PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES v. CITY OF LOS ANGELESDefendant and Appellant’s Answer to Petition for ReviewCal.November 10, 2010Pt Supreme Court No. $187243 7 2d Civil No. B216515 LASC Case No. BS112956 eaCOURT FILED NOV 10 2010 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Frederica «. Ohlrich Clerk Deputy PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC Plaintiffand Appellant, VS. CITY OF LOS ANGELES Defendant and Appellant. ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW CARMENA. TRUTANICH,City Attorney (86629x) KENNETH FONG,Deputy City Attorney (140609) AMY BROTHERS,Deputy City Attorney (206283) 700 City Hall East 200 North Main Street Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone (213) 978-8069 Facsimile (213) 978-8214 Attorneysfor Defendant/Appellant CITYOFLOSANGELES Supreme Court No. $187243 2d Civil No. B216515 LASCCase No. BS112956 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC Plaintiffand Appellant, VS. CITY OF LOS ANGELES Defendant and Appellant. ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW CARMENA. TRUTANICH,City Attorney (86629x) KENNETHFONG,Deputy City Attorney (140609) AMY BROTHERS,Deputy City Attorney (206283) 700 City Hall East 200 North Main Street Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone (213) 978-8069 Facsimile (213) 978-8214 Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant CITY OFLOSANGELES TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE(S) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....sccscsscssssssssssssssvessstvessssssvessssseesessseessssee ii J. INTRODUCTION..ucccssssssssesessssessssssesssssesesseesssssveesseseeesesneesssen 1 Il. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW ....esssccescssessssseesseee 3 IN. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS UNDER8.500 FOR GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW... eeeeeesesesecsssseseesseeesssccnseeeerneeusenaes 8 IV. THE APPELLATE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MELLO, COASTAL AND 66427.5 MUST APPLY TO PALISADES BOWL’S PROPOSED SUBDIVISON.........ee 13 A. THE PROPOSED SUBDIVISION IS A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT REQUIRING A COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT seeeesaeeceeeeseeeeeesaeeeteneceseecseeeesseeeeesssaseesesevecseeseessueeeseseeeseeessneeensseeaensgs 13 B. THE LANGUAGE OF THE COASTAL ACT ITSELF DOES NOT PRECLUDE ITS APPLICATION TO MOBILEHOME PARK CONVERSIONS UNDER SECTION 66427.5 AS PALISADES BOWL APPEARS TO ARGUE...eeeeeeeeeeeees 17 C. THE MELLO ACT MANDATES THAT THE CITY PRESERVE AFFORDABLE UNITS WHICH ARE TO BE CONVERTED 1... ceececeesscereneereneesseesesseeeseseesnaseeesaseaseseesesseesenaaees 18 V. CONCLUSION...eeeccencesrenseeseecseseneeseaeesessaeesseeseeensesenaeenes 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES California Coastal Com. v. Quanta Investment Corp. (1980) 113 Ca.App.3d 579... cicscesesseressenecenesseeneeseeseneeestaeteeeneeees 15 Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4™ 1068, 1075... eeccestececssssteeceessstseeeeesesseeees 7 Gualala Festivals Committee v. Cal. Coastal Commission (2010) 183 Cal.App.4” 60, 67 ..cceccccccsceececccesssseeccessssseeeecnsseecesses 15, 16 La Fe, Inc. v. County ofLos Angeles (1999) 73 Cal.App.4™ 231, 235, 240-242 fin 4... 14, 15, 16, 17 Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates LLC v. City ofLos Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4" at 1461, 1467-1471, 1476-1485 ....cceccseeeen sesueeseeeesseeaecceusnersesaesseceseeseenseeseeaeeees 1,3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18 Sequoia Park v. Sonoma County (2009) 176 Cal.App.4™ 1270, 1275, 1288-1292, 1299 ......2, 9, 10, 13 Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 571 oo. cesccesesneeeseneeeeeeececeeesanerceeeseneseneeeeeneeaes 7 il Table of Authorities, cont’d. STATUTES 14 California Code of Regulations Section 13301 oo... eeeecesssceeseeececeessneeeseeeseseseseeseeeeessesssneeessserseusssaesens 1] California Government Code Section 65590 oie iccecsccsssscssssssscscccceseeteneeececeeeeesecececececesenesereeeseseseeees 19 Section 65590(D).......ccecceceeesesseeseecsseeeseesseesseceseeesesesessesssesesessenseecetey 19 Section 65590(2)(1)...ceccsceseccesseeesneeceneeseseeeseeseeseesssesenseeessecseeeseeens 12 Section 65590(D).....:cceceescssseesessneeesscessssecsaeeeeseusnseeesseecseessssseeeeens 19 Section 655901) oo... eceeseesccessceestersseeeseessseeeseescssesenseesenerecseeenseseeaeens 19 Section 66410 wo... ieesssscssssssssesssseeesssssnseeesseesssaageesrsceseneeeenaeaeees 14 Section 66427.5 .oocccscccccccscerceseeseerceecneesecesenerseeeseesessesessseessasanspassim Section 66427.5(€).....csccescecsssecceseececesseecenseeesessseesseseeeseeseesesesensenees 5,9 California Public Resources Code Section 30007 .0......cccccesssesssesssnsceceesececccceeecceccesacecenececasseceecenseeeeeeeees 18 Section 30106 .......cccccssssccccceessssssssneeceeeeecseseseessatseseeseeeeesseneaaes 14, 16 Section 30600(b)........:ceceecsscesseesteeecseceeeeseeseseeeseessasesseeessesnsseneenaes 11 Section 30604 oo... ccsssssesssssscesssssssessssneeeseessauensesaesseesenseeeeeeeees 12 California Rules of Court Rule 8.268.000.0000... euuececeaeececerereesenecceees deveceuveceuseseceuceenscteceueseeneess 8 Rule 8.500... ecccccceccccceeeecccccecccecceuccccssecesseeeeucueevsesesecesseuarsseneesusereess 8 Rule 8.504(D)(3) occ ceccceccscecssceeneeneeeseeesnereseseeessasesseeesesseasoesesnesesaeeetens 8 lil I. INTRODUCTION This case concerns a local zoning matter: Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates LLC’s (Palisades Bowl) attempts to obtain the City ofLos Angeles’ review ofits incomplete application to convert its mobilehomepark to residential ownership under Government Code section 66427.5'. The park is located in the coastal zone as defined in the Coastal Act; consequently, the City required Palisades Bowlto apply for a Mello Act clearance and for a coastal development permit from the City. Palisades Bowl contended that these City requirements were not mandated understate law and were therefore preempted. Ultimately, the Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates LLC v. City of Los Angeles panel applied long established principles to hold that the Mello Act and the Coastal Act provide state law mandates which the City may not ignore in reviewing Palisades Bowl’s proposed section 66427.5 mobilehome park conversion. 187 Cal.App.4" 1461. This Petition for Review is remarkable solely because, for the first time sincethis litigation started, Palisades Bowl challenges the Coastal Act’s application to its proposed mobilehomepark conversion. Throughoutthe priorlitigation, up through and including ' For the remainder ofthis Answer, Government Codesection 66427.5 will be referred to as “section 66427.5.” oral argumentbefore the Appellate Court, Palisades Bowl admitted that it did not question the Coastal Act’s application to its proposed mobilehomepark conversion. In its written papers, Palisades Bowl conceded “Palisades Bowl doesnot contend here (nor did it contend to thetrial court) that §66427.5 somehow preemptsthe state statutes that require it to obtain a coastal development permit from the Coastal Commission.” Palisades Bowl’s Combined Respondent’s Brief and Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, at page 40, footnote 7. Similarly,in its oral argument before Appellate Court, Palisades Bowl maintained that it did not contest the Coastal Act’s application to its mobilehome park conversion. The petition for review does not meetthe criteria for Supreme Court review. Specifically, the Petition does not, as it must, demonstrate a conflict among published decisionsor a necessity to settle an important question of law. The Petition also attempts to recast the holding of Sequoia Park Associates v. Sonoma County (2009) 176 Cal.App.4" 1270 in an attempt to generate a conflict with the Palisades Bowl decision that does not exist. Finally, Palisades Bowl’s earlier and consistent admissions regarding application of the Coastal Act’s application to its proposed mobilehome park conversion demonstrate that the law in this area is already settled. Il. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW Palisades Bowl owns a mobilehome park with more than 170 units, located across Pacific Coast Highway from Will Rogers State Beach. Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4" 1461, 1467. In April 2007,Palisades Bowl representatives contacted the City to discuss variousissues related to its proposed mobilehome park conversion whereupon they were provided a packageofmaterials, including various forms and instructions (such as those related to Mello Act clearances and coastal developmentpermits), and a tract map checklist. Jd. at 1468. Palisades Bowlrepresentatives went to the Planning Department counter in June 2007 and attempted to submit an incomplete application for the proposed subdivision and were advised that the application was incomplete. Jd. In August 2007 the Chief Zoning Administrator for the Department of City Planning, Michael LoGrande, assigned a case manager, Richard Ferguson, to work directly with Palisades Bowl. Over the next few months, Ferguson had several communications with representatives of Palisades Bowl, both telephonic and by e-mail, regarding variousissues, including the requirements Palisades Bowl neededto satisfy and the allowable scope of the City’s review of the proposed subdivision. On November13, 2007, representatives of Palisades Bowl arrived at the Planning Department counter to submit its conversion application. Planning staffers Harper and Ferguson advisedthatthe application was incomplete and that Ferguson would send a follow up email. On November20, 2007, Ferguson sent an e-mail to Palisades Bowl’s engineer,listing “the items you need tofile your application.” The email specifically mentioned an application for a coastal development permit from City and an application to the Housing Department for clearance under the Mello Act. Jd. at 1469. Nofurther action was taken, by the City or Palisades Bowl, until Palisades Bowlfiled the petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunction and declaratory relief on January 17, 2008. The petition/complaint alleged the City failed to compile a properlist of items neededto apply for a mobilehome park conversion, improperly refused to accept Palisades Bowl’s application, and should be deemed complete under the Permit Streamlining Act. Thetrial court concluded that Ferguson’s November 20 e-mail substantially complied with the Permit Streamlining Act’s requirementthat the City provide a written completeness determination. Thetrial court also found that the language of Government Codesection 66427.5(e) precluded the City from requiring compliance with the Mello Act and preempted whatthetrial court considered the City’s local (not State mandated) requirement that Palisades Bowl apply for a coastal development permit from the City. Id. at 1470. Thetrial court entered judgment and issued a peremptory writ commanding the City to deem Palisades Bowl’s application complete and evaluate the application for approval, conditional approval, or disapproval. The City appealed the judgment and Palisades Bowl cross-appealed. The City contended the Mello Act and the Coastal | Act could be harmonized with section 66427.5, and that the trial court erred by finding that section 66427.5 precluded the City from requiring Palisades Bowl to comply with the Mello and preempted the City from requiring a coastal development permit. Palisades Bowl contendedthetrial court abusedits discretion in finding that the City satisfied the requirement of the Permit Streamlining Act to provide a written completeness determination. Jd. at 1471. The Appellate Court issued a published decision on August 31, 2010, upholdingthetrial court’s determination that Palisades Bowl wasnotentitled to have its application deemed complete dueto the City’s alleged failure to comply with the Permit Streamlining Act. Palisades Bowl does not seek review ofthat portion of the opinion. The Appellate Court also decided that section 66427.5 does not preclude the City from imposing conditions and requirements mandated by the Mello Act and Coastal Act on a subdivider seeking to convert a mobilehomepark located in the coastal zone. The panel determined that the City was following state law mandates in requiring Palisades Bowlto obtain a coastal development permit and a Mello Act clearance from the City. Jd. at 1484-1485. The Palisades Bowl appellate panel concludedthat Section 66427.5 did not exempt a mobilehomepark conversion applicant from having to comply with the Coastal Act and the Mello Act mandates that a developer obtain a coastal development permit and to preserve low and median incomeunits to be converted in the coastal zone: “To be sure, the policy behind section 66427.5 is an important one-to encourage conversions of mobilehome parks to resident ownership while protecting nonpurchasingresidents....But the policy considerations behind the Coastal Act-as well as the Mello Act, inasmuchasits genesis was the Coastal Act [citations]-are far more extensive.” Id. at 1485. The court foundthat section 66427.5 did not offer as much protection of affordable housing as the Mello Act did. “[T]he Mello Act preservesthe availability of housing units in the coastal zone dedicated to persons and families of low or moderate income; section 66427.5 would diminish the availability of such dedicated housing units. In short, the protections for low and moderate income persons and families provided by section 66427.5 does not provide the kind of protection so clearly mandated by the Mello Act.” Jd. at 1483. The court also noted that the Coastal Act ‘is an attempt to deal with coastal land use on a statewide basis.’ (Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 571...; see also Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4™ 1068, 1075...[“a fundamental purpose of the Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local government”. Jd. at 1479. The court concluded “[I]n light of the ‘paramount concern’ for protecting coastal resources by regulating development as expressed in the Coastal Act (and by implication, the Mello Act), we conclude that section 66427.5 does not preclude the City from imposing conditions and requirements mandated by the Mello Act and Coastal Act on a subdivider seeking to convert to resident ownership a mobilehome park located in the coastal zone.” Jd. at 1485. On October 13, 2010, Palisades Bowlfiled this Petition in the Supreme Court. Although Palisades Bowl had the opportunity to file a petition for rehearing under Rule of Court 8.268,it did not. Contrary to the requirements for Rule of Court 8.504(b)(3), the Petition does not state whethera petition for rehearing wasfiled. I. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS UNDER8.500 FOR GRANTING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW In an attempt tomanufacture a “conflict” for purposesofRule of Court 8.500, Palisades Bowl now recasts the holding in Sequoia Park, supra. The Sequoia Park court did not hold that a mobilehome park subdivision was subject to the exclusive control of Government Code ¥ 66427.5 to the exclusion of other State mandates, as Palisades Bowlcontends. Rather, the Sequoia Park court held-+that Government Code § 66427.5 pre-empted Sonoma County’s local ordinance, which provisions “deviat[ed] from state-mandated criteria for approving a mobilehome park conversion application.” Sequoia Park v. Sonoma County (2009) 176 Cal.App.4™ 1270, 1299. The Palisades Bowl panel explicitly noted that the Sequoia Park holding did not pertain to a situation where,as here, the City of Los Angeles applied state law mandated requirements to a section 66427.5 conversion: “Two prior decisions interpreting subdivision(e) have held that it precludes local authorities from ‘inject[ing] ...factors [other than thoseset forth in the statute] when considering an application to convert an existing mobilehome park form rental to a resident-ownerbasis.’....Neither decision, however, addresses a situation in whichthe local authority imposed requirementsthat it contended were mandated by anotherstate statute, and thus neither controls here.” 187 Cal.App.4™ 1461, 1476-1477. The Sequoia Park court introducedits opinion as resolving a pre-emption issue: “We conclude that the [Sonoma County] ordinance is expressly preempted....We further conclude that the [county’s] ordinance is impliedly preempted becausethe Legislature, which has established a dominantrole for the state in regulating mobilehomes, has indicated its intent to forestall local intrusion into the particular terrain of mobilehome conversions, declining to expand section 66427.5 in ways that would authorize local governments to imposeadditional conditions or requirements for conversion approval.” Sequoia Park Associates v. County ofSonoma (2009) 176 Cal.App.4™ 1270, 1275 (emphasis added). Misapplying Sequoia Park, supra, Palisades Bow]claimsthat if Palisades Bowldecision is allowedto stand, it will create a loophole such that local governments will be able to get around “exclusive application” of section 66427.5 through local ordinances whichrest on other applicable state statutes. The Palisades Bowl court did nothing more than set forth well-recognized legal principles and apply them to the City of Los Angeles’ local zoning issue. The Coastal Act and the Mello Actare state statutes that dictate the substance ofwhat local governments must do when reviewing an application for subdivision and conversion of affordable housing units. These principles are so well established that Palisades Bowl never argued 10 that the Coastal Act applied to section 66427.5 conversions during the trial court litigation and the appellate court proceedings. ° The Coastal Act requires a developer to seek and obtain a coastal development permit from the local agency and dictates the specific criteria the local agency must apply in its consideration of the coastal developmentpermit application. Palisades Bowl, supra, 187 Cal.App.4" at 1479, 1480. The Coastal Act authorizes a local government,like the City, to “establish proceduresfor the filing, processing, review, modification, approval or denial” of coastal development permits within its coastal zone. (Section 30600(b).) After a local governmenthasestablished these procedures, permit jurisdiction transfers to the local government. Followinga local government’s implementation of a coastal development permit program, “any person wishing to perform a developmentshall obtain a coastal development permit from the local government.” 14 CCR section 13301. The Coastal Act, having delegated permit authority to * Gilchrist and Rutter write in their letter of support for the Petition for Review that the holding of Palisades Bowl contradicts the reasoning in Sequoia Park which notesthatthe legislative scheme governing mobilehome park conversions “would not be advancedif parochial interest were allowedto intrude.” Underlying Gilchrist and Rutter’s assertion is the apparent notion that the interests of the State as expressed in the Mello and Coastal Actsare really just local “parochial” interests. That position makes no sense in light of long established law andasset forth in the Palisades Bowl decision. 1] the City, in accordancé with its 1978 election to adopt a local coastal program, requires the City to determine whether the project complies with all relevant policies of the California Coastal Act of 1976. Pub. Res. Codesection 30604; Palisades Bowl, supra, 187 Cal.App.4" at 1480-1481. The Mello Act mandates the local government to ensure affordable housing units for low and median incomeindividuals and families are maintained in the coastal zone andsets forth the definition of the affordable housing to be preserved. That definition of affordable units to be protected includes mobilehomesin mobilehome parks. Government Codesection 65590(g)(1); Palisades Bowl, supra, 187 Cal.App.4"at 1478. Additionally, Palisades Bowl’s claims that the Palisades Bowl decision would reverse the Sequoia Park holding that the General Plan Housing Element did not to apply to mobilehome park conversions are erroneous. The Sequoia Park court did not determine that Sonoma County deviated from Section 66427.5 by requiring applications to document compliance with “the goals and policies of the General Plan Housing Element...”as Palisades Bowl claims. (Petition, p. 10.) The Sequoia Park court did not discuss this portion 12 of the Sonoma Count ordinance in particular. Rather, Sequoia Park court’s only mention of the General Plan Housing Elementisin its verbatim reproduction of the entire Sonoma County ordinance. Sequoia Park, supra, 176 Cal.App.4™ 1270, 1288-1292. Instead, central to its analysis that the Sonoma County ordinance was preempted wasthe fact that the ordinance mandated whatstate law forbids. Jd. at 1299. The ordinance provided that a mobilehomepark subdivision application could only be approvedif, for example, it demonstrated that appropriate financial provision has been made to underwrite and ensure proper long-term management and maintenance ofall common facilities and infrastructure, etc. Id. IV. THE APPELLATE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MELLO, COASTAL AND 66427.5 MUST APPLY TO PALISADES BOWL’S PROPOSED SUBDIVISON A. THE PROPOSED SUBDIVISIONIS A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT REQUIRING A COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT Palisades Bowl claimsits proposed subdivision is not a developmentproject for purposes of the Coastal Act and therefore 13 does not require a coastal development permit becauseit does not effect a change in the density or intensity of the use. This argument ignores the Coastal Act’s plain language, specifically its definition of development, as well as case law regarding the definition of development. Additionally, Palisades Bow! fails to cite to any case law interpreting “development” which supports its novel claim. Public Resources Codesection 30106 defines developmentas a “change in the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act (commencing with Section 66410 of the Government Code), and any other division of land, includinglot splits.....” The cardinal rule of the Coastal Act is that a developer must obtain a coastal developmentpermit, either from the City orthe Coastal Commission or both, for every developmentproject in the Coastal Zone. As the Palisades Bowl panel pointed out, “A project that involves a subdivision under the Subdivision Map Act constitutes developmentfor the purposes of the Coastal Act (Cf. La Fe, Inc. v. County ofLos Angeles (1999) 73 Cal.App.4™ 231, 240...[“Section 30106 by its terms recognizes that a subdivision of land or lot 14 split can result in changesin the density or intensity of use of property”].) There is no question that the conversion of a mobilehomepark to resident ownershipis a subdivision under the Subdivision Map Act....Thus, a mobilehome park conversion is a “development” for which a coastal development permit is required under the Coastal Act. (See California Coastal Com. v. Quanta Investment Corp. (1980) 113 Ca.App.3d 579...[holding that the conversion of existing apartment units into a stock cooperative form of ownership constitutes a development whichfalls within the permit jurisdiction ofthe various Coastal Commission sunder the California Coastal Act of 1976,]) Palisades Bowl, supra, 187 Cal.App.4™at 1481. Contrary to Palisades Bowl’s contention, the reasoning in Quanta is not moot. (Petition, p. 16.) It continues to be cited favorably. See e.g., La Fe, Inc. v. County ofLos Angeles (1999), 73 Cal.App.4" 231, 240-242; Gualala Festivals Committee, supra, 183 Cal.App.4™at 67. The Coastal Act provides an expansive definition ofthe activities that constitute “development” for purposesofthe Act. 15 Gualala Festivals Committee v. Cal. Coastal Commission (2010) 183 Cal.App.4" 60, 67. The act’s goals include protection ofthe coastline and its resources and maximization ofpublic access. Another purpose is to “minimizethealteration of natural land forms.” La Fe, supra, 73 Cal.App.4"at 235. The actis to be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives. Id. In La Fe, supra, the court found that “development”for purposesofthe Coastal Act includeda lot line adjustment even though the adjustment did not create additional parcels. 73 Cal.App.4™ at 240-242. “The Legislature’s stated intent was to grant the commission permit jurisdiction with respect to any changesin the density or intensity of use of land, including any division ofland. Section 30106 by its terms recognizes that a subdivision ofland or a lot split can result in changes in the density or intensity ofuse of property.” Id. (emphasis added). The court notedthat Pub.Res. Code section 30106 explicitly applies to a ‘subdivision...and any other division of land...’ “The key pointis that section 30106 applies > In a footnote the court noted that the commission had found the proposedlot line adjustment changedthe density andintensity of use of the land. Jd., fn. 4. 16 to a ‘division of land’ andthat a lot line adjustment was such a division of land.” Jd. at 240 (emphasis added). Palisade Bowl’s theory that a mobilehome park conversionis not a developmentunder the Coastal Act is not supported by case law or a plain reading of the statute. Taking this theory to its logical extreme would meanthat air-space subdivisions of existing apartment buildings to condominiums,for example, do not change the density or intensity of use and therefore are excluded from operation of the Coastal Act. In any event, there is additional changein the density and intensity of use with a mobilehome park subdivision, as mobilehome owners maydecide to move their mobilehomesout after the conversion and new owners may movetheir mobilehomesin. B. ©THE LANGUAGE OF THE COASTAL ACT ITSELF DOES NOT PRECLUDEITS APPLICATION TO MOBILEHOME PARK CONVERSIONS UNDER SECTION 66427.5 AS PALISADES BOWL NOW APPEARS TO ARGUE Palisades Bowl also now appearsto argue that the language of the Coastal Actitself limits local action involving mobilehomeparks. (Petition, p. 18.) Not only is this contrary to its stance in all the proceedings below,but Palisades Bowl’s new theory: makes no sense. 17 Also contrary to Palisades Bowl’s new interpretation, Public Resources Codesection 30007is a reaffirmation that local governmentsare still required to make provision for preserving low and median income housingin the coastal zone. As the Palisades Bowl panel determined, the Mello Act provides greater protections for low and median income housing than section 66427.5 and therefore its mandate must be applied to affected conversions. Palisades Bowl, supra, 187 Cal.App.4"at 1482-1484. C. ©THE MELLO ACT MANDATESTHAT THE CITY PRESERVE AFFORDABLE UNITS WHICH ARE TO BE CONVERTED Palisades Bowlclearly ignores the plain language of the Mello Act which makesit applicable to conversions of mobilehomesin mobilehome parks. Palisades Bowlappears to claim that the following quotation: “[n]o provision of this section shall be construed as increasing or decreasing the authority of a local governmentto enact ordinancesorto take any other action to ensure the continued affordability of housing” meansthat any state statute which limits a local agency’s authority to maintainaffordable housing supersedes the Mello Act’s requirements. (Petition, pp. 20-21.) This claim makes no 18 sense. The plain language of the Mello Act, Government Code section 66590(i) merely says that the section does not increase or decrease a local government’s authority to ensure the continued affordability of housing. Additionally, Palisades Bowlcites from section 65590(i), not section 65590(h), as it stated in the Petition. Palisades Bowl’s next argument that Gov. Codesection 65590’s applicability to conversions of mobilehomeparksis actually limited by Section 65590(b) also makes no sense. Subsection (b) does not limit the scope of Section 65590, which providesthat units, where a lower or moderate incomefamily is no longerresiding, maystill be considered affordable units if a lower or moderate income family was evicted in the past year and for purposes of avoiding the requirements of Mello. Contrary to Palisades Bowl’s interpretation, the phrase in subsection (b) showsthe Legislature anticipated that some landowners would try to evade the requirements of the Act. The Legislature wanted to ensure landlords would not attempt to reduce the number of affordable units that needed to be maintained after a conversion by evicting lower and moderate income tenants immediately before the conversion. 19 V. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, the City ofLos Angeles respectfully requests that the Supreme Court denythe Petition for Review. Dated: November9, 2010 Respectfully submitted, CARMEN TRUTANICH,City Attorney KENNETH,Deputy City Attorney — AMY BROTHERS,Deputy City Attorney By: LALOAF & AMY BROTHERS Deputy City Attorney Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant CITY OF LOS ANGELES 20 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204 (c) Counsel for Respondentcertify that this Answerto Petition is produced using Times New Romanfont, 14 point type size, and contains 3,505 words as counted by the word processing program. Dated: November9, 2010 Respectfully submitted, CARMEN TRUTANICH,City Attorney KENNETH,Deputy City Attorney AMY BROTHERS,Deputy City Attorney By: [pre v3 ~~" AMY BROTHERS Deputy City Attorney Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant CITY OF LOS ANGELES M.\Real Prop_Env_Land Use\Land Use\AmyBrothers\Pacific Palisades\Pacific Palisades Bowl\Supreme Court\Answerto petition II. doc 21 PROOF OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, declare as follows: I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to this action. My business address is 700 City Hall East, 200 North Main Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. On November9, 2010, at my place of business at Los Angeles, California, a COPY of the attached ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW wasplaced in a sealed envelope addressedto: SEE ATTACHED SERVICELIST BY MAIL- I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California, with First class postage thereon fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Underthat practice,it is deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day, at Los Angeles, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion ofthe party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one (1) day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTEDon November9, 2010, at Los Angeles, California. Crate:pyre GUADALUPE LOPEZ) CA 22 PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILEESTATES, LLC, CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Supreme Court Case No. $187243 2d Civil No. B216515 LASC Case No. BS112956 2™ Appellate District — Div. 4 300 S.Spring St., 2"¢ Floor Los Angeles, CA 90012 William J. Constantine, Esq. 303 Potrero St., Ste. 29-104 Santa Cruz, CA 95060-2783 Elliot Bien, Esq. Bien & Summers 23 Palomino Road Novato, CA 94947 Attorneysfor Respondent and Cross-Appellant PACIFIC PALISADESBOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC Honorable James C. Chalfant c/o Clerk — Dept. 85 Los Angeles Superior Court 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Craig M. Collins, Esq. Blum Collins, LLC 707 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 4880 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Attorneysfor Respondent and Cross-Appellant PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC Pacific Palisades Bowl Residents’ Ass’n. Sunny K.Soltani Aleshire & Wynder, LLP 18881 Von Karman Ave., #400 Irvine, CA 92612 23
