IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LONG BEACH POLICE OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION AND DOES1-150,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs. |
CITY OF LONG BEACH,a
municipal corporation, LONG
BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Moher MCDONNELL, Chief of
olice
Defendants andAppellants,
LOS ANGELES TIMES
COMMUNICATIONSLLC,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
Case No. §200872
2d Civ. No. B231245
Los Angeles Super. Ct. No.
NC055491
Hon. Patrick T. Madden, Judge
SUPREME COURT
FILED
APR 16 2012
Frederick K. Oficn Cierk
Deputy
FILED WITH PERMISSION
ANSWERTO PETITIONSFOR REVIEW
KELLI L. SAGER (SBN 120162)
ROCHELLE L. WILCOX
(SBN 197790)
JEFF GLASSER (SBN 252596)
DAVIS WRIGHTTREMAINE LLI
865 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90017
Tel: (213) 633-6800
Fax: (213) 633-6899
KARLENE W. GOLLER
(SBN 147065)
LOS ANGELES TIMES
COMMUNICATIONS LLC
202 West First Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Tel: (213) 237-3760
Fax: (213) 237-3810
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest and Respondent
LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONSLLC ‘
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
) Case No. S200872
LONG BEACHPOLICE OFFICERS)
ASSOCIATION AND DOES1-150, ) 2d Civ. No. B231245
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Los Angeles Super. Ct. No.
NC055491
Hon. Patrick T. Madden, Judge
VS.
CITY OF LONG BEACH,a
municipal corporation, LONG
BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT,
TAMES MCDONNELL,Chiefof
olice,
Defendants and Appellants.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
COMMUNICATIONSLLC,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
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ANSWER TO PETITIONS FOR REVIEW
KELLI L. SAGER (SBN 120162) KARLENE W. GOLLER
ROCHELLE L. WILCOX (SBN 147065)
(SBN 197790) LOS ANGELES TIMES
JEFF GLASSER (SBN 252596) COMMUNICATIONS LLC
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLF 202 West First Street
865 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90012
Los Angeles, California 90017 Tel: (213) 237-3760
Tel: (213) 633-6800 Fax: (213) 237-3810
Fax: (213) 633-6899
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest and Respondent
LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW OF THE
ADDITIONALISSUES TO PREVENT COLLUSIVE THIRD
PARTY REVERSE-CPRA LITIGATION.uu...eeeeects neeeeeees 11
A. Permitting Reverse-CPRA Injunction And Appeal
Procedures Is Inconsistent With The CPRA And
FilarSky. ......scsccccescessceeeceeseceeensersccessaseseesseeseessseeeseeesseeseneeneees 12
B. This Court Should Grant Review Of The Additional
Issues To Prevent Delays In Disclosure Of Public
Records That The CPRA Is Designed To Prevent................ 17
C. This Court Should Grant Review OfThe Additional
Issues To Ensure That The CPRA’s Fee-Shifting
Provisions Are Applied To Collusive Reverse-CPRA
ACTIONS. ......ccescecsceessesscncececeeceneeessneuaueseeeseseaeeceseseeeseeeeseaeerneea 19
Tl. CONCLUSION 0... ecceesssecsrsestecseecseneeceseceecessseaeeceanecsteseseneeseaeesensntigs 21
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 450 (1962) wo... ceccscccsscsesececseeececsectseeecseeeeesanecsaeescesecersessseneees6
Black Panther Party v. Kehoe,
42 Cal. App. 3d 645 (1974)... ccecscecsesseeeceeeesecceesesseesesessaesenseesesseeeasens 15
City of Santa Rosa v. Press Democrat,
187 Cal. App. 3d 1315 (1986) occcee eecceetseeseescsesreecessseseseeseseessesessenes 15
Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior
Court,
42 Cal. 4th 278 (“POST”)eeccccccceseeeessnecesneeeseeeessneeereeeeeesereeseates 5,8
County of Santa Clara (Naymark) v. Superior Court,
171 Cal. App. 4th 119 (2009)... eesceesessseeeneseseeesessesseeceseeersaeenssens 16
Cuccia v. Superior Court,
153 Cal. App. 4th 347 (2007)... cccceeeeessccneeeseeesecneeesessesssesessessnersaseaes 7
Filarsky v. Superior Court,
28 Cal. 4th 419 (2002)...eeeceessecesneeceeenecesceeeseeseeesaaeesnecceseeens passim
Fontana Police Dep’t v. Villegas-Banuelos,
74 Cal. App. 4th 1249 (1999)oeeeeseeeseseeseeteeeeesevereeneaeneeens 10, 20
Freedom Newspapers,Inc. v. Superior Court,
186 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (1986)...eeeeecseceneeeseeceseeesnssteeeessseeeeseneey 18
Gwartz v. Superior Court,
71 Cal. App. 4th 480 (1999)oeeeeeessecseeneceresseaseeseeseeseeseeaseseseeeneeneeey 7
Int’! Federation of Professional & Technical Eng., Local 21, AFL-
CIO v. Superior Court,
A2 Cal. 4th 319 (2007)... .ccccsccssccssseeseneeceseeeceseesseeesesseeseeesaeeesaseseenenes 14
Korean Amer. Legal Advocacy Foundation v. Los Angeles,
23 Cal. App. 4th 376(1994)... eceecseeesseceeeeecreesseeeeseesseeseeseseseeseninene 15
Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. Superior Court,
65 Cal. App. 3d 661 (1977) .....eeecceessceeseecessesseeedenssnseecesseessecsssserseesseeaes 15
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINELLP
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Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Auth.,
88 Cal. App. 4th 1381 (2001)...cceescccsssceseseeessseseeseeeesssseseeeesns 18
Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n,
7 Cal. App. 4th 618 (1992)... cccssecssesssereescsessnscsesasscseessesessssneseners 15
Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist.,
202 Cal. App. 4th 1250 (2012) (petition for review pending, Cal.
Supreme Court Case No. S200500) .......cceccsssscccsssecessseesseeeenees 2, 10, 20 |
New York Times v. Superior Court,
52 Cal. App. 4th 97 (1997) ....eceeccceccsssceseseeesessneesteseeeseeeceesasenneseesaees 6, 8
Powers v. City of Richmond, |
10 Cal. 4th 85 (1995) oo. eaeeesseecneeeceessnseseeseeesaeesenessesesssenseaneraes 9, 18, 19
Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, LLC,
112 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (2004), overruled on other grounds................. 14
STATUTES
5 ULS.C. § S52. ccesssetesteeeeenevecccncceeececeseseesseceneenaaaeseseeeceseeacerseseseeceseeeoeseses 14
California Code of Civil Procedure § 526a..........ccccccecceeeeenerseeeeeeeeeeneneeeens 16
California Government Code § 6250,et S€Q.......secseeeeseeereeseeeeeneneneees 1
California Government Code § 6253.3 ....cscssscsssssessesseesesseereesssessteenteeseeneeee dS
California Government Code § 6253(b) ......ccccccsscscscseceecessceeceeessreccenseceeeeeeeeeeees 12
California Government Code § 6253(C) .......eeseescccceccessseeessesnnceseeeesensssaeeceeseenees 12
California Government Code § 6258 .........ccccsssssscecceseesseesteneaeneeesesesneaeeees 13, 18
California Government Code § 6259 00... cece eescesscceseccceseereseeetateesneseateneneenaes 18
California Government Code § 6259(C) .......eccssccccesssestceeeseeseteeeseeeeseeaes 17, 19
California Government Code § 6259(d) oo... ceeccssseceessneceeteeeeenneeeeeee 10, 19
California Penal Code § 832.5 .oc.ecccccccccssscsssecenseesseccesceeeseaecteesaeeeneesseeseeneeees 5
California Penal Code § 832.7 .o.....cceeccccssccsssseceeeeesnsanecsenececeaeeenaeesseeeceeneeeees 5
California Penal Code § 832.8 0... .ccescsesesscessseceeeeenecseeeecesareeeeneeeseesseeeeseees 5
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
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TREATISES
6 Witkin Cal. Procedure (Sth ed.) § 274 oo... ceseescesessececeseseeeneeeeees
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
California Constitution......... eccececcueceecececcuccecersecavsteceececnauevceaussssusanssess
California Constitution, Article I, § 3(D) .......essseseseeeeeeeeseeteeseteess
OTHER AUTHORITIES
91 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 11 (May 19, 2008)....ccssssssssssssssssssssessssssssseen
CRC 8.500(b)(1), (C) cossssssssesseesssessssssesseesessusesesssessssseesessessssssusssesessee
Orange County Register, February 19, 2012, available at
http://taxdollars.ocregister.com/2012/02/19/sheriff-confirms-
deputys-identity-right-move-wrong-reason/149204/ ........cceeeeeee
San Jose Mercury News, March 28, 2012, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/education/ci_20274624/uc-davis-
DEPPer-Spray-iINCident-report.............ccseseesesceeessseeccccansesceaaceccnenseeees
iv
beseeees 15
beseeees21
seeeseeees 1
veveeeeene6
seseeeeees2
seeeeeeee 7
seceeseon 7
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TO THE HONORABLETANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND TO THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT:
Real Party in Interest and Respondent Los Angeles Times
Communications LLC (‘the Times’) respectfully submits this Answerto the
Petitions For Review submitted by Plaintiffs /Appellants Long Beach Police
Officers Association and Doe Officers 1-150 (collectively “LBPOA”) and
Defendants/Appellants City of Long Beach, Long Beach Police Department
and James McDonnell (collectively “City”’).
Asdiscussed in more detail below, the Second Appellate District
Court ofAppeal properly rejected the arguments jointly advanced by the
purported “plaintiffs” and “defendants”in this reverse-CPRA lawsuit, and
correctly foundthat the identity of police officers who exercised lethal force
against citizens of this State over a five-year period cannotbe kept secret.
The collusive nature of the underlying proceedings, however— in which a
government agency joined forces with its own employeesin a lawsuit
designed to block the disclosure of information under California’s Public
Records Act’ — portends a dangeroustrendthat threatens to derail the State’s
statutory and constitutional goal ofproviding timely information to the
public about the conduct of governmentofficials.
' Cal. Gov’t Code § 6250, et seg.; Cal Const. Art. I, § 3(b).
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Consequently, if this Court accepts review of this case, The Times
respectfully requests that it accept for review the following additional issues
of statewide concern (CRC 8.500(b)(1), (c)):
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1, May an employee of a public agency bring a reverse-CPRA lawsuit
that the agency itself is prohibited from bringing under Filarsky v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 4th 419 (2002)?
2. DoesFilarsky v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 4th 419 (2002) and public
policy bar a government agency and its employees from cooperating
in a collusive lawsuit designed to block the disclosure of records in
response to a CPRA request?
3. Are lawsuits brought by public employeesor third parties to block the
disclosure of public records subject to the provisions of the CPRA,
including the provisions for fee-shifting and expedited review?
> Similar reverse-CPRA issues have been raised in another Petition
For Review pending in this Court. Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified
School Dist., California Supreme Court Case No. $200500. In recent years,
the practice by public employees of suing to block disclosure of public
records by their employers has become more and more common,
particularly by police officers and their unions. Consequently, this Court
should accept review ofthese additional issues even if it declines to reach
the issues raised by Petitioners.
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STATEMENTOF THE CASE
This lawsuit arose from a newspaper’s inquiry into the use oflethal
force by Long Beachpolice officers. On December 12, 2010, Long Beach
police officers shot and killed an unarmed 35-year-old man, Douglas Zerby,
who wascarrying a garden hose nozzle that police apparently mistook for a
gun. C.T. 000035, 000057-000080. In the wakeofthis controversial
shooting, on December 15, 2010, Los AngelesTimesreporter Richard
Winton madea request to the City under the California Public Records Act
(“CPRA”)for “[t]he names of Long Beachpolice officers involved in the
December 12 office[r] involved shooting in the 5300 block of East Ocean
Boulevard,” and “[t]he names of Long Beach police officers involved in
officer involved shootings from Jan. 1[,] 2005 to Dec. 11, 2010.” C.T.
000048-000054.
The City apparently informed LBPOAandthe affected police
officers about The Times’ CPRA requests, and notwithstanding the
deadlines for disclosure set forth in the CPRA, agreed to withhold the
requested information until January 10, 2011. C.T. 000006-000007.°
Taking their cue, and without providing notice to The Times, LBPOA
* In light of the City’s current position supporting LBPOA’s lawsuit —
a lawsuit that in name only portrays them as adverse parties — this appears to
have been a deliberate decision to assist LBPOAin obtaining an order
“restraining” the City from doing something it did not want to do: release
the namesofpolice officers involved in shooting civilians.
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initiated a lawsuit against the City to block the disclosure of the requested
records. C.T. 000005-000020. Thetrial court issued a temporary
restraining order on December 30, 2010 (C.T. 000024; LBPOAPetitioner’s
Appendix (P.A.) 000146),* but ordered LBPOAto give notice to The Times,
and subsequently permitted The Timesto intervene to oppose the injunction
request. 12/30/10 Hearing Tr.at 2-5; P.A. at 000193 (Trial Court’s Order
Denying Preliminary Injunction at 12).
From the outset, the City “defendants” joined with the LBPOA
“plaintiffs” to support issuance of an injunction preventing disclosure of
information to The Times. See, e.g., C.T. 000236-000241. After reviewing
The Times’ opposition brief, however, and hearing argumentthat included
The Times’ counsel, the trial court rejected the injunction request, but
granted a thirty-day stay to permit the parties to seek appellate writ relief.
C.T. 000300-000301. LBPOA and City delayed almost an entire month
before filing writ petitions with the Court of Appeal, in which they conceded
that the trial court’s ruling was not an appealable order;? nonetheless,
LBPOAalsofiled a Notice of Appeal, which the Court ofAppeal held
automatically stayed the trial court’s denial of the preliminary injunction
* The Notice of Ruling with the Temporary Restraining Orderis in
the Petitioner’s Appendix submitted by LBPOAto the Court of Appeal, but
was not included in the Clerk’s Transcript. See P.A. 000146.
> LBPOA Writ Petition at 6; City Writ Petition at 6.
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request. 2/23/11 Order at 1.° Further demonstratingthe collusive nature of
the underlyinglitigation, the City then filed its own Notice ofAppeal —even
though it ostensibly had prevailed as the defendantin the trial court. C.T.
000314-000315. The Times’ motion to dismiss the appeals,or, in the
alternative, for calendar preference, was denied on April 19, 2011, and the
appeals proceeded with briefing and oral argument.
On February 7, 2012 — thirteen months after The Times requested
information from the City under the CPRA — the Second Appellate District
Court of Appeal unanimously held that the objections to disclosure raised by
the City and LBPOAwereinvalid. Addressing the Petitioners’ primary
objection, the Court ofAppeal rejected Petitioners’ assertion that the
identity of police officers who exercise lethal force are barred from
disclosure underthe “Pitchess” statutes, Penal Code §§ 832.5, 832.7 and
832.8. Op. at 11-20. In its ruling, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on this
Court’s decision in Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Trainingv.
Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 278, 291-297 (“POST”), which similarly had
rejected argumentsraised by police officers that their identities could be
shielded from the public. The Court of Appealalso cited to a decision by
the Attorney General, which had addressed the precise issue raised by
° The Court of Appeal subsequently issued an ordertreating
LBPOA’spetition as a petition for a writ of supersedeas petition, which was
granted. 3/11/2011 Orderat 1-2.
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Petitioners two years earlier, and had rejected the argumentthat disclosure
of police officers’ identities in connection with a specific event — like the
shooting of a unarmed citizen — had to be kept secret forever. See 91 Ops.
Cal. Atty. Gen. 11 (May 19, 2008).
Finally, in reaching its conclusion that the namesof officers must be
disclosed, the Court of Appeal properly held that the speculative safety
concerns presented by the City and LBPOA did notclearly outweigh the
manifest public interest in disclosure, noting that the identity of police
officers is “all the more a matter of public interest when those officers use
deadly force andkill a suspect.” Op. at 22 (quoting New York Timesv.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 4th 97, 105 (1997)).
The Court of Appeal’s decision on these issues was well-reasoned,
and is entirely consistent with controlling authority from this Court, with the
decision in New York Times, and with the conclusions reached by the
Attorney General. There is no contrary published decision on those issues
that would justify review by this Court. See CRC 8.500(b)(1).
Nonetheless, despite the Court of Appeal’s published decision —
whichis binding on law enforcement agenciesandtrial courts throughout
the state’ — the names of law enforcementofficers involved in uses of force
7 See, e.g., Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450,
455 (1962) (understare decisis doctrine, court of appeal decision must be
followed byall superior courts in California, regardless of which appellate
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still are being improperly withheld. For example, the Alameda Superior
Court last week refused to disclose the namesof officers namedin a report
by retired Supreme Court Justice Cruz Reynoso about the use of pepper
against passive student protesters at UC Davis. Pike v. Univ. of Calif. Bd.
of Regents, Alameda Superior Court Case No. RG12-619930; see also “UC
Davis pepper-spray report should be released, judge says,” Jose
Mercury News, March 28, 2012, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/education/ci_20274624/uc-davis-pepper-
spray-incident-report. Similarly, in February, just days after the Court of
Appeal’s decision, the Orange County Sheriff refused to comply with CPRA
requests for the identity of the deputy sheriff who shot and killed a Marine
in front of his children, relenting only after the San Clemente Patch
published anarticle identifying the officer based on information from other
sources. See “Sheriff confirms deputy’s identity: Right move, wrong
reason,” Orange County Register, February 19, 2012, available at
http://taxdollars.ocregister.com/2012/02/19/sheriff-confirms-deputys-
identity-right-move-wrong-reason/149204/. These cases demonstrate the
district rendered the opinion); Gwartz v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 4th
480, 481 (1999) (“[w]e thought — incorrectly, as it turned out — thatthe trial
courts would simply follow our opinion even if they disagreed with it. Stare
decisis and all that stuff.... But sometimes it seems as though we have to
remind the lowercourt there is a judicial pecking order”); Cucciav.
Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 4th 347, 353-354 (2007) (“[i]t is simply not
appropriate for the trial court to state its disagreement and rule contrary to
the appellate opinion,” or claim case was “wrongly decided”).
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continued intransigence of public agencies in complying with requests by
the press and public for the names ofpeace officers who use force while on
duty. Consequently, if this Court grants review ofthis case, it should affirm
the Court of Appeal’s decision, and reaffirm its holding in POST that “the
public must be kept fully informed ofthe activities of its peace officers.” 42
Cal. 4th at 297 (citing New York Times, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 104-05)
(emphasis added).
In addition, if this Court grants review, it should resolve the
additional issues raised here, namely, whether a public agency can
effectively collude with its employee(s) orthird partiesto initiate litigation
for the purpose of blocking the disclosure of public records.
In Filarsky v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 4th 419, 423 (2002), this Court
barred public agencies from bringing “reverse-CPRA”lawsuits, finding that
the “exclusive procedureforlitigating the issue of a public agency’s
obligation to disclose records”is for “a declaratory relief proceeding[to be]
commenced only by an individual or entity seeking disclosure” of those
records. Id. at 423, 426. This Court concluded that allowing public
agenciesto initiate litigation of this nature would undermine the CPRA’s
carefully structured protections for public records requesters, including fee
shifting for successful PRA requesters, expedited procedures in thetrial
court, discretionary appellate review only by extraordinary writ rather than
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by mandatory appeal, and a prohibition on automatic stays that block the
disclosure of public records. Id. at 427-429.
In a transparent end-run of Filarsky, public agency employees have
worked hand-in-hand with agencies to initiate the same kind of injunctive
relief lawsuits that the agencies are prohibited from bringing, including the
lawsuit in this case. Even where, as here, the lawsuits are unsuccessful, the
agencies and their employees can delay disclosure of the records for many
- months,if not years, while the “plaintiffs” appeal the denial of a preliminary
injunction. Indeed, in this case, even the public agencies that were the
nominal defendants were allowed to appeal the denial of the request for a
preliminary injunction — even though the City “defendants” technically
prevailed in the trial court! See 4/19/11 Order denying The Times’ Motion
to Dismiss Appeals.
The proceduraltactic used in this case has substantively delayed the
public from learning the identities of the Long Beach police officers
involved in shootings over the last six years — even though the City and
LBPOAwereunsuccessfulin the trial court and in the Court of Appeal.
This delay is directly contrary to the CPRA’s goal of providing timely
information to the public about the conduct of governmentofficials. Asthis
Court recognized in Powers v. City of Richmond,10 Cal. 4th 85, 111
(1995), the purpose of the 1984 amendmentto the CPRA barring appeals
and requiring expeditious resolution through the appellate writ process was
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to prevent “delays of the appeal process, by meansofwhich public officials
are frustrating the intent of the laws for disclosure”so that by the time the
information is disclosed, “the story [is] no longer newsworthy.”
The use of this reverse-CPRA procedure also has thrown into doubt
the ability of prevailing public records requesters to recover their attorneys’
fees and costs, despite the statutory mandate designed to encourage
vindication of the public’s rights. See Gov’t Code § 6259(d); Fontana
Police Dep’t v. Villegas-Banuelos, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1249, 1253 (1999) (the
prevailing party in an action thatis “the functional equivalent of a
proceeding to compel production of” public records under the CPRA is
“entitled to recover attorneys’ fees despite the fact that he was not
denominated‘plaintiff in the action”). Although LBPOA admitted to the
Court of Appeal that it should have to pay The Times’ fees if The Times
ultimately prevails,® police unions have argued in other casesthat the
CPRA’s mandatory fee-shifting provision does not permit an award offees
against them. See, e.g., Los Angeles Times Communications LLC v. Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Superior Court Case
No. BS123076. See also Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School
® LBPOA madethis concession when faced with The Times’
argument that LBPOA should not have standing to pursue a reverse-CPRA
lawsuit, in part because of the detrimental impact on the CPRA’s goals if
prevailing requesters cannot recover fees. LBPOA SecondDistrict
Opening Brief 35-36.
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Dist., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1250, 1268 (2012) (“‘a requesting party who
participates in a reverse-CPRA lawsuit would not be entitled to the recovery
of attorney fees”) (petition for review pending, Cal. Supreme Court Case
No. 8200500).
Consequently, this Court should accept the additional issues for
review to make clear that public employeesorthird parties whostandin the
shoes of a public agency in opposing public records act requests are subject
to the same fee-shifting rules that would apply to a public agencythat is
sued under the CPRA.’? Without mandatory fee recovery for prevailaing
public records requesters, public agencies and their employees can utilize
reverse-CPRA cases to underminea vital aspect of the CPRA.
I
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW OF THE ADDITIONAL
ISSUES TO PREVENT COLLUSIVE THIRD PARTY REVERSE-
CPRA LITIGATION.
As discussed above,this case and other recent cases demonstrate the
need for this Court’s intervention to prevent public agencies and their
employees from evading the statutory and constitutional mandatesofthis
State’s Public Records Act. Allowing third partiesto initiate litigation to
block the disclosure of public records — without imposing upon them, and
* In addition, where,as here, the public agencyeffectively invitesits
employeesorthird parties to initiate a lawsuit seeking to frustrate disclosure
of public records, the agency shouldbe jointly and severally liable for the
requesters’ fees incurred in defending the public’s right of access.
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their cooperating public agencies, the strictures of the CPRA — invites abuse,
and effectively negates the carefully-constructed protections set forth in the
Act.
A. Permitting Reverse-CPRA Injunction And Appeal ProceduresIs
Inconsistent With The CPRA AndFilarsky.
This case provides a textbook example ofwhy reverse-CPRA suits
should be prohibited, so that public agencies cannot evadetheir legal
obligations by orchestrating litigation with supposedly “adverse”parties.
In conformance with the policy goal of promoting maximum public
access to records, the CPRA expressly requires agencieslike the City to
makepublic records “promptly available” to requesters like The Times.
Gov’t Code § 6253(b). Consistent with this language, public agencies are
required to provide a response no more than 10 daysafter receiving a PRA
request, unless good cause exists for a two-week extension of this deadline.
Gov't Code § 6253(c). Here, instead of providing requested information
“promptly,” or even responding within the statutory period, the City
stonewalled, so that LBPOA would have sufficient timeto file a
conspiratorial lawsuit for an order enjoining disclosure of the requested
information. '°
'0 Here,as in other cases, the putative “third party”plaintiffs filed
their injunction lawsuit without even providing notice to the requester
whose request wasthe subject of the lawsuit. If the trial court had not sua
sponte ordered that The Times be addedasa real partyin interest, the
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The City’s pretense of being a “defendant” in this case was almost
immediately abandoned;at the hearing before the trial court, counsel for the
City joined LBPOAinarguing against disclosure of the officers’ names.
See 1/18/11 Hearing Tr. at 9-13. Even more notably, the City then appealed
from the trial court’s order in its favor, which deniedthe plaintiffs’
preliminary injunction request. C.T. 000314-000315. In subsequent
proceedings, the City has adoptedall ofthe arguments presented by LBPOA
in its appellate briefs, and even filed a Petition for Review in this Court.
See, e.g., City of Long Beach Second District Opening Brief at 2-4, 6-29;
SecondDistrict Reply at 1-18.
This wink-and-nodcollusion between the City and LBPOAis a
transparent attempt to circumvent this Court’s decision in Filarsky, 28 Cal.
4th at 423-426, which held that the “exclusive procedureforlitigating the
issue of a public agency’s obligation to disclose records”is for “a
declaratory relief proceeding [to be] commenced only by an individual or
entity seeking disclosure” of those records. Id. at 423, 426 (emphasis
added). As this Court pointed out, Government Code § 6258 allows only
CPRA requester to seek injunctive or declarative relief or writ of mandate
collusive reverse-CPRA lawsuit would have proceeded with the only
participants being the City and LPBOA — both of which sought to prevent
disclosure to The Times.
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“to enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public
record.” Id. at 428-429.
Although this Court was faced in Filarsky with a lawsuit initiated by
a public agency, and thus did not expressly address third-party lawsuits
seeking to block disclosure of public records, the rationale for the decision
applies equally here. The CPRA was designed expressly to serve the
interests of individuals seeking information from the government; it was not
intendedto provide a meansfor public agencies (or their surrogates) to
discourage journalists and others who scrutinize government conduct from
seeking information through the CPRA.
Moreover, this Court noted in Filarsky that the federal Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) expressly permits “reverse” FOIA”actions
to bar release of public records, but the CPRA does not contain such a
provision. Id. at 432. Thus, this Court indicated that parties seeking to
prevent disclosure are outside of the purview of the Act. Id. See also
Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, LLC, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1508 n.6
(2004)(“there is no express authority for a third party to bring an action to
preclude a public agency from disclosing documents under the CPRA”;
noting that the press agreed to third-party TRO application), overruled on
other grounds, Int’] Federation of Professional & Technical Eng., Local 21,
AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 319, 335 (2007).
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Similarly, in Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 661 (1977), the court recognized that “‘a subject person has right
under Act to prevent disclosure of the record to any other person.” Id. at
668 (quoting Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645 (1974)).
See also City of Santa Rosa v. Press Democrat, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1315, 1320
(1986) ( “there is no provision for an action by the government agencyor for
any action to prevent disclosure”) (emphasis in original). The CPRA itself
makesclear that a “state or local agency may not allow another party to
'' LBPOA attemptedto distinguish Filarsky by claiming that it was
limited to cases wherethe plaintiffs are seeking declaratory judgment — a
limitation that does not appear anywhere in the case. LBPOA Second
District Opening Brief at 34. LBPOA also claimed thatthis caseis
somehow different than Filarsky becauseit is seeking equitable relief (id.),
namely, a temporaryrestraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a
permanentinjunctionin its first (and only) “cause of action.” Second
District Clerk’s Transcript 000010-000011. But an injunction is a remedy,
not a cause of action. See 6 Witkin Cal. Procedure (5th ed.) § 274.
“Because a preliminary injunction is an interim remedy, and not a cause of
action, a cause of action must exist before an injunction is issued.” Id.; see
also Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n, 7 Cal. App. 4th 618, 623
(1992) (“a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be
granted”); Korean Amer. Legal Advocacy Foundation v. Los Angeles, 23
Cal. App. 4th 376, 398-399 (1994) (same).
Here, LBPOAandthe officers have not identified a cognizable
“cause of action.” The only thing identified in the text of the First Cause of
Actionis “the Public Records Act.” C.T. 000010 (§ 16). But, as LBPOA
admitted in the Court of Appeal, the Legislature has provided that only the
public records requester enjoys a cause of action to determine whether a
particular record or class of records may be disclosed. LBPOA Second
District Opening Brief at 30-31. Thus, LBPOA’s cause of action cannot be
a “reverse-CPRA”cause of action, because such an action to prohibit the
disclosure of public records is outside the exclusive procedurecalled forin
the CPRA.
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control the disclosure of information that is otherwise subject to disclosure
pursuantto this chapter.” Gov’t Code § 6253.3 (emphasis added).
Here, the City was permitted to evade the protections afforded to
requesters under Filarsky and the CPRA by effectively outsourcing to its
employeesthe role of “plaintiffs” in seeking to bar disclosure of the
requested information (and in the process, disregarding its own legal
obligation to make the records promptly available). This insupportable
conduct illustrates the problems caused by reverse-CPRA lawsuits, and
should be addressed bythis Court.”
The Second District relied on an earlier appellate decision, County
of Santa Clara (Naymark) v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 4th 119 (2009),
in concluding that the CPRA does not preclude third parties from bringing
equitable actions to prevent disclosure of public records. If this Court grants
review, The Times will demonstrate why both Filarsky and the public policy
behind the CPRA support the opposite conclusion. Amongotherthings,in
Naymark, the Court distinguished between lawsuits that may involve public
records in some way,and lawsuits that directly involve “whether a particular
record or class of records must be disclosed.” (Emphasis added.) This
lawsuit clearly involvesthelatter. In contrast, the plaintiffs in Naymark
were seeking redress under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a to prevent
public agencies from engaging in policies that would impede public access
to records (such as charging impermissible “research” fees, requiring
requesters to show driver’s licenses, and forcing requestersto state the
purposeoftheir requests). Because the lawsuit “furthered,” rather than
“obstructed,”the “purpose of the CPRA,” and becauseit was outside the
class of cases on whether public records must be disclosed, the Court of
Appeal in Naymarkheldthat the plaintiffs’ lawsuit could proceed. Id.
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B. This Court Should Grant Review Of The Additional Issues To
Prevent Delays In Disclosure Of Public Records That The CPRA
Is Designed To Prevent.
Where, as here, a lawsuit involving the disclosure of public recordsis
allowed to proceed outside the auspices of the CPRA, the Legislature’s
intention to provide for expedited review is frustrated. Even though the City
and LBPOAhad submitted the complete trial court record in connection
withtheir initial writ petitions — utilizing the review process contemplated
by the CPRA — the subsequent recognition of their “appeals” required a
duplicative Clerk’s Transcript to be prepared, resulting in months ofdelay.
Bythe time theparties’ briefing in the Court of Appeal was concluded and
oral argumenttook place, more than a year had passed since The Times
made its CPRA request in December 2010 for the names of the Long Beach
officers involvedin the exercise oflethal force.'°
In contrast, the Legislature amended the CPRA expressly to provide
expedited appellate relief through the writ process,“ so that public agencies
would be prohibited “from delaying the disclosure of public records by
appealinga trial court decision and using continuancesin orderto frustrate
'5 The Second District Court ofAppeal also declined The Times’
request for an expedited appeal (CRC 8.240) (April 19, 2011 Orderat1),
demonstrating that that the appeals process is inadequate to protect the rights
of requesters to obtain speedy review.
'4 Under the CPRA, any requests for appellate relief must proceed
within 20 days by extraordinary writ. Gov’t Code § 6259(c).
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the intent of the Act.” Filarsky, 28 Cal. 4th at 426-427; see also Freedom
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1108 (1986)
(citing legislative history, court held that “[t]he sponsors ofthis bill seek to
correct an injustice they perceive due to Orange County’s delayingtactics,
as well as the potential for other public agencies to delay the disclosure of
public documents”).!° The reverse-CPRA lawsuit brought by LBPOAin
cooperation with the City threatens to render this provision of the CPRA a
nullity — public agencies can simply encourage their employeesor other
third parties to file injunctive relief lawsuits, and if the suit is unsuccessful,
the agency can join the employeesor third parties in protracted appellate
proceedings that delay disclosure for months, if not years. See Powers, 10
Cal. 4th at 111 (expedited appellate proceedings provisions are intended to
prohibit a party “from delaying the disclosure of public records by appealing
a trial court decision and using continuancesin orderto frustrate the intent
of the Public Records Act”); Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor
Transp. Auth., 88 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1386 (2001) (the “exclusive purpose”
'S The Legislature made the policy decision that questions concerning
the public’s right of access to records should be heard expeditiously,
including in appellate courts. Because the Legislature outlined in
Government Code §§ 6258 and 6259 the exclusive procedures for dealing
with the question ofwhether public records must be disclosed, the appellate
provision concerning expedited review should be applied to any case that
involves the disclosure of public records, regardless of how or by whomitis
initiated.
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of the provision for review by extraordinary writ “was to speed appellate
review’).
Allowing parties in reverse-CPRA cases to proceed by appeal also
results in an automatic stay, in contravention of the CPRA provision that no
automatic stays be given from trial court’s ruling in favor of aCPRA
requester. See Gov’t Code § 6259(c)(stay ofa trial court order “shall not be
granted unless the petitioning party demonstrates it will otherwise sustain
irreparable damage and probable success on the merits”) (emphasis added).
The CPRA’s prohibition on automatic stays reflects the Legislature’s
objective to prevent proponents of secrecy from “delaying disclosure ofthe
records ... by simply filing an appeal from the trial court’s ruling” and by
requiring the proponent of secrecy to “make the substantial showing
required by the statute”to obtain a stay. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 119
(George, J., concurring).
This Court should address the Additional Issues presented, to ensure
that reverse-CPRA lawsuits, like the underlying lawsuit here, are not used to
thwart the Legislature’s goals of expedited review.
C. This Court Should Grant Review Of The Additional Issues To
Ensure That The CPRA’s Fee-Shifting Provisions Are Applied
To Collusive Reverse-CPRA Actions.
LBPOAappears to concede that it is subject to an attorneys’ fee
award under the CPRA (Gov’t Code § 6259(d)) if the trial court’s and
Second District’s orders are affirmed. LBPOA Second District Opening
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Brief 35-36.'° Butother third parties have claimedthat the CPRA fee-
shifting provision applies only to public agencies, and that no fee award may
be granted against third parties who seek to prevent disclosure of public
records. See Los Angeles Times Communications LLC v. Superior Court,
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS123076. Similarly, although the
City’s position on this issue is unclear, other public agencies have claimed
that they should not be held responsible for fees incurred asa result of
lawsuits by public employees or other third parties to block disclosure of
public records. Id. Although the Fourth Appellate District properly held
that a prevailing party in an action that is “the functional equivalent” of a
CPRA actionis entitled to recover fees regardless of whetherthat party is
denominated as the “plaintiff? (Fontana Police Dep’tv. Villegas-Banuelos,
74 Cal. App. 4th 1249, 1253 (1999)), the Second Appellate District
disagreed in Marken,noting in dicta that a requester could not recover
attorneys’ fees and costs in a reverse-CPRA action. 202 Cal. App. 4th at
1268.17
This lack of clarity erodes the CPRA’s provision for a mandatory fee
recovery to prevailing public records requesters, which serves as an
'© TBPOA’s counsel also made this concession at oral argumentin
the Second District. The City has not agreed that it is subject to a fee award.
'’ In this case, The Times’ fee motion is being submittedto thetrial
court in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, but there is no ruling
at this stage.
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“incentive[] for members of the public to seek judicial enforcementoftheir
right to inspect public records subject to disclosure.” Filarsky, 28 Cal. 4th at
427. This Court should accept the Additional Issues for review to make
clear that, regardless ofhow or by whom the lawsuit is initiated, a case
involving the disclosure of public records falls within the scope of the
CPRA,and the party seeking to vindicate the public’s right of access to
public records must, if successful, be awarded its attorneys’ fees and costs.
I.
CONCLUSION
Allowing public agency employeesto bring reverse-CPRA lawsuits
obstructs the goals of the CPRA and substantially weakensits protections
for public records requesters. For these reasons and for the reasons stated
above, The Times respectfully requests that this Court grant review of the
Additional Issues set forth above, and protect the rights granted to public
Hl
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records requesters under the CPRA and the California Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED:April 5, 2012 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
KELLI L. SAGER
ROCHELLE L. WILCOX
JEFF GLASSER
LOS ANGELES TIMES
COMMUNICATIONS LLC
KARLENE GOLLER
By: eh PA bose,
Kelli L. Sager ~
Attorneys for Real Party In Interest
and Respondent LOS ANGELES
TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
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DATED: April 5, 2012 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
KELLI L. SAGER
ROCHELLE L. WILCOX
JEFF GLASSER
LOS ANGELES TIMES
COMMUNICATIONS LLC
KARLENE GOLLER
By: Aol,Yorn
Uydft\Glasser
Attorneys for Real Party In Interest
and Respondent LOS ANGELES
TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC
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f) f fo “A iO
ya lb.Ds : Li » LY ya 7
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Supreme Court Case No. $200872
Court of Appeal Case No. B231245
PROOF OF SERVICE
Service List
Key: [M] Delivery by Mail [FD] Delivery by Federal Express [H] Delivery by Hand
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[FD] James E. Trott, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
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Law Offices of James E. Trott Officers Association
8840 Warner Avenue, Suite 101
Fountain Valley, CA 92708
Tel: (714) 596-8995; Fax: (714) 596-8998
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City of Long Beach Long Beach Police Department
333 West Ocean Boulevard - 11th Floor and James McDonnell
Long Beach, CA 90802-4664
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[FD] Honorable Patrick T. Madden Trial Court
c/o Clerk of the Court
Los Angeles County Superior Court, Dept. B
Long Beach Courthouse
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[FD] Court of Appeal, State of California
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Supreme Court Case No. $200872
Court of Appeal Case No. B231245
PROOF OF SERVICE
DWT 19329045v1 0026175-000385