PEOPLE v. VALENCIARespondent’s Response to Amicus Curiae BriefCal.February 11, 2016 COPY In the Supreme Court of the State of California THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FILED DAVID J. VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant. Fifth Appellate District Case No. F067946 ~Lepuly Tuolumne County Superior Court, Case No. CRF30714 The Honorable EleanorProvost, Judge ANSWERTO AMICI CURIAEBRIEFS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT VALENCIA KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Chief Assistant Attorney General MICHAEL P. FARRELL Senior Assistant Attorney General STEPHEN G. HERNDON Supervising Deputy Attorney General RACHELLE A. NEWCOMB Deputy Attorney General PETER W. THOMPSON Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 143100 1300 I Street, Suite 125 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Telephone: (916) 324-5273 Fax: (916) 324-2960 Email: Peter.Thompson@doj.ca.gov Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction ......cccccsscsscssesscsesssssssscsesecseesesecescsescsscescesessseseseesnenseesseeneseesesseees I ALBUMEN...es ecscesssssesessesesseeneessesseerereesecasseneesnssaseusessssesassensentesessensateenes 2 I. The statutory language of Penal Codesection 1170.18 must be examined as @ WhOIE.......... cs cecsseeeseesseeseeseeeereneneenes 2 Il. Secondary sources are not evidenceofvoterintent............... 2 Ill. Amici Curiae’s statutory interpretation would lead to absurd results; respondent’s Would Not..........scssseereeereeees 4 IV. Proposition 47 wasnota clarification of the law enacted by Proposition 36..........ccssesseereeteeteesseeeereeseessseees 6 CONCLUSION. .......ccecscescessesstccessecsscenseceseeoseseasensascseseseesesseseussanesseeseaseceaneoneeseey 8 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES | Amador Valley Joint Union High SchoolDistrict v. Board of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208 ....ccssssesscscsssereeteresetsreresessensesensssssscssesenesesseseeensnes 4 Balen v. Peralta Junior College District (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821 o..ccceeesesesesseeeteensererenesssseasererssssesseerenesesensseneasens 7 Carter v. Commission on Qualifications ofJudicial Appointments (1939) 14 Cal.2d 179 .o.cccsesessessseesetenenesssnenssesnsesenssesnsnseenenenenenenenenees 3,4 Carter v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914... ceccessesscteseesssesesssensreereensessesssenensnessenseneetnesencens 6 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 557 U.S. 167 .escscsessssessseeteessesresesrsnsssesssesseneneneneeeneacarenenesenesetsnss 5 Harris v. City ofSanta Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 .....ccscsssssssessesssseessensesessesssscenesssssensesnesenensecncasensess 5 Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal4th 272 ....cesscesessesesseseescseerestsssseessenenserensenenenesnsesenensets vere 4 In re ChristianS. (1994) 7 Cal4th 768 ......ccsseseeseeseeeeessesseesensessenssesnsseenesenessensenenenenssens 5 In re Hall (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 525 ....ccescsecseeesesrsssssssesseesesessaensteeneneesenerensarens 5 Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal4th 1158... .eccscesseseeeresseesesnencsssssessssensneenenseneneennereesenensess 5 Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. Board ofEqualization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245 ..cesscsseseseessserscseesensesesessssssnesnenesssssenessensereneenensacanens 3 Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474 vcescsssssssrecserssrersersssesssesnesesssesseenenteenscssnenesenentes 3,4 il TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page People v. Anderson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 321] ....cceecesessssereeseeeeeesenenereneesseessenenseeseseseees 5 People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314icccccssesseseenesesessensensesnssecerssseessenssseesesenteenenecs 5 People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664 ......cecesessseserseseeeersentessenenerersssssssesssessseenens 6 People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179 oi. ccccesceeserstseesesessesneesseneanessssssssseseseseseneseesseees 5 People v. Lynch (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 353 ...cseceseeseseseeserseesensssessenesesessesesenensnenesenaes 6 People v. Merriman | (2014) 60 Cal.4th Loiccecessecessesseseeeressneeesterenereeneesenensnssensessseesseneseens 7 People v. Mora (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1477 ....ccccecesecesseceseersnsseeeensaensseseseseenssesenaee 6 People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415 vccescssesesseesetecteeenseseressssessssseesseseresssnesneneeses 5 People v. Superior Court 14 Cal.4th 968......cccccccecsscsscesccseeeesecsesssssssseseessersssessssesseesrerecesenseessnees 7 People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 ....cccccsesesesserseestetenereseneecscsnesnssnssesseesessseesenssensrnsenys 7 People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216 ....cccssssssessseserseesensetssensssssssesnsesssseensessessesenesensees 6 Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894 i.ccsecsesceerseesesrenseeseresseaneresererssssesessssnesseneees 3 Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157 ..cccecseesssssseeesenserersnesesensesssstersssseneseasseneseeneanerenns 2 lil R I N E o i l i e h o TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page South Dakota v. Brown (1978) 20 Cal.3d 765 .....sssssssscsssssesesssscsessensseessessnsassesesssesssssssessesereneasaes 4 Sperry v. Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502 .eesscsessseeseseesserereneeeeereeesaneneessnssseessensnnsesesseeeesenens 5 STATUTES | Government Code § 88002 ........ecescssessssetsessessesseceseneeeseresssnsseessnseseeneesesenens 3 Penal Code § 17, SUDA. (Db)... sesessessesssesseeeseeeessetenenesenenenensnenenenesesenenesesseseneneneneasacnenanes 7 § 667, SUB. (€)(2)(C)(AV) ...ssessecessesessesteeereneeenssesterssesseseeneensnensenenensatentes 2 SLLTOS v.ecesessesscssssessssssessstesesecseseessseesssearsvsnsscsesnseveseasnsensnennenseneneasens 2 § 1170.18, SUD. (C) ..cscecscescseresseseresseteneneecstenseesessseneseaeneseesnestenenenes 1,5,7 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS United States Constitution, 14th Amendment...ceccessesseeseeereetteeceneees 5 OTHER AUTHORITIES PropOSition 36 .....ssscessecsecscesssceesesseesessssssseenenenceveneneneneenenneacansssesseeeseeees passim PropOSition 47 .....ssssesseesessseseceeeeeeeesreessessssesenenaseensesnensaneecneenssonressasess passim iv INTRODUCTION Appellant David J. Valencia was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 25 yearsto life under the Three Strikes law. His petition for resentencing under the ThreeStrikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36) was denied, and he now seeksrelief under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47). Although neither the text of Proposition 47itself nor any ofthe official ballot materials presented to the voters made any reference to Proposition 36, appellant arguedin his Opening Brief on the Merits (OBM)and ReplyBrief on the Merits (RBM) that the plain language of Penal Code! section 1170.18, subdivision (c) requires application ofits “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” standard to Proposition 36 proceedingsand that the provision should apply retroactively. As argued in respondent’s AnswerBrief on the Merits (ABM), the statutory language of Proposition 47 as a whole and the initiative’s official ballot materials show that the voters did not intend for section 1170.18, subdivision (c) to apply to Proposition 36 proceedings, either prospectively or retroactively. | Amici curiae George Gascon, Bill Lansdowne, and David Mills, in the brief filed on their behalf by the Three Strikes Project in support of appellant (the TSP brief), and amici curiae California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (the CACJbrief) echo the argumentsraised by appellant. To the extent amici curiae’s brief warrants additional discussion beyond what was addressedin the parties’ briefs, it is discussed below. ' All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. ARGUMENT I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGEOF PENAL CODE SECTION 1170.18 MUST BE EXAMINED AS A WHOLE Amici curiae TSP mischaracterizes respondents position by suggesting that the parties agree that a plain language reading of section 1170.18 favors appellant. (TSP 7; see ABM 15-17 [statutory language indicates Proposition 47’s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” does not apply to Proposition 36 proceedings].) Amici curiae CACJ parrots the argument of appellant, arguing that section 1170.18 is clear and unambiguous and must be givenits plain meaning. (CACJ7.) Amici Curiae would have this court read no further than the isolated phrase “[a]s used throughout this Code.” But it is well settled that reviewing courts do not examine statutory language in isolation but in the context ofthe statute as a whole andthe overall statutory schemein orderto determineits scope and purpose. (People v. Arroyo (Jan. 14, 2016, $219178) _ Cal.4th __ [2016 Cal. LEXIS2, *7-8] [defendant’s interpretation “takes in isolation a single sentence of the statute” while People’s interpretation “better accounts for the statutory language as a whole”; Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165.) When the statute is read as a whole,the definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” set forth in Proposition 47 refers specifically to the unreasonable risk that a Proposition 47 petitioner—and no other—will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (ABM 15-17.) | II. SECONDARY SOURCES ARE NOT EVIDENCE OF VOTER INTENT Like appellant, both amici curiae rely heavily on secondary sources such as articles and editorials, publications and memoranda, and campaign websites as evidence ofthe California electorate’s intent in passing Proposition 47. (TSP 4-5, 19, 21-24, 29; CACJ 23-27, 29.) Such materials and their representations, as public and widespreadas they might have been, cannot be imputedto the voters as a whole andare not properly considered as evidenceofthe electorate’s intent.2 (ABM 24.) Rather, this Court has stated that only the ballot materials that were before all voters are probative ofthe voters’ intent. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 904-905; Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. Board ofEqualization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250, fn. 2 [amicus curiae briefs representing views of proposition sponsors do not “govern our determination how the voters understood the ambiguousprovisions”].) And the official Proposition 47 ballot materials provided noindication that the voters intendedfor that proposition to amend Proposition 36. (ABM 33-34; Gov. Code § 88002.) The materials relied upon by appeljant and amici curiae are not properly considered evidence of voter intent by virtue of being contemporaneousexpositionsorinterpretations of the voter initiatives. (See Carter v. Commission on QualificationsofJudicial Appointments (1939) 14 Cal.2d 179, 184.) First, as respondent already explained, they were notbefore the entire electorate.’ So to the extent early case law suggests otherwise, it appears to have been overruled on that point by more recent cases. (Compare Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 495 [suggesting contemporaneousstatements may be relevant but relying specifically on California Constitution Revision Commissionofficial reports] with Robert L. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 904-905 2 The individual opinions of the authors and proponents of . Propositions 36 and 47 are not relevantto the issue of voter intent. 3 Even if the legal community was generally aware of Proposition 47’s potential effects on Proposition 36 proceedings, that legal knowledge cannot be reasonably imputed to the average voter relying on the official Proposition 47 ballot materials. & fn. 13 [refusing to rely on evidence ofthe drafters’ intent that was not directly presented to the voters] and Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272,277, fn.4 [“nonofficial election materials” that are not directly presentedto the voters are notrelevantto voterintent.) Second, assuming contemporaneous opinions could bepotentially relevant, the materials relied upon here do not qualify as such. The type of contemporaneous opinions contemplated in Mosk were Attorney General opinions advising the chief executive (Carter v. Commission on Qualifications ofJudicial Appointments, supra, 14 Cal.2d at p. 184), opinions of the legislative counsel(id. at p. 185), and contemporaneousconstructions of the Legislature, chief executive, or administrative agencies charged with implementing and enforcing the new enactment (AmadorValley Joint Union High SchoolDistrict v. Board ofEqualization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245-246; South Dakota v. Brown (1978) 20 Cal.3d 765, 777). Ill. AMICI CURIAE’S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS; RESPONDENT’S WOULD NOT Asset forth in respondent’s AnswerBrief on the Merits, absurd results would follow from applying Proposition 47’s restrictive dangerousnessstandardto radically reduce court discretion in Proposition 36 proceedings, as appellant urges, with just two days remaining in the statutory period to file a Proposition 36 petition and without notice to the voters that Proposition 47 would amend Proposition 36. (ABM 25-27.) Amici curiae’s arguments to the contrary are essentially policy arguments favoring a uniform,lenient standard for relief under both Proposition 36 and Proposition 47.’ (TSP 23-24.) This type of policy judgmentis ‘ The allegation that over 95% ofthe Proposition 36 petitions filed had been granted (TSP 24) appears to undercut appellant’s and amici curiae’s argumentsthat Proposition 47 was necessary to and intended to (continued...) entrusted to voters, who cannot be understoodto havesilently “decided so important and controversial a public policy matter and created a significant departure from the existing law” without any express declaration or notice ofsuch intent. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 782; see Jonesv. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1171.) Onthe other hand, amici curiae are incorrect that applying the section 1170.18, subdivision (c) definition prospectively but not retroactively would lead to absurd results. (TSP 26-28.) Courts routinely apply different legal standards when there is a changein the law that does not apply retroactively. (See People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1421-1423 [pre- and post-realignmentsentencing]; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 322 [different formulasfor custody credits]; People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 188-191 [prospective-only application of statute lessening punishment]; see also Sperry v. Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502, 505 [“the Fourteenth Amendmentdoesnotforbid statutes and statutory changesto have a beginning and thus to discriminate between the rights ofan earlier andlater time”’].) It is also not uncommon for the same phrase to have different meaningsin different statutes that were enactedat different times or even in different portions of the same statute. (See Harris v. City ofSanta Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 221-222; Peoplev. Anderson(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 321, 338, fn. 11; In re Hall (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 525, 530; see also Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 557 U.S. 167, 175, fn. 2.) Additionally, amici curiae TSP attempts to bolster their argument by focusing on the filing date of the Proposition 36 petitions. (TSP 26-28.) .) (...continued) address the problem of too few Proposition 36 petitions being granted. (TSP 24; OBM 21, 28-30; RBM 37.) It is the date ofthe superior court’s dangerousness determination, not the filing date of the petition, that is significant. Respondent maintainsthat Proposition 47’s definition, assuming it applies at all to Proposition 36, would not apply to any Proposition 36 dangerousness determinations made by the superior courts prior to the effective date of Proposition 47, butit would apply to Proposition 36 petitionsstill pending at that time. There is nothing absurd aboutthat distinction, which preservesthe integrity and finality of proceedings. (C.f. People v. Mora (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1477 (realignment sentencing applies only to persons sentenced onor after October 1, 2011 pursuant to § 1170, subd. (h)(6)]; People v. Lynch (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 353 [same]; People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664 [same].) IV. PROPOSITION 47 WAS NOT A CLARIFICATION OF THE LAW ENACTED BY PROPOSITION 36 Although a declaration that an act is intended to merely clarify existing law may be evidenceofan intentto apply the act retroactively (Carter v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922-923), Proposition 47 cannotfairly be interpretedasa clarification of Proposition 36. (TSP 29.) In fact, Proposition 47’s reduction ofcertain felonies to misdemeanors wasinconsistent with Proposition 36’s purpose of maintaining two-strike sentences for such offenders. (See ABM 16-18.) There wasno indication in any of the Proposition 47 ballot materials to suggest anintentto clarify the Three Strikes Law or Proposition 36 in response to any ongoing controversy. (Cf.id. at p. 923 [express declaration of legislative intent to clarify existing law].) The mere fact that Proposition 36 gave courts broad discretion to make dangerousness determinations did not create a controversy in itself, for courts maintain broad, undefined discretion over numerous matters. (Cf. People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 239 [observing that “[cJountless provisions in the Penal Code” commit matters to the discretion oftrial courts]; People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 [exercise of discretion under § 17, subd. (b) using “broad generic standard”}; see also People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74 [relating to admissibility of evidence]; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 85 [consideration of evidence at sentencing].) And the over 95% rate at which Proposition 36 petitions were granted belies any notion of controversy requiring a clarification. (TSP 29.) To the extent Proposition 47 applies to Proposition 36 proceedings, Proposition 47 substantially changed the legal consequences ofprior Proposition 36 proceedings andupset the expectations based on thatprior law. (Balen v. Peralta Junior College District (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 828 & fn. 8.) There was nothing to indicate the voters intended to apply Proposition 47’s definition of “unreasonable risk of dangerto public safety” retroactively to Proposition 36 proceedings. (/bid.) Therefore, it should not be applied retroactively. CONCLUSION Accordingly, respondentrespectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment. Dated: February 9, 2016 SA20133 10924 32388267.doc Respectfully submitted, KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Chief Assistant Attorney General MICHAEL P. FARRELL Senior Assistant Attorney General STEPHEN G. HERNDON Supervising Deputy Attorney General RACHELLE A. NEWCOMB Deputy Attorney General PETER W. THOMPSON Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached ANSWER TO AMICI CURIAEBRIEFS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT VALENCIA usesa 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 2,030 words. Dated: February 9, 2016 KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California PETER W. THOMPSON Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL Case Name: People v. Valencia No.: $223825 I declare: I am employedin the Office of the Attorney General, whichis the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and nota party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondenceplaced in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same dayin the ordinary course of business. On February 10, 2016, I served the attached ANSWER TO AMICI CURIAE BRIEFSIN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT VALENCIAbyplacinga true copy thereof enclosedin a sealed envelopein the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 1300 I Street, Suite 125, P.O. Box 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550, addressed as follows: Stephanie L. Gunther CCAP Attorney at Law Central California Appellate Program 841 MohawkStreet, Suite 260 2150 River Plaza Dr., Ste. 300 Bakersfield, CA 93309 Sacramento, CA 95833 Attorney for appellant, 2 copies Clerk of the Court Clerk of the Court Fifth Appellate District Washington Street Courthouse 2424 Ventura Street Tuolumne County Superior Court Fresno, California, 93721 60 N. Washington Street Sonora, CA 95370 ~ Honorable Laura Krieg Tuolumne County District Attorney 423 N. Washington Street | . Sonora, CA 95370 I declare underpenalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on February 10, 2016,at Sacramento, California. Signature $A20133 10924 32389070.doc
