tenants. No more helpful is California State Teachers’ Retirement System v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 41. That case considers a statutory methodto value a private leasehold ina building owned bythe California State Teachers’ Retirement System (“STRS”) for purposes of property tax. It considered whether that method violated article XIII, section 3, subdivision (a) by taxing STRS’fee as well as the leasehold. There is no question an ad valorem property tax was in issue there. The case did not involve expenditure of the proceedsof a servicefee or the allocation of costs betweena city’s general fundandits utility enterprise funds.It adds 22 155131.9 nothing to the discussion of the Attorney General’s opinion andis unhelpful here for the same reasons. Furthermore,it is misleading to state that the Court of Appeal “cit[ed] with approval” the Attorney General's opinion. (Cal. Tax Br. at p. 23.) The Court of Appeal merely cited the Attorney General opinion to explain whythe Legislature amendedthesection at issue, and suggested nothing about the court’s view of the Attorney General’s analysis. (California State Teachers’ Retirement System, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th atp. 58.) In short, this case involves no tax on REU’s assets but rather the use of the proceedsof its earnings from wholesale power transactions. Even if it were shownto involvethe use of proceeds of retail rates, it wouldstill involve the use of fee proceeds and not the taxation of utility assets. This case is not governedbyarticle XIII, section 3, subdivision (b) — just as Hansen and Oneto were not. Vv. PLFAND CAL.TAX MISUNDERSTAND THE CITY’S BURDEN OF PROOF PLF and Cal. Tax accuse the City of ignoring its burden of proof underthe final, unnumbered paragraphofarticle XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e). (PLF Br. at pp. 13-15; Cal. Tax. Br. at p. 11.) However, the City acknowledgesits burden and meetsit. (OB at pp. 13-15; RB at pp. 2-5, 25-26.) PLF and Cal. Tax overlook two important points as to burdens —_ of proof. First, Citizens bears the burden to make a primafacie case that the PILOTfalls outside Proposition 26’s exemptions. 23 155131.9 Propositions 218 and 26 doshift the ultimate burden of proof from plaintiff to rate-making agency.(Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd.(b)(5) [“In anylegal action contesting the validity of a fee or charge, the burden shall be on the agency to demonstrate compliance with this article.”]; art. XIII C, § 1, subd.(e), final unnumbered para.[“The local governmentbears the burden of proving by a preponderanceof the evidencethat a levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax ...”].) However, under the familiar canon of expressio untus est exclusio alterius, that Propositions 218 and 26 change one elementof tax litigation procedure meanstheyleaveall others undisturbed.(Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195 [“Underthe familiar rule of construction, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius, where exceptions to a generalrule are specified by statute, other exceptionsare not to be implied or presumed.”] [supersededbystatute on other groundsasstated in Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086].) Thus, we look to earlier law which requires Citizensto state a primafacie case here.(E.g., Elliott v. City ofPacific Grove (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 53, 59 [plaintiff has burdento establish charges are unreasonable under commonlaw rate-making standard; burden then shifts to defendantto establish rates were reasonable,fair, and lawful]; OB at pp. 13-14; RB at pp. 3-4; see California Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 421, 436 [construing Proposition 13]; see also California Building Industry 24 155131.9 Association v. State Water Resources Control Board (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1451 [same].) This rule applies alike to Proposition 218 claims. (Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 (Morgan) [“[W]e do not find it sufficient for an appellant to merely claim the respondent should not have been successful attrial and then the burdenshifts to the respondentto proveits casein its entirety again”]; Lemon Grove, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [agency charging fee bears burden to prove compliance; “whethera fee or chargeviolates article XIII D is subject to de novo review”].) Second, an appellate court reviewsa trial court’s factual findings. The City argues the appropriate standard of appellate review oftrial courtfact-finding in its principal briefing. (OB at pp. 12-13 citing Schmeer v. County ofLos Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1317 (Schmeer); Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 697, 700]); see also RB at pp. 2-3.) However, regardless of the standard, an appellate court always reviews the trial court's findingsin light of the record evidence. (Lemon Grove, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 368; Morgan, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) Appellate courts are nottrial courts. Citizens and its Amici simply fail to refute the trial court’s factualfinding there is no evidence the PILOTis funded by.REU’s retail rates. (3 CT 741.) The record amply supports thetrial court’s finding, and neither Citizens nor its Amici make any meaningful 25 155131.9 attempt to addressit. (OB at pp. 35-38 [REU has multiple sources of income], IV AR Tab 145, p. 831 [FYs 2010 & 2011 budget, showing PILOT can be funded twice over from unrestricted revenues] (second table on page), IV AR, Tab 149,p. 873 [2010 audit showing PILOTof $6,055,950}, XIII AR Tab 205, p. 2975 [FYs 12 & 13 budget]; KBat p. 6 [same].) Nor do they demonstrate this record evidenceto be inadequate undereither the preponderance standardset forth in the final, unnumbered paragraphof Article XIII C, section 1, subdivision(e) or either of the appellate standards of review the City argues — de novoor substantial evidence. (OB at pp. 12-15.) Citizens and its Amici make no effort whatsoeverto satisfy Citizens’ burdenas Plaintiff and Appellant. Proposition 26 did not rewrite article VI of our Constitution nordidit alter the judicial processor the essentials of the appellate function. Thetrial court’s factual finding that the PILOTis not funded from REUelectric rates survives review underany standard. The Court of Appeal majority erred to conclude otherwise.(Citizens for Fair REU Rates, supra, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d at p. 731.) VI. CITIZENS’ AMICI CONFLATE PROPOSITIONS218 AND 26 Citizens’ Amici rely on Proposition 218 authorities to construe Proposition 26 with barely an acknowledgementthat the two measuresuse different language to impose different cost of service limitations. 26 155131.9 PLF simply equates the two withoutdiscussion. (PLF Br.at pp. 15-16.) HJTA acknowledges the measuresuse different language but argues “they are conceptually identical.” (HJTA Br.at p. 9.) This, of course, cannot be; the intent of a measureis gleaned from its language. (Schmeer, supra, 213 Cal.App.4that p. 1317.) Different language — particularly the absence from Proposition 26 of anything like the expressretroactivity languageof Article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (d) — requires different meanings. Thatis even moreso given that Propositions 26 and 218 are in pari materia. (Gately v. Cloverdale Unified School Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App. 4th 487, 494 [“Statutory provisionsthatare in pari materia,i.e., related to the same subject, should be construed together as one statute and harmonizedif possible”].) In this case, the harmonization of the two constitutional measures requires us to accountfor their intentional differences. Asthe City’s principal briefing argues in detail — to complete silence from Citizens’ Amici — the measuresuse different language to invoke different standards. (OB at pp. 30-33; RB at pp. 13-18.) Both propositions require service fees not exceed the cost of the service as to all customers in toto. (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (b)(1); id., art. XIII C, § 1, subd.(e)(2).) However, Proposition 218 imposesa further requirementthat a fee “not exceed the proportionalcost of the service attributable to a parcel.” (Cal. 7 Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd.(b)(3).) By contrast, Proposition 26 27 155131.9 imposes the more lenient Sinclair Paint standard: Redding must show only that “the mannerin which those costs are allocated toa payorbeara fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd.(e) [final, unnumbered paragraph]; Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866, 879 [quoting San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1132, 1146] [emphasis added].) “Fair or reasonable relationship” is not the sameas the cost justification Roseville and Fresno found Proposition 218 to requirefor the property related fees to whichit applies. Nor does the language of article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)’s final, unnumbered paragraph supportthe very exactingcost justification suggested by dicta in Capistrano Taxpayers Association v. City of San Juan Capistrano (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1506-1507, 1515-1516[invalidating tiered water rates due to complete absence of record evidence to justify price differences betweentiers; dicta suggesting cost- justification underProp. 218 mustbe very precise]. Thus, HJTA’s makes two fundamental errors to argue — as does Cal. Tax — that the absence from the City’s two administrative records here of cost-of-servicejustification for the PILOTnecessarily. - - means the challenged rates exceed service cost. (HJTA Br.at p- 10; Cal. Tax. Br. at 20.) First, they assume withoutjustificationthat 28 155131.9 Proposition 26 requires the samecost-of-servicejustification that Proposition 218 does despite the language the later measure uses to amendthe earlier. Second, they further assumetheelectric rates challenged here fund the PILOT, althoughthetrial court found otherwise with record support. Thus, the different language of Propositions 218 and 26 means that cases construing the former maynotbe blindly applied — wholesale — to determine disputes underthelatter. Fresno concluded that city could apply a PILOT to water and sewerfees under Proposition 13 (as Oneto held), but not under Proposition 218. Those measures use different language to achieve different results. So, too, Propositions 218 and 26. Fresno’s decision under Proposition 218 simply does not resolve application of Proposition 26 here. The contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeal majority, and the comparable arguments by Citizens and their Amici, simplyfail to accountfor the language of our Constitution. Vil. HJTA AND CAL.TAX ERRTO ARGUE THE CITY REENACTED THE PILOT HJTA agrees with the City that the PILOTis grandfathered by Proposition 26. (HJTA at pp. 11-12.) It also agrees with the Court of Appeal majority below that this grandfathering lasted only through the 2009-2010 budget andthat the June 2011 adoption of the 2011-__- 2012 budgetlegislated the PILOT anewinviolation of 29 155131.9 Proposition 26. This second point is unsupported bycitation to the record or to authority; it is also wrong. As demonstrated by the City’s principal briefing, the trial court found with record support that the City did not reenact, amendor increase the PILOTafter 2005. (3 CT 736-737; XI AR Tab 203, p. 2466; OB at pp. 16-18; RB at pp. 24-28.) Reenactmentof legislation without changeis not new legislation, but the maintenanceof earlierlegislation. (E.g., Gov. Code, § 9605 [portions of legislation “not altered are considered as having been the law from the time they were enacted” ]; Southern California Edison Co. v. P.ULC. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 172, 191 [legislative authority for PUC’s public goods charge evidenced by subsequent, related legislation which did notdisplaceit].) _ Nothing in Proposition 26 indicates voters intendedto change these fundamental rules of statutory construction. Indeed, the omission of anythinglike article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (d) from Proposition 26 — and ballot arguments it would not disturb preexisting consumerand environmental protection laws — are powerful evidence to the contrary. Thusall factors point to the conclusion that, absent a change in the PILOT’s calculation,it survives Proposition 26. Cal. Tax, too, argues the PILOT lapsed with the City’s FY 2009-2010 budget. (Cal. Tax Br. at pp. 25-26.) Unlike HJTA,it cites authority. Its cases are distinguishable, however. Yes on 25, 30 155131.9 Citizensfor an On-Time Budget v. Superior Court (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1445 rejected a challenge to the Attorney General's ballot title and summary of 2010’s Proposition 25, which allowed the Legislature to adopt budgets by simple majority vote, eliminating the previous requirementfor two-thirds approval. Writing for himself, Justices Raye and Hull, Presiding Justice Scotland found the measure was not misleading and issued a writ to overturn trial court ruling ordering amendmentof the argument. (Id. at p. 1450.) In the discussion Cal. Tax cites, the Court of Appeal was unpersuadedby a claim the measure wouldalso allow taxes to be approvedby a simple majority vote, in violation of Proposition 13: However, Proposition 25 would affect only the budget bill and other bills providing for appropriations related to the budgetbill. Indeed, the annual budget bill is a list of appropriations, “itemizing recommended expenditures’ for the ensuing fiscal year.” (Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1197, 219 Cal.Rptr. 664.) By definition, appropriations are not taxes. Accordingly, we find nothing in the substantive provisions of Proposition 25 that would give a green light to the Legislature to circumventthe existing constitutional requirementof a two-thirds vote ~ to raise taxes. 31 155131.9 (Id. at p. 1455.) In this, Cal. Tax finds a rule that all provisionsofall budgets lapse in a year. (Cal. Tax Br. at pp. 26-27.) This is obviously not so. Redding, like many agencies, adopts two-year budgets.(E.g., VII AR Tab 183, p. 1598 [Resolution No. 2009-61, budget for FYs 2010 and 2011].) Moreover, neither the Court of Appeal majority below nor Amici cite any language from Redding’s budget resolutions stating a sunset. While most appropriations are specific to given fiscal years, and are replaced by new appropriations in subsequent budgets, policy language in budgets — such as the PILOT — need have no sunset and, indeed, the City has demonstrated its intent to maintain the PILOTindefinitely. (OB at pp. 22-28; RB at 24-25.) Similarly, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 involved a challenge to abortion-funding restrictions on state budget appropriations for Medi-Calservices. This Court noted there that the disputed appropriations lapsed after one year and that certain claims were therefore moot.(Id. at p. 260, fn. 3.) Again, Cal. Tax reads this Court’s observation thatstate budgets typically lapse in a year as evidencethat all appropriations — state and local — necessarily do. This is not even trueas to the state. (Defendants’ and Respondents SupplementalBrief [filed Oct. 15, 2014] at pp. 1-3; see, e.g., 25 Stats. 2014 (SB 852) | § 1.80, subd.(a) [funds are appropriated for each fiscal year]; id. , § 1.80, subd.(b) [capital outlays may be encumbered until June 30,. 2017]; see also 22 Stats. 2013 (AB 75) §§ 21 [operative until July 1, * 32 155131.9 2018]; White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 538; Gov. Code, § 16304 [Legislature has expressly approved continuing state appropriations].) Noris it true as to the City here, as demonstrated above. Noneof Citizens’ Amici engages the City’s authorities for the rule that readoptionof legislative language without changeis not read to renew,but rather to continue, that legislation. This Court may take that silence as an admission that Amici have nothing useful to say on the point. Finally, if Cal. Tax’s and HJTA’s arguments are accepted, then Redding’s PILOT fails because it was legislated by budget action rather than by ordinanceor charter provision. Underthatrule, cities which enacted PILOTs by charter or ordinance benefit from the non- retroactive character of Proposition 26, while those which acted by resolution donot. This treats similarly situated cities differently based on anirrational and arbitrary distinction, and therefore works injustice. Such a rule not only elevates form over substance, butit amountsto retroactively imposing a requirement for the form of PILOTlegislation — a requirement not previously required by law. CONCLUSION Citizens’ Amici make twohelpful points. GCBGcorrectly - notes the Court of Appeal erred to evaluate the PILOT rather than the City’s electric rates. HJTA correctly notes thePILOT is at least - partly grandfathered by Proposition 26. 33 155131.9 In every other respect, however, Citizens’ Amici’s briefs are of little help here — they misunderstandthe facts, cite inapplicable law, and fail to meaningfully address the City’s arguments and authorities. Accordingly, and for the reasonsdetailed in its principal briefs, the City respectfully urges this Court to reverse the Court of Appealandto affirm the trial court’s judgmentsfor the City in both casesatbar. DATED:September 25, 2015 COLANTUONO, HIGHSMITH & WHATLEY, PC 7 MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO MICHAEL R. COBDEN MEGANS. KNIZE Attorneys for RespondentCity of Redding 34 155131.9 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CAL. R. CT. 8.520(B) & 8.204(C)(1) Pursuantto California Rules of Court, rules 8.520(b) and | 8.204(c)(1), the foregoing Reply to AmicusBriefs of California Taxpayers Association, Glendale Coalition For Better Government, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, and Pacific Legal Foundation by Defendants / Respondents City of Redding and City Council of Redding contains 6,221 words(including footnotes, but excluding the tables and this Certificate) and is within the 14,000 word limit set by California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(c). In preparing this certificate, I relied on the word count generated by Word version 14, included in Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2010. DATED:September 25, 2015 COLANTUONO, HIGHSMITH & WHATLEY, PC MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO 35 155131.9 PROOF OF SERVICE Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City OfRedding Third District Court of Appeal Case No. C071906 California Supreme Court Case No. $224779 I, Ashley A. Lloyd, declare: Iam employed in the County of Nevada, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business addressis 420 Sierra College Drive, Suite 140, Grass Valley, California 95945-5091. On September25, 2015 I served the document(s) described as ANSWER TO AMICUS CURIAEBRIEFS OF CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, GLENDALE COALITION FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT, HOWARDJARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, AND PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATIONontheinterested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHEDLIST — BY MAIL: The envelope was mailed with postage thereon'fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Underthat practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Grass Valley, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after service of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsof the State of California that the aboveis true and correct. Executed on September 25, 2015 at Grass Valley, California. yp Ashley A. Heyd / 36 155131.9 SERVICE LIST Citizens for Fair REU Ratesv. City ofRedding Third District Court of Appeal Case No. C071906 California Supreme Court Case No. $224779 William P. McNeill McNeill Law Offices 280 Hemsted Drive, Suite E Redding, CA 96002 Telephone: (530) 222-8992 Facsimile: (530) 222-8892 Email: waltmcn@aol.com Attorneys for Plaintiffand Appellant Citizens for Fair REU Rates Rick W.Jarvis Jarvis Fay Doporto & Gibson 492 9th Street, Suite 310 Oakland, CA 94607 Attorneysfor League of California Cities, Pub/Depublication Requestor JamesR. Cogdill HowardJarvis Taxpayers Association 921 11 Street, Suite 1201 Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneysfor Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, Pub/Depublication Requestor 155131.9 Barry DeWalt, City Attorney City Of Redding 777 Cypress Avenue P.O. Box 49601 Redding, CA 96099 Telephone: (530) 225-4050 Facsimile: (530) 225-4362 Email: bdewalt@ci.redding.ca.us Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent City ofRedding Daniel E. Griffiths Braun Blaising McLaughlin & Smith, PC 915 L Street, Suite 1270 Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneys for California Municipal Utilities Association, Pub/Depublication Requestor Steven A. Merksamer Eric J. Miethke Kurt R. Oneto Nielsen MerksamerParrinello Gross & Leoni, LLP 1415 L Street, Suite 1200 Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae California Taxpayers Association 37 Arthur Jarvis Cohen Harry Zavos 2 Venture, Suite 120 Irvine, CA 92618 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae Glendale Coalition for Better Government Clerk of the Court Shasta County Superior Court 1500 Court Street Redding, CA 96001-1686 155131.9 Meriem L. Hubbard Ralph W.Kasarda Pacific Legal Foundation 930 G Street Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation Court of Appeal Third Appellate District 914Capitol Mall Sacramento, CA 95814 38