HUDEC v. S.C.

Real Party in Interest, The People, Petition for Review

Cal.August 28, 2013

S213003 - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CHARLES HUDEC, ” N Petitioner, No. G047465 Vs. (Superior Court SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE Case No. C-47710) COUNTY, Respondent, SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ) F l L ED ) Real Party in Interest. ) AUG 28 2013 ) Frank A. McGuire Clerk PETITION FOR REVIEW Deputy FOLLOWING THE PUBLISHED DECISION OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE, GRANTING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION/MANDATE THE HONORABLE KAZUHARU MAKINO,JUDGE PRESIDING TONY RACKAUCKAS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF ORANGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY: BRIAN F. FITZPATRICK DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY EMAIL:brian.fitzpatrick@da.ocgov.com STATE BAR NO.165480 POST OFFICE BOX 808 SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA 92702 TELEPHONE:(714) 347-8789 FAX: (714) 834-5706 Attorneys for Real Party in Interest IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CHARLES HUDEC, ) ) Ss Petitioner, ) ) No. G047465 VS. ) ) (Superior Court SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE ) Case No. C-47710) COUNTY, ) ) Respondent, ) ) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,) ) Real Party in Interest. ) ) PETITION FOR REVIEW FOLLOWING THE PUBLISHED DECISION OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH APPELLATEDISTRICT,DIVISION THREE, GRANTING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION/MANDATE THE HONORABLE KAZUHARU MAKINO, JUDGE PRESIDING TONY RACKAUCKAS,DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF ORANGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY: BRIAN F. FITZPATRICK DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY EMAIL:brian.fitzpatrick@da.ocgov.com STATE BAR NO. 165480 POST OFFICE BOX 808 SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA 92702 TELEPHONE:(714) 347-8789 FAX:(714) 834-5706 Attorneys for Real Party in Interest TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........0. 0.0000 ccc cece eee ee eee ee ii ISSUE FOR REVIEW ...... 0... ccc ccc ccc ccc eect eee eeeeenee 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........0.000. cece cece cee eeeee 3 ARGUMENT....0.cccece cece een e ee neeeeeeey 4 THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY CONCERNING THE MEANING OF PENAL CODE SECTION 1026.5, SUBDIVISION (b)(7) .............. 4 CONCLUSION 1.0.0...eceee eee eee eeeeenneey 9 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT .............. 0 cee eee c eee ee. 10 PROOF OF SERVICE [END] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Allen y. Illinois (1986) 478 U.S. 364 [92 L.Ed.2d 296, 106 S.Ct. 2988] .. 0.0...eee eee 4 Cramerv. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131 0...cece cece eee. 4 People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843 20.eeeee eee. 4 People v. Haynie (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224 ....0 0.00eee. 7,8 People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740 2.0.0.0... ee eee. 5, 6, 8 People v. Lopez (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1099 .. 00... eee eee eee. 5,8 People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153.20.00... eee eee. 7,8 People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 CalApp.3d 477 20... 0... cc eee cece eee 6-8 STATUTES Former Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2, Subdivision (€).... 0... cece cece cece tence ctennceeu. 6 Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1) 2.2.2.0... cece eee eee ccc cece. 4 Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) ....... eee cece eee eee cece e cece. 4 ii Penal Codesection 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7) .. 0.0... 0...e eee neccee. 1,4, 8 OTHER AUTHORITIES Cal. Rules of Court, tule 8.500(b)(1) 2...cece cece ee cn cece eee. 1 ili IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CHARLES HUDEC, N Petitioner, No. G047465 VS. (Superior Court SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE Case No. C-47710) COUNTY, N e e N e e N e e ’ e e N e e e ’ N e N e ” N e ” Respondent, ) ) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,) ) Real Party in Interest. ) ) TO THE HONORABLE TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE, AND TO THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: The People ofthe State of California respectfully petition this Court to grant review to secure uniformity of decision and to settle an important question of law. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.500(b)(1).) Courts are struggling to determinewhichconstitutionalrights are afforded under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7) (hereafter “1026.5(b)(7)”).! As the court in our case ' All further statutory referencesare to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. noted, “Weare not the first court to grapple with this issue.” (Hudec v. Superior Court (July 26, 2013, G047465)_——Cal.App.4th__[slip opn.at p. 5]. In published decisions, different courts have disagreed conceming section 1026.5(b)(7)’s meaning and whether that section confers on a defendant the right to refuse to testify at his Penal Code section 1026.5 extended commitment proceeding. This issue is important and will continue to trouble the Court ofAppeal without guidance from this Court. We note guidance on the same issue was recently sought before this Court in People v. Ashley, case number $207383 (petn. den., January 23, 2013). We respectfully suggest the time has comefor this Court to grant review andsettle this issue. A copy of the Court ofAppeal’s opinionis attached. ISSUE FOR REVIEW Whether Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7) confers on a defendant the right to refuse to testify at his Penal Code section 1026.5 extended commitmenttrial. * Further citations to the opinion will be to the slip opinion. 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Defendant, a paranoid schizophrenic,killed his father inMay 1981 after hearing voicestelling him he had to commit the killing to please God and avoid becoming homosexual. (Hudecv. Superior Court, supra, G047465,slip opn. at p. 2.) The parties stipulated defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity and he was committed. (Ibid.) In March 2012, the People filed the latest petition to extend defendant’s commitment to Patton Hospital under section 1026.5. (Hudec v. Superior Court, supra, G047465,slip opn.at p. 2.) Thetrial court granted the People’s in limine motion to compel defendant’s testimonyat trial. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) The Court of Appeal granted defendant’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandate. (/d. at p. 19.) ARGUMENT THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY CONCERNING THE MEANING OF PENAL CODE SECTION1026.5, SUBDIVISION (b)(7) A defendant committedto a state hospital after being foundnotguilty by reason of insanity (“NGI”) may not be kept in custody longer than the maximumstate prison term applicable to the underlying offense. (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) The district attorney may petition to extend the commitment where the person “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) Commitmentproceedings undersection 1026.5 are civil in nature, not criminal, and neither the federal northe state constitutional right againstself- incrimination applies to such proceedings. (See Allen v. Illinois (1986) 478 U.S. 364, 374-375 [92 L.Ed.2d 296, 106 S.Ct. 2988]; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860; Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 134.) Section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), however, provides: The person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees. In our case, the court held section 1026.5(b)(7) confers upon the defendant the right to refuse to testify at his civil commitmentproceeding. (Hudec v. Superior Court, supra, G047465, slip opn. at p. 14.) The court found section 1026.5(b)(7)’s language is unambiguous and confers ail the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings, not “‘someofthe rights,” or ‘the due process rights required by judicial decision in commitment extension proceedings.’” (Hudecv. Superior Court, supra, G047465, slip opn. at p. 15.) As our court noted,its decision is contrary to other published Court of Appeal decisions. In People v. Lopez (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1099, the court foundthat, in enacting section 1026.5, the Legislature did not intend to provide persons subject to civil commitment proceedings with a broad right to refuse to testify. (Ud. at pp. 1113-1116.) Rather,as in civil proceedings generally, the person may invoke hisright not to answer questions which might serve to incriminate him in a future prosecution, but he may not refuse to testify otherwise as to matters pertinent to the commitment proceedings. (/d. at p. 1107.) The Lopez court cited People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, which considered the defendant’s claim that he wasentitled to the privilege againstself-incrimination under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2, subdivision (e). Asin section 1026.5(b)(7), that section provided, The patient shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6316.2, subd. (e), repealed by Stats. 1981, ch. 982, § 2.) In Henderson, the court concluded the language did “not extend the protection of the constitutional privileges against self-incrimination to testimonial communications which are not incriminatory.” (People v. Henderson, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748.) Instead, the Legislature merely intended to provide the constitutional protections mandated by judicial decision, i.e., the rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous verdict, not additional rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination. (Ibid.) The reasoning in Henderson wasapplied ten years later in People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477. In that case, the court held the doublejeopardy prohibitionsofthe federal and state Constitutions do not apply to proceedings undersection 1026.5(b)(7). (People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 488.) The court concluded section 1026.5(b)(7), [Merely codifies the application ofconstitutional protections to extension hearings mandated by judicial decision. It does not extendthe protection ofconstitutional provisions which bear no relevantrelationship to the proceedings. [Citation.] (People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 488.) The court reasonedthat, [D]oublejeopardyprovisions... have no meaningfulapplication to extension proceedings [that] are civil in nature, are for the purpose of treatment, not punishment, and are not an adjudication of a criminal act or offense,.... (Ibid.) In People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153, the court agreed with Williams that section 1026.5(b)(7) does not incorporate all constitutional procedural safeguardsandheldit did not include the right to personally waive jury trial applicable in criminal cases. (People v. Powell, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158-1159.) The court reasoned commonsense dictated that an insane person “should notbe able to veto the informedtactical decision of counsel [to waive jury].” (/d. at p. 1158.) In People v. Haynie (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, the court took a different turn holding section 1026.5(b)(7) conferred upon the defendant the right to refuse to testify at his extended commitment hearing. (Peoplev. Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1228-1230.) The court found the Legislature’s words were clear and unambiguous,stating, “[uJnder the plain languageofthestatute, . . . [the defendant] should not have been compelled to testify .. . at his commitment extensiontrial.” (/d. at p. 1228.) Asthesecasesillustrate, there is a sharp difference of opinion within the Court of Appeal concerning the meaning of section 1026.5(b)(7) and whetherit includes the right to refuse to testify. Our court’s opinion, that section 1026.5(b)(7) unambiguously includes ail constitutional rights applicable to criminal proceedings, is contrary to Lopez, Henderson, Williams, and Powell. Those courts determined section 1026.5(b)(7), or identical language in anothersection, doesnot include all the constitutionalrights. Ourcourt’s opinionis also contrary to Haynie. Althoughthe court in Haynie stated section 1026.5(b)(7)’s language was unambiguous, the court agreed with Williams and Powell that it does not include all applicable constitutional rights. (People v. Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1229-1230.) Haynie agreed section 1026.5(b)(7) “does not extend the ‘protection ofconstitutional provisions whichbear norelevantrelationship to the proceedings.’” (/d. at p. 1229.) In this respect, the Haynie court yielded to commonsense. Asthe court in Powell rhetorically questioned concerning the constitutionalright to personally waivejury trial, where a person has been found insane and theissueat trial is whether he remainsinsane, “[c]an such a person intelligently invoke or waive the right to a jury trial?” (People v. Powell, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158.) The court’s decision in our case leaves no room for commonsense. Underthis decision, even the mostlegally insane person without any evidence he hasregained any sanity would be requiredto personally waivejury trial and could veto his attorney’s decision to waive a jury. Such a result is absurd on its face. The decision in our case stands alone in declaring section 1026.5(b)(7) includes ail the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. Given the divergent opinions, this Court should grant reviewtoclarify section 1026.5(b)(7)’s meaning and resolve the confusion in the Court of Appeal. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the People respectfully request this Court grant review in this case. Dated this 23rd day ofAugust, 2013. Respectfully submitted, TONY RACKAUCKAS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF ORANGE,STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY: DBOtKH BRIANF. FITZPATRJCK DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 10 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT [California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c)] The text ofthe Petition for Review consists of 1,562 words as counted by the word-processing program usedto generate this brief. Dated this 23rd day August, 2013. Respectfully submitted, TONY RACKAUCKAS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF ORANGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA By. Se AST BRIAN F. FITZPATRICK DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 1] ATTACHMENT COURT OF APPEAL 4TH DISTRICT DIVISION 3 ELECTRONICALLY FILED Jul 26, 2013 Kevin Lane, Clerk By: D. Saporito CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE CHARLES HUDEC, Petitioner, G047465 V. (Super. Ct. No. C47710) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. OPINION Original proceedings; petition for a writ ofprohibition/mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kazuharu Makino, Judge. Writ granted. Frank Ospino, Public Defender, Jean Wilkinson, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Mark Brown,Assistant Public Defender, Christopher D. McGibbons, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, Brian F. Fitzpatrick, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent. Charles Hudec seeks a writ of prohibition or mandate to overturn the trial court’s order granting the district attorney’s motion in limine compelling him to testify in a trial to extend his commitment to Patton State Hospital (Pen. Code, § 1026.5; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless noted otherwise). Herelies on the Legislature’s statutory commandthat individuals facing commitment“shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.” (Id., subd. (b)(7).) Both constitutions guarantee the familiar right in a civil or criminal case not to incriminate oneself. (Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137 (Cramer).) But both constitutions afford broader protection in criminal proceedingsthat includes a “separate and distinct testimonial privilege[],” namely “an absolute right not to be called as a witness andnotto testify.” (Ibid.) Because the plain wordsofthe statute provide that the rights afforded in criminal proceedings “shall” be afforded to individuals facing a civil commitmenttrial, we grant Hudec’s petition. J FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This court presented the facts of the underlying case in a 1985 opinion modifying and affirming the judgment committing Hudec to Patton State Hospital. (People v. Hudec (Aug. 15, 1985, G000694) [nonpub opn.].) As notedin the earlier opinion, Hudec, a paranoid schizophrenic, killed his father in May 1981 after he heard voices tell him he had to commit the killing to please God and to avoid becoming a homosexual. The parties stipulated Hudec was not guilty by reason ofinsanity, and this court modified the commitmentorder to reflect Hudec committed voluntary manslaughter rather than first degree murder. In March 2012,the district attorney filed the latest petition to extend Hudec’s commitment to Patton Hospital under section 1026.5. Thetrial court scheduled a trial on the petition and later granted the district attorney’s written in limine motion to compel Hudec’s testimonyat trial. Hudec petitioned for a writ of prohibition or mandate. Weissued an order to show cause,stayed thetrial, and scheduled oral argument. II DISCUSSION Persons found notguilty of a felony becauseoflegal insanity may not be committed to a state hospital longer than the maximumstate prison sentencethat thetrial court could have imposed for the underlying offense. (§ 1026.5, subd. (a).) The district attorney maypetition to extend the commitment, however,if the person “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger ofphysical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court must advise the person namedin the petition of his or herrights to an attorney and to a jury trial, and that the rules of discovery in criminal cases apply (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(3)). “The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition for extended commitment. Thetrial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person andthe prosecuting attorney.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(4).) The issue in the current case concernsthe scope of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7). The subsection provides: “The person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedingsshall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.” Hudec contends section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), confers on him the right of a criminal defendantnotto be called as a witness and notto testify. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [Persons maynot . . . be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves”]; Evid. Code, § 930; Cramer, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 137 [in a criminal matter a defendant has an absoluteright not to be called as a witness and notto testify].) The district attorney correctly notes a commitment extension proceedingis civil in nature and therefore constitutional proscriptions against compelled testimony do notapply. (Allen v.Illinois (1986) 478 U.S. 364, 374-375 [privilege did not apply to proceedings underthe Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act because the proceedings were not criminal within the meaning of the Fifth Amendmentto the United States Constitution]; Cramer, at p. 137 [same under California Constitution].) Here, we must decide whether section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7) confers on the defendantthe right to refuse to testify at a section 1026.5 extension trial.’ In construing section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), our task is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and adopt the construction that best effectuates the law’s purpose. (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498 (Leiva).) We start with “‘the plain, commonsense meaning ofthe language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the languageis unambiguous,the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] We considerfirst the words of the statute because ““‘the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of 3999legislative intent.””” [Citation.] ‘[W]heneverpossible, significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some words surplusage.’ [Citation.] However, [Penal Code] section 7 cautions that ‘words and phrases must be construed accordingto the context....’ (§ 7, subd. 16.) Accordingly, ... words in a statute ‘“‘should be construed 3999in their statutory context’”’ [citation], and . . . ‘we mayreject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparentin the statute or that would lead to absurd 1 Thedistrict attorney argues extraordinary relief is unwarranted because Hudec has an adequate appellate remedy if the court grants the order extendinghis commitment. In issuing the order to show cause, we determined Hudeclacked “aplain, speedy, and adequate remedy,in the ordinary courseof law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Moore v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 401, 405, fn. 4; Robbinsv. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205 [court necessarily determined appeal was not an adequate remedy whenit issued alternative writ].) Denial of a claim ofstatutory privilege is properly reviewed by extraordinary writ. (See Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 336; see also People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 482, fn. 2 [special circumstances warrant review by mandate given the urgent nature of extension proceedings and becausethetrial court’s ruling will impact other extension proceedings].) results’ [citation], or ‘would result in absurd consequencesthat the Legislature could not have intended.’ [Citation.]” (Leiva, supra, at p. 506.) A. People v. Haynie Weare notthefirst court to grapple with this issue. In People v. Haynie (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224 (Haynie), the appellate court concludedsection 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), prohibited the prosecution from calling the defendant at the commitmentextensiontrial and questioning him about his mental state. The court explained “the Legislature’s words clearly and unambiguously state the person ‘is entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.’ A defendantin a criminal matter has an absolute right not to be called as a witness and not to testify. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Evid. Code, § 930.) Underthe plain language ofthe statute, because Haynieis entitled to the same rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant, he should not have been compelled totestify in the prosecution’s case at his commitmentextensiontrial.” (Jd. at p. 1228.) Haynie agreed subdivision (b)(7) does not extend rights that “bear no relevant relationship to the proceedings.” (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.) Haynie noted several courts had not applied all the constitutional rights guaranteed for criminal proceedings in section 1026.5 trials. (See People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158 [constitutional requirement ofpersonal waiverofjury trial; common sense dictates an insane person should notbe able to veto counsel’s informed tactical decision to waive jury]; Williams, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 484-485 [double jeopardy did not bar prosecuting attorney’s appealafter trial court granted nonsuit in section 1026.5 proceeding]; People v. Juarez (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 570, 575 [extended commitment procedures could not disadvantage the defendant in the determination ofhis criminal guilt, any amendmentto them couldnot, by definition, constitute an ex post facto violation]; People v. Beard (1985) 173 Cal-App.3d 1113, 1118-1119 [the defendant failed to show privilege against self-incrimination violated by court-ordered psychiatric exams; no evidence questions posed by psychiatrists sought to elicit information that could subject the defendantto criminal prosecution]; People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748 (Henderson) [admissionat trial of the defendant’s statements to hospital staff during routine therapy sessions did not violate privilege against self- incrimination]; People v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581, 585-586.) eeBut Haynie disagreed subdivision (b)(7) “‘merely codifies the application of constitutional protections to extension hearings mandated by judicial decision.’” (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; see Williams, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d atp. 488.) Haynie stated that “if the courts have granted rights to committees under case law, there is no need for the statutory declaration ofrights—it is surplusage. Second,that [construction] supplants thelegislative rights-inclusive language with a process whereby judges select which rights will apply. We prefer to leave it to the Legislature to be more specific as to which rights apply if it does notintendthatall rights apply. ... Finally, to the extent that case law holdsthat certain rights apply to extended-commitment proceedings under constitutionalprinciples, those holdings do not prevent the Legislature from providing additionalrights to civil committees.” (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.) Haynie concludedthe right against compelled testimony“is clearly and relevantly implicated when a personis called bythestate to testify in a proceeding to recommit him or her even ifwhat is said on the witnessstandis notper se incriminating. Bycalling the personin its case-in-chief, the state is essentially saying that his or her testimony is necessary for the state to prove its case. We have no doubt that a committee so compelledto testify is prejudiced under these circumstances.” (Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.) The Haynie court decided Jn re Luis C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, about a weeklater. Luis C. held Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5, which pertains to analogous recommitmenttrials involving persons within the control of the Division of Juvenile Facilities, granted the personthe right not to testify. A panel ofthis court later agreed in Joshua D. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 549 (Joshua D.)2, although the court emphasized section 1801.5 extends “all” rights guaranteed underthe federal and state constitutions in criminal proceedings, which is arguably broader than the languagein section 1026.5. (/d. at pp. 557, 560.) Joshua D. concludedtheright not to testify “is necessarily includedin the rights afforded by section 1801.5 because the word ‘all’ means‘all’ and not ‘some.’ The Legislature’s chosen term leaves no room for judicial construction.” (Id. at p. 558; see also In re Anthony C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1510 [section 1801.5 unambiguously includes prohibition against double jeopardy].) Joshua D. also noted the Legislature had amendedsection 1801.5 after Luis C. without changing the “‘all rights’” language. (Joshua D., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 560-561.) “It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that when the Legislature amendsa statute withoutaltering portions of the provision that have been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware ofand to have 2 Weinitially denied the petition in Joshua D., but the California Supreme Court granted review andtransferred the matter directing us to issue an order to show cause whythepetition should not be granted. 3 Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5 provides: “The person shall be entitled to all rights guaranteed underthe federal and state constitutions in criminal proceedings. A unanimousjury verdict shall be required in any jury trial. As to either a court or a jury trial, the standard ofproof shall be that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Legislature added the “‘all rights’” language in 1984 followingthe decision in People v. Superior Court (Vernal D.) (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d29, which held the Welfare andInstitutions Code section 1800 et seq. commitment schemeviolated due process by authorizing commitmentbased onless than a unanimousjury verdict and by implying the civil preponderance of the evidence standard applied. (See Joshua D., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 559-560.) acquiescedin the previousjudicial construction.” (Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 734.) B. People v. Lopez People v. Lopez (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1099 (Lopez) disagreed with the Haynie court’s analysis. Lopez considered an equal protection challenge raised by a defendant civilly committed as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (See § 2960et seq.) Section 2972, the statute governing the procedures for hearing thesepetitions, provides the committee with the rightto a jury trial, assisted by appointed counselif indigent, and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity. But section 2972 does not contain the language foundin section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7) (or Welf. & Inst. Code, §1801.5) entitling the person to rights guaranteed underthe federal and state Constitutions for criminal proceedings. In Lopez, the defendant argued admission of testimony from a prior MDO commitment hearing where he had been compelledto testify subjected him to disparate treatment comparedto section 1026.5 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5 committees. (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1105-1106.) He argued MDOs must be afforded the same rights as committees found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), including the right to refuse to testify per Haynie and Luis C. Lopez noted courts previously had held the right against self-incrimination did not apply in proceedings under the MDOlaw andother civil commitmentstatutes. (People v. Merfeld (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1446; People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1079 [requiring MDOto testify about her actions and mental condition during underlying offense did not violate her privilege against self- incrimination]; see also People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776, 781, 792-793 [defendant in proceeding under Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) had no constitutional right not to be called as a prosecution witness].) Lopez faulted Haynie for failing to follow Henderson, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 740. Henderson involved a proceeding to extend the defendant’s commitment under the now-repealed mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSO) law (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6300 et seq.). Former Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2, subdivision (e) of the MDSO law contained language almost identical to that found in section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7): “The patient shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. All proceedings shall be in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.” In Henderson,the patient complained admission into evidence ofhis statements to hospital staff violated his statutory right (former § 6316.2, subd. (e)) to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Henderson disagreed: “We do not so read the commandofthe statute. Subdivision (e) of section 6316.2 codifies the application of constitutional protections to MDSO proceedings mandated by judicial decision (see, e.g., [People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 314, 324 (Burnick) and People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 359 (Feagley)]). It does not extend the protection of the constitutional privileges against self-incrimination to testimonial communications whichare not incriminatory.” (Henderson, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 748.) Henderson cited Burnick and Feagley as examplesofjudicial decisions applying certain constitutional protections mandated by due process. Forinstance, Burnick concluded due process required the government to prove the MDSOallegations by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Feagley held due process required a unanimous verdict where the alleged MDSOwastried by a jury and that confining an MDSO indefinitely to prison where the offender has been deemed unamenableto treatment was cruel and unusual punishment. (See Henderson, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at pp. 746-747.) Lopez aiso relied on Conservatorship ofBones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1013 (Bones), which dealt with the procedures used in determining whetherto temporarily commit a personalleged to pose “a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon others” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5304, subd. (a)(1)). These procedures were adopted as part of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS), which prescribedstandards for involuntary civil commitmentsfor psychiatric treatment. Welfare andInstitutions Code Section 5303 required LPS hearings to be conducted “in accordancewith constitutional guarantees of due process of law and the procedures required under Section 13 of Article 1”of the State Constitution. When Welfare andInstitutions Code section 5303 was adopted, section 13 of the Constitution “enumerated various procedural safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants,” including the following: “‘No person shall be. . . compelled, in any criminalcase, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprivedoflife, liberty, or property without due process of law.’” (Bones, supra, 189 Cal.App.3dat p. 1016.) In 1974, the Legislature repealed section 13 and transposed the rights described in section 13 to other sections of the Constitution. The right not to be compelled to testify and the guarantee against double jeopardy migrated to article I, section 7, while the due process clause movedto article I, section 15. (Jbid.) The Bones court concluded the Legislature, in guaranteeing the rights enumerated in section 13, and subsequently movedtosections 7 and 15, did not intendto grant potential LPS committeesa privilege not to testify. The Bones court basedits holding onits interpretation of a footnote in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Burnick. The issue in Burnick was whetherthe federal and state due processclauses required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in MDSO proceedings. (Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 310.) Burnick explained the question ofthe proper standard ofproof“is not answered by the People’s reliance on the general proposition that mentally disordered sex offender proceedingsare‘civil in nature.’ [Citation.] Noris it necessary to inquire into 10 the constitutionality of the quoted language of [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6321 or Evidence Codesection 115. Rather we apply those statutes, and proceed to determine whether the standard ofproof beyond a reasonable doubtis ‘otherwise required’ in mentally disordered sex offender proceedings. Yet in so doing we are moved by constitutional considerations of the highest order, inasmuch as we discharge our duty to insure that no person be deprived ofhis liberty without the due process of law guaranteedbyarticle I, section 7, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution.” (Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 314, fn. omitted.) In a footnote, Burnick noted, “Similarly, the Legislature has not specified the standard ofproof for involuntary commitmentofpersons under our general mental health law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq., known as the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act), but has provided that such proceedings shall be conducted ‘in accordance with constitutional guarantees of due process of law and the procedures required under Section 13 [now § 7, subd.(a)] of Article 1 of the Constitution of the State of California.’ (§ 5303.) As in the case at bar, it will be for the courts to decide which standard ofproof is necessary to comport with those ‘guarantees and procedures’ in view ofthe consequencesto the individual of a commitment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.” (Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 314,fn. 5.) Bones concluded Burnick’s reference in this footnote to section 7 but not section 15 demonstrated Welfare andInstitutions Code section 5303 merely incorporated due process principles foundin section 7 and not the panoply ofcriminal defense rights found in section 15. (Bones, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016.) Lopez accepted without question Bones’s interpretation of the Burnick footnote, explaining that “Burnickas interpreted in Bones . . . affects our analysis in the following way: The Supreme Court in Burnick apparently concludedthat, despite the Legislature’s reference in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5303 to ‘the procedures 1] required under’ the part of the constitution containing the right notto testify, the Legislature did not intend that a potential LPS committee have the right nottotestify. Rather, the Legislature meantonly to afford the committee the rights guaranteed by due process,i.e., the rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimousjury. [9] Jf that conclusionis correct, then it is reasonable also to conclude the Legislature acted with the sameintent in enacting section 1026.5(b)(7). That is, in granting a potential NGI committee “the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings,” the Legislature intended to grant the rights guaranteed by due process, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimousverdict, but nototherrights that are granted criminal defendants alone, such asthe privilege notto testify.” (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1113-1114, italics added.) Lopez cited due process case law contemporaneous with the adoption of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), to support its conclusion the Legislature did not intend to grant potential committees the right not to testify. Before 1979, the Legislature had _ not enacted commitmentprocedures for individuals acquitted by reasonofinsanity. Because these individuals faced indefinite commitment exceeding the maximum possible prison term had they been convicted, and the Legislature had enacted less onerouscivil commitment proceduresfor similarly situated individuals in MDSOproceedings, the Supreme Court in In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457 (Moye) concludedindefinite commitment ofNGI defendants violated equal protection. Lopez reasoned, “With this context in mind, it becomesreadily apparent why the Legislature in enacting Penal Code section 1026.5 would include subdivision (b)(7): The Legislature wanted to establish a commitmentprocedure for NGI’s that would overcomethe equal protection problemsidentified in Moye whenit compared the treatment ofNGI’s and MDSO’s. Therefore, it included in the NGI commitment law the identical languageit had included in the MDSOlaw,by enacting Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e): the person subject 12 to commitment‘shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the Federal and State Constitutionsfor criminal proceedings.’ [{] As Henderson later concluded, however, Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e) was merely intended to provide the constitutional protections mandated by judicial decision,i.e., the rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimousverdict, not additional rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination. It is therefore reasonable to concludethat in includingtheidentical language in Penal Code section 1026.5(b)(7), the Legislature acted with the same intent.” (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1114-1115.) Lopez concludedits reading of section 1026.5(b)(7) was “supported by (1) Henderson’s nonliteral reading of identical languageas not guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination; (2) Burnick’s and Bones’s nonliteral readingofa statute specifically referring to the part of the state Constitution containing the right not to testify; (3) the circumstances under which section 1026.5(b)(7) was enacted: and (4) the fact that no decision other than Haynie and Luis C. has foundthe right notto testify to apply to a civil commitmentproceeding. [{]] That reading is further supported bythe fact that, two years after Williams was decided, the Legislature amendedsection 1026.5 without modifying its language to overrule Williamsorto state explicitly that an NGI committee has the criminal defendant’s privilege notto testify.” (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) Focusing on the absence ofa constitutionalright to refuseto testify in civil proceedings, Lopez viewed Haynieas inconsistent with Cramer, supra, 23 Cal.3d 131, which found nobar to the district attorney calling a mentally disabled personto testify at his own commitment hearing under former Welfare andInstitutions Code section 6502. Lopez noted Cramer’s analysis centered on the essential nature of civil commitment, which “maynot reasonably be deemed punishmenteither in its design or purpose. Itis not analogousto criminal proceedings.” (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116.) C6Because “‘thehistoric purposeofthe privilege against being called as a witness has been 13 to assure that the criminaljustice system remainsaccusatorial, not inquisitorial,” the high court in Cramer concluded the “extensionofthe privilege to an area outside the criminal justice system, in our view, would contraveneboth the language and purpose ofthe privilege.” (Cramer, at pp. 137-138.) According to Lopez, because “(c]ivil commitment, by definition, does not involve the ‘system ofcriminaljustice,’” and therefore does not implicate a constitutional right to refuseto testify, “{t]he conclusion ofthe court[s] in Haynie and Luis C. that civil committees do havethe right notto testify is inconsistent with” the decisions in Allen, Cramer, Merfeld, Clark, and Leonard holding the “right not to testify does not apply in civil commitmentproceedings, because they are not criminal proceedings, do not involve adjudication ofguilt, and do not result in punishment.” (Lopez, at p. 1116.) C. Analysis Weagree with Haynie subdivision (b)(7) bars the prosecution from calling the defendantas a witness in a section 1026.5 commitment extension hearing. In reaching the opposite result, Lopez leans heavily on policy arguments, with scant attention to the statutory language. But “‘“[i]t still remains true, asit alwayshas, that there can be nointent in a statute not expressedin its words, and there can beno intent upon the part of the framers of such a statute which does not find expression in their words.” [Citations.] ... “Words may notbe inserted in a statute under the guise of interpretation.” [Citation.]’” (People Ex Rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Muhyeldin (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 604, 611.) “‘In other words, the courts “may not, underthe guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.” [Citation.]” (California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. ofSouth Orange County Community College Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 574, 584.) 14 Here, the Legislature bestowed uponpotential committees “the rights guaranteed underthe federal and State Constitutionsfor criminalproceedings, not “some ofthe rights,” or “the due process rights required by judicial decision in commitment extension proceedings.” The Legislature’s words here are not ambiguousand, ofcourse, demonstrateits intent. We are boundby the plain meaningofthese words and maynot by judicial fiat adopt an interpretation at odds with that of the Legislature. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High SchoolDist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 919 [statute’s “plain meaning controls” and obviates “resort to extrinsic sources to determine the Legislature’s intent’’].) | Our reading does not contraveneanylegislative intent apparent in the statute, nor doesit lead to absurd results or consequences the Legislature could not have intended. A person subject to extended commitment under section 1026.5 faces the prospect ofa loss ofliberty akin to that associated with incarceration followinga criminal trial. (See Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 321; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 50 (“commitmentis a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one’s will, whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’”].) As we noted in Joshua D., the privilege notto testify reflects fundamental values and aspirations and a “‘senseof fair play whichdictates “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the governmentto leave the individual alone until good cause is shownfor disturbing him and by requiring the governmentinits contest with the individual to shoulderthe entire load”. . .; [and] ‘our respect for the inviolability of the humanpersonality andofthe right of each individual“to a private enclave where he maylead a private life... .”...””” (Joshua D., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 565, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Com’n (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55; overruled on another point in United States v. Balsys (1998) 524 U.S. 666, 687.)~(check cite)~ We therefore cannot agree with Lopez the right notto testify has no meaningful application in a section 1026.5 proceeding. It is not our province to second-guess the 15 Legislature’s policy choices by allowing the prosecution to call the defendant committee as a witness. Adopting Lopez’s rationale in denying a committee the right not to testify in commitment extension hearings would produce an anomalous contrast with juvenile commitmentextensions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5. As noted, Luis C. held juveniles in commitment extension hearings havethe right under section 1801.5 notto testify, and we presumethe Legislature approved this construction whenit amendedthe statute withoutdisturbing Luis C.’s interpretation. We discern no reason whythe Legislature would chooseto treat persons subject to extended commitmentundersection 1801.5 differently from those subject to extended commitment undersection 1026.5. Lopez’s historical rationale for deviating from the statutory language of section 1026.5 is not persuasive. While it is plausible the Legislature amended section 1026.5 in 1979 in response to Moye, and intended to conform the proceduresfor the extension of commitmentofindividuals acquitted by reason of insanity with commitment procedures for MDSOs, nothing suggests the Legislature intended by the use of similar language in both statutes (patient or person “shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed underthe Federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings”) to limit the rights in either proceeding to the due process-based rights ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimousverdict. Lopezrelied on Henderson in determining former section 6316.2 merely codified constitutional protections previously mandated by judicial decision. Henderson, in turn, relied on Burnick and Feagley, but neither case suggested the rights discussed in those cases (proof beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimousverdict, cruel or unusual punishment) should be the only onesavailable to persons subject to extended commitment. In Burnick, the Supreme Court likened the commitment of an MDSO to imprisonmentfor crime. (Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 310 [“it is no less cruel to 16 falsely find a manto be a ‘mentally disordered sex offender’ and confine him indefinitely in a prison-like state mental institution. Against such grievouserrors the law has erected sturdy bulwarks of procedure.”].) Given the backdrop of Burnick and Feagley, and the Legislature’s use of broad languagein section 6316.2,it is implausible the Legislature intended to guarantee only those rights expressly at issue in Burnick and Feagley. Lopez’s reliance on Bonesis also problematic. As noted above, Bones held Welfare andInstitutions Code section 5303 did not grant the potential LPS committee a privilege notto testify. Bones relied on Burnick, where the Supreme Court explained why the due process clauses of the California and federal Constitutions required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in MDSOproceedings even thoughthey are viewedascivil matters. The court stated it was “moved byconstitutional considerationsofthe highest order, inasmuchas wedischarge our duty to insure that no person be deprived ofhis liberty without the due process of law guaranteedby article I, section 7, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution.” (Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 314.) In the footnote mentioned above, Burnicknoted that while the Legislat ure had not specified the standard ofprooffor involuntary commitmentofpersons under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.), the Legislature had provided in section 5303 that such proceedings must comply with constitutional guarantees of due process andthe procedures required underarticle 1, section 13 of the California Constitution. The Supreme Court placed the following bracketed insertion after the reference to section 13: “[now § 7, subd.(a)].” (Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 314,fn. 5.) Based solely on this footnote, Bones surmised that Burnick’s reference to section 7, but not section 15, showed the Supreme Court would interpret section 5303 to merely incorporate due process principles found in section 7 and not the panoply of criminal defenserights found in section 15. (Bones, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016.) Lopez surmised, “The Supreme Court in Burnick apparently concludedthat, despite the 17 Legislature’s reference in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5303 to ‘the procedures required under’ the part of the constitution containing the right nottotestify, the Legislature did not intend that a potential LPS committee”to have thatright. (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113.) Bones’s conclusion does not withstandscrutiny. “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7.) Burnick did not decide whether an MDSOwasentitled to the right not to testify, nor did it consider whether Welfare andInstitutions Code section 5303 also includedthe rights contained in section 15 after the 1974 constitutional reshuffling of criminalrights. The issue in Burnick concerned whetherdueprocess required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in MDSOproceedings. The footnote in Burnick simply pointed out where the due process and burden ofproofprovisions were currently located in the State Constitution. Indeed, Lopez implicitly recognized Bones may haveoverstated the import ofBurnick when Lopez remarked the Supreme Court had “apparently concluded”(italics added) the Legislature’s reference in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5303 includedonly the section 7 criminal rights (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113). Lopez’s construction ofsection 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), proceeds from the unwarranted assumption that Bones correctly interpreted Burnick. The conclusion in Bones on which Lopez relies is weak fodder compared to “the plain, commonsense meaning ofthe language used by the Legislature.” (Leiva, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 506.) Lopez also noted that two years after Williams was decided, the Legislature amendedsection 1026.5 without modifyingits languageto overrule Williams orto state explicitly that an NGI committee has the criminal defendant’s privilege not to testify. (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) Williams, however, involved double jeopardy, nottestimonialprivileges. That the Legislature later amended the statute in a mannerthat had nothing to do with jeopardyor a right notto testify, but rather to overrule the determination in People v. Gunderson (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1292 that time spent in 18 outpatient status must count towards an MDSO’s extended commitment,is oflittle import here. In Joshua D., we recognized policy reasons exist both to grant and to deny the right notto testify at commitment extension hearings, but “[wJhere the Legislature has madea policy choice, using as here particularly clear and unambiguous language, we may not second-guessits determination.” (Joshua D., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th atp. 565; see Murphy, supra, 378 U.S.at p. 55.) That conclusion applies here with equal force. Il DISPOSITION Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its order granting the People’s motion to compel Hudectotestify at the section 1026.5 hearing and enter a new anddifferent order denying the People’s motion. ARONSON,J. WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM,ACTINGP.J. BEDSWORTH,J. 19 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ) ss COUNTY OF ORANGE ) RE: CHARLES HUDEC v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY CASE NO. G047465; SUP. CT. NO C-47710 I am citizen ofthe United States; I am over the age ofeighteen years and nota party to the within entitled action; my business address is: Office ofthe District Attorney, County ofOrange, 401 Civic Center Drive West Santa Ana, California 92701. On, August 27 2013, I served the within PETITION FOR REVIEW oninterestedparties in said action by placinga true copy thereof enclosedin a sealed envelope, in the United States mail at Santa Ana, California, that same day, in the ordinary course of business, postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as follows: PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE CHRISTOPHER D. MCGIBBONS 14 CIVIC CENTER PLAZA SANTA ANA,CA 92701 ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER ATTN: HON. KAZUHARU MAKINO,C62 700 CIVIC CENTER DR., WEST SANTA ANA, CA 92701 ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER ATTN: HON. CRAIG E. ROBISON,C5 700 CIVIC CENTER DR., WEST SANTA ANA,CA 92701 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. BOX 85266 SAN DIEGO,CA 92186 CLERK, COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT,DIV.3 601 W. SANTA ANA BLVD. SANTA ANA, CA 92701 I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed on August 27, 2013, at Santa Ana, California. LISA GOMEZ ATTORNEYeR