Case No. §222732
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COURT
DYNAMEX OPERATIONSWEST,INC. suTLE p
Defendant-Petitioner,
v. FEB 21 201?
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY‘is Clerk
Respondent, *” Jorge Navarrete
CHARLESLEE,etal. ff ———Depoty
Plaintiffs-Real Parties in Interest. A
On Review from a Decision by the Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Seven, Case No. B249546
L.A. County Super. Ct. Case No. BC332016 (Hon. Michael L. Stern)
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING
PLAINTIFFS-REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
ANTHONYMISCHEL(83834) *MICHAEL RUBIN (80618)
National Employment Law Project BARBARA J. CHISHOLM (224656)
405 14th Street, Suite 401 P. CASEYPITTS(262463)
Oakland, CA 94612 Altshuler Berzon LLP
Tel,: (510) 663-5700 177 Post Street, Suite 300
Fax: (510) 663-2028 San Francisco, CA 94108
amischel@nelp.org Tel.: (415) 421-7151
Counselfor Amici Curiae California Fax: (415) 362-8064
Rural Legal Assistance Foundation et al. mrubin@altber.com
bchisholm@altber.com
MONIQUE OLIVIER(190835) cpitts@altber.com
Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier LLP Counselfor Amici Curiae Service
100 BushStreet, Suite 1800 Employees International Union,
San Francisco, California 94104 United Food and Commercial
Tel.: (415) 433-0333 Workers International Union, and —
monique@dplolaw.com International Brotherhood Of
Counselfor Amicus Curiae | Teamsters
California Employment Lawyers
Association
(Additional Counsel on Inside Cover)
Additional Counsel for Amici Curiae
~ NICOLE G. BERNER
Service EmployeesIntl. Union
1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.-
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel.: (202) 730-7383
Counselfor Amicus Curiae Service
Employees International Union
NICHOLAS W. CLARK
United Food and Commercial
Workers Intl. Union
1775 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel.: (202) 223-3111
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union
BRADLEY T. RAYMOND
Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters
25 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Tel.: (202) 624-7479
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
International Brotherhood ofTeamsters
Case No. 8222732
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
DYNAMEX OPERATIONSWEST,INC.
Defendant-Petitioner,
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Respondent,
CHARLESLEE,etal.
Plaintiffs-Real Parties in Interest.
On Review from a Decision by the Court ofAppeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Seven, Case No. B249546
L.A. County Super. Ct. Case No. BC332016 (Hon. MichaelL. Stern)
SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING
PLAINTIFFS-REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
ANTHONYMISCHEL(83834)
National Employment Law Project
405 14th Street, Suite 401
Oakland, CA 94612
Tel,: (510) 663-5700
Fax: (510) 663-2028
amischel@nelp.org
Counselfor Amici Curiae California
Rural Legal Assistance Foundationetal.
MONIQUEOLIVIER(190835)
Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier LLP
100 Bush Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, California 94104
Tel.: (415) 433-0333
monique@dplolaw.com
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
California Employment Lawyers
Association
*MICHAEL RUBIN (80618)
BARBARA J. CHISHOLM (224656)
P. CASEYPITTS(262463)
Altshuler Berzon LLP
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108
Tel.: (415) 421-7151
Fax: (415) 362-8064
mrubin@altber.com
bchisholm@altber.com
cpitts@altber.com
Counselfor Amici Curiae Service
Employees International Union,
UnitedFood and Commercial
Workers International Union, and
International Brotherhood Of
Teamsters
(Additional Counsel on Inside Cover)
Additional Counsel for Amici Curiae
NICOLE G. BERNER
Service Employees Intl. Union
1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel.: (202) 730-7383
Counselfor Amicus Curiae Service
Employees International Union
NICHOLAS W. CLARK
United Food and Commercial
Workers Intl. Union
1775 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel.: (202) 223-3111
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union
BRADLEY T. RAYMOND
Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters
25 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Tel.: (202) 624-7479
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
International Brotherhood ofTeamsters
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..... 0. eececssssescesseseessesssssesesseseseeesssesseeeseeeeees 4
QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE COURT’S SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEFING ORDER 0.0... eeceeeeseteeeeseeeeeesseeeneeeeseesseeeesessaesseesnseseees 5
INTRODUCTION o.ooeee cce sees seeeeteteeeneeneeesceeeeeeeseeseeseeeesseasseeseseeseeeeeeees 5
ARGUMENT........ccceecsesscersceeeneeeseseessesssceeasseeuseaseessseseessecesseeeseeacaneeeessenentey 6
I. The DLSE Enforcement Manual Summarizes Other
Sources of Authority Without Offering New
Interpretations of California Law .........ccceecceseeeeneeseeeeeeees 6
II. The Enforcement Manual Has Not Been Revised
To Account for Martine......ccccccccccccccccsnsesserenecceeeeeessassaneeeesens 9
CONCLUSION.......cccccccesccccssssssscceseecseceessceeseeeeessesenaeessnersnanaeeeeeeeeeerersneeerse 13
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT............cccccecssssssesssnecceeeeeeesecsneneeeeenenes 16
PROOF OF SERVICE..........ccccccssesssessseecceneeessneceeeeessseeseaeelestseeeeeenseeeeesseees 17
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
California Cases
Augustus v. ABMSecurity Services, Inc.
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 257, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 634.0...cece eceesceseseteneseneeeees 11
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 522 ieeeeeseeeseseressccressssessecnsesseesesseessessesseneneesees 10
Martinez v. Combs
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 oeeeeessessseessesseeseessesneesseesenenseneeeeeeeeespassim
Morillion v. Royal Packing Co.
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 woeeccescseessssseseeseseneecnreseessaseeessessseneseeesenesnassanens 6
Reynolds v. Bement
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075 wooeeceseseessesseesssessseeessescssesssesseessssseseeseeseses 12
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. ofIndustrial Relations
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 341eeeeeeeesecseeseneesssessseessesseenssessesseeeesseeees 5, 9, 10
Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 occcescecseessescsscesesssecseesseeseeeeeeseseecnesseeeneeneeerseens 6
Other Authorities
DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual!
(2002 update as revised March 2006) ,
SLB ccccccccesceccseeceesesseeseessceeeaseeeeecsecseesesesassseceacesesesecsseasensesesensesseneens 7
§ LLG ec eececcccesesccssscceeeeseeseeeseecseeseesecsecseecsesseeseesseeensassesseseesseseeeneeeeees 7,8
§ LL.Dce ccccccccesesescerececeeeeseeeeeesseseecesssaseasecssessessessesssesesseseenseseseseesees 8
§ 2.2 cecsscssscsscecscsseesseeceseeseeseeseaecsessessseassassnnssserseacsesessensesseeneensees 5, 8, 9, 12
§ QQ ececsccessccesseecseecscesseceeesesneeesseesesssesesseusssssseeseseeenseenesereesneegeas 5,9, 12
§ 28 CL SCG. cecerccccsscsrsrecscessneneereeceeceseeseseeeessceesesseeeeseeeesseseeerecsneenenespassim
§ 28.3 ecccccsccsecseescessesscneecseseseeececeesscessesasesessssesseesecsessecsesseesecausaecaeseasenes 8
QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE COURT’S
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ORDER:
This matter, in which review has been granted, presents the
following issue: In a wage and hour class action involving
claims that the plaintiffs are misclassified as independent
contractors, may a class be certified based on the Industrial
- Welfare Commission definitions as construed in Martinez v.
Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 (Martinez), or should the
commonlaw test for distinguishing between employees and _
independent contractors discussed in S.G. Borello & Sons,
Inc. v. Dept. of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341
(Borello), control? The court requests the parties in the above
entitled matter to file supplemental briefs addressing the
following question: In resolving the above issue, what
relevance, if any, should the court give to the Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) Enforcement Policies
and Interpretations Manual (2002 update as revised March
2006) and, in particular, to the sections of the manual that
discuss the independent contractor/employee distinction (§§
2.2, 2.2.1, 28-28.4.2.4)? |
INTRODUCTION
The crucial question before this Court is whether the definition of
employmentset forth in the Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders,
as construed by this Court in Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35,
governs all claims arising under the Wage Ordersand related provisions of
the Labor Code, or whether the IWC’s definition applies only to claims
involving “joint” employment, leaving all disputes as to employee
classification to be resolved by applying the version of the commonlaw test
set forth in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. ofIndustrial Relations (1989)
48 Cal.3d 341. The DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations
Manualhas no relevanceto the Court’s consideration of that statutory
interpretation question, because the Manual does not take any position on
that issue. By its own terms, the Manual does not offer new interpretations
of California law, but merely summarizes the policies and interpretations
set forth in other sources of authority, such as DLSEinterpretive letters,
5
adjudicative decisions by the Labor Commissioner, and judicial opinions
construing California law. The provisions of the Manual addressing the
distinction between independent contractors and employees werelast
modified before this Court held in Martinez that the Wage Orders’
definition of employment requires consideration of three separate and
distinct prongs, only one of which is based upon the commonlawtest set
forth in Borello. Because the independent contractor-related provisions
have not been revisited since Martinez was decided, they were not intended
and cannot be construedto reflect any considered position by the DLSE
regarding whether the definition of employmentset forth in Martinez
applies to misclassification claims arising under the Wage Orders and
related Labor Code provisions.
ARGUMENT
L. The DLSE Enforcement Manual Summarizes Other Sources of
Authority Without Offering New Interpretations of California
’ Law.
This Court has long held that the provisions of the DLSE
Enforcement Manualare not entitled to receive any deference from
California courts. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 50 n.15 (citing
Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 581-82; Tidewater
Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 575-77).
Regardless of any positions expressed in the Manual, this Court must
exercise its independent judgment in determining whether the [WC’s
definition of employmentapplies whenevera workerclaims to be
employed by a particular employer for the purposes of the Wage Orders
and related Labor Code provisions, or whether the [WC’s definition of
employmentapplies only to disputes involving purported “joint
employers.”
The Manualitself acknowledges the limitations on the DLSE’s
interpretive authority, and does not purport to provide any new
interpretations of California law. See DLSE Enforcement Manual§1.1.3
' (citing Tidewater and acknowledging that as a general matter the DLSE
“may not interpret the myriad of laws which it must enforce without
utilizing the [Administrative Procedures Act process]”). Instead, the
Manual merely “summarizes the policies and interpretations which DLSE
has followed in discharging its duty to administer and enforce the labor
statutes and.regulations of the State of California.” Jd. §1.1.6. Those
policies and interpretations are derived from other sources of authority—
namely:
l. Decisions of California’s courts which construe the
state’s labor statutes and regulations and otherwise
apply relevant California law.
2. California statutes and regulations which are clear and
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation.
3. Federal court decisions which define or circumscribe
the jurisdictional scope of California’s labor laws and
regulations or which are instructive in interpreting
those California laws which incorporate, are modeled
on, or parallel federal labor laws and regulations.
4, Selected opinion letters issued by DLSE in response to
requests from private parties which set forth the
policies and interpretations of DLSE with respect to
the application of the state’s labor statutes and
regulations to a specific set of facts.
5. Selected prior decisions rendered by the Labor
Commissioner or the Labor Commissioner’s hearing
officers in the course of adjudicating disputes arising
under California’s labor statutes and regulations.
Id.
For each policy and interpretation presented in the Manual, the
Manualcites the underlying source upon which the DLSErelied. Id.
§1.1.6.1. For example, in stating that “[t]he definition of employerfor
purposes of California’s labor laws”is “‘any person . . . who directly or
indirectly, or through an agent or any other person, employs or exercises
control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of any person,’” the
Manualidentifies as its source “the Wage Orders promulgated by the
Industrial Welfare Commission.” Jd. §2.2 (quoting 8 C.C.R.
§11090(2)(F)).!
Similarly, the Manual’s discussion in Chapter 28 of the (then-
current) test for distinguishing independent contractors from employees
identifies the specific sources for that discussion—namely, this Court’s
holding in Borello, two Court of Appeal decisions decided shortly
thereafter, and various pre-Borello decisions construing Labor Code
§2750.5. Id. §28-28.4.2.4 (citing, e.g., Borello, 48 Cal.3d 341; Yellow Cab
Coop. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1288; Toyota
MotorSales v. Super. Ct. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864; Fillmore v. Irvine
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 649). Consistent with the express limitations on the
Manual’s scope, Chapter 28 offers no analysis but simply an objective
description of the commonlawtest “adopted ... in Borello.” Id. §28.3.
Nowheredoes the Manual’s discussion ofthat test suggest that the Borello
test takes precedence over the IWC’s definition of employment, and
! Notably, the Manualtakes the position that this definition of
employmentapplies to all of “California’s labor laws” and not merely to
claims specifically arising under the Industrial Welfare Commission’s
Wage Orders. DLSE Enforcement Manual §2.2; see also Martinez, 49
Cal.4th at 64 (concluding that “the Legislature intended to defer to the
IWC’s definition of the employmentrelationship in actions under [Labor
Code §1194]*).
nowhere doesit cite any authority that would support such an interpretation
of California law.
II. The Enforcement Manual Has Not Been Revised To Accountfor
Martinez.
Any ambiguity regarding whether the DLSEintendedits
Enforcement Manualto take a position regarding the question before this
Court is resolved by the revision history of §2.2, §2.2.1, and Chapter 28.
_ The Manualidentifies each of those sections as having last been revised in
June 2002. Martinez, of course, was decided in 2010. Because the DLSE
has not yet revised Chapter 28, §2.2, or §2.2.1 to account for that decision,
those provisions cannot be construed as adopting any position regarding the
question beforethis Court.
Asnoted above, the provisions of the Manual addressing the
distinction between independentcontractors and employees simply describe
Borello’s version of the commonlaw test for determining whether a
particular worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee.
Construing the Workers’ Compensation Act’s statutory definition of
“independentcontractor,” Borello established a multi-factor test grounded
in the common law’s concern with the alleged employer’s right to control
the worker’s manner and meansofproduction. 48 Cal.3d at 349-53.
Borello recognized that employmentshould not be defined exclusively
through the narrow test used to determine whether an individualis
“vicarious[ly] liab[le] for the misconduct of a person rendering service to
him” and that courts should consider other relevant factors (including those
set forth in the Restatement Second of Agency). Jd. at 350-51. Borello
nonetheless concluded, on the basis of the Act’s express incorporation of
the commonlaw’s definition of employment, that the employer’s right to
control the means and mannerofproduction remains the “most important”
consideration in determining whethera particular individual is an employee
rather than an independent contractor. Jd. at 350; see also id. at 349 (“The
Act defines an independent contractor as ‘any person whorenders service
for a specified recompensefor a specified result, under the control of his
principalas to the result ofhis work only and notas to the means by which
such result is accomplished.’”) (quoting Cal. Labor Code §3353) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, Borello has been recognized as an application of the
commonlaw definition of employment. See, e.g., Ayala v. Antelope Valley
Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 530-31 (Borello applied“the
commonlaw test” for determining whether individuals were employees or
independentcontractors”).
In Martinez, this Court considered the [WC’s definition of
employment,as set forth in the Wage Orders, and concludedthat the IWC’s
definition is not limited to the common law. Martinez explainedthat the
IWC’s definition of “employ”“has three alternative definitions”: “(a) to
exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to
suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law
employmentrelationship.” 49 Cal.4th at 64 (emphasis in original). As
Martinez explained, only the third definition of “employ” (“to engage”)
incorporates the common law standard addressed in caseslike Borello. Id.
(“{T]he IWC’s definition of employmentincorporates the common law
definition as one alternative.”). With respect to the other two definitions,
_ the focus is not onthe hiring entity’s control over the worker’s performance
(as under the commonlaw), but instead on the power ofthe hiring entity to
ensure compliance with California’s minimum labor standards. The “suffer
or permit”definition, for example, was intended to extend the Wage
Orders’ protection beyond the “common law master and servant
relationship” andto establish that the entities that benefit from workers’
efforts have a duty to “us[e] reasonable care” to prevent the existence of
prohibited working conditions. Jd. at 58-59 (citation omitted). Similarly,
10
the “control over wages, hours or working conditions”definition of
employment was designed to “bring[] within [the Industrial Welfare
Commission’s] regulatory jurisdiction an entity that controls any...
aspect[] of the employmentrelationship”falling within the Commission’s
“delegated authority,” whetheror not that entity would be an “employer”
under the common law. Id. at 59; see also Augustus v. ABMSecurity
Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 257, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, 639 (“When
construing the Labor Code and wage orders, we adopt the construction that
best gives effect to the purpose of the Legislature and theWC. Time and
again, we have characterized that purpose asthe protection of employees—
particularly given the extentof legislative concern about working
conditions, wages, and hours when the Legislature enacted key portions of
the Labor Code.”) (citations omitted).
As Martinez emphasized, the [WC’s very purpose in adopting its
three alternative definitions of employment was to extend legal protection
to workingrelationships that might not constitute “employment” underthe
commonlaw. 49 Cal.4th at 57-58 (explaining that the “suffer or permit”
definition reaches “irregular working arrangements the proprietor of a
business might otherwise disavow with impunity” under the common law
standard). In holding that the [WC’s definition of employment includes
three alternative tests, only one of which involves common law standards,
Martinez madeit clear that courts and agencies should not presume(as
some courts previously had) that the Legislature intended common law
concepts alone to determine whetherthe legal protections provided by the
Wage Orders and related Labor Codeprovisions extend to anyparticular
individual, and that courts and agencies should instead focus on the
“historical and statutory context”of the provisions at issue. Compare
Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 64 (concluding, as a matter of statutory
construction, that Labor Code §1194 incorporates the Wage Orders’ three-
il
pronged definition of employment); with, e.g., Reynolds v. Bement (2005)
36 Cal.4th 1075, 1087 (concluding that the common lawtest defines
employmentfor the purposes of §1194).
Byrelying solely upon the test of employmentset forth in Borello,
the Manual’s discussion ofthe distinction between independentcontractors
and employeesreflects the very presumption in favor of the common law
that this Court rejected in Martinez. Nowhere in Chapter 28 does the DLSE
purport to consider the “historical and statutory context” of the various
Labor Code and Wage Orderprovisions that the DLSE administers in order
to determine how employment should be defined for the purposes thereof.
Nordoesit explain why the Industrial Welfare Commission’s definition of
employment should.not apply to misclassification cases involving the Wage
Orders and closely related Labor Code provisions. Instead, that chapter
simply describes the commonlaw test of employmentset forth in Borello.’
The Manual’s failure to consider the effect ofMartinez on the
independent contractor-employee analysis andits reliance on the common
law test set forth in Borello is not surprising, for an obvious reason: the
DLSEhasnot revised or revisited Chapter 28 (or the other Manual
provisionscited in the Court’s supplemental briefing order) since Martinez
was decided. Each ofthose provisions was last revised in 2002, while the
decision in Martinez issued in 2010. See DLSE Enforcement Manualat 2-
1, 28-1, 28-2, 28-3, 28-4; see also id. at Enforcement Manual Revisions
chart (listing revised sections and omitting §2.2, §2.2.1, and chapter 28).
2 That the DLSE, whenit last revised these sections of the Manual,
may have wrongly presumedthat the commonlawtest alone appliedto the
misclassification question is not surprising: As Reynolds makesclear, many
courts and agencies, including this one, applied a presumption in favor of
the commonlaw test before Martinez explained why that approach was
improper.
12
Quite simply, the DLSE hasnot yet considered whether the portions of the
Manualcited in the supplemental briefing order should be revised to
account for Martinez’s holding that the Wage Orders and related Labor
Code provisions extend protection to working relationships that do not
constitute “employment” under the commonlawtest set forth in decisions
such as Borello—including wherethe hiring entity suffers or permits
unlawful working conditions or exercises direct or indirect control over a
worker’s wages, hours, or working conditions. Because the Manual’s
provisions regarding independent contractors have not been revised since
Martinez, they cannot and do not express any position regarding whether
the definition of employmentset forth in Martinez applies to cases
involving the alleged misclassification of particular workers as non-
employed “‘independent contractors,” and they are irrelevant here.
CONCLUSION
Because the Manual does not and cannot purport to address the
question presented in this case, the provisions of the Manualcited in the
supplementalbriefing orderare irrelevant to the Court’s consideration of
that question. The Court must exercise its independent judgmentin
determining whetherthe “statutory and historical context” of the Wage
Order and Labor Code provisionsat issue, Martinez, Cal.4th at 64,
establishes that the IWC’s three alternative definitions of employment
should be used to determine whether a particular individual is an employee
or an independent contractor.
13
Dated: February 21, 2017 By:
14
Respectfulisybmyted,
Yi/\——
CAA/RUBIN
ARBARA J. CHISHOLM
P. CASEYPITTS
Altshuler Berzon LLP
Counselfor Amici Curiae Service
Employees International Union,
United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, and
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters
ANTHONY MISCHEL
National Employment Law
Project
Counselfor Amici Curiae
California Rural Legal Assistance
Foundation, National
Employment Law Project, Los
Angeles Alliance For A New
Economy, La Raza Centro Legal,
Legal Aid Society —Employment
Law Center, Asian Americans
Advancing Justice-LA, Asian
Americans Advancing Justice-
ALC, The Impact Fund, Alexander
Community Law Center, UCLA
Center For Labor Research,
Women’s Employment Rights
Clinic, and Worksafe
MONIQUE OLIVIER
Duckworth Peters Lebowitz
Olivier LLP
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
California Employment Lawyers
Association
45
NICOLE G. BERNER
Service Employees Intl. Union
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
Service Employees International
Union
NICHOLAS W. CLARK
United Food and Commercial
Workers Intl. Union
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union
BRADLEY T. RAYMOND
Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters
Counselfor Amicus Curiae
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
I hereby certify pursuant to Rule 8.520(d)(2) of the California Rules
of Court that the attached SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS-REAL PARTIESIN INTERESTis
proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 13 points or more, and contains
2,556 words, excluding the cover, the tables, the signature block, andthis
certificate. Counsel relies on the word count of the word-processing
program usedto preparethis brief.
DATED:February 21, 2017 ~/
/ 7 Michael Rubin
16
PROOF OF SERVICE
CASE: Dynamex v. Superior Court
CASE NO: Supreme Court Case No. 8222732
I am employedin the City and County of San Francisco, California.
I am overthe age of eighteen years and nota party to the within action; my
business address is 177 Post Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California
94108. On February 21, 2017, I served the following documents:
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING
PLAINTIFFS-REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
on the parties, through their attorneys of record, by placing true copies
thereof in sealed envelopes addressed as shownbelowfor service as
designated below:
A. By U.S. First Class Mail: I am readily familiar with the practice of
Altshuler Berzon LLP forthe collection and processing of correspondence
for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I placed each such
envelope, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, to be deposited in a
recognized place of deposit of the U.S. Mail in San Francisco, California,
for collection and mailing to the office of the addressee on the date shown
herein.
ADDRESSEE PARTY
A Ellen M. Bronchetti, Esq. Dynamex Operations
DLA Piper LLP West, Inc.
555 Mission Street, Suite 2400 Defendant-Petitioner
San Francisco, CA 94105-2933
A Paul S. Cowie, Esq. Dynamex Operations
Sheppard Mullin West, Inc.
379 Lytton Avenue Defendant-Petitioner
Palo Alto, CA 94301-1479
17
ADDRESSEE
Robert G. Hulteng, Esq.
Phillip A. Simpkins, Esq.
PARTY
Dynamex Operations
West, Inc.
Damon M.Ott, Esq. Defendant-Petitioner
Littler Mendelson PC
333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
A. Mark Pope, Esq. Charles Leeetal.
Pope, Berger, Williams & Plaintiffs-Real Parties in
Reynolds, LLP Interest
401 B Street, Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101
Kevin F. Ruf, Esq. Charles Leeet al.
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP pjaintiffs-Real Parties in
1925 Century Park East, #2100 Juterest
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Jon R. Williams, Esq. Charles Lee etal.
Williams Iagmin LLP Plaintiffs-Real Parties in
666 State Street Interest
San Diego, CA 92101
Clerk Respondent
Los Angeles County
Superior Court
111 North Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Clerk Appellate Court
Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District
Division Seven
Ronald Reagan State Building
300 S. Spring Street
2™4 Floor, North Tower
Los Angeles, CA 90013
18
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws ofthe State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed February 21,
2017, at San Francisco, California.
Jean Perley
19
