PEOPLE v. COOK

Respondent’s Petition for Review

Cal.January 17, 2014

§ 215927 In the Supreme Court of the State of Caltfornia SUPREMECOURT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No. S PL=D CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, JAN AT 20 V. Frank A. MeCuire Clerk VICTORIA SAMANTHA COOK, ” Deouty Defendant and Appellant Appellate District Division Two, Case No. E054307 Riverside County Superior Court, Case No. SWF 10000834 The Honorable Dennis A. McConaghy, Judge PETITION FOR REVIEW KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California DANER. GILLETTE Chief Assistant Attorney General JULIE L. GARLAND Senior Assistant Attorney General STEVE OETTING Supervising Deputy Attorney General TAMI FALKENSTEIN HENNICK Deputy Attorney General ’ State Bar No. 222542 110 West A Street, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA 92101 P.O. Box 85266 San Diego, CA 92186-5266 Telephone: (619) 645-2274 Fax: (619) 645-2271 Email: Tami.Hennick@doj.ca.gov Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Question Presented ..........cceseseceeseesecentenseesesaeereeesseesesssesesensscesseusnseseneeenses 1 Statement of the Case ........c.cccesescsscssecceeeseeceseeseneseeeeeeereessesesensaesnrasesseesense 1 A. Reasonsfor granting reVicW.......ccccecssseessseseseeeesenees 3 B. Review is necessary to determine whether section 12022.7, subdivision (g), evidences the legislative intent that a defendantreceive a lesser sentence for killing two people compared to killing one person andinjuring another.............045 3 COMCIUSION ........:cccccseseesceeseseeeessncesscecsscecsnceccecseeetsaeeenseaeesssecsssaneesesseeseneeaaepaee 8 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Nealy. State ofCalifornia (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 ecceccccsssseesessesssesecssseeseesseseesessecesesessesesseessnasentenss 6 People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693 ......ccessccseessssctscssssesseesesseesseceasseessseensseneens 2,3 People v. Julian (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1524oececcssecencesceseneeeenecteeseeeesseesenees passim People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 oecccscessccesecsnsessseseecsetseeseeesseeeeesaeeseesessessertseeeaeeas 6 People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336... ceesccsecescerenestecseeneeeseceeneceeceeeenseesenerereeseees 4,6 People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146...cceeesescseeeeeeseeecneeseetaeteesaeeneee 3, 4, 6 People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301iceeecccsseeceestecseeeseerenscssesceeeeseeracceeeseraeeas 3 STATUTES Penal Code § 192, Subd. (C)(8 ...eeeeeccccecescceseeeseeseceeaeesecsecseceenaceneeesaeeesseaneaseaeeneseeeaaeeseraee 1 § 654 oe eeeccccscenecsneseseccteeseeeesesoeseasenecsecsessessevsecesnaeseeseaeerssateneeeeeaeeeecensenes 5,7 § 1170 eeeeeeeteeeeeteeee saeeseessesaeeeauunessessessescsecsessesaesatecauesesestsenseasenecnensursrerase 4 § 1192.7, subd. (C)(8).... ee cecceesceseeceeeeeseesicenaseneeseeeseceaeenecseeeeseeraerateerereenees 1 § 1385eeeecccccsevecssseseeseseescsesaseacnectsesasenccseeenetseseatseeaecsessedeeesaeteceeseeatsaterees 2 § 12022.7 oe eeeececcccecsceceecenectncveneeacesseseeececeesceaseesseseeesseeeeseeeeeaeteeeiensetaeees 3, 4, 6 § 12022.7, SUB. (A) ....ceecccceccsescseeneeseceseeccaeesneesneeessseaeecteeessasenieeseeeeeenaes 1,5 § 12022.7, SUDA. (g ..eecessecssecssrcsecetsccetessereeteetseteneeesraseaeerseetareenteees passim | COURT RULES California Rules of Court Tule 8.500 veeeceseeesccseeeeeeccneeaccerssesseeucesceaenseecseeseneeesssesieeteeseeseeeterieeented 1 Tule 8.S0O(D)C1) soe eeecetesesnctcecsseeceaeseesaeseccsececeaeeeeeeecsseaersesaeeeseersneteaeenees 3 ii TO THE HONORABLETANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE, AND TO THE HONORABLEASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: Pursuantto Rule 8.500 of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner, the People of the State of California, respectfully requests this Court grant review ofthe partially published decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, in this matter. The panel’s opinion reversing the judgment ofthe Riverside County Superior Court,filed December12, 2013, is attached to this Petition. QUESTION PRESENTED Does Penal Code! section 12022.7, subdivision (g), evidence the Legislative intent that a defendant receive a lesser sentence for killing two people comparedto killing one person and injuring another? STATEMENT OF THE CASE While speeding and driving recklessly during a bout of road rage, appellant caused an accidentthat killed three people and severely injured a fourth person. On June 28, 2011, a jury convicted appellant of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter, in violation of section 192, subdivision (c)(8), for the deaths of Zaria W. (count 1); Cedric Page (count 2); and Christine Giambra(count 3). With regard to count 1, the jury found appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury on Page, Giambra, and a surviving victim, Robert Valentine, within the meaning of sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). (1 CT 259-264.) On August 16, 2011, the court sentenced appellant to a total term of nine years and eight monthsin prison, consisting of four years for count1, ' Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. one year and four months each for counts 2 and 3, and three years for the great bodily injury enhancementas to Valentine attached to count |. The court struck the remaining great bodily injury enhancements as to Page and Giambra, pursuantto section 1385. (3 RT 663; 2 CT 372.) Appellant appealed, contending, among other things,thatall three great bodily injury enhancements attached to count 1 must be stricken because 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits imposition of any great bodily injury enhancement to a murder or manslaughter conviction. (2 CT 323.) In the published portion ofits opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed the true findings on the great bodily injury enhancementsrelated to victims Giambra and Page, holding that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits imposition of a great bodily injury enhancementrelative to any victim in a case in which the defendant has been convicted for manslaughteras to that victim. (Slip Opinion at p. 10.) ). In so doing, the court expressly disagreed with People v. Julian (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1524, a published opinion out of Division One of the Fourth Appellate District, which held that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), does not prohibit imposition of great bodily injury enhancements for the injuries suffered by separate victims who were also the subject of a manslaughter conviction. The court affirmed imposition ofjudgment on the enhancementas to Valentine, however, holding that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), does not prohibit imposition of a great bodily injury enhancement with respect to a victim whois not the subject of a defendant’s manslaughter conviction, expressly disagreeing with the opinion of the Second Appellate District in People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693. (Slip Opinion at p. 10.) Becausethetrial court had already stricken the enhancements as to Giambra and Pagein the interests ofjustice, the Court of Appeal’s decision did not affect appellant’s sentence. A. Reasons for Granting Review Review is necessary to secure uniformity of decision as to whether section 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits imposition of a great bodily injury enhancementfor injuries to a separate victim whois also the subject of a manslaughter conviction. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1).) Thereis a split of authority among the California appellate courts as to whethersection 12022.7, subdivision (g) prohibits imposition of a great bodily injury enhancementfor injuries caused to a victim whois also the subject of a separate manslaughter conviction. (See generally People v. Julian (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1524; People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301; People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.44th 1146; People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693.) The Court of Appeal’s decision here produces an absurdresult in that a defendant receives a lesser sentencefor killing two people than if he killed one person and injured another. Resolution ofthis conflict will provide necessary guidance to prosecutors andtrial courts in charging and sentencing decisions in cases where a defendant’s conductresults in the death of multiple victims. B. Review is Necessary to Determine Whether Section 12022.7, Subdivision (g), Evidences the Legislative Intent That a Defendant Receive a Lesser Sentence for Killing Two People Compared to Killing One Person and Injuring Another Section 12022.7 provides in pertinent part: (a) Any person whopersonally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonmentin the state prison for three years. (g) This section shall not app f°to murder or manslaughter ora violation of Section 451 or 452.. (§12022.7.) The purpose of section 12022.7 is “to punish more severely those crimesthatresult in great bodily injury “on any person.” (Verlinde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168, citing People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 344.) The Court of Appeal acknowledgedthe split of authority in the appellate courts on this issue in holding that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits imposition of the enhancementrelative to any victim in a case in which the defendant has been convicted for manslaughteras to that victim. (Slip opinion at 10.) The Court of Appeal’s opinion produces absurd results in that a defendant receives a lesser sentence for conduct that kills two people, than she would for conductthat kills one person and injures a second person. The Court of Appeal erred in reaching this conclusion. This Court should hold that section 12022.7, subdivision (g), does not prohibit injuries suffered by a deceased victim from serving as the basis for a great bodily injury enhancementallegation attached to a manslaughter charge for a different victim. Such an interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the statute and furthers public policy goals. To illustrate this point, where a defendant suffers two manslaughter convictions, interpreting the statute to allow imposition of a great bodily enhancement permits a court to sentence a defendantto a four, six or ten- year term on count |, plus an additional three years for the great bodily injury allegation. Because the enhancement makesthe felony a serious or violent one, the defendant’s conductcredit is calculated at 15 percent. If the statute is interpreted to disallow the enhancement, as the Court of Appealdid here,thetrial court is only able to sentence the defendantto one-third of the middle term on count 2 (pursuantto section 1170), and the defendant’s conduct credit is calculated at 50 percent. Underthis interpretation, the defendantreceives a significantly lighter sentence. In the instant case, the trial court struck the great bodily injury enhancementsas to the deceased victimsin the interests ofjustice, thus, the defendant’s sentence wasnotaffected by the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the statute. However, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation will affect countless numbers of sentences in other cases. | In People v. Julian, supra, the court allowed imposition of the enhancement. This wasthe correct application of the statute. In Julian, while driving underthe influence of alcohol, the defendant plowed into a sports utility vehicle with a mother (Terri Keller) and her two daughters (Alexis Keller and Amanda Keller) inside. Terri was killed instantly and Amandadied after being in a permanent vegetative state. Alexis survived, but suffered severe injuries. A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and foundtrue four great- bodily-injury allegations under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) -- two allegations for each manslaughter charge. For the manslaughter charge related to Terri, both daughters were alleged as the injured victims. For the manslaughter charge related to Amanda, Terri and Alexis were alleged as the injured victims. (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1527-1528.) The court sentenced the defendant to the upper term on count | (victim Terri), and imposed sentence for two great bodily injury enhancements: one for Amanda and onefor Alexis. With respect to count 2, the court stayed (undersection 654) a four-year sentence, and stayed the sentences of three years for each of the enhancements. (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1527-1528.) On appeal, the court affirmed the sentence. In doing so,it held that a deceased victim could be namedas the injured victim for a section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancementallegation attached to a manslaughter charge for a different victim, and that the limitation of subdivision (g) did not | apply under these circumstances. (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1526-1527.) The court explained that “to hold Alexis's injuries will support an enhancement but, because she died, Amanda's injuries will not, would permit a defendant, such as Julian, to benefit to some extent from the fact one of his multiple victims died rather than survived. We of course must reject such a grotesqueinterpretation of the statute.” (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1531.) The court noted that ‘““‘a fundamental principle of statutory construction is that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences.’” (/bid., citing People v. Verlinde (2002)100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1168-1169.) The court’s analysis was correct. The language in section 12022.7, subdivision (g), should not be interpreted to prohibit application of the subdivision (a) enhancement where there are multiple manslaughter victims. Such a construction is consistent the purpose of section 12022.7, which is “to punish more severely those crimesthat result in great bodily injury “on any person.” (Verlinde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168, citing § 12022.7, subd. (a), and People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 344.) This interpretation is also consistent with a fundamental objective of the criminal justice system - to ensure a defendant’s punishmentis commensurate with his or her culpability, taking into accountthe gravity of both the criminal act and the resulting injuries. (Verlinde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168; see also People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211; Neal v. State ofCalifornia (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 20.) Barring imposition of the great bodily injury enhancements for injuries caused to multiple victim permits lesser punishment when a defendant’s actions result in the death of a victim, than if the victim survives his or her injuries. Such an outcomeis inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent. The court in Julian recognized this, and interpreted section 12022.7, subdivision (g) to avoid such an absurdresult. Moreover,as the court in Julian noted, this interpretation is consistent with the mandate of section 654, that a defendant be punished “underthe provision that provides for the longest term of punishment.” (§ 654; Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1531-1532.) To avoid the absurd result.ofits interpretation of the statute, the Court of Appeal here suggested that the prosecutor could have charged the defendant with a substantive crime only as to one victim, and allege only great bodily injury as to the multiple deceased victims. Or, as the Court of Appeal suggested, the People could moveto dismissall but one manslaughter conviction at sentencing, in order to impose the great bodily injury enhancementfor the injuries to those victims. (Slip opinion at 19- 20.) However, there is no precedent to. suggest creative litigation by the prosecution can or should ameliorate the absurdresults arising from a particular interpretation of a statute. A defendant whokills multiple victims should be convicted of a commensurate numberof countsto reflect her more egregious behavior. In sum, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 12022.7, subdivision (g), is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute and leads to absurd results. The published opinion in this case underscores the conflict amongthe appellate courts as noted above. Review by this Court should be granted to settle an important question of law as to whether section 12022.7, subdivision (g), prohibits imposition of a great bodily injury enhancementfor injuries to a separate victim whois also the subject of a manslaughter conviction. CONCLUSION For the reasonsset forth above, respondent respectfully requests this Court grant review in the present case, and, upon review,to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal. Dated: January 16, 2014 $D2011702397 70809802.doc Respectfully submitted, KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California DANER. GILLETTE Chief Assistant Attorney General JULIE L. GARLAND Senior Assistant Attorney General STEVE OETTING Supervising Deputy Attorney General Nun & ¥o_ TAMI FALKENSTEIN HENNICK Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached PETITION FOR REVIEW usesa 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 2,089 words. Dated: January 16, 2014 KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California Whivd a HO TAMI FALKENSTEIN HENNICK Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Plaintiffand Respondent ATTACHMENT CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION’ IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT I IL. i= DIVISION TWO COURTOFAPPEAL FOURTH DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E054307 Vv. (Super.Ct.No. SWF10000834) VICTORIA SAMANTHA COOK, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dennis A. McConaghy, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Thomas K. Macomber, under appointmentby the Court ofAppeal, f or Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief As sistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and R espondent. * pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.11 10 , this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts A and B. Defendant and appellant Victoria Samantha Cook pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license (count 4—-Vehicle Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). Thereafter, a jury convicted defendant of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter for the respective deaths of Zaria Williams (Williams), Christine Giambra (Giambra), and Cedric Page (Page) (counts 1-3—Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)).!_ The jury additionally found true three allegations attached to the count | offense that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Giambra, Page, and Robert Valentine (Valentine) (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term ofincarceration of nine years, eight months, striking punishmentfor the enhancements as to Giambra and Page, but imposing a three-year consecutive term for the enhancementas to Valentine. On appeal, defendant makes four assignments oferror: (1) the court erred in excluding evidence of the victims’ propensity for reckless driving as a potential defense of legal necessity; (2) the People committed prejudicial prosecutorial misconductin ostensibly alluding to the pristine driving records of the victims and witnesses; (3) the section 12022.72 enhancements must be reversed because the statute explicitly forbidsits application to cases of manslaughter; and (4) the trial court abusedits discretion by denying defendant’s request for release ofjuror information. Wereverse the true ! All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 Thejury found nottrue an allegation attached to count 1 that defendant had personallyinflicted great bodily injury against Danyell Rivera (Rivera). b o findings on the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements with respect to victims Giambra and Page. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Austin Welch (Welch)testified that on June 2, 2009, he was driving home eastbound on Highway 74 from work. He witnessed the driver of a charcoal gray Ford ‘Fusion, later determined to be defendant, drivingerratically. Traf fic slowed in the right lane, in which defendantwastraveling; defendant then pulled out abruptly into the fast lanein front of a silver Audi whosedriver, later identified as vi ctim Page, was forced to slam on his brakes. Defendant immediately spedup as Page slowedto allow spac e between the two cars. Defendantlater changed back into the slow lane. As traffic slowed in that lane, defendant once again changed lanes back into the fast lane without signaling, cutting Page off and forcing Page to slam on his brakes and swerve to avoid hitting defendant's car. Defendant was driving “very fast” and “swerved pretty hard.” Both drivers then sped up quickly. Page came so cl ose to the rear of defendant’s vehicle that Welch could not see a gap between them. Wit hout signaling, defendant once again changed lanes into the slow lane in front of Welch’s vehicle, where there was insufficient spaceto fit; defendant’s vehicle collided with Welch’s. This caused defendant’s vehicle to fishtail, dart across lanes, and eve ntually cometo rest in a field on the side of the road. | . Welch thereafter witnessed a Mitsubishi SUV launch i nto the air. Afterward, Welch wasable to see that Page’s Audi and the Mitsubishi had been involved in a head- on collision. A white Nissan Altima (driven by Rivera) then rear-ended the Mitsubishi. Rivera suffered a dislocated elbow. The driver of the Mitsubishi, Valentine, was “screaming for his life” and had blood coming out of his mouth. Deputy Coroner Kathleen Cohentestified Page, Giambra, and Williams were already dead when she arrived at the scene of the accident. CHP Officer David Kling was dispatchedto investigate the collision. He interviewed a numberofthe drivers and witnesses to the accident. He requested help from the Multi Disciplinary Accident Investigation Team (MAIT), which consists of “specialized officers who do accident reconstruction and very specialized investigation into complex accidents.” Together they gathered evidence from the scene, and surveillance video from a nearby conveniencestore and a bus traveling nearby at the time of the accident. Officer Kling and MAIT Officer Scott Parent concluded defendant wasthe primary cause ofthe collision because of her unsafe lane change. They determined the sequence of events to have begun when defendant’s vehicle collided with Welch’s, causing defendantto swerveleft, colliding with Page’s vehicle and forcing it into oncomingtraffic. Page’s vehicle thereafter collided head-on with Valentine’s. Rivera . braked to avoid hitting Valentine’s vehicle; however, Rivera grazed Valentine’s Mitsubishi and hit Page’s Audi. The People played the video recordings from the convenience store and bus during trial. Juanita Solt (Solt), who wastraveling eastbound on Highway 74at the time ofthe accident, testified she saw a black Acura driving aggressively, tailgating vehicles, honking its horn, swervingin and outoflanes, and eventually traveling into defendant's lane, forcing defendantinto the slow lane and Page’s vehicle. Officer Klingtestified he had determined that Solt had not actually witnessed the accident because the video showed her coming through the scene 13 to 14 secondsafter the vehicles involved, which contradicted her statement that she was right behind the vehicles involved. None of the other witnesses described seeing the black vehicle reported by Solt.3 Officer Kling did not find any blackpaint transfer on any of the cars involvedin thecollision. - DISCUSSION A. RELEVANCE OF THE DRIVING RECORDS OF WELCH AND PAGE Defendant contends the court prejudicially erred in excluding admissionof the driving records of Welch and Page, which undermined her defense that her movement _ into Welch’s lane was committed underlegal necessity. We disagree. In its pretrial brief and motionin limine,the People sought admission of defendant’s prior driving record to prove her appreciation of the risk she posed to others by driving recklessly. The People also soughtto exclude any evidence of contributo ry negligence on the part of Page, evidence Page was driving with a suspended license, an d Welch’sprevious driving record. After an off-the-record discussion, the court determined that it would allow evidence of defendant’s receipt of warnings and citations issued by three different police officers. 3 Defendanttestified she was followed by a black car, but conceded she could have been “persuaded”by Solt’s description ofthe vehicle immediately after the accident. The court preemptively ruled it would neither permit any evidence of contributory negligence nor the driving records of the victims or witnesses. After a discussion ofthe driving records of Page and Welch, the court stated, “The reason the Court ruled the way it did is because whether or not... Welch or... Page was a substantial factor in causing this accident isn’t what’s relevant. What’s relevant was, was [defendant] a substantial factor in causing this accident.” Nevertheless, the court reserved ruling on the admissibility of the driving records of Welch and Page. The next day, defendantfiled points and authorities seeking admissibility of the driving records of Welch and Page. The court permitted additional argument on the matter, but ultimately excluded admission oftheir driving records. Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial, and trial courts have broad discretion to determinethe relevance of proffered evidence. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 933.) “Evidence Code section 352 accordsthe trial court broad discretion to exclude even relevant evidence ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability thatits admission will .. . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative [citation] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedingsor the reliability of the outcome”[citation].’ [Citation.] We review a trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 352 for an abuse ofdiscretion. [Citations.]” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal4th 856, 893.) “Evidence Code section 1103 authorizes the defense in a criminal case to offer evidence ofthe victim’s characterto prove his conductat the time of the charged crime. Consequently,in a prosecution for a homicide or an assaultive crime where self-defense is raised, evidence of the violent character of the victim is admissible to show that the victim was the aggressor.” (People v. Shoemaker(1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 446,fns. omitted; italics added.) The defense of necessity is available to any defendant charged with gross vehicular manslaughter whoacts in an emergency not substantially created by her to prevent significant bodily harm to herself or others. (CALCRIM Nos. 592, 3403; 1 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 62-65, pp. 500-505.) First, Welch was not a charged victim ofdefendant’s offenses; thus, Evidence Code section 1103 would not authorize the admission of evidence ofhis driving record to prove conductin conformity therewith.4 Second, to the extent Page’s tailgating of defendant could be perceived as an emergencysituation requiring defendan t immediately 4 Contrary to defendant’s claimsatthe initial oral argument in this matter, Evidence Codesection 1103, subdivision (a)(1) is not construed broadly to include anyone whocould be deemedto have been injured by a defendant’s conduct. Rather, Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a) explicitly limits the admissibility of evidenceofspecific instances of conduct to “the victim of the crime for whic h the defendantis being prosecuted[.]” Although Welch could certainly be deemed a victim of defendant’s actions, he was not a victim of any of the crimes for which defen dant was being prosecuted. Moreover, defendant’s citation to People v. Tackett (2006) 1 44 Cal.App.4th 445 actually belies her position on appeal. That court held Evid ence Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1) must be narrowly construed. (Tackett, at p. 455 .) Moreover,it affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the def endant’s passenger’s prior acts of reckless driving while underthe influence at the def endant’s trial for felony driving under the influence where defendant alleged his passenge r wasthe actual driver. (id. at p. 448.) This, despite the fact that the defendant’s passenger had been thrown from the truck, suffering substantial bodily injury, and coul d thereby be deemed a “victim”in a broad construction ofthe term. (/d. at p. 452.) change lanes, we cannotsay that it was not a condition substantially created by defendant’s own behavior. After all, defendant had already twice cut-offPage such that Page wasrequired to slam on his brakes and swerveto avoid a collision with defendant’s vehicle. Third, we cannotsay that the tailgating of defendant’s vehicle by Page, no matter how closely, was an emergency that required an illegal act in order to escape significant bodily injury. Defendant could just as easily have taken her foot off the accelerator, slowly braked, or simply waited for an opportunity to make a safe lane change as alternatives to colliding with Welch’s vehicle. One cannot reasonably infer from Page’s tailgating of defendant that he intended to strike her vehicle. Nor, even if that washis intent, can one infer it would necessarily have caused defendant substantial bodily injury, let alone injury even remotely comparable to that caused by defendant. Thetrial court acted well within its broad discretion in excluding evidenceofthe driving records of Page and Welchas irrelevant. _B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct by making purported allusions to the otherdrivers’ ostensibly pristine driving records, in contradiction of his own knowledge of those records, when presenting his final summation. Wedisagree. Duringtrial, the People adduced the testimonies of four police officers who had each issued separate citations to defendant in the preceding three years. Theoffenses included three citations for speeding, including one for traveling at 80 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, and one for makingillegal and u nsafe lane changes. In the People’s closing argument, the prosecutor referenced th ese citations, arguing defendant had been told a numberoftimes about the dangers. of driving recklessly. The prosecutor then stated defendant “knew more than an yoneelse on the road not to drive like that.” Defense counsel immediately requeste d a sidebar conference on the issue and admonishmentofthe prosecutor. The court cleare d the courtroom of the jury and permitted defense counsel an opportunity to argue his ob jection to the People’s statement. The court then informed the prosecutor, “The part about a ny otherdrivers, | believe he’s correct. And I admonish younotto do that.” Defense counse l asked that the jury be admonished that no evidence ofany other drivers’ records had been pres ented and the People’s reference to such records was improper. The court concluded , “He’s not going to make anymorereference to that. I’ll leaveit at that.” Misconduct by the prosecutorviolates the federal Constitution whenit “<«<«comprises a pattern of conduct“so egregiousthatit infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.””””” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.) “‘Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminaltrial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law onlyif it involves “‘“the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.”’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (/bid.) We review de novo a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 860.) A prosecutor commits misconduct by arguing a proposition he knowsis contradicted by defense evidence excluded on the prosecution’s own motion. (People v. Varona (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 566, 570; People v, Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 146.) The prosecutor’s single remark regarding other drivers, which would require the jury to engage in an inference unjustified by the record, wasneither a pattern of egregious conduct nor reprehensible conduct renderingthe trial fundamentally unfair such as to amountto prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. The People’s statement was fleeting and in no way prejudicial. C. SECTION 12022.7 ENHANCEMENTS Defendant contendsall three section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements should be reversed because section 12022.7, subdivision (g) prohibits applicability of the statute to manslaughter cases. In our original opinion filed on March 19, 2013, we agreed that section 12022.7, subdivision (g) prohibits imposition of the enhancementrelative to any Victim in a case in which the defendant has been convicted for manslaughteras to that victim. Thus, we reversed the true findings on the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements with respect to victims Giambra and Page. However, we disagreed with defendant that section 12022.7, subdivision (g) prohibits imposition of the enhancement with respect to a victim whois not the subject of a defendant’s manslaughter conviction. Thus, weaffirmed imposition ofjudgment on the enhancementwith respect to victim Valentine. On April 2, 2013, the People filed a petition for rehearing relying, in large part, on our failure to consider the decision in People v. Julian (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1524 10 (Fourth Dist., Div. One) (Julian), in reaching our decision onthis issue.5 On April 12, 2013, we granted the People’s petition for rehearing and set the matter for supplemental briefing on the question of whetherthis court should follow the holding in Julian, which differed from that of our original opinion. We have reviewed the supplementalbriefs and Julian and stand byour original holding that section 12022.7, subdivision (g) prohibits imposition of the enhancementrelative to any victim in a case in which the defendant has been convicted formanslaughteras to that victim. Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) provides: “Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplicein the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonmentin the state prison for three years.” However, section 12022.7, subdivision (g) prohibits applicability of the statute to “murder or manslaughter. . . . Subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an elementofthe offense.” Section 12022.7, subdivision (f) defines “great bodily injury” as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.]” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.) Defendant primarily exposits People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693 in support of her contention. In Beltran, the defendantfled thepolice, threw cocaine out the window,ran a stop sign, and collided with the victims’ vehicle. The driver of the other 5 Julian, supra, was decided long before briefing began in our case, but was not cited by either party. Nor, unfortunately, wasit discovered by us in our own research. 1] car died and the passenger sustained injuries. A jury convicted the defendant of felony evasion and foundtrue two section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancementsthat he had caused great bodily injury on the victims. The jury also convicted the defendant of vehicular manslaughter with respect to the driver. The trial court imposed sentence on both substantive counts and both enhancements. (Beltran, at p. 695.) The appellate court, relying exclusively on the language of section 12022.7, subdivision (g) that it does not apply to manslaughter, reversed the judgmentto the extent it imposed the great bodily injury enhancements. In People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146 (Fourth Dist., Div. One) (Verlinde), the defendant rear-ended a flatbed truck in the emergency lane of the freeway, killing one of her own passengers and injuring the other two. (/d. at pp. 1155-1157.) The defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated; vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence; driving under the influence while causing injury to two victims; and driving with a blood alcohol content of over .08 and causing injury to two victims. The jury also found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on two victims within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) on all counts. The trial court imposed sentence on the gross vehicular manslaughter count and imposed consecutive terms for the section 12022.7, subdivision (a2) enhancements, but stayed imposition of sentence on the remaining counts and enhancements pursuantto section 654. (Verlinde, at p. 1154.) On appeal, the defendant maintained the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements should bestricken for several reasons. The appellate court agreed that the 12 enhancementas to oneofthe victims should be reversed because the victim “was 4 potential accomplice of the charged crimes, a nd thetrial court erred in not giving accomplice witness instructions. Moreover,the trial court, in instructing on the great bodily injury enhancement, failed to inform the ju ry that injury to an accomplice is not subject to enhanced punishment[.]” (Verlinde, sup ra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.) However, as to the other victim, the court held, “T he language of section 12022.7, subdivision (g) does notlimit application ofthe statute to t his vehicular manslaughter case where, in addition to the homicide victim, twoothervi ctims suffered great bodily injury.” (/d. at p. 1168.) It reasoned that the statutory exemptio n operated to bar imposition of an enhancementfor“the injuries inflicted on the homici de victim, who obviously has suffered great bodily injury.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, it would not li mit imposition of the enhancementto other victims who were not the subject of th e manslaughter conviction. Thus,it affirmed imposition ofjudgment on the enha ncement as to the other victim. (/d. at pp. 1168-1169.) In People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301 (Fourth Dist., Div. One) (Weaver), the defendantpled guilty to one count of gross vehicular manslaught er while intoxicated, and admitted an allegation she personally inflicted great bodily injury on another person in her commission ofthat offense. (/d. at p. 1307.) Defendant challenged imposition ofjudgment on the enhancementbased onthe language of section 12022.7, subdivision (g). The appellate court, relying partially on Verlinde, held that “a section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement mayapply to a victim-specific offense . . . even whenthe ostensible victim ofthat offense was not, for purposes ofsection 12022.7, 13 subdivision (a), the person on whom the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of that offense.” (Weaver, at p. 1335.) In other words, even though the gross vehicular manslaughter count was specific to the deceased victim, the court could properly impose judgmenton a section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement attached to that countif it involved anothervictim. (Weaver, at p. 1335.) The court determined,“There is no logical reason to preclude application of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) when a defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on persons other than the victim ofa ‘victim-specific’ offense, but to allow its application when those other persons were injured in the commission ofa ‘non-victim-specific’ offense.” (Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) Further, it noted, “it is generally appropriate that a defendant be subject to greater punishment for committing an offense if his or her commission of that offense causes injuries to multiple persons. [Citations.] It is consistent with our criminal justice system to impose greater punishment on [the defendant] for the great bodily injuries she personally inflicted on [victim 2] during her commission ofthe section 191.5, subdivision (a) offense that caused [victim 1’s] death.” (Id. at p. 1331.) The Weaver court criticized People v. Beltran, supra, for summarily concluding section 12022.7 enhancements could not apply to any vehicular manslaughter offenses regardless of injuries sustained by victims other than the deceased. It characterized the Beltran decision as “without any substantive reasoning.” (Weaver,at p. 1335, fn. 35.) In Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 1524, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of vehicular manslaughter against victims Terri Keller (count 1) and Amanda 14 Keller (count 2). The jury additionally found tr ue great bodily injury enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivisions (a) and (b) attached to both manslaughter counts. As to count 1, the jury found true great bodily injury e nhancements for causing the coma of Amanda,¢ andinflicting great bodily injury on Alex is Keller. On count 2, the jury found true attached great bodily injury enhancements as to Terri and Alexis. Thetrial court sentenced defendantto the “four-year upper term... f or the manslaughter ofTerri, a five-year enhancement for Amanda’s great bodily injury.. . anda three-year enhancement forAlexis’s great bodily injury. With respect to the m anslaughter of Amanda, a four-year upper term and twothree-year greatbodily injur y enhancements for the injuries to Terri and Alexis were imposed and stayed undersection 654.” ( Julian, at p. 1526.) Defendant appealed contendingthe trial court erred in imposingall t he section 12022.7 enhancements.’ (Julian, at pp. 1526-1527.) The court in Julian held, “Although Terri and Amanda died asa result oftheir injuries and their deaths support [the defendant’s] manslaughter convictions, in this case their injuries also support enhancements under section 12022.7.” (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530.) The court observed it was continuing to narrowly construe the exception set forth in section 12022.7, subdivision (g), as it had in Verlinde and Weaver, disallowing the enhancementonly whereit concerned the same victim of manslaughter or 6 Amanda remained in a permanent vegetative state for six months and was thereafter removed from life support. (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4that p. 1528.) 7 The jury in Julian convicted the defendant in Riverside Superior Court. The defendant appealed to this court. After the record wasfiled, the case wastransferred from this court to Division One. 15 murderas the substantive count to which it wasattached. (Julian, at pp. 1529-1530.) It reasoned such an “interpretation not only avoids the absurd result of diminishing punishment when a victim dies, it also is consistent with the requirementofsection 654 a defendant be sentenced underthestatute which provides the longest potential term of imprisonment.” (Jd, at pp. 1531-1532.) “To hold Alexis’s injuries will support an enhancement but, because she died, Amanda’s injuries will not, would permit a defendant . .. to benefit to some extent from the fact oneofhis multiple victims died rather than survived. We ofcourse mustreject such a grotesqueinterpretation ofthe statute” (Id. at pp. 1530-1531.) It further concludeda contrary interpretation was unnecessary to prevent double punishment because, as did the sentencing court in its case, application of section 654 would necessarily bar such a result. (/d. at pp. 1531-1532.) We agree with Verlinde, Weaver, and Julian to the extent they allow imposition of a section 12022.7 enhancement with respect to a victim whois not the subject of a manslaughter conviction in that case. The statutory bar in section 12022.7, subdivision (g) would appear to be limited to the imposition of an enhancement with respect to a victim for whom the defendant had already been convicted of manslaughter. It would not apply to other victims for whom the defendant had not been convicted of manslaughter or murder, Likewise, imposition of the enhancementto victims who were not the subject of a manslaughter conviction is commensurate with the general notion of the propriety of imposing greater punishmentfor offenses that injure more than one individual. (Weaver, supra. at p. 1331.) Thus, the sentencing court correctly imposed judgmenton the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement with respect to victim Valentine. 16 Although neither Verlinde nor Weaverex plicitly barred nor indorsed imposition of a section 12022.7 enhancement with respect to a victim who was the subject of a defendant’s manslaughter conviction, this was larg ely because neither court faced such a factual scenario. Indeed, Verlinde,in dicta, reasoned th at the statutory exemption operated to bar imposition of an enhancement for “the injuries in flicted on the homicide victim, who obviously hassuffered great bodily injury.” (Ver linde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.) Likewise, Weavercriticized Beltran for holding that t he enhancementcould notapply to victims other than the deceased. (Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335, fn. 35.) In our original opinion, we expressed the view thatthis dicta in Verlinde and Weaver supported our determination that imposition of a section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancementwith respect to a victim for whom the defendant has already been convicted of manslaughteris barred by the express provision of section 12022.7, subdivision (g). Julian informs us we were wrong to so interpret Verlinde and Weaver. Nevertheless, we disagree with Julian and stand by our original holding. | First, although we do not construe section 12022.7, subdivision (g) as broadly as does Beltran, neither do we agreeit should be construed as narrowly as does Julian. Indeed, Julian largely renders section 12022.7, subdivision (g) as surplussage, relying on section 654 to bar dual punishment. (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506 [‘‘[W]heneverpossible,significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some words surplusage’”].) Subdivision (g) would appear to mean whatit clearly reads, i.e., the enhancement doesnot attach with regard to a victim ofmurder or manslaughter 17 for which a conviction on the substantive count has been obtained. Moreover, Julian’s holdingresults in a pleading shell game where a manslaughter charge as to victim A is enhanced withthe great bodily injury ofB, simultaneously charging the defendant with the manslaughter ofB with an attached enhancement for A. The only function subdivision (g) then effectively servesis to prohibit a defendant from suffering a conviction for murder or manslaughter and an enhancementasto the victim ofthat same crime whenshejust happenstokill only one individual. Indeed, under Julian’s logic, a broad construction of subdivision (g) might even allow a manslaughter conviction to be enhanced with an attached great bodily injury enhancement undersection 12022.7, pertaining to the samevictim,ifthat victim suffered somedistinct injury. (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1530-1531 [the “separate and distinct nature” of Amanda Keller’s injuries permits them to be used as an enhancement].) Thus, in Julian, ifAmanda had beenthe only victim, Julian’s reasoning would have allowed both the manslaughter conviction for her eventual death and an attached enhancementfor her coma. We would regard sucha result as violative of the plain meaning of subdivision (g). Second, Julian’s rationale that any other construction permits a defendant to benefit from wrongdoing does not necessarily withstand scrutiny. Ju/ian reasonsthat to hold that a victim whodoes not die will support an enhancement, but a victim who does would permit a defendant “to benefit to some extent from the fact one of his multiple victims died rather than survived.” (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1531.) This is because the defendant in Julian was convicted of manslaughter for the death ofAmanda 18 Keller, for whom healso sustained a subdivision (b) gr eat bodily injury enhancement. The subdivision (b) enhancement with respect to Amanda, applicable for the infliction of great bodily injury, which causes the victim to become comat ose or results in paralysis, mandateda five-year term, whereas the upper term for the substant ive count of vehicular manslaughter allowed only a four-year term. Thus, imposing sentence on the enhancementattached to count 1 permitted the court to impose five years inste ad of four years on the count 2 manslaughter charge, for injuries sustained by Amanda. However, in Julian the People could have merely pled thefirst count of manslaughter against Terri Keller with the section 12022.7 enhancements as to both Alexis Keller and Amanda Keller without charging a second count of manslaughter against Amanda and have obtained the same sentencing result. Indeed,in the instant case the People did not charge defendantfor any substantive crime for the injuries sustained by Valentine. Rather, they merely attached the subdivision(a) enhancementto the count 1 charge. This most likely reflects the People’s determination that any substantive crime they could have charged defendant with for injuries sustained by Valentine would have resulted in lesser punishment than simply alleging the enhancementfor those injuries. In the alternative, in Julian, the People could have pled the case exactly as they did, but moved for dismissal of the count 2 charge and attached enhancements pursuant to section 1385 at the time for sentencing; again, resulting in the same potential sentence for the defendant without violating the statutory language of subdivision (g). In the instant case, the subdivision (a) enhancements posed only a three-year term, while the 19 midterm posed four years and the upper term six years for the substantive counts.8 (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 193, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, in our case, as in most others, abiding by the proscriptions of subdivision (g) will not result in any benefit to defendant where incarceration is concernedin the immediatecase. Regardless, any problem concerning the degree ofpunishmentfor the charge of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without gross negligence atissue in Julian being less than that forthe section 12022.7, subdivision (b) enhancementis something that should be dealt with by the Legislature, not by judicial violation of the clear language of subdivision (g). Third, subdivision (g) contains another provision which would bar imposition of the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements in this case as to Giambra and Page. Subdivision (g) also provides, “Subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.” Both the instant case and Julian, supra, involved convictions on the substantive counts for the homicides of victims for which the People additionally sought imposition of section 12022.7 enhancements. As Verlinde itself noted, “The statutory exemption for murder and manslaughteris 8 At oral argument, after we granted rehearing in this matter, the People noted section 1170.1, subdivision (a) limits consecutive sentencing to one-third the middle term of imprisonmentprescribed for each of the substantive offenses. Indeed,this is the precise sentencing scheme imposedby the trial court below. Since, as noted above,the sentencing court struck punishment on the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements as to Giambra and Page, our holding does not reduce the amountof time defendantwill be imprisoned, it merely strikes the findings on those enhancements. The People have nowhere on appeal arguedthe sentencing court should or even could have imposed time on the enhancements. Indeed, Julian itself maintained section 654 would preclude double punishment where a defendant was convicted of a substantive offense and the enhancement with respect to the same victim. (Julian, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1531-1532.) 20 intended to bar imposition of an enhancement for the injuries inflicted on the homicide victim, who obviously has suffered great bodily injury .” (Verlinde, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168; People v. Valencia (2000) 82 Cal. App.4th 139, 143-149 [statutory definition of “great bodily injury” includes deat h].) Thus, the section 12022.7 enhancements as to Giambra and Page cannot stand because defend ant had already been found guilty for their deaths, a finding that inherently involves “great bod ily injury.” Fourth, any argumentthat section 12022.7, subdivision (g) does not apply to stayed enhancementsdisregards both the clear languageof the statute and the fact that even stayed enhancements may have unforeseen negative repercussions for a defend ant. Again, subdivision (g) reads, “This section shall not apply to murder or manslaughter... . Subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.” It does not providethat it may apply if stayed. Moreover, stayed enhancements maybe used to enhance a defendant’s current sentence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)), inmateclassifications (15 Cal. Code ofRegs. §§ 3375, subds. (g)(5)(D) & (g)(6)(B), 3375.2, subd. (b)(26)), or punishment for future crimes (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8)). Thus, however noble,the desire to punish a defendant moreextensively for the perceived egregiousness of her crimes does notjustify violating the statutory prohibitions on imposing section 12022.7 enhancements with regard to victims for which defendant has already been convicted of a homicide. Therefore, we shall reverse the true findings on the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements with respect to victims - Giambra and Page. 21 D. PETITION FOR RELEASE OF JUROR INFORMATION Defendant contendsthetrial court abusedits discretion in denying herpetition to disclose juror information. We disagree. Code of Civil Procedure section 206, subdivision (g) provides: ‘Pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 237, a defendant or defendant’s counsel may, following the recordingofa jury’s verdict in a criminal proceeding, petition the court for access to personal juror identifying information within the court’s records necessary for the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose.” Upon the recording of a jury verdict in a criminal case, the court’s record of the jurors’ personal identifying information is to be sealed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2).) Any person maypetition the court for disclosure of the identifying information, and the petition must be supported by a declaration establishing good cause for the disclosure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b); Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1098, fh. 7; People v. Granish (1996) 41 Cal_App.4th 1117, 1131.) Good cause, in the context of a petition for disclosure to support a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct, requires “a sufficient showing to support a reasonablebelief that jury misconduct occurred... .” (People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 552; accord, People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 850-852.) Good cause does not exist where the allegations ofjury misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported. (See Wilson, at p. 852.) We review the denial of a petition for disclosure for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 22 317; accord Peoplev. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 991; People v. Santos (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 965, 978.) Here, defense counsel contended he posited good cause for release ofjuror information, because he had been “informed byajuror that during deliberations one of the jurors went out and purchased toy cars to re-enact the accident during the lunch break prior to the juror’s verdict. As part of that conversation, the jurors discussed what [defendant’s] options were whentailgated by [Page] and discussed other options never presented by even the prosecution.” The court denied defendant’s petition reasoning, “the law says that you can’t do experiments. But there is no difference with using plastic cars trying to—and lookslike what they were trying to do was trying to find a way out not to convict her. But usingplastic cars is not an experiment. That is no different than drawinglittle pictures or using the yellow [Post-it] that says this car’s here, that car’s there. I don’t see good cause,sir.” “Not every jury experiment constitutes misconduct. Improper experiments are those that allow the jury to discover new evidence by delving into areas not examined duringtrial. The distinction between proper and improper jury conduct turns onthis difference. The jury may weigh and evaluate the evidence it has received. It is entitled to scrutinize that evidence, subjecting it to careful consideration by testing all reasonable inferences. It may reexamine the evidencein a slightly different context as long as that evaluation is within the ‘“scope and purview of the evidence.”’ [Citation.] What the jury cannotdo is conduct a new investigation going beyond the evidence admitted.” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 249.) 23 Defendant’s showingfell short of good cause for release ofjuror information. The use oftoy cars to reenact the collision was not an investigation that went beyond the evidence presented attrial. Rather, it appears the jurors simply attempted to reenact the versions ofthe collisions as adducedin the evidenceat trial. There was no showingthe jurors attempted to discover new evidence by their experiment;it is difficult to imagine how they would havedoneso with such an experiment. Thus, the court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s petition. DISPOSITION Thetrue findings on the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements with respect to victims Giambra and Page are reversed. The superior court clerk is directed to generate a new minute order striking the enhancements. The clerk is further directed to forward a copy ofthe corrected minute order to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgmentis affirmed. CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION MILLER J. Weconcur: McKINSTER mr Acting P. J. se CODRINGTON - J. 22 24 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL & ELECTRONIC SERVICE Case Name: People v. Cook No.: E054307 I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a memberofthe California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondenceplacedin the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. On January 16, 2014, I served the attached PETITION FOR REVIEWbyplacing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 110 West A Street, Suite 1100, P.O. Box 85266, San Diego, CA 92186-5266, addressed as follows: Thomas Kevin Macomber Attorney at Law The Honorable Dennis A. McConaghy 3877 Twelfth Street c/o Riverside County Superior Court Clerk Riverside, CA 92501 4100 Main Street Attorney for Appellant Riverside, CA 92501 Two copies California Court of Appeal The Honorable Paul E. Zellerbach 3389 Twelfth Street District Attorney Riverside, CA 92501 Riverside County District Attorney's Office 3960 Orange Street Riverside, CA 92501 and I furthermore declare, I electronically served a copy of the above document from Office of the Attorney General's electronic notification address ADIEService@doj.ca.gov on January 16, 2014, to Appellate Defenders, Inc.'s electronic notification address eservice-criminal@adi- sandiego.com. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoingis true and correct and that this declaration was executed on January 16, 2014, at San Diego, California. Carole McGraw LoteSMVAL, Declarant Signature SD201 1702397 70810570.doc