NEIGHBORS FOR SMART RAIL v. EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY (LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION)

Appellant’s Petition for Review

Cal.May 29, 2012

Gy Q) Cy GQ© LIU, J. Case No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT NEIGHBORS FOR SMARTRAIL, ° a non-profit California corporation, MAY 29 2012 Petitioner and Appellant Frederick « Ohirich Clerk ‘ e V. e EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY, Deputy EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY BOARD, Respondents, LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY BOARD, Real Parties-in-Interest and Respondents. AFTER A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION EIGHT CASE No. B232655 Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURTCASE No. BS125233 HONORABLE THOMASI. MCKNEW,JR. PETITION FOR REVIEW JOHN M. BOWMAN,SBN 137383 C.J. LAFFER, SBN 260546 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 746-4400 Facsimile: (310) 746-4499 Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellant NEIGHBORS FOR SMARTRAIL 202016v7 Case No. IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA NEIGHBORS FOR SMARTRAIL, a non-profit California corporation, Petitioner and Appellant Vv. EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY, EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY BOARD, Respondents, LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY BOARD, Real Parties-in-Interest and Respondents. AFTER A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEAL SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION EIGHT CASE No. B232655 Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CASE No. BS 125233 HONORABLE THOMASI. MCKNEW,JR. PETITION FOR REVIEW JOHN M. BOWMAN,SBN 137383 C.J. LAFFER, SBN 260546 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 746-4400 Facsimile: (310) 746-4499 Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellant NEIGHBORS FOR SMART RAIL 202016v7 Il. IH. IV. V. 202016v7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEWuuu... cccccccccccceessesecessesenens 1 REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW ..u..ecccecccccsesscesecseseseececeeceeeees 1 A. The Baseline Issue ..0.........cccccesesesesccesecocceccecceceececseececevseeesserensees 1 B. Adequacy of Mitigation Measures..........:cccssscssssesseceseecsseeeseseees 4 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND...ececcseeeees 6 DISCUSSION oo cccccccesesecccccecsssecssssssssccecesescceecececenesssesececeesececeeseeuas 10 A. Review Should Be Granted to Settle an Important Question of Law Regarding the Proper Baseline for Environmental Review Under CEQAandto Secure Uniformity of Decision on the “Baseline” QUESTION ......cccceeeessscceeececssseceessceecssesseecessaeesensesereeecestsesseerstecess 10 1. The Opinion Directly Conflicts With Recent Decisions Issued by the Fifth and Sixth Appellate Districts .......ccccccccsescseesseceesteeserecsssessssessteesaes 12 2, The Opinion Misconstrues CEQA’s Mandates ........ccccscccccccccececeuccsscceussssssesesceeeceeceeuvssssssesesesens 16 B. Review Should Be Granted to Clarify that a Mitigation Measure that Merely Identifies Actions that Could Be Taken By Other Public Agencies Without Actually Requiring the Implementation of Any ofthe Identified Actions, Constitutes Improper Deferral and Does Not, Standing Alone, Support a Finding that the Impact Will Be Reduced to a Less that Significant Level ........c.ceeeseeseneeees 22 CONCLUSION ooccceccccccssessssessssseevecescecccecseceeeeveceseceeeceseeeseeueesenaas 27 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Citizensfor East Shore Parks vy. California State Lands Comm. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549ooiescccscsssenecseesessssssesscssececeseceesssecessessesseseeesseens 10, 18 City ofSan Diego v. Trustees ofthe California State University, (2011) 201 Cal. App.4th 1134...ci cccccsessecssssecssesecssssssessrssecseesneeseesecsessssaessresesenesasvess 5 Communitiesfor a Better Environmentv. City ofRichmond (2010) 184 CalApp.4th 70... esccsscscssccssceressecsnessrsssseesersesaserseeseessessecneeaes 5S, 24 - 26 Communitiesfor a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality ManagementDistrict (2010) AS Cal. 4th 310.ceecsecenecesneeesereceeeeneeeeseessaeecssecesnaerereeeseesieeseesenaeessaspassim Federation ofHillside & Canyon Associations v. City ofLos Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252... eceseesccneenseesecseecseessaeecsesseeseeeeneesnsessecsesnneeres 5, 22, 24 Friends ofMammoth v. Bd. ofSupervisors (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 247 ooo ceccescesccesseneessesecesseesssscneesseeeesseeesnaeessesscecesevsseseescnasseseneesenesaeeaey 21 Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County ofMadera (2011) 199 CalApp.4th 48oicecesseessceesseeseeseseecnaeersseeeeeersseesenesessssnaeeseeereneeespassim Pfeiffer v. City ofSunnyvale (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552.0... cccccccesscssscesesesseeceecesersnecsaeeesseceaeesaeeseseeseessaeeesesasens 19 Sacramento Old City Ass’n. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d LOLcececceccessscssecssecsesseecceeeseceeaeseecesecsaeesateseeseeeneessatessesanens 26 San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County ofMerced (2007) 149 CalApp.4th 645 oo... ccccscccsecsessessseesseseeesseesseetsessaeeaeeeeeseeaseesneeenens 5,17, 24 Santiago County Water Dist. v. County ofOrange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818occcccscssscssecceteeseesseseseeecsecsatecenecsseesasessarerseessnsesaeseeens 19 Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99 oo. ccsccsccccssseeccesseecseecsneceeesnaeecerseereeseneeesaaeseeessneeseteeneeesseeses 10 Sunnyvale West Neighborhood Ass’n. v. City ofSunnyvale (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1351cceeccccsssscccsseceseecssseeeecsenetsesneeecssseeeseersneesesseeeesseespassim 202016v7 11 Vineyard Area Citizensfor Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City ofRancho Cordova (2007) AO Cal. 4th 412icccceecneesssceessesessessessesessseecssacsecseesssssseesessevesersaessteeenseces 19 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138 CalApp.4th 273 oo... esccssscssssseessecscssessscessceseesesseesssssesscssesssseseessnserssssness 17 Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n., Inc. v. City ofFresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683 occecccsecsesssessessessscsssesesessssssescsesasssesseesssensesatesstsassseess 18 STATUTES Gov't. Code, § 11342.2. ecccsecssscsssserscsscseesssseessscnesssecsecssecsaseeecraeeesseesseescntses 14 Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 ef S€q. .cccccccscccsscssscessessessesssessesssesnecesseeenerecassaeseens 1,3 Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.) ooo .cccceccesscssecesssessesssessesseeessecessseessreesneccssseesesens 22 Pub. Resources Code, § 21060.5 wc. cccceccccsssscecssssesssscsrseeecessceeessseeeeraes 14, 16, 17, 21 Pub. Resources Code, § 21068 ......cccecccssccssscsssecesseccsseeseeeresecssesesssensgeeceseeesstessesees 17 Pub. Resources Code, § 21081 wo...eeeVecesaueeeesensseesaeeeeeeceecueeesessaaaeeecessseeeaeeens 27 Pub. Resources Code, § 21081.6 wc.cecsccccssscceesseecssssersesesesnseesesseseeseceeeeesesensensess 22 Pub. Resources Code, § 21151 .....ecceeccssssecssssecesnececsseessreecssennecerssesesssasesessesessensees 17 OTHER AUTHORITIES Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § 15000 ef Seq... cciccscesssssessesseteessresensesenetsessasecssesensensesesersas 2 Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § [S065 oo... ceceececsesereeseeenecseesereseeecsestesesseeensesesessnereenes 20 Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § 15091 ooeccsscessscccsssessseecesseseeeesseeeessesessesseesssneasns 27 Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § 15125 occccecscssseccsssessseeteecesseeeesseenreeeees 10, 13, 14, 20 Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § 15126.2 oi ccccececscsseessesseessssesseesseseensesssseeseereeseea 10, 18 Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § 15126.6 occccccsecssecsseessssseecsscessecessessenseecsseeeseeserersuss 20 Cal. Code Regs., tit 14, § 15130occceseesccssseetseeresseessesseceesssesseseraseseeerspeseessess 20 202016v7 iil I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW l. Underthe California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq., is a public agency required to evaluate a project’s potential traffic and other impacts using a baseline consisting of the existing physical conditions in the affected area during the period of environmental review, or may an agency instead elect to evaluate the impacts of a project only against projected future conditions? 2. Under CEQA,is a mitigation measure that merely identifies several possible remedial actions, all of which lie outside the lead agency’s jurisdiction and control, adequate to support a finding that a significant impact of a project will be mitigated or avoided, where there is no assurance that any of the actions will be incorporated into the project or otherwise actually implemented? Il. REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW This case involves a challenge to the adequacy of the environmental impact report (the “EIR”) for a controversial light rail transit line along the Exposition Corridor from Culver City to Santa Monica (the “Project”). As approved, the proposed 6.6-mile rail line will run dual tracks through primarily residential neighborhoods in Los Angeles, crossing some of the region’s most congested north- south thoroughfaresat street level. A. The Baseline Issue In order to determine whether a potential environmental impact of a project is significant, a lead agency must measure the impact 202016v7 - ] - against the existing environmental conditions in the absence of the project, which is referred to as the “baseline” for environmental analysis. The use of a proper baselineis critically important because an environmental impact may not be significant when measured against one baseline, but may be significant when measured against another. The EIR, which wascertified by Respondent Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (“Expo Authority”) on February 4, 2010, did not measure the potential traffic and air quality impacts of the Project against the existing physical conditions in the affected area as of (1) the time that environmental review had commenced (which, according to the State CEQA Guidelines,’ will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a lead agency determines whether an impactis significant); (2) the date of EIR certification and Project approval; or (3) the anticipated date of Project completion. Rather, in preparing the EIR, the Expo Authority “elected” to evaluate these potential impacts only against a long-range forecast of future conditions in the year 2030 — two decades after Project approval and 15 years after the date that the Project is expected to commence operations. In its published opinion upholding the EIR (the “Opinion” or “Op.”),” the Second District Court of Appeal held for the first time ' “Guidelines” refers to the regulations codified in title 14, sections 15000 et seq. of the California Code of Regulations, which have been “prescribed by the Secretary of Resources to be followed byall State and local agencies in California in the implementation of [CEQA].” Guidelines, § 15000.. * The Opinionis attachedto this Petition as Exhibit “A.” 202016v7 -2- that a public agency’s use of projected future conditions as the sole baseline for evaluating a project’s environmental impacts is proper, so long as the agency’s predictions regarding such future conditions are supported by substantial evidence. In reaching this conclusion, the Second District expressly disagreed with the Sixth District’s decision in Sunnyvale West Neighborhood Ass’n. v. City of Sunnyvale (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1351 and with the Fifth District’s decision in Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, each of which expressly held that an EIR must include an evaluation of a project’s potential effects on the environment using a baseline consisting of the existing conditions during the period of environmental review. Consequently, there is now a clear split of authority on what constitutes a proper environmental baseline. Moreover, the Opinion clears the way for public agencies to dramatically curtail the scope of EIR’s by omitting relevant information concerning the impacts of projects on the existing environment, thereby precluding informed decision-making and informed public participation in contravention of CEQA’s mandates. Throughout California, government agencies, project proponents, EIR preparers, and the public need clarity on the baseline question, which is fundamental to the manner in which environmental analyses are conducted under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000 et seg. Review by this Court is critical to securing uniformity of decision and to settle this important question of law. 202016v7 -3- B. Adequacy of Mitigation Measures The EIR acknowledges that without mitigation, the Project will have a significant adverse impact on surrounding neighborhoods because the demand for parking will exceed the supply at several proposedstations. (Op. at 31.) To mitigate this impact, the EIR relies upon a mitigation measure that only requires Respondent and Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) to “work with the appropriate local jurisdiction and affected communities to assess the need for and specific elements of a permit parking program for the impacted neighborhoods,” and identifies several other “mitigation options” for those locations where spillover parking impacts cannot be addressed through a permit parking program, including “time-restricted, metered, or shared parking arrangements.” (Op. at 32.) However, all of the identified “options” are outside of Metro’s jurisdiction and control, and thereis no requirementthat any of these options actually be implemented. Despite the obvious uncertainty as to whether any of the remedial actions identified in this amorphous mitigation measure will ever be implemented, and despite the fact that implementation of these actions is squarely outside the jurisdiction and control of Expo Authority and Metro, the EIR nevertheless concluded that the identified mitigation measure would reduce the spillover parking impacts of the Project to a less than significant level. The published Opinion upholds this conclusion, stating that there is no reason to “assume” that the measures won’t be implemented by the affected cities simply because Expo Authority cannot require the cities to do so. (Op.at 34.) 202016v7 - 4 - The Opinion’s discussion regarding the adequacy of this and similar mitigation measures in the EIR represents a stark departure from established law, including numerous reported decisions holding that that a mitigation measure that merely states a “generalized goal” of mitigating a significant environmental effect without committing to any specific criteria or standard of performance violates CEQA by improperly deferring the formulation and adoption of enforceable measures. See, e.g., San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 670 and Communities for a Better Environment v. City ofRichmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 93. See also Federation ofHillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260 (holding that the agency’s finding that mitigation measures had been “required in, or incorporated into” the project was not supported by substantial evidence because there was “great uncertainty as to whether the mitigation measures would ever be funded or implemented” and no policy would prevent development of the project without mitigation). The Opinion also conflicts with the holding of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in a decision that is currently pending before this Court. See City of San Diego v. Trustees of the California State University, Case No. 8199557 (D057446; 201 Cal. App.4th 1134) (holding that a mitigation measure that required San Diego State University to develop a campus Transportation Demand Management program in consultation with specified regional planning agencies, but did not commit the University to take any specific mitigation measures to reduce vehicle trips or provide any objective performance 202016v7 - 5 - standards by which the success of any mitigation measures can be measured, constitutes improper deferral of mitigation). The Opinion, if allowed to stand, will significantly erode established principles of law regarding an agency’s duty to mitigate, to the extent feasible, the potential impacts of those projects they propose to approveor carry out. Review should be granted in order to clarify that a mitigation measure that merely identifies a laundry list of actions that other agencies could or should take, but does not actually require that any of the actions be incorporated into the project or otherwise required as conditions of approval, constitutes improper deferral and cannot support a finding that the impact will be reduced to a level of insignificance. HI. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 12, 2007, the Expo Authority issued a Notice of Preparation (“NOP”) announcingits intent to prepare an EIR for the Project, known as the Exposition Corridor Transit Project Phase 2 (“Expo Phase 2”), thereby initiating the Project’s environmental review period. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 156, 20839. On January 28, 2009, Expo released a draft EIR for the Project, which described and evaluated six project alternatives, including four light rail alternatives with slightly different alignments, each beginning in Culver City and ending in downtown Santa Monica. (Op. at 5.) The Project, identified as Light Rail Transit (“LRT”) Alternative 2, included four consecutive at-grade(i.e., surface) crossings of major north/south thoroughfares, from and including Overland Avenue, Westwood Boulevard, Military Avenue, and 202016v7 - 6 - Sepulveda Boulevard. Light rail trains would pass throughtheat- grade crossings of these major north/south streets 280 times per day (one train every 2 2 minutes during peak periods), thereby severely impeding the flow of automobile traffic on already congestedstreets. ARat 21, 368, 382, 38388. During the public commentperiod, the Expo Authority received thousands of comments from public agencies, individuals, homeowners’ associations, and businesses regarding the potential traffic and other impacts of the Project, including the Project’s impacts on public safety. For example, the City of Los Angeles Department of Transportation, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and others expressed concerns regarding the potential safety hazards associated with the at-grade Overland Avenuecrossing, which is immediately adjacent to an elementary school. AR at 1181- 1192, 1265-1271, 1764-1767. On February 4, 2010, the Expo Board certified the final EIR and approved the Project. (Op. at 6-7.) The EIR described the physical conditionsin the vicinity of the Project as they existed at the time of environmental review. However,the EIR did not use the existing conditions as the baseline for evaluating the Project’s potential traffic and air quality impacts. Rather, the EIR measured the Project’s traffic and air quality impacts only against a long-range forecast of future conditions in the year 2030. AR at 242, 346-347, 505-510, 1057, 10722, 10737. The EIR and the Expo Authority assumedthat the Project would be completed and operational by 2015. AR at 1063, 1130, 1307, 4017, 14956, 28926. Thus, the EIR 202016v7 - 7 - failed to evaluate or discussthe traffic and air quality impacts of the Project for the first fifteen years of its operation. In its findings, the Expo Board further acknowledged that the EIR used only “future” (rather than existing) baseline conditions in assessing thetraffic and air quality impacts: For most of the environmental topics in the FEIR and in these Findings, the Authority finds that existing environmental conditions are the appropriate baseline condition for the purpose of determining whether an impact is significant. However, the Authority ... is electing to utilize the future baseline conditions for the purposes of determining the significance of impacts to traffic and air quality. AR at 17 (emphasis added). The EIR concluded that the Project would have “significant and unavoidable” impacts on aesthetics and air quality (during construction). In all other respects, the final EIR concluded that the Project’s potential impacts would either be less than significant or would be reducedto a “less than significant” level by implementing specified mitigation measures. For example, the EIR concludesthat without mitigation, the Project would havea significant impact on the existing parking supply because the demandfor parking “will exceed the proposed supply at several stations, potentially resulting in some parking intrusion into adjacent neighborhoods.” (Op.at 31.) However, the EIR further concludesthat the impacts associated with station spillover parking would be reducedto a less than significant level by adopting a mitigation measure that requires Metro to “work with the appropriate local jurisdiction and affected communities” on 202016v7 - 8 - the elements of a permit parking program for the impacted neighborhoods. (Op.at 32.) Petitioner Neighbors For Smart Rail (“NFSR”), a non-profit corporation comprised of a coalition of community residents, organizations and other interested persons,filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the adequacy of the EIR under CEQA. Judgment was entered denying the petition on March 4, 2011. 3 Joint Appendix (“JA”) 0745-746. NFSR subsequently appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District (the “Court of Appeal”). 3 JA 0806-809. On April 17, 2012, the Court of Appealfiled its opinion affirming the trial court’s decision. A copy of the Opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.” The Opinion wasoriginally certified for publication with the exceptionofparts 3 through 8 of the Discussion (parts 1 and 2 of the Discussion concerned the standard of review andthe baseline issue). On May7, 2012, Metro submitted a letter requesting publication of parts 5 (cumulative traffic impacts), 6 (adequacy of mitigation measures), 7 (project alternatives), and 8 (recirculation). A copy of this request is attached hereto as Exhibit “B.” On May 9, 2012, the Court of Appeal granted Metro’s request. A copy of the Court of Appeal’s publication order is attached hereto as Exhibit “C.” A petition for rehearing wasnotfiled. 202016v7 -9- IV. DISCUSSION A. Review Should Be Granted to Settle an Important Question of Law Regarding the Proper Baseline for Environmental Review Under CEQAandto Secure Uniformity of Decision on the Baseline Question “An EIR must include a description of the physical environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time the notice ofpreparation is published, from both a local and regional perspective.” Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a). (Emphasis added.) These existing conditions “will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a Lead Agency determines whether an impactis significant.” Jd. See also Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a). In the absence of an accurate baseline, “the goals of CEQA are thwarted and a prejudicial abuse of discretion has occurred.” Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 128. See also Citizens for East Shore Parks v. California State Lands Comm, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 557 (“[A]n inappropriate baseline may skew the environmental analysis flowing from it, resulting in an EIR thatfails to comply with CEQA.”). This Court recently affirmed that an EJR must analyze a project’s impacts in comparison to actual physical conditions existing in the area affected by the project at the time of analysis. Specifically, in Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management District (2010) 48 Cal. 4th 310 (“CBE”), this Court held that the South Coast Air Quality ManagementDistrict (the “District’’) violated CEQA whenit analyzed the impacts of a proposed refinery project by erroneously comparing the increased air emissions from the 2020167 - 10 - project to maximum capacity limits allowed under previously issued permits, rather than existing conditions. “By comparing the proposed project to what could happen, rather than to what was actually happening,” the District utilized “hypothetical” conditions as its ceebaseline, resulting in “‘illusory’ comparisons that ‘can only mislead the public to the reality of the impacts and subvert full consideration of the actual environmental impacts’” of the project. Jd. at 322 (emphasis in the original). In CBE, this Court described the limited circumstances under which agencies may deviate from the “normal” practice, pursuant to CEQA Guidelines section 15125, subd. (a), of utilizing existing environmental conditions “at the time the notice of preparation [of an EIR] is published”as the baseline, as follows: In some circumstances, peak impacts or recurring periods of resource scarcity may be as important environmentally as average conditions. Where environmental conditions are expected to change quickly during the period of environmental review for reasons other than the proposed project, project effects might reasonably be compared to predicted conditions at the expected date of approval, rather than to conditions at the time analysis is begun. [citation omitted.] A temporary lull or spike in Operations that happens to occur at the time environmental review for a new project begins should not depress or elevate the baseline; overreliance on short- term activity averages might encourage companies to temporarily increase operations artificially, simply in order to establish a higher baseline. CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 328 (emphasis added). Thus, while recognizing that lead agencies have some discretion to determine the baseline, this Court indicated that the 202016v7 - 11 - baseline must be the existing conditions during the “period of environmental review” (i.e, no later than the date of EIR certification). However, this Court did not address the question that is squarely presented here: whether a lead agency is required to evaluate a project’s potential traffic and other impacts using a baseline consisting of the existing physical conditions in the affected area during the period of environmental review, or may instead elect to only evaluate a project’s impacts against projected future conditions beyondthe period of environmental review. 1. The Opinion Directly Conflicts With Recent Decisions Issued by the Fifth and Sixth Appellate Districts Citing this Court’s decision in CBE, the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District recently rejected the use of projected future conditions as the sole baseline for evaluating the potential traffic impacts of a project in Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 1351. In Sunnyvale, an EIR was prepared for a public infrastructure improvement project using projected traffic conditions in the year 2020 as the environmental baseline, rather than the existing conditions during the period of environmental review, on the theory that this methodology offered “the most accurate and informative portrayal” of the impacts of the project. Jd. at 1358. The City of Sunnyvale used a projected 2020 baseline because, it was assumed, the proposed street extension would “not be complete and in use” until that date. Jd. at 1359. The Sunnyvale Court held that the City’s use of a future baseline was improper, even if supported by substantial evidence, stating that “nothing in the law authorizes environmental impacts to be evaluated 202016v7 - 12 - only against predicted conditions more than a decade after EIR certification and project approval.” Jd. at 1380 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that “[w]e do not construe the word “normally,” as used in Guidelines section 15125, subdivision (a)...to mean that a lead agency hascarte blancheto select the conditions on somefuture, post-approval date as the ‘baseline’ so long as it acts reasonably as shown by substantial evidence.” Jd. at 1379. Building on CBE and Sunnyvale, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently held in Madera Oversight Coalition, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 48 that an EIR for a mixed-use project did not comply with CEQA because the Court was unable to determine with certainty that the EIR had used existing (as opposed to future predicted) conditions as the baseline for determining the significance of the project’s potential traffic impacts. In Madera, the Court specifically held as follows: We adopt the following legal conclusions based on the precedent established by Sunnyvale: (a) A baseline used in an EIR mustreflect existing physical conditions; (b) lead agencies do not have the discretion to adopt a baseline that uses conditions predicted to occur on a date subsequent to the certification of the EIR; and (c) lead agencies do have the discretion to select a period or point in time for determining existing physical conditions other than the two points specified in subdivision (a) of Guidelines section 15125, so long as the period or point selected predates the certification of the EIR. Id. at 90. The Madera Court rejected the county’s argument that the Sunnyvale decision went too far in limiting the lead agency’s discretion, finding “the extensive analysis undertaken by the 202016v7 ~ 13 - Sunnyvale court to be persuasive.” Id. at 89. The Madera Court also made the following important observation: The proper interpretation of Guidelines section 15125, subdivision (a) requires an examination of what is implied by the use of the term “normally” as well as consideration of the meaning of the term “exist.” The term “exist” is especially important because it was used by the Legislature in CEQA itself. (E.g., §§ 21060.5 [“environment” defined as the physical conditions that exist within the affected area], 21151, subd. (B) [when preparing an EIR, “any significant effect on the environmentshall be limited to substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse changes in physical conditions which exist within the area’’], italics added.) A regulation must be “consistent and not in conflict with the statute” to be valid. (Gov’t. Code, § 11342.2.). Id at 89.(italics in original; underline added). In this case, the EIR did not use “existing” conditions as the baseline for evaluating the Project’s impacts on traffic and air quality. Instead, Expo Authority “elected” to use only predicted “future” conditions in the year 2030 as the baseline for analyzing these impacts, thereby ignoring the potential traffic and air quality impacts of the Project for the first 15 years of its operation. The selected 2030 baseline year clearly falls outside the “period of environmental review” in this case (i.e, from the issuance of the Notice of Preparation in 2007 to EIR certification in 2010), and bears no relationship to the date on which Project is expected to commence operations. In its published Opinion, the Second District expressly disagrees with Sunnyvale and Madera and upholds the EIR’s use of projected future (2030) conditions as the sole baseline for evaluating 202016v7 - 14 - the Project’s impact on traffic and air quality. (Op. at 4, 15-16.) The Court of Appeal explained its reasoning as follows: Weagree with the Expo Authority and amici curiae that, in a proper case, and when supported by substantial evidence, use of projected conditions may be an appropriate way to measure the environmental impacts that a project will have on traffic, air quality and greenhouse gas emissions. As a major transportation infrastructure project that will not even begin to operate until 2015 at the earliest, its impact on presently existing traffic and air quality conditions will yield no practical information to decision makers or the public. An analysis of the environmental impact or the project on conditions existing in 2009, when the final EIR was issued (or at any time from 2007 to 2010), would only enable decision makers and the public to consider the impactof the rail line if it were here today. Many people who live in neighborhoods near the proposed light rail line may wish things would stay the same, but no one can stop change. Thetraffic and air quality conditions of 2009 will no longer exist (with or without the project) when the project is expected to come on line in 2015 or over the course of the 20-year planning horizon for the project. An analysis of the project’s impacts on anachronistic 2009 traffic and air quality conditions would rest on the false hypothesis that everything will be the same 20 years later. Op. at 14-15 (emphasisin original). As acknowledged by the Second District, the Opinion is directly contrary to the holdings of the Sixth District in Sunnyvale and the Fifth District in Madera. Consequently, there is now clearsplit of authority among the Courts of Appeal on the issue of whether an agency may omit any evaluation of the potential impacts of a project against existing conditions and instead evaluate the impacts only 202016v7 - 15 - against projected future conditions, so long as those projections are supported by substantial evidence. As this Court observed in CBE, “[t]o decide whether a given project’s environmentaleffects are likely to be significant, the agency must use some measure of the environment’s state absent the project, a measure sometimesreferred to as the ‘baseline’ for environmental analysis.” CBE, supra, 48 Cal. 4th at 315. See also Remyet al., Guide to the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (11th ed. 2006) p. 198 (although neither CEQA nor the Guidelines define the term 99 66“baseline,” “as a conceptual matter, the determination of whether impacts are ‘significant’ requires a ‘baseline’ set of environmental conditions against which to compare a project’s anticipated impacts.”). With the publication of the Opinion, there is now great uncertainty among public agencies, EIR preparers, and project sponsors across the State regarding this most fundamental aspect of the environmental review process. Review by this Court is necessary to provide much-needed guidance regarding the limits of an agency’s discretion to deviate from the “normal” baseline for environmental review. 2. The Opinion Misconstrues CEQA’s Mandates In addition to being a stark departure from established precedent, the Opinion reflects flawed reasoning and is contrary to the provisions and intent of CEQAin several important respects. First, as noted by the Court in Madera, CEQAitself defines the term “environment” to mean “the physical conditions which exist within the area which will be affected by a proposed project ....” Pub. Resources Code, § 21060.5. Moreover, CEQA expressly requires 202016v7 - 16 = that an EIR discuss the “substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse changes in physical conditions which exist within the area as defined in Section 21060.5.” Pub. Resources Code, § 21151, subd. (b). See also Pub. Resources Code, § 21068 (“‘Significant effect on the environment’ means a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment.”). Although CEQA doesnot define the term “exist,” it is generally understood to mean something having “real being.” See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (1 0th ed., 1998). “Future,” on the other hand, is understood to mean something “that is to be.” Jbid. Thus, by assessing the impacts of the Project only against projected future conditions, Expo Authority did not evaluate the Project’s traffic and air quality impacts on the “environment” as required by CEQA. Rather, Expo Authority considered only those changes to environmental conditions that are predicted to happen two decadesin the future. The Opinion does not attempt to explain how thestatutory term “existing” can be reasonably construed to mean “future” in this or any other case. More importantly, the Opinion overlooks the fact that by relying solely on a comparison of two future scenarios(i.e., predicted conditions in 2030 with and without the Project), the EIR in this case omits any consideration of the “relevant change,” which “is identified by comparing existing physical conditions with the physical conditions that are predicted to exist at a later point in time, after the proposed activity has been implemented.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 289 (emphasis added), See also San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at 658 (baseline for proposed expansion of a mining operation must be 202016v7 - 17 - the “realized physical conditions on the ground ...”); Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 693 (effects of office and shopping center development must be compared to the current undeveloped condition of the property, rather than to an office park that could be developed under existing zoning); Citizens for East Shore Parks, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 558 (“[T]o afford meaningful environmental review of a proposed project’s impact, a CEQA baseline must reflect ‘the ‘existing physical conditions in the affected area’ [citation], that is the ‘real conditions on the ground’[citation] ...”’). Second, the Opinion rests on the flawed premise that the Project’s impact “on presently existing traffic and air quality conditions will yield no practical information to decision makers or the public.” (Op. at 15.) On the contrary, by relying on a comparison of two future (2030) scenarios, the EIR omits any consideration of possible traffic and air quality impacts of the Project during the 15 year period following the commencement of operations. See Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a) (“Direct and indirect significant effects of the project on the environment shall be clearly identified and described, giving due consideration to both the short-term and long-term effects.”) For example, in this case, NFSR demonstrated that, based on information contained in the EIR, the level of service (“LOS”) at several street intersections along the Project alignment could potentially fall from an acceptable LOS of A through D to an unacceptable LOS of E or F during the first 15 years of Project operations ~ a potential significant impact that the EIR did not even consider. Respondents argued below that such impacts are not likely 202016v? -18- to occur, but did not — and cannot -— show where this issue is even discussed in the EIR. 2 JA 466-469. As this Court observed in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 412, 443, the “audience to whom an EIR must communicate is not the reviewing Court but the public and the governmentofficials deciding on the project.” In this case, it is undisputed that, by relying solely on a 2030 baseline, the EIR did not evaluate or discuss the Project’s potential impacts on nearby street intersections from 2015 to 2030. See Santiago County Water Dist. v. County of Orange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818, 829 (“[T]he ultimate decision of whether to approve a project, be that decision right or wrong, is a nullity if based upon an EIR that does not provide the decision-makers, and the public with the information about the project that is required by CEQA.”). Third, the Opinion suggests that in order to evaluate the environmental impacts of a “major transportation infrastructure project,” predicted future conditions must be used as the baseline and that use of existing conditions would be improper. (Op. at 15.) However, this rationale presents a false choice. It is not uncommon (or particularly difficult) for an EIR to evaluate certain impacts of a project using both existing conditions and projected future conditions as a baseline. See Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1571-1572 (upholding an EIR that used multiple baselines, including both existing conditions and future conditions, in its analysis of the project’s traffic impacts). Furthermore, as the Sixth District observed in Sunnyvale, just because an EIR must include an evaluation of the impacts of the project using existing conditions as 202016v7 ~1]9- the baseline does not mean “that discussions of the foreseeable changes and expected future conditions have no place in an EIR.” Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 1381. Specifically, in addition to evaluating “project specific” impacts, an EIR must separately discuss the potential cumulative impacts of a project “when the project’s incremental effect is cumulatively considerable,” which “means that the incremental effects of an individual project are significant when viewed in connection with the effects of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects of probable future projects.” Guidelines, §§ 15130, subd. (a) and 15065, subd. (a)(3). This discussion, which must include eithera list of past, present, and “probable future projects” producing related or cumulative impacts, or a “summary of projections contained in an adopted general plan or related planning document...,” must necessarily consider future conditions. Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b)(1). Moreover, in evaluating the required “no project” alternative, an EJR must discuss the existing conditions “as well as what would be reasonably expected to occur in the foreseeable future in the project were not approved, based on current plans and consistent with available infrastructure and community services.” Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (e)(3)(C). See also Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (e) (“Where a proposed project is compared with an adopted plan, the analysis shall examine the existing physical conditions ... as well as the potential future conditions discussed in the plan.”). Thus, requiring an EIR to evaluate the impacts of a project using existing conditions does not mean that future conditions will be overlooked. On the other hand, omitting any evaluation of the impacts of a project 2020 16v7 - 20 - as comparedto existing conditions during the period of environmental review would effectively conflate CEQA’s requirement for separate analyses of project-specific impacts, cumulative impacts, and the “no project”alternative into one — which is precisely what occurredinthis case. Fourth, by effectively relieving agencies of the duty to evaluate a project’s impacts on the physical conditions which “exist” within the area which will be affected by a proposed project (Pub. Resources Code, § 21060.5), the Opinion allows agencies to evaluate a Project’s potential impacts entirely within the abstract confines of long range forecasts, which are subject to substantial error over time and can be easily manipulated by “experts” to support a desired conclusion. Although projections of future conditions may provide a useful analytical tool, they are inherently less reliable than existing conditions, which can be directly observed and measured during the period of environmental review. Thus, for example, while existing traffic conditions at street intersections can be independently verified with traffic counts, projected future traffic conditions—which cannot be verified——provide fodder for the inevitable “battle of the experts.” Finally, the Opinion conflicts with the Legislature’s intent that CEQA “be interpreted in such manneras to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.” Friends of Mammoth vy. Bd. of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259. Specifically, by allowing lead agencies to use projected future conditions as the sole baseline for environmental analysis, the potential short- and medium-term impacts of projects will be ignored. As such, the Opinion interprets CEQA in a manner 202016v7 - 21 - that will limit the CEQA’s effectiveness in protecting the environment. B. Review Should Be Grantedto Clarify that a Mitigation Measure that Merely Identifies Actions that Could Be Taken By Other Public Agencies Without Actually Requiring the Implementation of Anyof the Identified Actions, Constitutes Improper Deferral and Does Not, Standing Alone, Support a Finding that the Impact Will Be Reduced to a Less that Significant Level “Each public agency shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environmentofprojects that it carries out or approves wheneverit is feasible to do so.” Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b). In order to achieve this goal, lead agencies “shall provide that measures to mitigate or avoid significant effect on the environmentare fully enforceable through permit conditions, agreements, or other measures,” and must adopt a monitoring program to ensure that the mitigation measures are implemented. Pub. Resources Code, § 21081.6. As aptly noted by the Court in Federation ofHillside & Canyon Associations, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at 1261 (emphasis in original): “The purpose ofthese requirements is to ensure thatfeasible mitigation measures will actually be implemented as a condition ofdevelopment, and not merely adopted and then neglected or disregarded.” Here, the EIR acknowledged that without mitigation, the Project could have a significant adverse impact because “demand for parking will exceed the proposed supply at several stations, resulting in some parking intrusion into adjacent neighborhoods.” ARat 178-9, 413. For example, the Expo/Westwoodstation is expected to have 202016v7 -22- over 5,000 daily boardings, yet no off-street parking spaces will be providedat the station. AR at 412, 414. To mitigate this potentially significant impact, the EIR relies upon mitigation measure MM TR-4, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: In the quarter mile area surrounding each station where spillover parking is anticipated, a program shall be established to monitor the on-street parking activity in the area prior to the opening of service .... If a parking shortage is determined to have occurred ... due to the parking activity of the LRT patrons, Metro shall work with the appropriate local jurisdiction and affected communities to assess the need for and specific elements of a permit parking program for the impacted neighborhoods. _... Metro shall reimburse the local jurisdictions for the costs associated with developing the local permit parking programs ..... Metro will not be responsible for the costs of permits for residents desiring to park on the streets in the permit districts. For those locations where station spillover parking cannot be addressed through the implementation of a permit parking program,alternative mitigation options include time-restricted, metered, or shared parking arrangements. Metro will work with the local jurisdictions to determine which option(s) to implement. ARat 413-414 (emphasis added). In reliance on this measure, the EIR concludes, and Expo Authority found, that the station-area spillover parking impacts would be “less than significant.” AR at 54, 413-414. NFSRchallenged Expo Authority’s finding on the groundthat MM-TR4 was inadequate as a matter of law. Specifically, NFSR argued that only requiring Metro to “work with” local agencies and affected communities to “assess” the need for a permit parking program provides absolutely no assurance that any such program will 202016v7 ~ 23 - ever be formedorthat the impacts will ever be mitigated.’ NFSR further argued that MM-TR4 constitutes improper deferral of mitigation andis legally inadequate becauseall ofthe actions identified in MM TR-4, including the specified “back up” options (i.e., time-restricted, metered, or shared parking), must be approved and/or implemented by other public agencies, and are therefore beyond Expo Authority’s control. In other words, “working with”is fundamentally different than “doing.” See Federation ofHillside & Canyon Associations, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at 1260-62 (holding that traffic mitigation measures identified in an EIR for a general plan amendmentdid not comply with CEQA because they were not “incorporated into the project or required as a condition of project approval in a mannerthat will ensure their implementation”); San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, supra, 149 Cal.App. at 670 (mitigation measure that merely states a “generalized goal” to mitigate a significant effect without committing to any specific criteria or standard of performance violates CEQA); Communities, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 93 (mitigation plan that merely proposes a generalized goal of no net increase in greenhouse gas emissions and then sets out a handful of cursorily described mitigation measures for future considerationis deficient). The Opinion rejects NFSR’s arguments and concludes that MM TR-4 is adequate to support a finding that the Project’s spillover > Indeed, in the City of Los Angeles, such programs notonly require the approval the City Council, but also an affirmative vote of the majority of residents in the affected area. 2020167 -24.- parking impacts will be mitigated to a less than significant level. (Op. at 33-34.) In support of this conclusion, the Opinion states as follows: Nor do we accept the claim that the measure is inadequate for lack of “assurance” that permit parking programs will be formed and effective in preventing spillover parking. The mitigation measure sets forth a specific performance standard — monitoring parking activity to determine if LRT activity increases parking utilization to 100 percent — and if it does, Metro undertakes to work with local jurisdictions, to follow their guidelines for permit parking programs, and to reimburse their costs. ... We will not assume, as petitioner implicitly suggests, that simply because Expo Authority cannotrequire a local jurisdiction to adopt a permitprogram, the mitigation measure is inadequate. Ibid (emphasis added). Notably, while the Opinion declines to “assume” that MM-TR4 is inadequate,it offers no explanation as to how MM-TR4 meets the standards discussedin the authorities cited above. Even if a program to “monitor the on-street parking activity” could somehow be construed as a “performance standard,” nothing in MM-TR4requires the eventual achievementof any particular standard. Moreover, the Opinion fails to confront the fundamental underlying problem. Specifically, when parking utilization reaches 100 percent, Expo Authority lacks the legal authority to implement a parking permit program or any ofthe other actions identified in MM-TR4,and there is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the relevant local jurisdictions could and would implement such measures. Where a project may have environmental impacts “for which mitigation is known to be feasible, the EIR may give a lead agency a choice of which measuresto adopt, so long as the measuresare 202016v7 - 25 - coupled with specific and mandatory performance standards to ensure that the measures, as implemented,will be effective.” Communities, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 94. For example, in Sacramento Old City Ass'n. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1028-1029, the Court upheld an EIR that set forth a range of mitigation measuresto offset a project’s significant traffic impacts where performance criteria would have to be met, even though the EIR did not specify which measure had to be adopted by the city. However, in Sacramento Old City, each of the measuresidentified in the EIR were within the City’s power to implement. In contrast, the measures identified in MM-TR4are outside Expo Authority’s jurisdiction and control, and there is no actual requirementthat any of these measures be implemented by the relevantlocal jurisdictions.‘ To the extent feasible, lead agencies must mitigate the significant impacts of those projects that they decide to carry out. * The deficiencies in MM-TR4arealso present in mitigation measure MM SAF-1, which wasadopted to mitigate the Project’s potential impacts on public safety. Specifically, the EIR acknowledgesthat the Project could impede emergency responder’s accessto residential neighborhoods,but asserts that these impacts would be reduced to level of insignificance by implementing MM SAF-1, which requires that Metro “coordinate” with the affected cities, “inform” them of Metro’s emergency response procedures, “provide a detailed description” of its emergency response proceduresso as to provide such agencies with “knowledge” of Metro’s response plan, and “encourage”the cities to update their procedures to address implementation of an LRT Alternative. (AR at 726-7.) Of course, neither Metro nor Expo Authority has any power to compelthe affected cities to update their response procedures(e.g., Fire Departmentresponse times), and there is no actual requirementthat cities’ response procedures be updated. 202016v7 - 26 - This requires the adoption of enforceable measures whose implementation will actually result in the mitigation of impacts, rather than solely relying on the mere possibility that a different agency may mitigate the identified impact. The Opinionis the first reported case upholding a mitigation measurethat relies entirely on actions that the lead agency has no power to implement. Assuch,it represents a significant departure from established law, and provides a roadmapfor lead agenciesto evade their mitigation duties under CEQAbysimply shifting them to other agencies. Review should be grantedin orderto clarify that CEQArequires lead agencies to do more than simply establish a “‘to do”list for other agencies.” Vv. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, this Court should grant review in order to resolve important questions of law concerning the appropriate ° Withoutelaboration, the Opinion cites Pub. Resources Code § 21081 and Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(2), which provide that an agency may find that changesthat will avoid or lessen a significant environmental effect “are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency”and “can and should be adopted by such other agency.” (Op. at 30, 34.) However, Expo Authority did not makethis finding in this case. Rather, Expo Authority made the finding specified in Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(1) (‘Changesoralterations have been requiredin, or incorporated into, the project which avoid or substantially lessen the significant environmental effect as identified in the final EIR”.). (AR at 54-55.) Moreover, even if Expo Authority had madethe finding set forth in Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(2), such a finding would not support the EIR’s conclusion that MM-TR4 will mitigate the Project’s potential spillover parking impactsto a less than significant level, because there is no assurance that other agencies would in fact implement any of the identified measures. 202016v7 ~ 27 - baseline for environmental review under CEQAand the adequacy of mitigation measures, and to secure uniformity of decision on the “baseline” issue. DATED: May 25, 2012 202016v7 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP John M. Bowman Attorney for Neighbors for Smart Rail, Plaintiff and Appellants - 28 - CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.504(d)(1)) This Petition for Review contains 7,617 words as counted by the Microsoft Word version 2007 word processing program used to generate the petition. DATED: May25, 2012 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP JOHN M. BOWMAN Attorneys for Neighbors For Smart Rail, Petitioner and Appellant 202016v7 - 29 - Filed 4/17/2012 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION® IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL - SECOND DIST. DIVISION EIGHT EF I L E D Apr 17, 2012 NEIGHBORSFOR SMARTRAIL, B232655 JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk B. FISHER Deputy Clerk Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS 125233) v. EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITYet al., Defendants and Respondents; LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITYetal., Real Parties inInterest. APPEALfrom a judgmentof the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. Thomas I. McKnew,Jr., Judge. Affirmed. Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside, John M. Bowmanand C.J. Laffer for Plaintiff and Appellant. * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, this opinionis certified for publication with the exception of parts 3 through 8 of the Discussion. NOSSAMAN,Robert D. Thornton, John J. Flynn III, Robert C. Horton, Lauren C. Valk and Lloyd W. Pellman for Defendants and Respondents Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority and Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority Board. Andrea S. Ordin, County Counsel, and Ronald W. Stamm,Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Board. Remy, Thomas, Moose and Manley, Tiffany K. Wright; Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart and Bradley R. Hogin for Southern California Association of Governments, Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency, San Joaquin Hills Transportation Corridor Agency, Metropolitan Water District, San Joaquin Council of Governments, Madera County Transportation Commission, Riverside County Transportation Commission, Contra Costa Transportation Authority, Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority, Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, Orange County Transportation Authority, and San Francisco County Transportation Authority as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents and Real Parties in Interest. Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Michael H. Zischke, Andrew B. Sabey and Rachel R. Jones for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents and Real Parties in Interest. Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Andrew J. Nocas, Supervising City Attorney, Timothy McWilliams and Siegmund Shyu, Deputy City Attorneys, for City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondents and Real Parties in Interest. SUMMARY This appeal arises under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.)! and involves the second phase of the construction of a light rail line along the Exposition Corridor connecting downtown Los Angeles with Santa Monica. The first phase, approved in 2005, will run from downtown Los Angeles to Culver City. The second phase (the project or Expo Phase 2) consists of the proposed construction of 6.6 miles of light rail line from the terminusofthe first phase in Culver City to Santa Monica. On February 4, 2010, the Board of the Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (the Expo Authority) approved the project and certified as adequate and complete a final environmental impact report (EIR) for the project.” CEQAdescribes the EIR as an informational document. Its purpose is to provide public agencies, and the public, with detailed information about the effect a proposed project is likely to have on the environment;to list ways in whichthe significant effects of a project might be minimized; and to identify alternatives to a project. (§ 21061.) Neighbors for Smart Rail (petitioner), a nonprofit California corporation comprised of a coalition of homeowners’ associations, community groups and unaffiliated citizens, sought a writ of mandate. Petitioner asked thetrial court to order the Expo Authority to vacate and set aside its approval of the EIR and other project approvals. Thetrial court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the Expo Authority used an improper baseline for analyzing the impacts of the project on traffic, air quality and greenhouse gas emissions. Petitioner contends the Expo Authority improperly evaluated the significance of those 1 All statutory references are to the Public Resources Code unless otherwise specified. 2 The Expo Authority was created by statute in 2003 for the purpose of awarding and overseeing final design and construction contracts for completion of the light rail project from downtown Los Angeles to Santa Monica. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 132600, 132605.) The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) and its Board are real parties in interest. environmental impacts using baseline conditions in 2030. According to petitioner, the Expo Authority should have used baseline conditions that existed sometime between 2007, when the notice of preparation of the Expo Phase 2 project wasfiled, and 2010, when the Expo Authority certified the final EIR. The use of hypothetical future conditions as the baseline for analyzing the environmental impacts of the project, petitioner argues, violates CEQA,as held in Sunnyvale West Neighborhood Assn. v. City ofSunnyvale City Council (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1382-1383 Sunnyvale) and Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County ofMadera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 90 (Madera). Petitioner also contends the EIR was inadequate on several other grounds, arguing (1) the traffic analysis failed to address potential traffic impacts on Sepulveda Boulevard, whichservesas a de facto alternative route whentraffic is particularly bad on the Interstate 405 Freeway (1-405); (2) the analysis of growth-inducing impacts did not discuss the potential impacts of concentrating new development around the planned transit stations; (3) the analysis of cumulative traffic impacts did not consider the localized traffic impacts of related projects, in particular the Casden Project, a probable future mixed-use project adjacent to the proposed Sepulvedatransit station; (4) mitigation measures were inadequate (and improperly deferred) to reduce adverse impacts related to parking, noise and vibration, safety and construction; and (5) the EIR failed to adequately evaluate grade separation as a design alternative to at-grade crossings between Overland Avenue and Sepulveda Boulevard. Finally, petitioner contends the Expo Authority made “major changes”after circulation of the draft EIR, but failed to recirculate the EIR and permit additional comment, as is required when significant new information is added to an environmental impact report after notice and public comment but before certification. Wefind no merit in petitioner’s contentions and affirm the judgment. Because we disagree with Sunnyvale and Madera, and hold that use of projected future conditions as a baseline for analyzing environmental impacts is proper in this case, we publish that portion of our opinion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The project under review is called the Exposition Corridor Transit Project Phase 2, referred to in the EIR as “Expo Phase 2.” Its purpose is to extend high-capacity, high- frequency transit service from the Expo Phase 1 terminus at the Venice/Robertson Station in Culver City to Santa Monica. After various preliminary procedures, including a public “scoping”period during which the Expo Authority received and considered over 1,800 comments from public agencies and individuals concerning the project design and proposedalternatives, the Expo Authority circulated a draft EIR. The draft EIR included six alternatives: a “No- Build”alternative, consisting of the existing transit services plus improvements “explicitly committed to be constructed by the year 2030” as defined in the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)Regional Transportation Plan; a “Transportation System Management”alternative, involving the addition of a rapid bus route connecting downtown Culver City with downtown Santa Monica, with associated service improvements on selected routes; and four light rail transit (LRT) alignments,all beginning at the terminus of Expo Phase 1 and ending in downtown Santa Monica near the intersection of 4th Street and Colorado Avenue. The four LRT alignments were further broken down into segments for purposes of environmental analysis. Segment 1 of two of the LRT alignments included four consecutive at-grade (street level) crossings, where the proposed LRTline crosses Overland Avenue, Westwood Boulevard, Military Avenue, and Sepulveda Boulevard, as well as an at-grade station and a 170-space parking lot within the right-of-way east of Westwood Boulevard. The draft EIR also discussed several alternatives that were rejected by the Expo Authority; none of them included grade-separated crossings in Segment1. The Expo Authority received almost 9,000 written and oral comments onthe draft EIR. In response to the comments, the Expo Authority undertook more technical and environmental analyses, as well as agency coordination and community outreach. These additional efforts resulted in changes to the LRT alternatives and new design optionsthat were included in the final EIR. The changes to the LRT alternatives included a grade-separated (elevated) crossing at Centinela Avenue,a third northbound lane on Sepulveda Boulevard, and the redistribution of parking from the Colorado/4th Street station to nearby City of Santa Monicapublic parking facilities. The new design options included, among others, a grade-separated (elevated) crossing at Sepulveda Boulevard, elimination of parking at the Expo/Westwoodstation, and an alternative layout for the maintenancefacility that created additional space between the facility and a nearby residentialarea. The Expo Authority also further analyzed the Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard grade crossings in coordination with the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT), and confirmedthat those crossings would operate safely at grade, with effects mitigated to a less than significant level. (The final EIR described two design options for grade separation (a trench under Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard and an aerial structure) at those crossings, but concluded that grade separation at those locations “would not be needed to mitigate significant impacts, and if anything, would generate other environmental impacts,” and did not evaluate either of those design options.) Thefinal EIR, including the changes just described, was circulated on December 21, 2009, identifying LRT Alternative 2 as the preferred alternative for the project. LRT Alternative 2 follows the existing, Metro-ownedrailroad right-of-way knownasthe Exposition Corridor right-of-way (part of which runs adjacent to Cheviot Hills) from the Expo Phase 1 terminus in Culver City to the Sepulveda Boulevard intersection. The route continues along the Exposition Corridor right-of-wayto its intersection with Olympic Boulevard, and follows the right-of-way to west of 19th Street in Santa Monica, whereit diverges onto Colorado Avenueeast of 17th Street and continues along the center of Colorado Avenue, terminating between 4th and 5th Streets. On February 4, 2010, after a public hearing, the Expo Authoritycertified the final EIR and approved the Expo Phase 2 project, adopting LRT Alternative 2 with 6 modifications. The Expo Authority adopted detailed findings of fact, a statement of overriding considerations, and a mitigation monitoring and reporting program. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate invalidating the Expo Authority’s certification of the EIR andsetting aside the approval of the Expo Phase 2 project. Judgment was entered denying the petition for a writ of mandate on March 4, 2011, and this appeal followed. The relevant details of the EIR will be set out in the course of our discussion. DISCUSSION Wefirst describe the settled principles guiding our review in CEQAcases, and then addressin turn each ofthe challenges petitioner interposes to the adequacyof the final EIR. 1. CEQAPrinciples and the Standard of Review A comprehensive discussion of CEQA and the purposes and role of an EIR appears in Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University ofCalifornia (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390-393 (Laurel Heights I). The Legislature intended CEQAto be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope ofthe statutory language. (Laurel Heights I, at p. 390.) Before approving a project, the lead agency—here, the Expo Authority—mustfind either that the project’s significant environmental effects identified in the EIR have been avoided or mitigated, or that unmitigated effects are outweighed by the project’s benefits. (/d. at p. 391, citing §§ 21002, 21002.1 & 21081.) The EIR has been described as “ ‘the heart of CEQA,’ ”an“ ‘environmental “alarm bell,” ’ ” and a “document of accountability.” (Laurel Heights I, at p. 392.) “If CEQAis scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on whichits responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally significant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees.” (/bid.) In an action to set aside an agency’s decision under CEQA,the court’s inquiry extends only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs if the agency has not proceeded in a mannerrequired by law,orif its decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The court passes only upon the EIR’s sufficiency as an informative document, not upon the correctness of its environmental conclusions. (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.) CEQA Guidelines, which implementthe provisions of CEQA,define “substantial evidence” as “enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be madeto support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached.” (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).)> Laurel Heights I cautions that a court may notset aside an agency’s approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable. (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 393.) CEQA’s purposeis to compel government to make decisions with environmental consequences in mind, but CEQA “ “does not, indeed cannot, guarantee that these decisions will always be those which favor environmental considerations.’ ” (Laurel Heights I, at p. 393.) Technical perfection in an EIR “ ‘ “is not required; the courts have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure.” ° ” (California Native Plant Society v. City ofSanta Cruz (2009) 177 Cal_App.4th 957, 979.) The appellate court’s inquiry is the sameas that of the trial court. The appellate court reviews the administrative record independently to determine whether the Expo Authority complied with CEQA or made determinations that were not supported by substantial evidence. (Planning & Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 892, 912; see also § 21168.) “The burden of showing that the EIR is inadequate is on the party challenging the EIR.” (Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1562 (Pfeiffer).) 3 All references to “Guidelines” are to the current CEQA Guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.). Courts “should afford great weight to the Guidelines except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous under CEQA.” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 391, fn. 2.) 2. The Baseline for Analysis of Traffic, Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Issues An EIR uses an environmental baseline to analyze the impacts of a project. The Expo Authority found the population andtraffic levels that were current in 2009 did not provide a reasonable baseline for determining the significance oftraffic and air quality impacts of the project and, instead, used future, 2030 baseline conditions to makethat determination. Petitioner contends that, as a matter of law, projected future conditions cannot provide the baseline for reviewing the significance of environmental impacts. We disagree. Before we address petitioner’s contention in the context of this case, we summarize the law on the point as it has developed sofar. a. The law CEQAitself does not refer to a baseline, but CEQA Guidelinestell us the following: “An EIR mustinclude a description of the physical environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time the notice of preparation is published,or if no notice of preparation is published, at the time environmentalanalysis is commenced, from both a local and regional perspective. This environmentalsetting will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a lead agency determines whether an impactis significant.” (Guidelines, § 15125, subd.(a), italics and boldface added.)4 As the Supreme Court has observed, “A long line of Court of Appeal decisions holds,in similar terms, that the impacts of a proposed project are ordinarily to be comparedto the actual environmental conditions existing at the time of CEQAanalysis, 4 See also Guidelines, section 15126.2, subdivision (a): “An EIR shall identify and focus on the significant environmentaleffects of the proposed project. In assessing the impact of a proposed project on the environment, the lead agency should normallylimit its examination to changesin the existing physical conditions in the affected area as they exist at the time the notice of preparation is published, or where no notice of preparation is published, at the time environmental analysis is commenced.” rather than to allowable conditions defined by a plan or regulatory framework.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality ManagementDist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 320-321 (CBE).) “This line of authority includes cases where a plan or regulation allowed for greater development or moreintense activity than had so far actually occurred, as well as cases where actual developmentor activity had, by the time CEQAanalysis was begun, already exceeded that allowed underthe existing regulations. In each of these decisions, the appellate court concluded the baseline for CEQAanalysis must be the ‘existing physical conditions in the affected area’ [citation], that is, the ‘ “real conditions on the ground”’ [citations], rather than the level of developmentor activity that could or should have been present according to a plan or regulation.” (/d. at p. 321, fns. omitted.) CBEinvolved modifications at a petroleum refinery where the operation of four boilers (the existing steam generation equipment) wasrestricted by permits stating a maximum rate of heat production. To evaluate changes in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions that would be caused by the proposed modifications, the agency used as a baseline the maximum emissions allowed underthe current permits,that is, all four boilers running at maximum capacity simultaneously, even though such simultaneous operation was not the norm. In ordinary operation, a boiler would run at maximum allowed capacity only when one or more ofthe other boilers were shut down for maintenance. (CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 322.) The court concluded the agency’s baseline—simultaneous maximum operation— was“not a realistic description of the existing conditions without the [project].... By comparing the proposed project to what could happen, rather than to what wasactually happening, the District set the baseline not according to ‘established levels of a particular use,’ but by ‘merely hypothetical conditions allowable’ underthe permits.” (CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 322.) This approach,using “hypothetical allowable conditions as the baseline,” provided “an illusory basis for a finding of no significant adverse effect despite an acknowledged increase in NOx emissions exceeding the District’s published significance threshold.” (/bid.) This use of maximum capacity levels rather than actually 10 existing levels of emissions from the boilers, as a baseline to analyze emissions from the project, was “inconsistent with CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines.” (d. at pp. 326-327.) CBE also observed: “Neither CEQA nor the CEQA Guidelines mandates a uniform, inflexible rule for determination of the existing conditions baseline. Rather, an agency enjoys the discretion to decide, in the first instance, exactly how the existing physical conditions without the project can mostrealistically be measured, subjectto review, as with all CEQAfactual determinations, for support by substantial evidence.” (CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 328.)5 Since CBE, two Courts of Appeal have held it was improper to use predicted conditions on a date after EIR certification or project approval as the baseline for assessing environmental consequences. In Sunnyvale, the Sixth District found that projected 2020 conditions provided an improperbaseline for determiningtraffic and related impacts of a roadway extension project. (Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1383.) In Madera, a case involving the developmentof 1,579 acres for residential, 5 The court again quoted the Guidelines (§ 15125, subd.(a)) directing that the lead agency “normally” use a measure of physical conditions at the time a notice of preparation is published or when the environmental analysis is commenced. (CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 327.) The court continued: “But, as one appellate court observed,‘the date for establishing baseline cannot be a rigid one. Environmental conditions may vary from year to year and in somecasesit is necessary to consider conditions over a range of time periods.’ [Citation.] In some circumstances, peak impacts or recurring periods of resource scarcity may be as important environmentally as average conditions. Where environmental conditions are expected to change quickly during the period of environmental review for reasons other than the proposedproject, project effects might reasonably be compared to predicted conditionsat the expected date of approval, rather than to conditionsat the time analysis is begun. [Citation.] A temporary lull or spike in operations that happensto occurat the time environmental review for a new project begins should not depress or elevate the baseline; overreliance on short-term activity averages might encourage companiesto temporarily increase operationsartificially, simply in order to establish a higher baseline.” (CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 327-328.) ll commercial andlight industrial uses, the Fifth District followed Sunnyvale, concluding the EIR failed to clearly identify the baseline being used to quantify the project’s impacts ontraffic, and holding that “‘a baseline . . . must reflect existing physical conditions” and “lead agencies do not have the discretion to adopt a baseline that uses conditions predicted to occur on a date subsequent to the certification of the EIR.” (Madera, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 89-90, 92, 96.) In still another case, involving a proposal to expand a medical campusin the City of Sunnyvale, the Sixth District rejected a claim the EIR used a legally incorrecttraffic baseline for determining the project’s traffic impacts. (Pfeiffer, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557.) In Pfeiffer, the EIR used multiple traffic baselines to analyze traffic impacts: existing conditions, background conditions(existing traffic volumes multiplied by a growthfactor plustraffic from approved but not yet constructed developments), project conditions and cumulative conditions. Cd. at pp. 1560, 1571.) The court rejected the claim that use of background “predicted” conditions was improperandthatthe baseline should be limited to existing conditions. (/d. at p. 1572.) The court observed: “[A]ppellants’ contention that a traffic baseline is limited to existing conditions lacks merit because ... the California Supreme Court has instructed that predicted conditions may serve as an adequate baseline where environmental conditions vary.... ([CBE], supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 327-328.) Here, there was substantial evidence, undisputed by appellants, that traffic conditions in the vicinity of the... project could vary from existing conditions due to a forecast fortraffic growth and the construction of already- approved developments. Moreover, appellants overlook the fact that the EIR included existing conditions, based on actual traffic counts, in its analysis oftraffic impacts.” (Pfeiffer, at p. 1572.) Pfeiffer distinguished Sunnyvale because in Sunnyvale, the traffic baselines included only projected traffic conditions in 2020, while in Pfeiffer the baselines also “included existing conditions andthetraffic growth anticipated from approved butnot yet constructed developments.” (Pfeiffer, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.) In addition, Sunnyvale had acknowledged that discussions of expected future conditions may be 12 necessary to an intelligent understanding of a project’s impacts over time. (Pfeiffer, at p. 1573; Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.) b. This case In this case, the Expo Authority described the existing physical environmental conditions in the EIR and acknowledged that, under CEQA Guidelines, those conditions would normally constitute the appropriate baseline physical conditions for determining whether an impact is significant. For most environmental topics, the Expo Authority found existing conditions to be the appropriate baseline—butnotfortraffic and air quality impacts. Instead, the Expo Authority “elect[ed] to utilize the future baseline conditions for the purposes of determining the significance of impactsto traffic and air quality,” finding that “the existing physical environmental conditions (current population andtraffic levels) do not provide a reasonable baseline for the purpose of determining whethertraffic and air quality impacts of the Project are significant.” Thus, the Expo Authority defined the “No-Build”alternative as consisting of existing transit services and “improvements explicitly committed to be constructed by the year 2030”as defined in the 2008 SCAG Regional Transportation Plan,® and evaluated projected future traffic and air quality conditions with and without the project. SCAG identified the project as a necessary componentofthe regional transportation system in Southern California, and the Expo Authority relied on various SCAGprojections for 2030, whichit identified as the project’s planning horizon. The Expo Authority “adopted official demographic and [sic] projections for the project area and region” and further explained: “Past experience with the adopted demographic projections indicate[s] that it is reasonable to assumethat the population of the project area and the region will continue to increase overthe life of the project. The projected population increases will, 6 The Expo Authority’s findings of fact further explain that the No-Build alternative “includes only transit service and roadwayconstruction projects that are programmed and funded and would be expected to occur, independent of and regardless of whether one of the proposed Transportation Systems Management. . . or LRT Alternatives is approved.” 13 in turn, result in increased traffic congestion and increased air emissions from mobile sources in the project area and in the region.” The Expo Authority found it was necessary to evaluate future projected traffic and air quality conditions with and without the project “so that the public and the decision makers may understand the future impacts on traffic and air quality of approving and not approving the project.” So, for example, in traffic studies analyzing the impact of the project on intersection delay, the EIR assessed project impacts “under ‘future’ conditions,” evaluating “the impacts of the project alternatives against projected future traffic conditions in the year 2030,” identifying impacts both with and withoutthe project. Petitioner objects to the Expo Authority’s approach, contending, based on Sunnyvale and Madera,thatit fails to comply with CEQAby using “hypothetical ‘future’ conditions as the baseline for analyzing impactsontraffic, air quality, and climate change... .” Further, petitioner objects that use of the No-Build conditions as the environmental baseline was improper because the No-Build conditionsrepresent a future, hypothetical scenario that assumes the completion of various regionaltransportation improvements. Petitioner objects, for example, that the “threshold for assessing the Project’s potential impacts on the operation of selected street intersections was whether the Project would causean intersection’s level of service (‘LOS’) ‘under the No-Build [alternative]’ to deteriorate from an acceptable LOSto an unacceptable LOS... []’ by 2030.” Petitioner argues that the use of existing conditionsat the intersectionsas the baseline “would havelikely revealed additional and/or more severetraffic impacts” than were identified with the use of 2030 as the baseline. Petitioner makes similar objections with respect to the EIR’s analysis ofair quality and greenhouse gases. Weagree with the Expo Authority and amici curiae that, in a proper case, and when supported by substantial evidence, use of projected conditions may be an appropriate way to measure the environmental impacts that a project will have ontraffic, 14 air quality and greenhouse gas emissions.’ As a major transportation infrastructure project that will not even begin to operate until 2015 at the earliest, its impact on presently existing traffic and air quality conditions will yield no practical information to decision makers or the public. An analysis of the environmental impact of the project on conditions existing in 2009, when the final EIR wasissued (or at any time from 2007 to 2010), would only enable decision makers and the public to consider the impact of the rail line if it were here today. Many people wholive in neighborhoods near the proposed light rail line may wish things would stay the same, but no one can stop change. The traffic and air quality conditions of 2009 will no longer exist (with or without the project) whenthe project is expected to come online in 2015 or over the course of the 20-year planning horizon forthe project. An analysis of the project’s impacts on anachronistic 2009 traffic and air quality conditions would rest on the false hypothesis that everything will be the same 20 yearslater. Consequently, we reject the notion that CEQA forbids, as a matter of law, use of projected conditionsas a baseline. Nothing in the statute, the CEQA Guidelines, or CBE requires that conclusion. To the extent Sunnyvale and Madera purport to eliminate a lead 7 The Expo Authority also argues that petitioner did not exhaust its administrative remedies onthe baseline issue in the proceedings below, pointing out that in fact petitionercriticized the Expo Authority for not using a 2035 baseline. (Petitioner asserted in a letter to the Expo Authority that the “traffic study and corresponding air quality analysis should be based upon a 20-year planning horizon for environmental analysis, ” and “the environmental analysis should be based upon modeling that forecasts out to the project design year of 2035, not 2030,” because “[o]therwise, the environmental analysis is only based upon a 15-year window with a base year [2005] that occurs 9 years before the project is projected to be implemented [2014].”) Another commenter, however,did raise the issue, asserting that the draft EIR “understates the impact of the Project’s traffic,” measuring the impact “by comparing the change in intersection performance between the No-Build alternative and LRT alternative in 2030,” but nowhere evaluating “the impact between the Project-addedtraffic to existing conditions.” While petitioner did not raise the issue, we think the quoted comment was sufficiently specific to preserve the claim for appeal. (See Sierra Club v. City ofOrange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536.) 15 agency’s discretion to adopt a baseline that uses projected future conditions under any circumstances, we disagree with those cases. Recognizing that we are boundto follow the Supreme Court’s teaching in CBE, we find CBE does not resolve this case. CBE rejected the use of “hypothetical allowable conditions” when those conditions were “not a realistic description of the existing conditions” without the project, as that would be an “illusory basis”for a finding of no significant impact from the project. (CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 322.) But present-day “hypothetical allowable” conditions are quite different from projected future conditions. Andthe timeline for building a major new transportation project is likewise different fromthe timeline to modify already-operating steam generation equipment. It is “illusory” to assume something is happening (and useit for a baseline) whenit is not happening and neverhas, such as with the NOx emissions in CBE. Butthere is nothing “allusory” about population growthandits inevitable impacts on traffic and air quality: population is growing, and population increases do affect traffic and air quality, with or without the project. A decision to measure environmentaleffects of a long-term project by lookingat those effects in the long term is neither hypothetical nor illusory. It isa realistic and rational decision. CBEis not to the contrary. The choices in CBE both involved measuring the project’s effects against “existing” conditions: the existing allowable emissions versus the existing actual emissions. The court insisted on a realistic description of existing conditions, and that meant actual, not hypothetical, existing conditions. Here, by contrast, existing conditions—population andtraffic levels—are not static, and are notin any sense a “realistic” baseline from which to measure the traffic and air quality impacts of a long-term rail infrastructure project. On the contrary, using a 20-year planning horizon, based on reasonable demographic projections, to measure those impactsis,it seems to us, eminently realistic. We turn now to Sunnyvale and Madera, cases that petitioner contends require the measurement of environmental impacts against presently existing conditions under any 16 and all circumstances.8 Sunnyvale involved a roadwayextension project. The EIR used projected traffic conditions in the year 2020, “based on expected growth underthe City of Sunnyvale’s general plan and in neighboring communities,as its ‘baseline’ to evaluate the roadwayproject’s traffic and related impacts,” and “did not consider the project’s traffic and related impacts on the existing environment.” (Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358.) The court concluded this was “‘a failure to proceed in the manner required by law.” (/d. at p. 1383.) Sunnyvale emphasized case law indicating that an EIR “ ‘must focus on impacts to the existing environment, not hypothetical situations.’ ” (Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) And the court cited CBE’s conclusion that the lead agency in that case was required to “compare ‘existing physical conditions’ without the project to the conditions expected to be produced by the project because ‘[w]ithout such a comparison, the EIR wil! not inform decision makers and the public ofthe project’s significant environmental impacts, as CEQA mandates, (§ 21100).’ ” (Sunnyvale,at p. 1375, quoting CBE, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 328.) Sunnyvale pointed out that in CBE the Supreme Court “never sanctioned the use of predicted conditions on a date subsequentto EIR certification or project approval as the ‘baseline’ for assessing a project’s environment consequences.” (Sunnyvale, at p. 1375.) But neither did the Supreme Court forbid the use of projected future conditions; the point was simply notat issue. In the end, Sunnyvale holds that “[t]he statute [CEQA] requires the impact of any proposedproject to be evaluated againsta baseline of existing environmental conditions 8 The League of California Cities, the California State Association of Counties, the City of Los Angeles, SCAG, and some 11 other regional transportation and water agencies have joined in briefs supporting the use of projected future conditions and asking this court to reject the Sumnyvale approach. They contendthat use of a future- conditions baseline is essential for long-range transportation and water supply projects, in order to isolate project-generated environmental effects from ambient effects that would occur in any event. It is the Sunnyvale approach, they say, that would study hypothetical conditions: “the project is constructed today and conditions remained unchanged over the next 20 to 30 years.” 17 (see §§ 21060.5, 21100, subd. (d), 21151, subd. (b); see also CEQA Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a)), whichis the only wayto identify the environmental effects specific to the project alone.” (Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380, italics added.) But none of the statutory provisions or Guidelines cited “requires” that conclusion. Moreover, Sunnyvale cites no authority for its own conclusion that use of a baseline of current conditions “is the only way”to identify impacts “specific to the project alone” (Sunnyvale, at p. 1380)—andwefind that conclusion is erroneous when applied to traffic and air quality impacts of a long-term infrastructure project, the very purpose of which is to improvetraffic and air quality conditions overtime. Weconstrue the Guidelines to permit analysis of environmental impacts using a baseline other than the environmentalsetting as it exists when the notice of preparation of an EIR is published or when environmental analysis is begun. The Guidelinesstate that publication of the notice of preparation of an EIR or the beginning of environmental analysis “will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a lead agency determines whether an impactis significant.” (Guidelines, § 15125, subd.(a), italics added.) Tostate the norm is to recognize the possibility of departure from the norm. Wesee norational basis for Sunnyvale’s constricted view of the word “normally.” Sunnyvale construed the term as allowing discretion to change the baseline from the times identified in the regulation to an earlier date (e.g., if current conditions temporarily deviate from the usual historic conditions)or to a later date (e.g., if “traffic levels are expected to increase significantly during the environmental review process dueto other developmentactually occurring in the area”), but not to any date later than the date of project approval. (Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380.) Wedo notagree these are the only appropriate scenarios for using a baseline other than present-day conditions irrespective of the nature of the project under analysis. If “projected traffic levels as of the expected date of project approval”(Sunnyvale, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380) may be an appropriate baseline, then projected traffic levels as of the expected date the project will come online, or some later date in the planning horizon, may also be appropriate. The important point, in ourview, is the 18 reliability of the projections and the inevitability of the changes on which those projections are based. The objective is to provide informationthat is relevant and permits informed decisionmaking. Nothingin the use of a baseline of future projected conditions, not “hypothetical allowable” conditions, has been shown to be inconsistent with the provisions of CEQAorwith its purpose. Accordingly, we reject Sunnyvale’ s conclusion that, as a matter of law, CEQA requires, for “any proposed project,”that the significance of its impact on the environment be measured against a baseline of conditions existing, at the latest, at the time the project is approved. (Sunnyvale, at p. 1380.) Neither the language nor the purposeof the statute and the Guidelines requires that conclusion in every case. Petitioner also relies on Madera, a case involving a mixed-use development project and whether a proper baseline was used to analyze the project’s traffic impacts. In that case, the Fifth District followed Sunnyvale, finding its analysis “persuasive” and declining to “set forth a redundantanalysis here.” (Madera, supra, 199 Cal.App.4that p. 89.) In Madera, the lead agency asserted that two baselines were used and existing conditions were the primary baseline (id. at pp. 92-93), but the Court of Appeal was “unable to state with certainty that existing conditions were used as the baseline... .” (Id. at p. 95.) Based on Sunnyvale, Madera adopted the legal conclusionsthat “[a] baseline used in an EIR mustreflect existing physical conditions,” and lead agencies “do not have the discretion to adopt a baseline that uses conditions predicted to occur on a date subsequentto the certification of the EIR” (although lead agencies “do have the discretion to select a period or point in time for determining existing physical conditions other than the two points specified in subdivision (a) of Guidelines section 15125, so long as the period or point selected predates the certification of the EIR”). (Madera,at pp. 89- 90.) Madera adds nothing to the Sunnyvale analysis, with which weare in fundamental disagreement. To summarize: We agree with the Expo Authority that there is a “profound difference” between projected conditions supported by substantial evidence and the “hypothetical”or “illusory” conditions discussed in the cases. Population growth, with 19 its concomitant effects on traffic and air quality, is not hypothetical in Los Angeles County; it is inevitable. Neither CBE nor CEQAforbidsthe use of a future baseline, and an agency’s use of discretion in selecting a baseline is expressly reserved in the Guidelines by the use of the word “normally.” In a major infrastructure project such as Expo Phase 2, assessmentofthe significance of environmental effects based on 2009 conditions (or conditions at any point from 2007 to 2010) yields no practical information, and does nothing to promote CEQA’s purpose of informed decisionmaking on a project designed to serve a future population. We therefore hold that an agency’s use ofa projected future baseline, when supported by substantial evidence, is an appropriate means to analyze thetraffic andair quality effects of a long-term infrastructure project.” Before weleave this subject, we note that respondents devote a considerable part of their briefs to showing that substantial evidence supports the methodologies and projections used by the Expo Authority to determine the significance of traffic and air quality impacts in this case. We need not dwell on this point at any length, because petitioner does not suggest that the methodologies, forecasts, models, and other data are insufficient to support the projections the Expo Authority has used—but ratheronly that the Expo Authority should not be permitted to use them. Petitioner has made noeffort to demonstrate how the use ofprojectedtraffic and air quality conditions as a baseline to measure the impactofthis project has precluded or could preclude informed decisionmaking (or, conversely, how the use of current conditions to measure those impacts would or could contribute to informed decisionmaking). In our review ofthe record, we found the Expo Authority’s use of 2030 projections is supported by both 9 Petitioner also complains that the Expo Authority “elected to use 2030 as the baseline for the [final EIR’s] traffic analysis, although operation of the system is expected to begin in 2015,” and this “ignores the Project’s first fifteen years of impacts.” But petitioner did not raise this claim in the administrative proceedings (and doesnotidentify any other commenter whodid). In any event, because we find that use of a future baseline is permissible for a major infrastructure project, the decision on whetherto use the opening year or a later year within the planning horizon is within the agency’s discretion. Petitioner has shown no abuseofthat discretion. 20 substantial evidence and commonsense,andis entirely consonant with the EIR’s purpose as an informational document. It is only when an EIR “fails to include relevant information and precludes informed decisionmaking and public participation”that a prejudicial abuse of discretion occurs. (See Save Our Peninsula Committee y. Monterey County Bd. ofSupervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 128.) That is notthis case. 3. The EIR’s Analysis of Traffic Impacts Petitioner contends the EIR’s traffic analysis was inadequate becauseit failed to address potential traffic impacts on Sepulveda Boulevard, which servesas a de facto alternative route for the I-405 whentraffic is bad on the freeway. Petitioner points out that, in response to the draft EIR, the LADOT commented onthe at-grade rail crossing at Sepulveda Boulevard,stating that “[i]t must be recognized that Sepulveda Boulevard serves as analternate route to the Interstate 405 Freeway when incidents occur and the traffic volumesused for analysis do not consider these occurrences.” After the comments were received, however, additional studies and discussions with LADOToccurred, and the at-grade crossing at Sepulveda Boulevard was reconsidered and re-analyzed. California Public Utilities Commission standards and other environmental factors were also taken into consideration, and both at-grade improvements and grade-separation options were discussed. Thus,“as a result of the additional analysis and coordination with LADOT,”the final EIR added third northbound lane on Sepulveda Boulevard between the LRT crossing and Pico Boulevard. In addition, the Expo Authority included anaerial station and grade separation at Sepulveda Boulevard asa design option in the final EIR, “which could be constructed subject to the provision of additional funding by others.” These actions were consistent with the contents of an October 15, 2009 letter from the LADOT summarizing the measures proposed by the Expo Authority concerning grade crossings, including at Sepulveda Boulevard. After concluding that the level of service was acceptable to LADOT, the LADOT concluded: “The queue lengths and delay cited above reflect normal conditions. We note that Sepulveda Boulevard sometimes servesas a de facto alternate route for Interstate 405 during freewayincidents. 21 Whenthis occurs, motorists divert to Sepulveda Boulevard and traffic demand increases dramatically. Accordingly, we encourage consideration of the Design Option and believe that an aerial grade separation at Sepulveda Boulevard would be a better long-term measure than at-grade operation.” In short, the changes rendered the at-grade crossing acceptable to LADOT, although it preferred an aerial grade separation as a long-term measure. Moreover,after the judgment was entered below, the Expo Authority’s Board, at a special meeting held on March 18, 2011, adopted a resolution in whichit “selected and adopted” the Sepulveda grade-separation design option. (This court granted the Expo Authority’s request for judicial notice of the Board’s resolution.) Consequently, petitioner’s claim the final EIR did not contain a “sufficient degree of analysis” of the traffic impacts on Sepulveda Boulevard “during freeway incidents,” assuming it had any merit, has been effectively eliminated. Inits reply brief, petitioner says that providing the grade separation at Sepulveda, but not at Overland, Westwood or Military, “will merely attract more vehicles toward Sepulveda Boulevard” and “may actually exacerbate the traffic impacts resulting from the diversion oftraffic during incidents on I-405.” This is speculation, unsupported by any Citation to the record, and is insufficient to meet petitioner’s burden to demonstrate any inadequacyin thefinal EIR. 4. Growth-inducing Impacts Petitioner’s next claim is that the EIR’s analysis of growth-inducing impacts of the project was inadequate. CEQA Guidelines require an EIR to discuss “the ways in which the proposed project could foster economic or population growth, or the construction of additional housing,either directly or indirectly, in the surrounding environment.” (Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (d).) The Guidelines explain: | “Included in this are projects which would remove obstacles to population growth (a major expansion of a waste water treatment plant might, for example, allow for more construction in service areas). Increases in the 22 population may tax existing community service facilities, requiring construction of new facilities that could cause significant environmental effects. Also discuss the characteristic of some projects which may encourage and facilitate other activities that could significantly affect the environment, either individually or cumulatively. It must not be assumed that growth in any area is necessarily beneficial, detrimental, or oflittle significance to the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (d).) Thus, for example, a transportation project in an isolated or undeveloped area may be considered growth-inducing. The EIR ultimately concluded that the Expo Phase 2 project would not result in growth-inducing impacts. The EIR explained: “The Expo Phase 2 project would be built within a well-developed urban area, where only in-fill development opportunities remain. The project would be located in an area that is already well served by an existing networkofelectricity, water, sewer, storm drain, and other infrastructure that accommodates existing and planned growth. “The project would not provide new accessibility but would enhance accessibility by transit, thereby reducing private automobile use. The need for a high-capacity, major transit investment in the Expo Phase 2 communityis driven by significant population and employment concentrations, along with continued growth trendsin the greater area. The project would accommodate and serve residents and visitors to the project cities and would provide an increased level of public transit service that is consistent with local and regional growth projections and land use/transportation policies. The project also is consistent with local and regional planning to accommodate anticipated corridor growth by reducing VMT[vehicle miles traveled] and other impacts attendant on private automobile use. In fact, the proposed project is the culmination ofa planning process that has been underwayfor over 30 years .... Given that the Exposition transit corridor area is a planned and desired land use as reflected in local and regionalplans, it would be compatible with the study area’s general land use characteristics and would serveto link activity centers within the area. Notably, the intensification ofland uses around transit station areas with mixed uses and higher densities reflects an embracementof ‘smart growth’ principles—that projected growth should befocused or directed towards areas with available infrastructure and supportive ofreduced vehicle miles traveled, fewer air emissions, and reduced energy consumption. Under smart growthprinciples, this growth that is projected to occur anywayis directed through generalplan, 23 community plan, and specific plan amendments, and rezonings towards station areas.” (Boldface & italics added.) Petitioner points out that the EIR stated the project “could result in community investment and the development of Transit Oriented Development (TOD) aroundstation areas,” and contendsthat by “failing to discuss the potential impacts of concentrating new development aroundthe plannedstations,” the EIR’s discussion of growth-inducing impacts is “fatally incomplete.” Further, the EIR (in its assessment of cumulative impacts)lists past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects, and these include a mixed-use construction project (the Casden project) adjacent to the proposed Sepulveda transit station. Thus, petitioner claims, the EIR should have discussed “the potential localized impacts”of the intensification of land uses aroundtransit station areas, such as “traffic, parking, aesthetics, noise, light and glare, etc.” Petitioner ignores the law on the point. “An EIR must analyze the growth- inducing impactof a project, including reasonably foreseeable consequences but not speculative effects.” (Federation ofHillside & Canyon Associations v. City ofLos Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1265 (Federation); see also Napa Citizensfor Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. ofSupervisors (2001) 91 Cal.-App.4th 342, 368- 369 (Napa Citizens) [an EIR is not required “to make a detailed analysis of the impacts of a project on housing and growth”; “Nothing in the Guidelines, or in the cases, requires more than a general analysis of projected growth.”].) “The detail required in any particular case necessarily depends on a multitude of factors, including, but not limited to, the nature of the project, the directness or indirectness of the contemplated impact and the ability to forecast the actual effects the project will have on the physical environment. In addition,it is relevant, although by no means determinative, that future effects will themselves require analysis under CEQA.” (Napa Citizens, at p. 369.) The EIR’s discussion of growth-inducing impacts (and its conclusion there were none,as the project accommodated projected growth and travel demand rather than inducingit) satisfied the CEQAguideline. First, the purpose and nature of the Expo Phase 2 project “wasnotto facilitate additional development after the project is 24 completed” (Clover Valley Foundation v. City ofRocklin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 227) or to remove an obstacle to growth. (Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (d).) As the EIR notes, the growth in question “is projected to occur anyway”andis “directed through general plan, community plan, and specific plan amendments,and rezonings towards station areas.” And, “any future effects of that additional development will undergo CEQAanalysis.” (Clover Valley, at p. 228; see also Napa Citizens, supra, 91 Cal.App.4that p. 369.) Second, nothing in the Guidelines requires the detail petitioner suggests— discussion of “potential localized impacts” such as“traffic, parking, aesthetics, noise, light and glare” froma project (the Casden project) which was not even under environmental review until several monthsafter the draft EIR for the Expo Phase 2 project was circulated. (Cf. San Franciscansfor Reasonable Growth v. City and County ofSan Francisco (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 61, 74, 75 (San Franciscans) [for purposes of cumulative impact analysis, an EIR must consider “other closely related projects that were currently under environmental review,” as these are “ ‘[reasonably] foreseeable probable future projects’ ”]; see also § 21002.1, subd. (e) [“lead agencies shall, in accordance with Section 21100, focus the discussion in the environmental impact report on those potential effects on the environment of a proposed project which the lead agency has determined are or maybesignificant. Lead agencies maylimit discussion on other effects to a brief explanation as to whythoseeffects are not potentially significant.”}; § 21100, subd. (c) [the EIR “shall also contain a statement briefly indicating the reasons for determining that various effects on the environmentofa project are not significant and consequently have not been discussed indetail in the environmental impact report”}.)!8 10 Petitioner cites Bakersfield Citizensfor Local Controlv. City ofBakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1218 (Bakersfield) and San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center v. County ofStanislaus (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 713, 732-733 (San Joaquin), but neither case is relevant to petitioner’s contention. Bakersfield held that EIR’s for two shopping center projects—neither of which considered the other, despite overlapping 25 In short, petitioner has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating any error in the EIR’s analysis of growth-inducing impacts, 5. Cumulative Traffic Impacts CEQA Guidelines require an EIR to discuss cumulative impacts of a project “when the project’s incremental effect is cumulatively considerable, as defined in section 15065(a)(3).” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (a).) “ ‘Cumulatively considerable’ means that the incremental effects of an individual project are significant when viewed in connection with the effects of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects of probable future projects.” (U/d., § 15065, subd. (a)(3).) A cumulative impact “is created as a result of the combination of the project evaluated in the EIR together with other projects causing related impacts.” (d., § 15130, subd. (a)(1).) The CEQA Guidelines say that several elements are necessary to an adequate discussion of significant cumulative impacts. As relevant here, these include: 1. Either a “list of past, present, and probable future projects producing related or cumulative impacts,” er a “summary of projections contained in an adoptedlocal, regional or statewide plan, or related planning document, that describes or evaluates conditions contributing to the cumulative effect” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b)(1)); 2. “A summary of the expected environmental effects to be produced by those projects with specific reference to additional information stating wherethat information is available” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b)(4)); and 3. ‘A reasonable analysis of the cumulative impacts of the relevant projects. An EJR shall examine reasonable, feasible options for mitigating market areas and shared roadways—werelegally inadequate because of “underinclusive and misleading cumulative impacts analysis.” (Bakersfield, at pp. 1216-1217.) In San Joaquin, sewer expansion (for which a separate EIR had beencertified) was recognized in the draft EIR for a developmentproject as necessary to the project, “yet was excluded from the description of the development project and its effects ignored”in the final EIR. (San Joaquin, at pp. 729-730, 732.) Both cases involved two projects, both of which were undergoing environmental review. 26 or avoiding the project’s contribution to any significant cumulative effects.” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b)(5).) The Guidelines specifically state that previously approved land use documents, “including, but not limited to, general plans, specific plans, [and] regional transportation plans ... may be used in cumulative impact analysis.” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd.(d).) The EIR in this case identified the two alternatives permitted by the CEQA Guidelines for discussion of cumulative impacts (the “list of projects” approach and the “summary of projections” approach), and indicated that: “For purposesofthis project, a ‘blended’ cumulative impacts analysis has been conducted based on a summary of projections from SCAG’s 2008 RTP [Regional Transportation Plan], Metro’s 2009 Long Range Transportation Plan, and the Culver City, Los Angeles and Santa Monica General Plans, together with funded and unfunded improvementprojects from the 2008 RTP and Metro’s 2009 Long-Range Transportation Plan. In addition, a list of recently proposed or planned projects was evaluated for potential cumulative effects.” With respect to cumulative traffic impacts, the EIR contains no separate analysis, instead referring the reader to the analysis provided in the EIR’s discussion of transportation and traffic impacts of the project itself, explaining that the latter analysis was “based upon both existing and future conditions, with and without the project.” Petitioner contends the EIR’s analysis of cumulative traffic impacts was inadequate becauseit failed “to consider the localized traffic impacts of related projects and other deficiencies.” No “other deficiencies” are identified. Petitioner asserts the EIR does not meet the second andthird ofthe three requirements listed above—that it does not “provide a summary ofthe expected environmental effects to be produced by the related projects . . . and fails to meaningfully analyze the Project’s potential cumulative impacts.” Petitioner complains that the EIR “ignores known,related projects that will have direct, localized, cumulative impacts that are not captured by the ‘summary of projections,’ thereby failing to comply” with the CEQA Guidelines. Petitioner identifies only one specific deficiency. Petitioner cites the Casden Project—whichis identified in the EIR as proposing 265,000 square feet of retail floor 27 space and 500 residential units, but for which no applications had been filed when the draft EIR was circulated. Petitioner complains that the EIR “made no attempt to actually quantify the traffic generated by the Casden Project or even discuss the potential cumulative traffic impacts” at the highly congested intersection of Pico and Sepulveda Boulevards and, instead, “merely relied on regionaltraffic volumes and adjusted for assumedtrip reduction based ontransit ridership, station-area parking and drop-off/pick- up, and trip diversions.” Wesee no inadequacy in the Expo Authority’s approach. The Expo Authority identified the CasdenProject along with many others in its “List of Recent Projects Included in the Cumulative Assessment.” But no application had been madeforthat project whenthe notice of preparation of the Expo Phase 2 project was filed in February 2007, or when the draft EIR wasissued in January 2009. Onthat basis alone, the Expo Authority arguably was not required to consider the Casden Project. In San Franciscans, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at pages 74-75, the court held that “ ‘foreseeable probable future projects’ ” included projects “currently under environmental review,” and found CEQA wasviolated when a cumulative impacts ee Respondents assert that we need not consider petitioner’s contention, because the claimed failure to analyze adequately the “localized” cumulative traffic impacts at the intersection of Sepulveda and Pico Boulevards was never brought to the Expo Authority’s attention during the administrative proceedings. (See § 21177, subd. (a), & fn. 7, ante, at p. 15.) It is true that, while petitioner raised manyalleged inadequacies in the cumulative impact analysis during the proceedings below, the failure to analyze the impact of the Casden Project on the Sepulveda/Pico intersection was not one of them. But another commenterstatedthat the draft EIR “fails to mention the impacts of the proposed Casden Project on Sepulveda Boulevard and Pico Boulevard. The construction of this project and Expo Phase 2 will cause a combined negative impact upon the neighborhood surroundingthe right-of-way. The impact of the Casden Project must be studied.” Still another commenterstated that “The [draft] EIR fails to evaluate known related projects. Specifically, it fails to evaluate interactions with [amonga half dozen other items] the Casden project at Exposition/Sepulveda.... [{] This failure renders the [draft] EIR inaccurate and useless as an environmental document.” Again, we think the other comments weresufficiently specific to preserve the claim for appeal. (See Sierra Club v. City ofOrange, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.) 28 analysis is based only on approved projects and projects under construction. (San Franciscans, at p. 72.) (While it did not discuss the point, the court apparently rejected the contention that “projects formally announced by developer also should have been considered.” (/d. at p. 74.)) Petitioner relies on Gray v. County ofMadera (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1127-1128 (Gray), where the court said that “any future project where the applicant has devoted significant time and financial resources to prepare for any regulatory review should be considered as probable future projects for the purposes of cumulative impact.” (/bid.) But petitioner fails to note that Gray endorsed a reasonable cutoff date for the inclusion of projects in a cumulative analysis: The lead agency “had the discretion to set the date of the application for the current Project as the cutoff date to determine which projects should be included in the cumulative impacts analysis.” (/d. at p. 1128.) The more important point, however, is that the EIR’s analysis of project impacts includedtraffic conditions in 2030 with and without the project, relying on projections in SCAG’s Regional Transportation Plan, Metro’s long-range plan, and the general plans for the relevant municipalities. Consequently, traffic increases and intersection delays based on those plans were indeed taken into account, albeit in a more generalized way than petitioner would prefer.!2_ Thus,this is not a case, like Kings County Farm Bureau v. City ofHanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, where the EIR “avoids analyzing the severity of the problem and allows the approvalof projects which, whentaken in isolation, appear insignificant, but when viewed together, appear startling.” (/d. at p. 721.) Here, the Expo Authority employed the “summaryof projections” approach. The EIR’s traffic analysis, based asit is on projected traffic conditions in 2030, discloses 12 Asthe Expo Authority stated in responding to comments on the draft EIR, “The Casden project has not yet been approved for construction, and is therefore speculative. The Casden project waslisted in the projects considered under Cumulative Impacts. In addition, jobs and housing that would potentially be created by the project are included within the 2030 SCAG Growth Estimates used in the Travel Demand Model.” 29 * “the severity and significance of the cumulative impacts ....°” (City ofLong Beachv. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 889, 906.) Whatit does not include is a microanalysis of those impacts as they may be affected at a particular intersection by a particular project that was not under environmental review when the draft EIR was circulated. But there is no requirement for such an analysis where the lead agencyhas used the “summary of projections” approach. Indeed, the Guidelinestell us that the discussion of cumulative impacts “shall reflect the severity of the impacts and their likelihood of occurrence, but the discussion need not provide as great detail as is provided for the effects attributable to the project alone. The discussion should be guided by the standards of practicality and reasonableness... .” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b).) That standard is met here. 6. The Adequacy of Mitigation Measures Petitioner contends the EIR failed to provide adequate mitigation measures, and improperly deferred the formulation of mitigation measures, in the areas of parking, noise and vibration, public safety, and construction, We summarize the legal requirements, and then discuss each contested area in turn. Whensignificant effects on the environment have been identified in an EIR,the public agency must make one or more of several possible findings with respect to each significant effect. The agency must find, based on substantial evidence, that changes “have been required in, or incorporated into, the project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment”; or that those changes “are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency”; or that mitigation is infeasible and overriding considerations outweighthe significant environmental effects. (§ 21081; Guidelines, § 15091.) When mitigating changes have been required to avoid the significant effects, the agency must “adopt a reporting or monitoring program for the changes, .. . designed to ensure compliance during project implementation.” (§ 21081.6, subd. (a)(1).) And the agency “shall provide that measures to mitigate or avoid significant effects on the 30 environment are fully enforceable through permit conditions, agreements, or other measures.” (§ 21081.6, subd. (b).) “The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that feasible mitigation measures will actually be implemented as a condition of development, and not merely adopted and then neglected or disregarded.” (Federation, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261, italics omitted.) The formulation of specific mitigation measures may be deferred ifit is impractical to formulate them at the time of project approval. “Deferral of the specifics of mitigation is permissible where the local entity commits itself to mitigation andlists the alternatives to be considered, analyzed and possibly incorporated in the mitigation plan.” (Defend the Bay v. City ofIrvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1275 (Defendthe Bay); Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1028- 1029 (Sacramento Old City) [“ ‘for [the] kinds of impacts for which mitigation is known to be feasible, but where practical considerations prohibit devising such measuresearly in the planning process... , the agency can commititself to eventually devising measures that will satisfy specific performancecriteria articulated at the time of project approval’ ”].) In the discussion of mitigation measures, an EIR “need not be exhaustive or perfect; it is simply required to ‘describe feasible measures which could minimize significant adverse impacts.’ ” (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan vy. City and County ofSan Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 696.) “We review the EIR’s discussion of mitigation measuresby thetraditional substantial evidence standard. It is not our task to determine whether adverse effects could be better mitigated.” (/bid.) a. Parking i. Spillover parking The EIR concludes that the demand for parking “will exceed the proposed supply at severalstations, potentially resulting in some parking intrusion into adjacent neighborhoods. Spillover parking in the neighborhoods aroundthe stations can be expected to occur aroundall of the stations except the Sepulveda/National.” To mitigate 31 this potentially significant impact, the Expo Authority adopted mitigation measure MM TR-4, providing that: “In the quarter mile area surrounding each station wherespillover parking is anticipated, a program shall be established to monitor the on-street parking activity in the area prior to the opening of service and shall monitor the availability of parking monthly for six months following the opening of service. If a parking shortage is determined to have occurred(i.e., existing parking spaceutilization increases to 100 percent) due to the parking activity of the LRT patrons, Metro shall work with the appropriate local jurisdiction and affected communities to assess the need for and specific elements of a permit parking program for the impacted neighborhoods. The guidelines established by each local jurisdiction for the assessment of permit parking programs and the development of community consensus on the details of the permit program shall be followed. Metro shall reimburse the local jurisdictions for the costs associated with developing the local permit parking programs within one-quarter mile of the stations and for the costs of the signs posted in the neighborhoods. Metro will not be responsible for the costs of permits for residents desiring to park on the streets in the permit districts. For those locations where station spillover parking cannot be addressed through implementation of a permit program, alternative mitigation options include time-restricted, metered, or shared parking arrangements. Metro will work with the local jurisdictions to determine which option(s) to implement.” The EIR concluded this mitigation measure would reduce the impacts of station spillover parking to a less than significantlevel. Petitioner contends the record does not contain substantial evidence of the “feasibility or effectiveness” ofMM TR-4,as there is “no assurance that any such [permit parking] program will ever be formed,or that it would be effective in preventing ‘spillover’ parking,” or that the alternative mitigation options would be implemented or effective. Petitioner further complains the measureis “improperdeferral” of mitigation, that residents will have to pay for permits, and that, under Gray, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at page 1119, the mitigation measure is inadequate unlessit “ensure[s] that residents in the vicinity of LRT stations will retain their ability to park in their neighborhoodsin substantially the same mannerto which they are currently accustomed.” We understand 32 petitioner’s concern, as would any resident of Los Angeles, Culver City or Santa Monica, but we disagree with this contention. Gray does not establish that these mitigation plans are inadequate. Gray, which involved water resources, not parking, disapproved several measures that were proposed to mitigate a decline in water levels in private wells that would result from a proposed mining operation. (Gray, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) One of the measures was to provide bottled water. The court stated that it “defies commonsense. . . to conclude that providing bottled water is an effective mitigation measure”; the measure “does not explain how and in what amountthe bottled water will be delivered”; landowners had fluctuating, often unpredictable water usage needs; the measure did not explain how the water bottles would be replaced or recycled; and the measure improperly deferred formulation of specific mitigation strategies, as the agency committeditself only to a goal that included no performance standards(rather than to a mitigation strategy). (/d. at p. 1118.) The court concludedthat “the listed mitigation alternatives, except for the building of a new water system [which had not been studied], cannot remedy the water problems because they would not place neighboring landownersinto a situation substantially similar to what the landowners experienced prior to the operation ofthe mine.” (/d. at p. 1119.) The Gray case is not analogousto this case. This is not a case where the effectiveness of a mitigation measure “defies common sense.” (Gray, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1118.) The change to permit parking for residents in neighborhoods neartransit stations makessenseand is “substantially similar” to parking without the need for a permit; it is obviously not the same, but residents will still have street parking. Weare not persuaded that permit parking will fail to reduce the impact of spillover parking. Nor do weacceptthe claim that the measure is inadequate for lack of “assurance” that permit parking programswill be formed andeffective in preventing spillover parking. The mitigation measuresets a specific performance standard—monitoring parking activity to determine if LRT activity increases parkingutilization to 100 33 percent—andif it does, Metro undertakes to work with localjurisdictions, to follow their guidelines for permit parking programs, and to reimburse their costs. (See Defend the Bay, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1275 [deferral of specifics is permissible where the local entity commitsitself to mitigation andlists the alternatives to be considered].) We will not assume,as petitioner implicitly suggests, that simply because the Expo Authority cannot require a local jurisdiction to adopt a permit program, the mitigation measure is inadequate. (Cf. § 21081 [one of the possible findings an agency may makewith respect to a significant effect is that changes mitigating or avoiding the significant effect “are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency’’].) Petitioner has not shown any deficiency in the spillover parking mitigation measure. !3 ii. Removalof street parking The Expo Phase 2 project will eliminate street parking in some areas along the project corridor. One of these is on the south side of Colorado Avenue between 14th Street and Lincoln Boulevard and oneither the north or south side of the street between Lincoln Boulevard and 4th Street. Surveys revealed moderate to intensive use of those spaces with little excess capacity on adjacentside streets, requiring mitigation measures to reduce the impacts of displaced street parking spaces. (The Expo Authority’s responses to commentsonthis issue show that of 56 parking spaces proposed to be 13 Petitioner cites Federation, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260, where the court agreed with the contention that there was “no assurance that the mitigation measureswill be implemented.” But in Federation, where the mitigation measures involved improvements in transportation infrastructure requiring the cooperative efforts of several state, local and federal public agencies, in addition to the city (the lead agency) (id. at p. 1256), the city admitted that its portion of the cost would far exceed its anticipated revenues (ibid.), and “acknowledged . . that there was great uncertainty as to whether the mitigation measures would ever be funded or implemented.” (Jd. at p. 1261.) Consequently, the court could find no substantial evidence that the mitigation measures would actually be implemented. (/bid.) This is not such a case. 34 eliminated on the south side of Colorado Avenue between 14th Street and 4th Street, 35 were regularly used.) The EIR proposed mitigation measures as follows: “MMTR-9 Colorado Avenue. Replacement parking would be required along impacted portions of Colorado Avenue. The potential replacement parking lots are listed below. Additional replacement options could include implementation of diagonal parking on adjacent streets (after extensive neighborhood outreach), or the implementation of design options, which would reduce the extent of parking impacts[.]!4! “MM TR-9(a) South side of Colorado Avenue, between 14th Street and 11th Street. Property would have to be acquired to provide replacement parking. Potential parcels on the south side of Colorado Avenue between 18th Street and 16th Street have been identified. “MM TR-9(b) South side of Colorado Avenue, between 11th Street and 4th Street. Property would have to be acquired to provide replacement parking. A potential parcel at the northwest corner of 6th Street and Colorado Avenue has been identified.” The EIR concluded that implementation of these mitigation measures would reduce the impact of displaced parking spacesto less than significant. Petitioner contends there is no evidence these measures would be feasible, and that the Expo Authority’s ability to acquire replacementlots is “purely speculative” because of high land costs. Petitioner again claimsthere is “no assurance that replacement parking will actually be provided” and, therefore, as in Federation, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 14 The EIR described two design options. First, “[t]he Colorado Parking Retention Design Option would reduce the track centers and sidewalk widths to create room for parking between Lincoln Boulevard and 4th Street along both sides of Colorado Avenue. Impacts to on-street parking along Segment 3a (Colorado) would remain less than significant.” Second, “[t]he Colorado/4th Parallel Platform and South Side Parking Design Option would reconfigure the Colorado/4th Street Station so that the platform would be parallel with 4th Street. If implemented, this design option would create room for parking between Lincoln Boulevard and 6th Street along the south side of Colorado Avenue. Impacts to on-street parking along Segment 3a (Colorado) would remain less than significant.” 35 at page 1261, “great uncertainty as to whether the mitigation measures would ever be funded or implemented.” But as we have seen (fn. 13 ante, at p. 34), in Federation the agency “acknowledged... that there was great uncertainty as to whether the mitigation measures would ever be funded or implemented.” (/bid.) There was no such evidence here, and no such uncertainty. Petitioner does not challenge the EIR’s financial evaluation of the Expo Authority’s ability to build the project, which includes allowancefor mitigation measures. (See also Santa Clarita Organizationfor Planning the Environment v. County ofLos Angeles (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 149, 163 [“{h]ere, unlike Federation, there is nothing to suggest the mitigation measures will not be implemented”; the appellant pointed to “nothing in Federation or any other case that requires the EIR to discuss funding for mitigation measures”].) The parking mitigation measures explicitly state that property “would have to be acquired to provide replacement parking,” and parcels have been identified for that purpose. These mitigation measures are not uncertain or speculative, and it is feasible to acquire the identified parcels for parking. Again, petitioner has not met its burden to demonstrate any deficiency. b. Noise andvibration Petitioner challenges mitigation measure MM NOI-1, which the EIR states will ensure that operational noise levels will be below the applicable FTA (Federal Transit Administration) impact threshold for moderate noise impact. The measure provides for installation, at certain locations, of sound walls—a mitigation measure widely used on highwaysandrail transit lines—or, alternatively, the construction of a landscaped berm parallel to the rail line, or some combination of sound wall and berm. This would eliminate the predicted noise impact “[e]xcept where noise impacts are due to special trackwork at crossovers and turnouts... .” In these instances (and in the case of sound receivers in high rise apartment buildings), other options were specified as an alternative or supplement to sound walls. The mitigation measure continues: “Tf during Final Engineering or Operationsit is determined that measures described aboveare not practicable or do not provide sufficient noise 36 mitigation, the Expo Authority or Metro, as appropriate, shall provide for sound insulation of residences and other noise-sensitive facilities as... anotheralternative that could be used. Sound insulation involves upgrading or replacing existing windowsand doors, and weatherstripping windows and doors. Installing a mechanical ventilation system may be needed so that windowsdo not need to be openedfor ventilation.” (Italics omitted.) Petitioner objects that, for the situations where the sound walls and bermswill not suffice, the EIR gives no information “how such improvements [(sound insulation,etc.)] to private structures would actually be ‘provided’ by Expo or Metro”; there is no evidence “that it would be feasible to do so in all cases”; residents affected would have to keep their windowsclosed; and the mitigation measures would not mitigate noise impacts while residents are outdoors. But CEQAdoesnot require a lead agencyto detail “how” it will “actually” provide the insulation. (See Sacramento Old City, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1028- 1029 [“ ‘the agency can commit itself to eventually devising measures that will satisfy specific performancecriteria articulated at the time of project approval’ ”].) The mitigation measure states exactly what the Expo Authority will do, if necessary. The Expo Authority commits in its mitigation monitoring and reporting program to provide sound insulation where needed to meet the applicable noise threshold, and sound insulation is an established method of mitigating noise impacts. Petitioner is mistaken in contending,in reliance on Gray, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1117-1118 (discussed in part 6.a.i. ante, at pp. 32-33), that residents must be “restore[d] . . . to the position that they are currently accustomed to”; mitigation requires impacts to be minimizedto less than significant, not eliminated. (See Guidelines, § 15370.) c. Safety The EIR acknowledges that emergency vehicles traveling on streets intersecting at-grade crossings may encounter some delay whena light rail vehicle is crossing the street, since emergencyvehicles will be unable to cross while the railroad gates are down. Mitigation measure MM SAF-1 addressesthis impact, specifying that, before operations begin, Metro must coordinate with the Cities of Los Angeles, Culver City and Santa 37 Monica; give community safety providers a detailed description of Metro’s emergency response procedures; and encouragethe cities to update their emergency response procedures to address implementation of the project. The EIR notes, in response to comments, that the Cities of Los Angeles, Pasadena, South Pasadena, and Long Beach have successfully implemented the procedures described in this mitigation measure on other Metro rail lines. Implementation of this measure, the EIR concludes, will render impacts to the delivery of community safety services less than significant. Petitioner contends there is insufficient evidence the mitigation measure would be effective, and insufficient evidence the cities would “actually implement any of the necessary ‘updates’ to their emergency responseplans,” again creating, as in Federation, “great uncertainty as to whether the mitigation measures would ever be funded or implemented.” (federation, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261.) Petitioner’s citation to Federation is misplaced (see discussion in fn. 13, ante, at p. 34), and we see no reason to concludethe cities involved will fail to act to update their emergency procedures to address “any changein circulation patterns associated with the project,” just as other municipalities have in the past. (Cf. § 21081; Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(2) [an agency mayfind that changesthat will avoid or lessen a significant environmental effect “are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency”and “can and should be adopted by such other agency”].) Petitioner has not shown any inadequacy in the Expo Authority’s mitigation of potential safety impacts. d. Construction The EIR found that construction of the project could result in the closure of one or more lanes of a major/arterialtraffic-carrying street for an extended period of time (one month or more) during construction. The Expo Authority proposed three mitigation measuresthat it concluded would reduce this significant impact to a level less than significant. First (MM CON-1), the Expo Authority is required to provide “at least one lane of traffic in each direction on accesscrossstreets that are not going to be dead-ended during 38 construction. If one lane of traffic cannot be maintained, the Expo Authority shall provide a detour route for motorists.” Second (MM CON-2), “Worksite Traffic Control Plans (WTCP) and Traffic Circulation Plans, including identification of detour requirements, will be formulated in cooperation with” the cities and other affected jurisdictions “in accordance with the Work Area Traffic Control Handbook (WATCH) manual and Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)as required by the relevant municipality.” The WTCP’s “will be based on lane requirements and other special requirements defined by” the LADOT and the other municipalities “for construction within their city and from other appropriate agencies for construction in those jurisdictions.” These plans must also “be designed to maintain designated Safe Routes to School wherever possible during times of the year whennearby schools are in session.” Third (MM CON-3), no designated major or secondary highway will be closed to vehicular or pedestrian traffic “except at night or on weekends, unless approvalis granted by the jurisdiction in whichit is located.” Petitioner contends there is no evidence these measures would be effective or feasible, because (1) there are no standards by which relevant jurisdictions may grant approval for weekday street closures under MM CON-3,and (2) MM CON-2 does not address “the potential safety impacts that may arise where maintaining . . . designated Safe Routes to School would not be possible,” and “improperly defers mitigation without including any performance standards,” so there is no evidence the measure would be enforceable. The law does not require that an EIR specify the standards under which different jurisdictions will decide whether or not to approve weekday road closures. The EIR contemplates that major arteries will not be closed during nonweekend and nonevening hours without that approval, which is an acceptable performance standard. Moreover, as the Expo Authority points out, MM CON-3 must be considered in conjunction with the other mitigation measures that address the same impact (closure of major/arterialstreets). MM CON-2?contains multiple performance standards that must be satisfied before major 39 arterial streets may be closed during construction, whether in the evening or otherwise. The Expo Authority is required to comply with the traffic control and traffic circulation plans that are formulated in cooperation with the affected jurisdictions, and these must be formulated in accordance with specified manuals “as required by the relevant municipality.” (See Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County ofOrange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 794 [fuel modification plan to be prepared that must comply with county guidelines and be approved by county is not improper deferral].) Petitioner has demonstrated no inadequacy in the Expo Authority’s construction mitigation measures. 7. Project Alternatives An EIR must “consider alternatives to proposed actions affecting the environment.” (§ 21001, subd. (g).) One of the purposes ofthe EIR is “to identify alternatives to the project... .” (§§ 21002.1, subd. (a), 21061 [purposeis “to list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project”].) The guideline is feasibility: “[P]ublic agencies should not approve projects as proposedif there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially lessen the significant environmentaleffects of such projects ....” (§ 21002.) The “ ‘statutory requirements for consideration of alternatives must be judged against a rule of reason.’ ” (Citizens ofGoleta Valley v. Board ofSupervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 565 (Goleta Valley).) “CEQA establishes no categorical legal imperative as to the scope ofalternatives to be analyzed in an EIR. Each case must be evaluated onits facts, which in turn must be reviewedin light of the statutory purpose.” (/d. at p. 566.) An EIR “need not consider every conceivable alternative to a project.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).) An EIR “must consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the project, or to the location of the project, which: (1) offer substantial environmental advantages over the project proposal [(§ 21002)]; and (2) may be ‘feasibly accomplished in a successful manner’ considering the economic, environmental, social and technological factors involved.” (Goleta Valley, at p. 566, italics omitted, citing § 21061.1 & Guidelines, § 15364.) “Amongthe factors that may be usedto eliminate 40 alternatives from detailed consideration in an EIR are: (i) failure to meet most of the basic project objectives,(ii) infeasibility, or (iii) inability to avoid significant environmental impacts.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (c).) Petitioner contends the EIR here is inadequate becauseit did not “consider an alternative or design option with grade-separation in Segment1 (from and including Overland Avenue to Sepulveda Boulevard) . . . .” While the EIR “briefly discussed and rejected the option of grade-separation at Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard, this cursory discussion failed to address whether such an alternative or design option could potentially avoid or reduce the impacts of the Project.” And, petitioner continues, the record does not support a conclusionthat grade separationis infeasible. Wesee no inadequacyin the EIR’s failure to include a detailed examination of an alternative with grade-separated crossings in Segment | instead ofat-grade crossings. It is unnecessary to consider “every conceivable alternative” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a)), and the EIR evaluated every at-grade crossingin each of the LRTalternatives. We do not find the EIR’s discussion of grade separation at Overland and Westwoodto be “cursory.” The EIR discussed a trench option (underground grade separation) and an aerial structure, and concluded grade separation was unnecessary to mitigate significant impacts, and indeed wouldcreate other environmental impacts. The summary of its grade-separation analysis wasthis: “In summary, the proposed at-grade alignment at Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard could operate safely and minimize impacts to a less- than-significant level, as required by CEQA. Assuch, a grade separation in these locations would not be needed to mitigate significant impacts, and if anything, would generate other environmental impacts. Construction impacts associated with a grade separation at Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard would be more extensive and disruptive to the adjacent community and nearby school. In addition, grade separating Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard would substantially increase costs, requiring more local funding and reducingthe project’s overall cost effectiveness with respect to [Federal Transit Administration] standards. Further, the at-grade crossings would be consistent with Metro’s policy guidance for evaluating grade crossingsrelative to safety, traffic, and other considerations. 41 “As a result of the community impacts, constructability issues, and cost implications, the Expo Phase 2 project objectives are better accomplished and CEQAsignificance thresholds are achieved with an at-grade configuration of both Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevard. Therefore, a trench under Overland Avenue and Westwood Boulevardis not recommended to be retained in the [final EIR] for further consideration, noris an aerial structure.”!5 In short, petitioner has not shownthat detailed consideration of an alternative with grade-separated crossings was required, or that such an alternative might have offered “substantial environmental advantages over the project proposal ....” (Goleta Valley, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 566; see also Citizens ofGoleta Valley v. Board ofSupervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1177-1178 [“The range of alternatives is governed by the ‘rule of reason,’ which requires only an analysis of those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice.”].) Every at-grade crossing was evaluated in connection with other alternatives, and the impacts of the project were mitigated to a less than significantlevel. The “rule of reason” governs (Goleta Valley, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 576), and each case “must be evaluated onits facts....” (Ud. at p. 565.) On this record, we conclude the Expo Authority evaluated a reasonable range ofalternatives. 8. Recirculation Petitioner argues that the final EIR reflected “major changes” to the project made after circulation of the draft EIR, requiring recirculation of the EIR in draft form for further public comment. CEQArequires recirculation and opportunity for commentbeforecertification of an EIR when“significant new information” is added. (§ 21092.1.) The law on when 15 The trench option involved disruption of existing storm drains and construction of a pumpstation or an inverted siphon; creation of a large depressed area, which could become flooded in the event of a major storm, thus requiring flood proofing; a substantial increase in construction impacts; and significantly higher costs. The visual impacts of an aerial structure would be significantly greater, as would its construction impacts, and an aerial structure would also have greater costs and worse cost effectiveness. 42 recirculation is required was settled in Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University ofCalifornia (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112 (Laurel Heights Il). There, the court concluded that“the addition of new information to an EIR after the close of the public commentperiodis not‘significant’ unless the EIR is changed in a waythat deprives the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment upon a substantial adverse environmental effect of the project or a feasible way to mitigate or avoid such an effect (including a feasible project alternative) that the project’s proponents have declined to implement.” (Ud. at p. 1129.) Laurel Heights II continued: “[R]ecirculation is not required where the new information added to the EIR ‘merely clarifies or amplifies [citations] or makes insignificant modificationsin [citation] an adequate EIR.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, recirculation is required, for example, when the new information added to an EIR discloses: (1) a new substantial environmental impactresulting from the project or from a new mitigation measure proposed to be implemented [citation]; (2) a substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact unless mitigation measures are adopted that reduce the impactto a level of insignificance [citation]; (3) a feasible project alternative or mitigation measure thatclearly wouldlessen the environmental impacts of the project, but which the project’s proponents decline to adopt [citation]; or (4) that the draft EIR was so fundamentally and basically inadequate and conclusory in nature that public commenton the draft was in effect meaningless[citation].” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp.1129-1130.) The substantial evidence standard governs the lead agency’s decision notto recirculate an EIR, with reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the administrative decision. (Laurel Heights IT, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) Petitioner contends “significant new information” was addedto the final EIR, including new information on grade separation at various intersections, signal phasing at the intersection of Westwood Boulevard and Exposition Boulevard North; parking; and 43 noise impacts (all described, post).!© None of the added information discloses “a new substantial environmental impact,” or a “substantial increase in the severity” of an impact of the project. (Laurel Heights H, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1130; Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(1), (2).) As the trial court pointed out, “[i]f anything, the information added (five additional sound walls, signal phasing, and parking surveys) served to lessen the severity of an impact.” Substantial evidence supports the Expo Authority’s decision not to recirculate the EIR before certification. We address each of petitioner’s claims in turn.!7 Grade separation. Petitioner points out that, after circulation ofthe draft EIR, additional studies were prepared further evaluating grade separation at various intersections; these were discussed in the final EIR, which indicates that the studies “resulted in changes to the project, including modifications to impacts and mitigation measures.” The changes included grade separation (elevation) at Centinela Avenue, and a design option for grade separation using an aerial structure at Sepulveda Boulevard (subsequently adopted by the Expo Authority). Petitioner says there was no meaningful opportunity to commenton the studies and conclusions. But that is not the standard for recirculation of an EIR; the question is whether the new information disclosed a substantial adverse effect (or increase in severity), in which case the public should have 16 Petitioner also recites, in its list of “major changes,” two other items: the addition of a third northbound lane on Sepulveda Boulevard and a new design option for changes to the Santa Monica maintenance facility. Petitioner does not elaborate on these items and makes no argumentas to why or how these changes show new significant environmental impacts or a substantial increase in the severity of an impact, so we will not consider them. "7 Petitioner also contends recirculation was required because the draft EIR was, as stated in Guideline section 15088.5, subdivision (a)(4), “so fundamentally and basically inadequate and conclusory in nature that meaningful public review and comment were precluded.” This contention is based on the “fail[ure] to evaluate grade-separated alternatives from, and including, Overland Avenue to Sepulveda Boulevard.” We have already rejected the contention that the Expo Authority was required to include such an alternative (part 7, ante, at pp. 41-42). 44 an opportunity to comment. That is not the case here. The additional evaluations and analyses were conducted in response to public comments. The grade separation at Centinela and the design option for grade separation at Sepulveda, adopted as a result of those new studies, were not “new significant environmental impact[s]” that wouldresult from the project or a “substantial increase in the severity” of an impact, upon which the public should have had an opportunity to comment. (Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(1), (2).) On the contrary, they were improvementsto traffic impacts at those locations. Petitioner cites nothing in its briefs that suggests otherwise.18 Signal phasing. After the draft EIR was circulated, signal phasing wasrefinedat the intersection of Westwood Boulevard and Exposition Boulevard North, resulting in revisions in the level of service and delay. The draft EIR showed, during the morning peak hour, an “A”level of service with a delay of only four seconds; the final EIR shows a “D”level of service and a delay of 38 seconds. For the afternoon peak hour, the level of service changed from “B” to “C” and the delay changed from 10.9 seconds to 23.4 18 Forthefirst time in its reply brief, petitioner suggests that the new design option for an aerial station at Sepulveda will have adverse visual impacts, and for this proposition it cites analyses of elevated grade-separations at other locations in other LRT alternatives (including a 5.5 mile-long elevated structure) that were rejected. Evenif the point had not been waivedbyfailing to raise it in its opening brief, the analyses petitioner cites are irrelevant to consideration of an entirely different aerial structure. The final EIR concluded the structure would result in less than significant visual impacts, stating: “Within Visual Character Area C, the Exposition [right-of-way] is screened from view by the residences by use of heavy landscaping in this area. The aerial structure would offer passing motorists using Sepulveda Boulevard highly visible but fleeting views of the aerial structure. Residents to the south along Exposition Boulevard would have the greatest visibility of the aerial structure; however, these views would be screened as feasible as landscaping would be incorporated to screen the Expo[right-of-way] from view, as would other design features specified by the Metro Design Criteria to reduce visual impacts. Therefore, implementation of the Sepulveda Grade Separation Design Option would not result in a degradation of the area, and, as such, introduction of the Sepulveda Grade Separation Design Option would result in Jess than significant impacts.” 45 seconds. Petitioner contends these changes constituted a “substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact,” requiring recirculation. Petitioner has failed to considerthe entirety of the recirculation standard. As Laurel Heights II and the Guidelines makeclear, recirculation is required when the new information added to an EIR discloses a substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact “unless mitigation measures are adopted that reduce the impactto a level ofinsignificance ....” (Laurel Heights I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1130, italics added; Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(2).) Even with the increase in the average delay at the intersection of Westwood and Exposition Boulevards, the intersection will operate within the impact threshold identified in the draft EIR as less than significant: the impact is significant “if the project traffic is projected to cause deterioration in level of service to LOS E or worse.” Petitioner contends this added “significant new information” on “the availability of, and restrictions on, the ‘potential replacement options’ that had been identified in the [draft EIR] for the loss of on-street parking spaces along Sepulveda Boulevard, Westwood Boulevard, and Overland Avenue.” Accordingto petitioner, this new information “undermines”the conclusion that the project would havea less than significant impact on the supply ofon-street parking along those three streets. But that is all petitioner says. Petitioner fails even to identify the nature of the new information to which it objects, much less to explain how that new information would cause a “new significant environmental impact” or cause a “‘substantial increase in the severity” of an impact. (Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Under these circumstances, petitioner has waivedthe issue. (See Inyo Citizensfor Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [* ‘[w]e are not required to search the record to ascertain whetherit contains support for [petitioner’s] contentions’ ”; “the issue, to the extent one has been raised, is waived”].) Petitioner also points out that in the final EIR, a proposed parking lot at the Colorado/4th Street station that had been in the draft EIR was eliminated. The final EIR concludesthat the approximately 215-space demand for parking at the station could be accommodated in adjacent existing public parking facilities in downtown Santa Monica. 46 Finally, petitioner complains of an added design option that, if implemented, would permit the elimination of a proposed 170-space “park-and-ride” lot at the Expo/Westwoodstation. But petitioner identifies no reason to believe this option would alter the conclusions reached after the additional parking surveys were performed: that demand for replacement parking for removed spaces could be accommodatedin various ways including permit parking. Further, the final EIR indicates that if this design option is used, “[t]o address community concerns regarding the loss of on-street parking along Westwood Boulevard, 20 parking spaces would be dedicated to neighborhood residents east of Westwood Boulevard and north of the LRTline.” The conclusion wasthat impacts would remainless than significant. Again, no adverse impact is disclosed by the added design option. Noise. Petitioner complains that new information was addedto the final EIR concerning mitigation measures for noise impacts. This consists of information showing that (a) the numberofreceptors that will be moderately impacted by noise will increase from 162 to 171, and the numberseverely impacted will increase from 49 to 67; (b) studio uses along the Sepulveda-Cloverfield segment will be severely impacted by noise; and (c) as a result of the increased severity of noise impacts, the final EIR identifies five additional locations requiring soundwalls as mitigation.!9 Petitioner complains the public was denied the opportunity to comment“on the efficacy and potential impacts of these additional sound walls, as well as potential mitigation measures to address such impacts.” Again, this contention misconstruesthe meaning of “significant new information.” The Expo Authority conducted additional noise testing and analysis in more locations in response to comments on the draft EIR, focusing on sensitive receptors including studios, schools and residential areas. That 19 Petitioner also asserts there was new informationthat station public address systems may cause significant noise impacts during nighttime hours. But the final EIR stated that “[w]ith proper design of the public address systems and the automatic volume adjustment, the noise from the PA system should not generate any adverse effects in communities near the stations.” 47 further analysis identified additional receptors that were affected, but with the addition of five soundwalls—the same established mitigation technique identified in the draft EIR— the noise levels “will be below the applicable FTA impact threshold for moderate noise impact.” New information requires recirculation of the EIR if it shows a “substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact . . . unless mitigation measures are adopted that reduce the impact to a level of insignificance.” (Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(2).) So, even if one concludes the increase in the numberof affected receptors amounted to a substantial increase in the severity of the noise impacts, mitigation measures were adopted (the additional soundwalls) reducing the impactto less than significant. And petitioner does not suggest how or why anyof the additional soundwalls might have a significant environmental impact. Accordingly, recirculation was not required. (See Laurel Heights IT, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [“the Legislature did not intend to promote endless rounds of revision and recirculation of EIR’s”; recirculation “was intended to be an exception, rather than the general rule”].) DISPOSITION The judgmentis affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION GRIMES,J. WE CONCUR: BIGELOW,P.J. FLIER,J. 48 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL TRANSPORTATION DIVISION ONE GATEWAY PLAZA LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012-2952 TELEPHONE (213) 922-2525 JOHN F. KRATTLI FACSIMILE Acting County Counsel May7, 2012 (213) 922-2531 TDD (213) 633-0901 The Honorable Patricia Bigelow The Honorable Elizabeth A. Grimes The Honorable Madeleine Flier California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight Ronald Reagan State Building 300 S. Spring Street, 2nd Floor, North Tower Los Angeles, California, 90013 Re: Request for Publication Neighborsfor Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority et al. (Case No. B232655) Dear : Dear Justices Bigelow, Grimes, and Flier: Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1120, subdivision (a), the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”), respectfully requests publication of Parts 5 through 8 ofthe opinion issued bythis Court in Neighborsfor Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority et al. (April 17, 2012, B232655)(the “Opinion”). Currently, only Parts 1 through 3 of the Opinion have been ordered published. Metro makesthis request becauseit believes Parts 5 through 8 of the Opinion also contain sound legal principles that, if enshrined in case law, would benefit Californians. This letter sets forth Metro’s interest in publication and the reasonsit believes Parts 5 through 8 of the Opinion meet the standards for publication set forth in California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105, subdivision (c). As described in more detail below, those parts of the Opinion 1) explain andclarify existing rules of law; 2) include very helpful explanation andclarification of existing principles underthe California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.); and, 3) involve legal issues of continuing public interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105, subdivisions (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(6).) HOA.883547.1 May7, 2012 Page 2 1. Metro hasan interest in publication of the Opinion. Metro is a statutory regional transportation planning and public transportation agency operating for the County of Los Angeles. (See Pub.Util. Code, §§ 130050, 130051.) With the influx of Measure R! dollars, Metro is currently undertaking environmental review of several regional transportation projects andis involvedin litigation defendingits approval of some such projects under CEQA. The issues addressed in Parts 5 through 8 of the Opinion are being raised both administratively andinlitigation challenging Metro’s environmental review ofits various proposed regionaltransportation projects and the Opinion would provide helpful guidance in addressing these issues both with respect to currently pending projects and approved projects that are being challenged in the courts. Metroalso believes that publication of Parts 5 through 8 of the Opinion would be helpful to public agencies throughoutthe State of California, who are undertaking projects that could impact various jurisdictions, projects that are likely to undergo modifications and additional analysis as a result of the CEQA review process, and projects that will rely on regulatory or other standards in reducing impacts to less-than-significant levels. As discussed below,if Parts 5 through 8 of Opinion were published, the Opinion’s holdings onthe issues of mitigation measures, alternatives, the duty to recirculate an EIR for additional public review, and requirements regarding cumulative impact analyses would provide clarification on frequently litigated issues. 2. The Opinion provides importantclarification regarding the reliance on performancestandardsin the formulation of mitigation measures under CEQAin a context that is different from any prior decision. The Opinion gives important guidance regarding the formulation of adequate mitigation measures under CEQA.(Opinion,pp. 30-39, § 6.) In particular, the Opinion offers valuable instruction regarding the reliance on specific performancestandards to provide adequate assurance that a mitigation measure will be effective at reducing a particular impact. In recentyears, the courts of appeal have grappled with the circumstances in which deferral of ‘In November 2008, Los Angeles County voters approved Measure R, committing a projected $40 billionto traffic relief and transportation upgrades throughout the county over the next 30 years. HOA.883547.1 May7, 2012 Page 3 specifics of mitigation measures are permissible.” Noneofthe recent cases, however, consider nearly the broad range of impact categories as those at issue in the Opinion, making the Opinionparticularly useful in understanding the application of CEQA’s requirements to mitigate environmental impacts to a range of potential impact categories. Moreover, none of the recent cases provide as clear of guidance regarding the amountof detail necessary to include in a mitigation measurein order to support a conclusion that the mitigation measure would reduce impactsto less than significant.’ The Opinion makes clear, however, that the level of detail set forth in an EIR’s mitigation measures need not be exhaustive andthat the courts will uphold the mitigation measures provided they are supported by substantial evidence. (Opinion, p. 31.) To that end, the Opinion upholds mitigation measures for parking, noise and vibration, safety, and construction impacts that commit respondent Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (“Expo Authority”) and Metroto achieving specific performance standards and to providing reasonable assurancethat the mitigation measures will be effective. (Opinion,pp. 31-40.) * See e.g., Clover Valley Foundation v. City ofRocklin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 236; Oakland Heritage v. City ofOakland (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 884, 906-910 (Oakland Heritage); Communitiesfor a Better ‘Environment (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 93-96; California Native Plant Society v. City ofRancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603, 621-623; Gray v. County ofMadera (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1119-1120 (Gray); see also Defend the Bay v. City ofIrvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1275; Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.Ap.3dh 1011, 1028. 3 For example, in Oakland Heritage, supra,the First District Court of Appeal foundthe City of Oakland hadnot impermissibly deferred formulation of mitigation measuresto reduce a project’s seismic impacts where the EIR included a very detailed description ofthe statutes and regulations that would apply to the project to reducepotential seismic and other geologic hazards. (195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 907-908.) Althoughthe court did not hold that an in-depth discussion of the regulatory standards was necessary in orderto justify an EIR’s conclusions that reliance on specified performance standards would reduce impacts to less- than-significant, Metro understandsthat since the Oakland Heritage opinion was issued, project opponents havecited that opinion for the proposition that mitigation measures needto include very detailed information regarding the performancestandardsthat will be achievedifthe project is to rely on those mitigation measures to reduce impactsto less than significant. HOA.883547.1 May7, 2012 Page 4 In so holding, the Opinion makesclear that the fact that implementing the mitigation measures will involve cooperating with other jurisdictions does not, in itself, mean the mitigation measures are too uncertain for the purposes of concluding impacts are less than significant. (Opinion, pp. 31-38; see esp. Opinion, pp. 37-38 [safety mitigation measures requiring coordination with cities to update emergency response procedures], pp. 39-40 [construction mitigation measures requiring formulation of constructiontraffic plans in cooperation with affected cities].) Thisaspect of the Opinion is especially relevant to agencies approving regional projects that could affect multiple jurisdictions and provides some assurance that requiring cooperation between agencies, in addition to requiring other measures to reduce impacts, may be an effective meansto reduce impacts under CEQA. Further, the Opinion clarifies that mitigation measures need not eliminate an impactaltogether, they simply must minimize the impact to below the significance levels set forth in an EIR. (Opinion p. 37.) In so clarifying,the Opinionis careful to explain that Gray, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1117-1118 did not hold that mitigation measures must restore affected residents to the position to which they are currently accustomed;rather mitigation measures must simply minimize impactsto lessthan significant. (Opinion,p. 37.) The Opinion’s reasoning in this regard, and with respect to mitigation measures generally, elaborates upon and clarifies CEQA’s rules regarding the purpose ofmitigation measures and thelevel of detail to include in the measures and should be published for this reason. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105, subd. (c)(3), (4).) 3. The Opinion’s discussion of the reasonable rangeof alternatives merits publication. The Opinion furthers an understanding of the CEQAprinciple that requires an EIR to describe a range ofreasonable alternatives to a project by clarifying the extent to which an agencyis required to consider additional alternatives recommended by project opponents. (Opinion,pp. 40-42, § 7.) Specifically, petitioner in this case claimed the EIR was inadequate because it did not consideran alternative with a grade separation in the segmentofthe lightrail line from Overland Avenue to Sepulveda Boulevard. The EIR had explained why grade separation at this segment was not necessary to mitigate significant impacts, and, indeed would cause other environmental impacts. The EIR also explained that grade separation would substantially increase costs and wasnot necessary under Metro’s policy guidance for evaluating grade crossingsrelative to safety, traffic, and other considerations. The court held that CEQA did not require the EIR to evaluate a grade-separated alternative. In so holding, the court squarely HOA.883547.1 May7, 2012 - Page 5 and properly placed the burden on petitioner to show that detailed consideration of such an alternative might have offered substantial environmental benefits over the proposed project. Becausepetitioner failed to meet this burden, the court held the rangeof alternatives evaluated in the EIR was adequate. (Opinion, p. 42.) In this respect, the Opinion provides important guidance regarding the burden of proofin litigation with respectto the range of alternatives evaluated in an EIR as well as the need to tie proposed alternatives with substantial environmental benefits and therefore warrants publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105, subds. (c)(3), (4).) 4, The Opinion explains an existing rule of law regarding CEQA’s standards governing recirculation of an EIR,an issue of continuing public interest. _ The Opinion also gives meaningful and well-reasoned guidance regarding Public Resources Code section 21092.1, and the California Supreme Court’s holding in Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, regarding the circumstances under which an agencyis requiredto recirculate a draft EIR for further public review and comment. (Opinion, pp. 42-48, § 8.) Significantly, the Opinion makesit very clear that recirculation is only required when a new significant or substantially more severe environmental impact is identified; recirculation is not required to allow further public commenton new studies prepared for the project in response to public comments, where new mitigation measures are addedto the EIR, or where impacts may be worsethanoriginally disclosed in the EIR, but not so much worsethat the impact exceeds the thresholds of significance set forth in the EIR. (Opinion, pp. 44-48.) The Opinion’s holding and reasoningin this respect is particularly applicable for agencies conducting environmental review oflarge projects that require considerable responses to comments and refinement over the CEQAprocess. The Opiniongivesclear and helpful guidance about the scope of the information that may be addedto an EIR withouttriggering the duty to recirculate. 5. The Opinionclarifies and explains the level of detail necessary in a cumulative impact analysis that uses the “summary of projections” approachto analyzing such impacts. Lastly, the Opinion includes an important discussion on CEQA’s requirements regarding cumulative impact analyses. (Opinion,pp. 26-30, § 5.) The CEQA Guidelines provide that a cumulative impact analysis may be based on either a “list of past, present, and probable future projects producing related or HOA.883547,1 May7, 2012 Page 6 cumulative impacts”or a‘““summary of projections contained in an adoptedlocal, regional, or statewide plan, or related planning document, that describes or evaluates conditions contributing to the cumulative effect.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b)(1).) The EIR in this case used a combination of both. (Opinion, p. 27.) The petitioner argued the EIR did not adequately accountfor a nearby proposed commercial andresidential project, the Casden Project, in analyzing the project’s cumulative traffic impacts. The EIR identified the Casden Project along with many othersin its “List ofRecent Projects Included in the Cumulative Assessment,” but no application for the Casden Project had been filed when the draft EIR was circulated. The court found that on this basis alone, the Expo Authority was arguably not required to consider the Casden Projectin its cumulative impact analysis. (Opinion p.28.) More importantly, the court found the EIR’s analysis of project impacts includedtraffic conditions in 2030 with and without the project, relying on projections in the Southern California Association of Governments’ (SCAG’s) Regional Transportation Plan, Metro’s long-range plan, and the general plans for relevant municipalities. Consequently,traffic increases and intersection delays _basedon those plans were taken into account, albeit in a more generalized way than petitioner would prefer. The Opinion is careful to note that there is no requirement for a “microanalysis” of impacts as they may be affected by a particular intersection by a particular project where an agency has used the “summary ofprojections” approach. Indeed, the Opinion notes, the CEQA Guidelines instruct that the discussion of cumulative impacts ““shall reflect the severity ofthe impacts andtheir likelihood of occurrence, but the discussion need not provide as great detail as is provided for the effects attributable to the project alone. The discussion should be guided by the standards of practicality and reasonableness ... .” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b).) The court found that standard had been methere. - In so holding,the Opinion provides helpful guidanceto bothtrial courts and public agencies regarding the level of specificity an EIR needsto include whenit uses the “summary ofprojects” approach to cumulative impact analyses. Notably, no other published opinionspecifically addresses the level of detail necessary in an EIR’s cumulative impact analysis based on the summary of projections approach and the Opinion warrants publication onthis basis. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105, subds. (c)(3), (4).) HOA.883547.1 -May 7, 2012 Page 7 6. Conclusion The currently unpublished portions of the Opinion meet several of the standards for publication set forth in California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105, subdivision (c). As explained above, the unpublished portions of the Opinion address numerous important issues in a clear, careful, and reasoned manner. Therefore, the Opinion would makea significant contributionto the legal literature and would provide useful guidance to agencies seeking to comply with CEQA,litigants, and trial courts. Very truly yours, JOHN F. KRATTLI Acting County Counsel By RewalolWSlo, RONALD W. STAMM Principal Deputy County Counsel Transportation Division RWS HOA.883547.1 Neighborsfor Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority,etal. Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight, Case No. B232655 (Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BS125233) PROOF OF SERVICE I am citizen of the United States, employedin the City and County ofLos Angeles. My business address is One Gateway Plaza, 24" Floor, Los Angeles, California 90012. I am overthe age of 18 years and nota party to the above-entitled action. I am familiar with the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority's practice whereby the mail is sealed, given the appropriate postage and placed in a designated mail collection area. Each day's mail is collected and deposited in a U.S. mailbox after the close of each day's business. On March 7, 2012, I served the following: Letter from Court re: Request for Oral Argument ¥Y_ On the parties in this action by causing a true copy thereofto be placedin a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing mail addressed as follows; or On the parties in this action by causing a true copy thereof to be delivered via Federal Express to the following person(s) or their representative at the address(es) listed below; or Ontheparties in this action by causing a true copythereof to be electronically delivered via the internet to the following person(s) or representative at the address(es) listed below: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Proof of Service was executed this 7th day of March, 2012,at Los Angeles, California. Vndrw- ~“Sandra Gonzales ~ HOA.883566.1 Neighborsfor Smart Rail yv. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority, etal. Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight, Case No. B232655 (Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BS125233) SERVICE LIST John M. Bowman C.J. Laffer Elkins Kalt Weintraubetal. 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3202 Robert D. Thornton John J. Flynn I Robert C. Horton Lauren C. Valk Nossaman LLP 18101 Von Karman Ave., Suite 1800 Irvine, CA 92715-1007 Lloyd W. Pellman Nossaman LLP 777 South Figueroa Street, 34" Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 AMICT: Bradley R. Hogin Woodruff Spradlin and Smart 555 Anton Bivd., Suite 1200 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 HOA.883566.1 Attorneys for Petitioner /Appellant NEIGHBORS FOR SMART RAIL VIA USS. Mail Attorney for Respondent EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITYetal. VIA U.S. Mail Attorney for Respondent EXPOSITION METRO LINE CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITYetal. VIA U.S. Mail Andrew B. Sabey Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP 555 California Street, 10" Floor San Francisco, CA 94104-1513 San Joaquin Council of Governments Rod Attebery, General Counsel Neumiller & Beardslee Waterfront Office Towers 509 W. Weber Avenue, 5th Floor Stockton, CA 95203 MAILING ADDRESS P.O. Box 20 Stockton, CA 95201-3020 Metropolitan WaterDistrict Adam Kear Senior Deputy General Counsel Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Office of the General Counsel 700 N. AlamedaStreet Los Angeles, CA 90012 Mail: P.O. Box 54153 Los Angeles, CA 90054-0153 Madera County Transportation Commission Patricia Taylor, Executive Director 2001 Howard Road, Suite 201 Madera, CA 93637 Contra Costa Transportation Authority Malathy Subramanian Best Best & Krieger, LLP 2001 N. Main Street, Suite 390 Walnut Creek, California 94596 HOA.883566.1 Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency and the San Joaquin Hills Transportation Corridor Agency; AND San Francisco County Transportation Agency Robert D. Thornton Attorney at Law NOSSAMANLLP 18101 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 1800 Irvine, CA 92612 Southern California Association of Governments Joann Africa, Chief Legal Counsel Sharon Neely Deputy Executive Director 818 W. Seventh Street, 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Riverside County Transportation Commission Steve DeBaun Charity Schiller Best Best & Krieger LLP 3750 University Avenue, Suite 400 Riverside, CA 92501 P.O. Box 1028 Riverside, CA 92502 Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority Michael Estrada, General Counsel Richards Watson Gershon 355 South Grand Avenue, 40th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-3101 Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority Evelynn N. Tran Senior Assistant Counsel 3331 North First Street Building C, Second Floor San Jose, CA 95134 HOA.883566.1 Orange County Transportation Authority Bradley R. Hogin Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart 555 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1200 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Filed 5/9/12 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT NEIGHBORS FOR SMARTRAIL, B232655 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS125233) Vv. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION EXPOSITION METRO LINE FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITYet al., [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendants and Respondents; LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITYet al., Real Parties in Interest. THE COURT: The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on April 17, 2012, was certified for partial publication. For good cause, publication is modified to include parts 5 through 8 of the opinion. Thus, the note at the bottom of page one of the opinion is modified to now read: * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, this opinionis certified for publication with the exception of parts 3 and 4 of the Discussion. There is no changein the judgment. * BIGELOW,P.J. FLIER,J. GRIMES,J. PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. [ am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2700, Los Angeles, California 90067. On May 25, 2012, I served true copies of the following documentdescribed as PETITION FOR REVIEW ontheinterested parties in this action as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST _X BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressedto the personsat the addresseslisted in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that the correspondenceis placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. __ BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: | enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by the overnight service carrier and addressed to the personsat the addresseslisted in the Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight service carrier or delivered such document(s) to a courier or driver authorized by the overnight service carrier to receive documents. I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 25, 2012, at Los Angeles, California. ‘ o K4% ( MKCet Cheryl Pickens / 202016v7 SERVICE LIST Robert D. Thornton, Esq. John J. Flynn, IH, Esq. Robert C. Horton, Esq. Nossaman LLP 18101 Von Karman Avenue Suite 1800 Irvine, CA 92612 Attorneysfor Respondents Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority and Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority Board Ronald W. Stamm Principal Deputy Office of County Counsel 1 Gateway Plaza Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attorneyfor Real Parties-in-Interest and Respondents Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Board Hon. Thomas I. McKnew,Jr. Department SE H c/o Clerk of Court Los Angeles Superior Court 12720 Norwalk Blvd. Norwalk, CA 90650 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight 300 S. Spring Street, 2™ F1., North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013 2020167 Michael H. Zischke, Esq. Andrew B. Sabey, Esq. Rachel R. Jones, Esq. Cox, Castle & Nicholson 555 California Street, 10" Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae League ofCalifornia Cities California State Association of Counties Tiffany K. Wright, Esq. Remy Moose Manley, LLP 455 Capitol Mall, Suite 210 Sacramento, CA 95814 Bradley R. Hogin, Esq. Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart 555 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1200 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae Southern California Association ofGovernments,et al.