PEOPLE v. ELIZALDERespondent’s Reply Brief on the MeritsCal.September 11, 2014 Jn the Supreme Court of the State of Caltfornta THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, Vv. GAMALIEL ELIZALDE,et al, Defendants and Appellants. ‘Case No. 8215260 First Appellate District, Division Two, Case No. A132071 Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. 050809038 The Honorable John W. Kennedy, Judge REPLY BRIEF SUPREM ECOUR T FIL E n ON THE MERITS - SEP 12 2014 KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California. GERALD A. ENGLER Frank A. McGuire Cler: Deputy _ Senior Assistant Attorney General RENE A. CHACON Supervising Deputy Attorney General JULIET B. HALEY Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 162823 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 703-5960 Fax: (415) 703-1234 Email: Juliet.Haley@doj.ca.gov Attorneysfor Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ALQUMENoo... eeeccceseeeecsetsesseesscseseesesseseseeessesesaeceaceaesaesassessaseessasaesssseeensenseees 1 I. Mota’s admissions of gangaffiliation fall within the booking exception to Miranda ..c..ccccccccccssescessesevsssssesssessases 1 Il. There can be no Edwara’s violation in the absence of a Custodial interrogation .........::cccccesessscsesceseseseseecssssessessenens 7 A. Background soessesavessuassesseeansneaseaceresenenteententenetaneastaeanees 7 B. The claim is forfeited and lacks merit.....00.cceee 8 III. |The admission of Mota’s statements was harmless.............. 10 COnCIUSION 0.0... eeeeceecsesscsessseessesssesescneccscsesssesesesecssssesssscsussssusovasenaeeaceeesessees 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 US. 279 secscssssssssssssseessesssnsnsssceceecennesseseeeeee ~ Berkemerv. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420 ..ccccessssccsssssessssseennsesssseeeeeernnessesiennnee Chapmanv. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ceeceeecenssseseatteeneteesceteeeneneeeeneetens Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 ceccccccccsssssssscessssssuestnnnsinseessittinssnsss Inre Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.Ath 68 vcccccscssssssssssssesssssesssssseeceesennesseeesenee McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 US. ULcceesnereeneneeeeeceneeecereseresneneseneans Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 cee cccceeeteteeretetectetteesernteenetenserseeeseens New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 vecssssssssssssssessessessssnsssnnssnnnennnnnnssssssssssessees Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039 ..cccssscsssssssssssssssesssssssseeeesnseeeeeense Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 US. 582...eccccceeetesceeeneteeeneeeteneneneteneteeerens People v. Calderon (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 766 vscsscsscssssssussssssssessssnnessseesesnet People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824 ..ccsscsccsssssssssesnusssssseeeeesnnsssssssente People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 539 ..cssssssssssscssesssesussssssnsntnnnensssunsssssssssssees il Page ecsestess ceseeseee 10 evenetesaeeeneeaneees 7 eveeveaeeesetaeeees 10 seesaeesnenens 7, 8,9 seceneteeeesensenees 3 secaseeneeeeteenaeeens 9 vaceeeeesenes passim seceeeesteneeeees 5,6 sevseeeseeeseeeaeeees 9 eveseeesanens 1, 4,5 leeeeeoeseeeensesenees 8 eeneeenseenseeueesnes 3 eceneeaeeenerneensees 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page People v. Gomez (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 609 oo. ccecceeseseeseneescneeseseteesseeneseeasceesesseeeas 5 People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619cccccccceeccsceresecsescesseeveceessceetereceeetscseaesesseeecas 8 People v. Johnson (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 168... eceeeccteseeeereetensereeeeseseteneeereeersessessenees 9 People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 63 occ cccccccsesseesesereeseeecescnsceesesacsesssesssetavseseeessees 10 People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368 wccccccsccssseessnsececseesescecsecseeseneesecssseesesseseseeerstsees 3 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165 ..oc.ccccccsccscsscsesscsecsecseesessesecsessesacsesseesesesseessesesesessees 2 Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291ccccccccetecscsseseesescsesseeeeeeceeseeaseestessessssesees passim South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 ULS. 553Leesepesessessesssesscsecssccatensenscatensestssssavasvasd 1,.4 United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval (9th Cir. 1990) 894 F.2d 1043 wc ccccccscsesscsessesscsecseesescseecsecsssessseersesesessssees 3 United States v. Henley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1040 wccceesssessssseseseesseseeeeecsecsessesessesersvsessesesees 3 Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391ccccccssescsceseeccesetseseeessecsessecsetesseesensesenecseses 10, 11 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS United States Constitution Fifth Amendment.......c..cccceecccsccsccsssssssssseseceeeveessessessstseeeeeesessenesenses 7,9 California Constitution article I, § 28, Subd. (f) 0... eeeceesessseesseecereeseeecsaceseneesenesseaeentesseesseeens 3 ill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page COURT RULES California Rules of Court Tule 8.520(D)(3) ...cccecccccescereereeseecserenersenseseesessesseeseseneesesseseenseseeseetaeeees 8 iV ARGUMENT I. MOTA’S ADMISSIONS OF GANG AFFILIATION FALL WITHIN THE BOOKING EXCEPTION TO MIRANDA The questions asked of appellant Mota regarding his gangaffiliation werelegitimate and necessary booking questions askedofall prisoners to assuretheir safe placement in the jail. He does not contend otherwise. Respondenthas argued that Miranda’ warnings are not required in this circumstance. Instead, Miranda’s procedural requirements only apply where the suspect is subjected to “custodial interrogation,” and the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined “interrogation” to exclude words and actions on the part of the police “normally attendant to arrest and custody.” (RhodeIsland v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300 Unnis); South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 564, fn. 15 (Neville)) [“police words or actions ‘normally attendant to arrest and custody’ do not constitute interrogation”].) Furthermore, the high court has approved questions that “appear reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns.” (Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601-602 (Muniz).) Thatis this case. | Respondent’s opening brief explained that the Supreme Court-has adheredto its exclusion of colloquies attendantto arrest and custody from its definition of “interrogation,” and that it has maintainedthat line when exploring the scope of the booking exception. This distinction subsists notwithstandingthe reality that such colloquies can, and often do, produce incriminating statements by the defendant. As respondent explainedin the openingbrief, the reasons for the result are that booking questions share none ofthe coercive features of an interrogation, are not askedaspart of an ' Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). investigation into the individual’s crime, and serve an essential administrative need. Respondentalso argued, relying on the test approved and applied in People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 187 (Williams), that the questions asked of appellant clearly fall within the booking exception. As Williams found, the focus when determining the applicability of the - booking exception to Miranda is whether the questions to a suspect rreasonably relate to a legitimate administrative concern,or, instead, are a pretext for eliciting incriminating information aboutthe case. (Peoplev. Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th 165, 187.) This is an objective assessmentthat looks to the totality of the circumstances, taking into accountthe nature of the questions, when and where they were asked, the standardizationofthe question, the knowledge andintent ofthe officer asking the question, the administrative need for the inquiry, and any other indications that the questions were designedtoelicit incriminating evidence. (/d. at p. 188.) Appellant fails to respond to respondent’s arguments on thesepoints. He does not acknowledge, muchless apply, the test adopted in Williams to his case. Instead, quoting at length from the Court of Appeal’s decision, he championsthat court’s conclusion that any questions a police officer “should have known[were] likely to elicit an incriminating response’”are inadmissible absent Miranda warnings and waivers. (ABOM 13-17.) That might be a defensible responseto a petition for review, but not to the merits of the question before this court. As respondent explainedin our opening brief, the Court of Appeal’s analysis erroneously engrafts Innis’s “should have known”test for interrogation onto the booking exception. That renders the booking exception a meaningless nullity. It reflects an approach that is contrary to Williams and United States Supreme Court decisions that exclude legitimate booking questions from Miranda. Choosing not to engage on those points, appellant instead invokes this court’s decision in People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 387 (Rucker). Ruckerheld that booking questions need not be preceded by Miranda warnings, but that any answer with “potential for incrimination”is inadmissible absent warnings. (ABOM 15.) Appellant argues that Rucker wasnot abrogated by Proposition 8 because a line of lower federal court decisions hold the answers to booking questions that go beyondbasic biographical inquiry are not admissible absent Miranda advisements.” (ABOM15.) At the outset, appellant’s argument misunderstandsthestrictures of Proposition 8, which permits the exclusion in state courts of “relevant, but unlawfully obtained evidence” only if exclusion is required by the United States Constitution, “as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 76; accord, People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f).) Our state Constitution requires Rucker’s exclusionary rule to be judged by whether exclusion is compelled by controlling United States Supreme Court authority, not lower federal court decisions. . | Ruckeris invalid authority whenmeasured underthat standard. Of course, Rucker predated and, therefore, did not consider, muchless apply, the definition of interrogation articulated in Jnnis—whichcategorically excludes from Miranda, and thereby necessarily rendered admissible any responses by the suspect to, police words or actions normally attendant to arrest and custody. Nor did Rucker have the benefit ofMuniz’s or Neville’s * Defendantfails to acknowledge that Rucker’s blanket exclusionary rule for booking questions goes beyond even these lower federal court decisions. (See United States v. Henley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1040, 1042; United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval (9th Cir. 1990) 894 F.2d 1043, 1046.) application of the booking exception. These two cases makeclear that the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme | Court, does not require exclusion ofall incriminating evidence obtained by police during bookingin the absence of Miranda warnings. Rucker’s blanket exclusionary rule to the contrary cannot stand. Moreover,the lower federal court decisions cited by appellant contain _ the same defect as the Court of Appeal’s decision below: they assessthe admissibility of a defendant’s response by analyzing post hoc the likelihood an answerto a given booking question could have an incriminating effect. In other words, the federal courts in those decisions address the wrong question. The relevant inquiry is whether the questions asked at the booking in each case were categorically those “normally attendantto arrest and custody”as declared in Innis, which are questions “reasonablyrelated to the police’s administrative concerns” that Muniz omits from the stricture of Miranda. Only throughthat objective inquiry can courts determine whether the police asked legitimate booking questions exempt from Jnnis’s definition of interrogation. Neither Muniz nor Neville endorse any approach that asks whether, viewing the case in retrospect from what followed after booking, whether otherwise legitimate booking questions had a potential to incriminate a particular suspect. To the contrary, Muniz’s plurality’s discussion did not consider whether the questioner “should have known”that an incriminating response by the suspect waslikely. Nor did the high court in Neville pose the question of whether the officer should have known that incriminating responses were reasonablylikely. Instead, having concluded that the questions were “attendantto defendant’s arrest and custody,” Neville found that there was no interrogation within the meaning of Innis, and that, accordingly, Miranda warnings were not required. (Neville, supra, 459 U.S. at p. 564, fn. 15.) Again appellant has offered no response to respondent’s observations on the analysis of these high court’s decisions. Likewise, appellant does not respond to respondent’s reliance on People v. Gomez (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 609, 630 (Gomez). Instead, he attacks Gomezfor principles not advanced by respondent. He reads Gomez as erroneously concluding that Muniz supplanted Jnnis’s “reasonably likely _ to elicit an incriminating response”test for interrogation, which focuses on the language of the question and the mentalstate of the arrestee, with a “designedto elicit incriminatory admissions” test, which focuses on the subjective intent of the officers. (ABOM 19-20.) Although appellant’s argument is beside the point, we note that he misreads Jnnis and Muniz. Put simply, /nnis is not a booking case. It recognized the booking exception, butit did not articulate a particulartest to determine the exception’s availability. Muniz is a booking case. As such, it identified the parameters of the exception for legitimate booking inquiries. Muniz did not overrule Innis because the cases concern different forms of questioning, booking questions and custodial interrogation. The Muniz plurality concluded that some of the questions in that case were of the type it had previously held in Jnnis were outside the definition of interrogation triggering Miranda’s procedural requirements,1.e., even outside the booking context the questionsdid not require Miranda warnings. As for Muniz’s use of the phrase “designedtoelicit,” that was not new Supreme Court law. The phrase appeared in both Innis® and Quarles.* It is 3 “(The intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have knownthat their words or actions were reasonablylikely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice is designedto elicit an incriminating response from the accused,it is unlikely that the practice will not also be (continued...) responsive to the concern that unbounded Miranda exceptions could be abused and that investigatory questions may be asked underthe guise or pretext that the question is prompted by an emergency,orto save victims, or to satisfy a legitimate administrative need. Thetest for determining the applicability of the booking exceptionis an objective one. It’s availability, like that of other identified exceptions to Miranda, does not turn upon the intent of the individualofficer. Asthis court recognized in People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 539, 593 (Davis): [T]he applicability of the public safety exception, which is analogousto the rescue doctrine, “does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S.at p. 656.) A subjective test, the high court noted in Quarles, would be problematic because different police officers in similar situations may act out of “a host of different ... and largely unverifiable motives”(ibid.), and the legality of their conduct “should not be made to depend on posthocfindingsat a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation ofthe arresting officer” (ibid.). In determining the applicability of the Mirandarule, the high court has generally frowned on the use of subjective tests. (See People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 1184, 1199 [citing decisions of the United States Supreme Court demonstrating that “applications of the Miranda rule generally do not turn uponthe individual officer’s subjective state of mind....”].) (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 593, first and third ellipses original, parallel citations omitted.) : A primary purpose of the booking exception is to permit the authorities to fulfill their administrative obligations to run jail or prison (...continued) one which the police should have known wasreasonably likely to have that effect.” (Innis at p. 301, fn. 7, emphasis added.) * (See New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 659 (Quarles) [distinguishing question necessary to secure officer or public safety from “questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect”’].) safely without imposing on them the nearly impossible task of gauging the potential incriminating effect of each booking question on every prisoner. Adopting a should-have-knowntest for interrogation, to assess the propriety of questions asked to administer in-custody housing, defeats this purpose and runsafoulofthe goal of having clear, uniform rules in the Miranda context. (See Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 430.) _ Like the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine, the need for police to ensure the safety of all prisoners, including the defendant, outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment. Having created a booking exception, its scope should be shaped by the purposeit wascreated to serve. A booking question that is judged torelate to a legitimate administrative purpose does not require Miranda warings. The purpose of the questions asked of appellant during his booking interview wereto ensure his safe housing and were therefore within the booking exception to Miranda. II. THERE CAN BE NO EDWARD’S VIOLATION IN THE ABSENCE OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION Defendantasserts that his statements admitting gang affiliation were also erroneously admitted in violation ofEdwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 (Edwards). (ABM 10-12.) The claim wasforfeited, is beyond the scope of review,and, in any event, proves meritless. A. Background Whenappellantarrived at the jail and was told he would be searched for contraband, he laughed nervously and told deputies, “Man I’m in here for someshit that I didn’t do. They said I killed someone, but it wasn’t me. I was there, but I didn’t kill anyone. The guy that did it is already in jail. He confessed already, but now heis trying to bring me down too....” (5 RT 1004.) Agitated, appellant continued, “I’m a gang banger, but I’m not a murderer.” (5 RT 1005.) Appellantrelated that he had previously “told those other copsthat I didn’t know anything because I thought I would be ‘in trouble, but now I don’t care... .” (5 RT 1005.) In responseto appellant’s remarks, sheriff's deputies asked if he wantedto talk to a San Pablo Police detective. Appellant said, “Yeah,I will, but first I should talk to my lawyer. After I talk to him I will tell you guys what really went down... .” (5 RT 1005.) Appellant’s desire to speak to his attorney and to police was noted by the intake deputy and the booking process continued. Thereafter, the jail classification interview occurred in which appellant admitted his gang affiliations. Relying on the above described exchange, appellant arguedattrial that his statements during the subsequent classification interview were inadmissible based on Edwards, supra, 451 U.S.477. Thetrial court rejected the argument. It reasoned that Edwards only precludes a subsequentinterrogation, that appellant’s jail classification interview did not constitute an “interrogation,” and that legitimate booking questions do not violate Miranda or Edwards. (17 RT 3079.) B. The Claim Is Forfeited and Lacks Merit Defendant did not challenge the trial court’s Edwards ruling on appeal, nor did he seek to expand the questions on review to encompassthat ruling by the trial court. His failure to do so has forfeited the claim. (Peoplev. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 666 [rule requiring specificity in ground for objection to admission of evidence applies to Miranda-based objections and motions to exclude]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.520(b)(3) [briefs must be confined to issues on review absent court order].) Considered on the merits, the claim fails as well. First, Miranda rights cannot be invokedanticipatorily. They must be invoked during the custodial interrogation against which they are being asserted. (People v. Calderon (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 766, 770 [invocation ofthe rightto counselis ineffective if asserted outside the custodial interrogation setting as there can be no “anticipatory invocation” of Miranda for purposes of custodial interrogation that takes place in the future]; McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 182, fn. 3 [“that we have allowed the Mirandaright to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted _ initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect.”].) As the facts above make clear, Mota wasnot being “interrogated” when he expressed his willingnessto talk to police after consulting with his attorney. Second, there can be no Edwards violation in the absence of a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, As the Supreme Court expressly held in Edwards: “The Fifth Amendmentright identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringementofthe right that [the accused] invoked. . . .” (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 485-486.) That Edwards, like Miranda,is subject to a booking exception is also implicitly recognized in Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, where the Supreme Court madeclear that after an arrestee has invokedhis right to counsel, “inquires or statements, by either an accusedor a police officer relating to the routine incidents ofthe custodial relationship, will not generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense in which that word wasused in Edwards.” (Cd. at pp. 1045-1046, emphasis added.) (See also People v. Johnson (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 168, 173-175 [the rights enumerated in Miranda,specifically the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, are not implicated by questionsrelating only to booking information].) For the reasons we have argued,the classification interview was not an interrogation. Ill. THEADMISSION OF MOTA’S STATEMENTS WAS HARMLESS Admission in evidence of statements obtained in violation of Miranda are subject to the harmless error standard of Chapmanv. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 63, 86.) Under the Chapmantest, error is harmless whenit appears “beyond a reasonable doubtthat the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, supra, at p. 24.) ““To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’” (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86, quoting Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403.) “Thus, the focus is what the jury actually decided and whetherthe error might havetaintedits decision.” (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86.) Respondenthas arguedthat if this court concludes appellant’s admissions of gang membership were received in evidencein violation of Miranda, the error was harmless beyond doubt. Most importantly, appellant’s gang membership was convincingly established by many other sources. Specifically, three witnesses testified, based on their familiarity with appellant asfellow gang members and/orfriends that he was a member of Varrio Frontero Lobo (VFL). In addition, the jury heard the People’s gang expert opine that appellant was a VFL memberbased on information other than his admissions. The jury also heard evidence that appellant had committed an earlier robbery in which he wore colors associated with the gang, and was throwing handsignsto his codefendant signifying his gang status. Last, the jury was presented with photostake of appellant with other VFL gang members in which he was making similar gang signs. 10 Appellant challenges the Court of Appeal’s finding of harmlessness, arguing that mostof this other evidence came by way of accomplice testimony that was not sufficiently corroborated to renderit reliable. (ABOM 26-49.) In so doing, appellant reargues other claimsoferror rejected by the appellate court and outside the scope ofthe petition for review. His prejudice argument not only exceeds the scope of the question on review before this court, it is based on a misapplication of Chapman. Under that decision, the reviewing court asks whether the complained of error (here, the erroneous admission of the challenged evidence) contributed to the verdict. In making this assessment, the reviewing court looks at “everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” (Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. 391, 403.) Here, the jury considered all of the testimony described above, which as previously discussed, amply supports the conclusion that appellant’s admission was proved overwhelmingly by other evidence. Thus, any error - was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the evidence was erroneously admitted should be reversed and the judgment otherwise affirmed. Dated: September 11,2014 Respectfully submitted, KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California GERALD A. ENGLER Senior Assistant Attorney General RENE A. CHACON Supervising Deputy Attorney General hy Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Respondent SF2014407977 41075932.doc 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITSusesa 13 point Times New Romanfont and contains 3,238 words. Dated: September 11, 2014 KAMALAD. HARRIS Attorney General of California \ibe |HALEY Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Respondent DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL Case Name: People v. Gamalied Elizalde, et al No.: $215260 I declare: I am employedin the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a memberof the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. J am familiar with the businesspractice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placedin the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of © business. On September 11, 2014, I served the attached REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITSbyplacing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004, addressed as follows: Solomon R. Wollack Attorney at Law P. O. Box 23316 Pleasant Hill, CA 94523 Attorneyfor Appellant Gamaliel Elizalde (2 copies) Stephen B. Bedrick Attorney at Law 1970 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94612 Attorneyfor Appellant Jose Mota-Avendano (2 copies) John P. Ward Attorney at Law 584 Castro Street, #802 San Francisco, CA 94114 Attorneyfor Appellant Javier Gomez — (2 copies) The Honorable Mark Peterson District Attorney ~ Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office 900 Ward Street Martinez, CA 94553 Superior Court of California County of Contra Costa Main Courthouse P.O. Box 911 Martinez, CA 94553 Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, Division Two 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 (via hand delivery) First District Appellate Project 730 Harrison St., Room 201 San Francisco, CA 94107 (BY E-MAIL: by transmitting a PDF version of this documentvia electronic mail to: eservice@fdap.org) I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsof the State of California the foregoingis true and correct and that this declaration was executed on September 11 2014, at San Francisco, California . a Ly rw J. Wong J } Declarant Signature SF2014407977 41074532.doc
