STEEN v. APPELLATE DIVISION

Real Party in Interest, The People, Written Return

Cal.November 14, 2012

P=WERELENE SPEEN, Petitioner, ae APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, SUPREME COURT IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE STATE OFCALIFORNIA, ED \AN \e 25(b)/ NOV 14 201? Frank A. McGuire Clerk $174773 3©Deputy: (Ct. of App., 2nd Dist, Div. 4, Case No..B217263) (Willhite, Acting P.J., Manella,J., Suzukawa, J.) (Appellate Div. Sup. Ct. No. 3046020) (Weintraub, J., McKay, P.J., Wasserman,J.) (Trial Ct. No. 6200307) (Munisoglu, C., Dept. 66) Respondent, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest. REAL PARTY’S SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE CARMENA. TRUTANICH,Los Angeles City Attorney DEBBIE LEW,Assistant City Attorney Supervisor, Criminal Appellate Division KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE, Deputy City Attorney katharine.mackenzie@lacity.org State Bar No. 106349 CRIMINAL APPELLATE DIVISION 500 City Hall East 200 N. Main Street Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone: 213-473-6900 Fax: 213-473-6915 Service on the State Attorney General required by California Rule of Court 8.29(c)(1) Attorneys for Real Party in Interest PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JEWERELENE STEEN, Petitioner, S$174773 (Ct. of App., 2nd Dist, Div. 4, Case No. B217263) (Willhite, Acting P.J., Manella, J., Suzukawa, J.) APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF (Appellate Div. Sup. Ct. No. CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF BR046020) LOS ANGELES, (Weintraub, J., McKay,P.J., Wasserman,J.) R dent, esponest (TrialCt. No. 6200307) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF (Munisoglu, C., Dept. 66) CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest. REAL PARTY’S SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE Service on the State Attorney General required by California Rule of Court 8.29(c)(1) CARMEN A. TRUTANICH,Los Angeles City Attorney DEBBIE LEW,Assistant City Attorney Supervisor, Criminal Appellate Division KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE, Deputy City Attorney atharine.mackenzie@lacity.org State Bar No. 106349 CRIMINAL APPELLATE DIVISION ~ 500 City Hall East 200 N. Main Street Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone: 213-473-6900 Fax: 213-473-6915 Attorneys for Real Party in Interest PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TOPICAL INDEX OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES REAL PARTY’S SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE INTRODUCTION STATEMENTOF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES ARGUMENT I. There is No Violation ofDue Process When the Prosecutor Institutes A Prosecution By Approving, Authorizing, or Concurring in a Complaint Filed Under the Process Provided By Section 959.1 IL. The Prosecution in This Case Was Commenced within the Statute of Limitations CONCLUSION CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS Page ii 15 15 15 25 36 38 39 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment California Constitution Article I, section 7 Federal Case In Re United States ofAmerica (7th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 450 United States v. Cowan (Sth Cir. 1975) 524 F.2d 504 California Cases People v. Abayhan (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 324 People v. Adams (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 697 People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 People v. Municipal Court (Pelligrino) (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 193 People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937 People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218 People v. Price (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 987 ii Page 24 23, 24 34, 35 22 19 9, 16, 17, 19, 20 25 28 33 People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104 People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033 People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418 People v. Superior Court ofSan Diego County (Copeland) (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 283 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 People v. Valenzuela (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 427 People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186 People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335 Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101 Woods v. Department ofMotor Vehicles (1989) 211 Cal-App.3d 1263 Statutes Penal Code, § 19 § 19.6 § 19.8 § 496 § 647, subd.(f) ill 26, 32 19 31 31 25 33 16, 17 28, 29, 30, 33 20, 21, 22 33 26 26 26 22 20, 21 § 802, subd.(a) § 802, subd. (d) § 802.5 § 804 § 804, subd.(a) § 804, subd. (b) § 804, subd.(d) § 813 § 1385 § 959.1 § 959.1, subd. (c) § 959.1, subd. (c)(1) § 8583.8 Vehicle Code, § 12500, subd.(a) § 16028, subd.(a) § 4000, subd. (a)(1) § 40504 § 40508 § 40508, subd.(a) § 40515 iv 3, 5, 12, 27, 30 32 35 5,27 35 3, 12, 27, 30 3, 12, 30, 33, 34, 35 31 23 passim 1, 4, 18 2, 36 32 27 27 27 30 11, 26 7, 12, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32 3, 30, 31, 32 Other Authorities 56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 165 (1973) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 48(a) Sen. Com. On Judiciary, Rep. on Assem.Bill No. 3168 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) June 19, 1990 Stats. 1990, ch. 289, § 1 Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, § 1 Stats. 1981, ch. 1017, § 3 32 23, 24 18 18 35 35 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JEWERELENE STEEN, SI7AT73 we (Ct. of App., 2nd Dist, Div.4, Petitioner, Case No. B217263) Willhite, Acting P.J., Manella, J.,( g Vv. Suzukawa, J.) SPEELIATEDIISIONOETHEoy | (paneDiSup. Ce.No CALEORNIAFOR THE COUNTY OF (Weintraub J, McKay, P.J ANGELES, Tr? momWasserman,J.) Respondent, (Trial Ct. No. 6200307) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF (Munisoglu,C., Dept. 66) CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest. REAL PARTY’S SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE INTRODUCTION Petitioner, Jewerelene Steen, filed a Petition for Writ ofMandate on July 20, 2009 (“Petition’’) requesting that this Court vacate her misdemeanorconvictionfor her failure to appearin court on traffic offenses. Pursuant to this Court’s order to show cause requesting briefing on one issue, the Peopleofthe State of California, responding asreal party in interest (“real party”), filed its initial return on October 19, 2009, which addressed whether Penal Code section 959.1, subdivision (c),' violated the ' Subsequentstatutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. separation ofpowers doctrine. On September 12, 2012, this Court issued a second order to show cause requesting briefing from real party and respondent on two additional issues: (1) does section 959.1 violate due process, and (2) was the prosecution in this case commenced within the statute oflimitations. This case involves the Legislature’s effort to “increase court efficiency” with a resource-saving procedure that is consistent with technological advances and applicableto limited offenses of a special nature, here, a failure to appear. In this case, the question is whetherthe Legislature was permitted to address those goals by enacting a procedure whichallowscourt clerks to issue andfile electronic complaints under the unique circumstancesthat exist when a defendant fails to appear. Most often, when a defendantfails to appear, it is only the clerk who has personal knowledgeoris in possession of credible information of the commission ofthe offense. Thus, the clerk is the best possible complainant to issue a complaint stating facts supportive of those allegations, andthat is why Penal Codesection 959.1, subdivision (c)(1), means precisely whatit says, that a court may receive a complaint in electronic form issued bya clerk - the complaining witness with knowledge ofthe facts of the offense of a failure to appear. The Legislature recognized that it would be unnecessarily burdensometo require court clerks to submit to the prosecutor documentation detailing every failure to appear, failure to pay a fine, or failure to comply with a court order, and in turn require the prosecuting attorney to submit backto the clerk reciprocal documentation in order to issue andfile complaints for these charges. Asset forth in real party’s initial return, the separation ofpowers doctrine is not violated when a clerk complainantperformsthe act of filing a complaint. Furthermore, as addressed in this supplementalreturn, there is no due processviolation when the prosecution approves, authorizes, or concurs in complaints filed by clerks under the process provided by section 959.1. Here, the prosecution was aware ofthis statutory procedure and the clerk’s utilization ofit; and the prosecution approved, authorized, and concurred in the complaints filed under that process. Thus, the complaint filed in this case effectively commenced criminal proceeding against petitionerat the time it was filed on August 13, 2002. Moreover, because not only a complaint, but also an arrest warrant was issued on August 13, 2002, the prosecution of petitioner’s July 24, 2002,failure to appear offense wastimely commenced within the one-year statute of limitations. (§§ 802, subd. (a), 804, subds. (b) & (d); Veh. Code, § 40515.) STATEMENTOF FACTSIN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN Real party, the People of the State of California, by it attorney, Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney of Los Angeles, herebyfiles its verified Supplemental Return to the Petition for Writ of Mandate. Realparty reallegesas true all allegations set forth in its initial return filed November 23, 2009. Real party denies any contrary allegations in petitioner’s petition filed July 20, 2009,and petitioner’s traverse to real party’s return filed December8, 2009. Followingthe filing of real party’s return and petitioner’s traverse, this Court accepted for filing on January 12, 2010, the amicuscurie brief of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office (“District Attorney”), which addressed the separation ofpowers issue. Petitionerfiled her reply to the District Attorney’s amicusbrief on January 28, 2010. And,real party filed its answerto the District Attorney’s amicusbrief on February 23, 2010. On June 28, 2010, petitioner filed a request for judicial notice of pleadingsand transcripts from an unrelated criminal proceeding handled in Fresno County. On July 14, 2010, real party filed its opposition to judicial notice of those documents, which were not beforethetrial court or the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. On September 12, 2012, this Court issued to real party and respondent a secondorder to show cause whythereliefprayed for in the petition for writ ofmandate filed July 20, 2009, should not be granted on the following two additional grounds: (1) Penal Code section 959.1, subdivision (c), violates due process. (See U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) (2) The prosecution in this case was not commenced within the statute of limitations. (See Pen. Code, §§ 802, subd.(a), 804.) This Court’s September 12, 2012, order to show cause further stated that “The court on its own motion takes judicial notice ofthe appellate record in People v. Jewerelene Steen (Super. Ct. App. Div., L.A. County, BR046020).” Realparty asserts that the record on appeal considered by the Appellate Division in People v. Jewerelene Steen (BR046020) consisted of the following documents, and real party will be relying on them in this supplemental return: (1) Clerk’s Certificate and Receipt for Record on Appeal, dated January 30, 2008. (2) Clerk’s Certificate and Receipt for Record on Appeal, dated March 10, 2008. - (3) Notice to Appear, Citation No. 6200307, dated June 8, 2002. (4) Citation Correction Request for Citation No. 6200307. (5) Complaint for failure to appear, Case No. 6200307, dated August 13, 2002. (6) Case Action Summary (Misdemeanor Docket), dated July 27, 2007. (7) Demurrerfiled July 27, 2007. (8) Misdemeanor Sentencing Memorandum,dated July 27, 2007. (9) Verbal Notice of license suspension by Court Employee, dated July 27, 2007. (10) Commitment Form, dated July 27, 2007. (11) Notice ofAppeal, filed August 27, 2007. (12) Proposed Statement on Appeal. (13) Request for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal. (14) Notice of Filing Notice of Appeal sent to Judge. (15) Notice of Filing Notice of Appeal sent to prosecution. (16) Request for a Hearing date, dated September 6, 2007. (17) Request for a Hearing Date — Response. (18) Notice of Hearing to Settle Statement on Appeal, dated September 14, 2007. (19) Case Action Summary (Misdemeanor Docket), dated January 8, 2008. (20) Transcript ofProceedings of July 27, 2007. In order to respond to this Court’s second order to show cause,real party realleges the following facts from paragraph 2 ofits return: On June 8, 2002, petitioner was cited for driving a motor vehicle with an expired registration, driving a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license, and failing to provide evidenceoffinancial responsibility. (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Notice to Appear, Citation No. 6200307 [‘Noticeto Appear”].) On the Notice to Appear citation, petitioner signed and declared, “Without admitting guilt, I promise to appear”on or before July 23, 2002, at the Clerk’s Office of the Superior Court at 1945 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, 90007. (Ibid.) Realparty further alleges that petitioner did not appearon July 23, 2002, and there is nothingin the record indicating any appearance or answer to the chargesuntil her appearance with counsel on July 27, 2007. Realparty realleges the following facts from paragraph 3 ofits return: After petitioner’s failure to appear as promised, on August 13, 2002, a misdemeanor complaint wasissued electronically charging petitioner with a violation of Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision (a), willfully violating her written promise to appear in court. (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Complaint for failure to appear, Case No. 6200307 [“complaint”’].) Real party further alleges that the face of the complaint indicatesit wasissued in the Los Angeles Metropolitan “Judicial District.” The complaint was signed underpenalty ofperjury by a “declarant and complainant.” The complaint indicated that bail was set at $1,174.00, and namedpetitioner, listed her driver’s license number, residence address, date of birth, gender, eye and hair color, height, and weight, and described her vehicle. It stated the relevant charge as follows: The undersigned says, upon information andbelief, that the above named defendantwillfully and unlawfully committed the offense set forth above in the above namedjudicial district, County of Los Angeles, State of California,to wit: Violation of the defendant’s written promise to appear or a lawfully granted continuance of his promise to appear in court before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail... . (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Complaint.) The face of the complaint showsthat it was filed on August 13, 2002. The Expanded Traffic Record System (“ETRS”) showsthat an arrest warrant wasissued on the same date. (Real Party’s Supplemental Return, Ex. 2, p. 44.) The ETRS showsthe same name, address, date of birth, and 7 driver’s license number, andcitation numberfor petitioneras set forth in the complaint and Notice to Appear. (/bid.) The attached ETRS was obtained by real party on August 12, 2008. Real party unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a more recent copy. (Real Party’s Supplemental Return, Ex. 1, pp. 40-41.) The November 9, 2012, ETRSprintout indicates that the _ record for case no. 6200307 could not be found. (Real Party’s Supplemental Return, Ex. 3, p. 52.) 10 Real party alleges that whenpetitioner appeared in court on July 27, 2007, the arrest warrant was recalled. (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Case Action Summary dated 7/27/07; Real Party’s Supplemental Return, Ex.2, p. 51.) 11 Real party asserts that at the hearing on the demurrerheld July 27, 2007, petitioner did not challenge her prosecution as time-barred by the statute of limitations. Her challenge to the complaint was limited to the constitutional grounds of separation ofpowers and due process. Petitioner’s written demurrer, filed on that date, argued that “a charge purportedly filed by a clerk is constitutionally invalid, as violative of the separation ofpowers and dueprocess, andis a nullity, which fails to provide jurisdiction to the court.” (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Demurrer, p. 8.) The written demurrer made no mentionofthe statute of limitations. Likewise, defense counsel’s argumentat the hearing focused solely on whether a complaintfiled by a clerk, rather than a prosecutor, commencedcriminal proceedings. Defense counsel identified the issue to be determined by the demurrer, as follows: Your Honor,in this case, the only issue that the Court needs to address is who is authorized under California law and under the California Constitution to commence criminal prosecutions against those found in California, and, more narrowly, is the Court clerk one ofthose individuals whoare, in fact, authorized to prosecute people in California. (Petitioner’s Ex. B., RT pp. 1-2.) Defense counsel argued that complaints filed by “private parties or members of other branches of government” were constitutionally invalid because they werethe result of a violation of the separation ofpowers doctrine because filing of criminal charges was reserved exclusively to prosecutorial agencies in the executive branch. (Petitioner’s Ex. B, RT pp.2-4, 7.) In response to petitioner’s constitutional arguments, the court noted that under People v. Municipal Court (Pellegrino) (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 193, 206 (Pellegrino), the prosecution can constitutionally approve, authorize, or concur in complaints filed by private parties. The court rioted that petitioner’s argumentfailed to acknowledge the Pellegrino court’s statement, “By this holding we do not mean to imply that criminal complaints need take any different form than they presently do, but only that their filing must be approved, authorized or concurredin by the district attorney before they are effective in instituting criminal proceedings against an individual.” (Petitioner’s Ex. B, RT pp. 4-5.) Whenthe court asked if the prosecutor was “authorizing or concurring in the complaint as presently constituted,” the prosecutor replied, “yes.” (/d. at p. 5.) Relying on Pellegrino,the trial court found “that the fact that the prosecution has concurred in the complaintasit stands is sufficient to render it constitutional and provide the Court with adequate legal basis for denying your demur[sic].” (Petitioner’s Ex. B, RT pp. 4-7.) Thereafter, at the trial court’s invitation, the prosecutor made additional representations for the record regarding the prosecution’s awareness of complaints filed by the clerks using the process provided by section 959.1 andthe prosecution’s approval and concurrencein those complaintsat the time they were filed. Briefly, regardless of the Court’s question to the People as to whether or not we approveofthe complaint, again, which we do, without havingto say those words, the actionsofthe People ofthe State of California through the Los Angeles City Attorney’s office demonstrates that we approve and concur in this complaint as well as all other complaints that are filed in all the other cases in this courthouse. We knowthepractice exists where a complaint is generated via a notice to appear in which a personcited in the notice to appearhasfailed to appear. Wehavenot asked the Court and/orits clerk to stop. Moreover, we have notfiled a motion to dismiss in this case. Additionally, when the case waspresentedto our office [on July 27, 2007], we reviewed the complaint and made an offer on that particular case. Therefore, based upon all those actions, wealso not only explicitly approve and concurin this complaint, but our actions in this case and all other cases demonstrate, unless otherwise indicated that we approve and concur in these complaints. (Petitioner's Ex. B, RT pp. 6-7.) Respondingto thetrial court’s finding andthe prosecutor’s comments, defense counsel reasserted his argumentthat in orderfor the clerk’s complaintto be constitutionally valid, the separation ofpowers doctrine and the due processclause required the prosecution to approve or concur in the complaint at the time it was filed. Defense counselstated: Concerning the concurrenceby the City Attorney, your Honor, again the concurrence, evenifit’s approved ultimately, has to be timely. In this case, it is not. Thefailure to appear in this case occurred in 2002. Right now it is the year 2007. It is too late for the City Attorney to concur. If the City Attorney wished to concur in a complaint that was previously filed by a private judicial or quasi-judicial entity, specifically the clerk of the court, the City Attorney needed to concurat that time. Otherwise, your Honor, this Court will invite private parties to file criminal complaints en mass and 10 have those individuals arrested and brought before the Court and then wait for the City Attorney to concuror not to concur in those complaints. And concerning the fact that the clerk was perhaps a witness to an individual’s failure to appear, that may beso, butthat still does not authorize that witness to bring criminal prosecution against an individual. The Court: [Defense Counsel], your argumentsare noted. And, thank you, People, for your arguments. [§] The Court finds that the demur[sic] is to be overruled, that there is no basis to find that the complaintis invalid on its face. (Petitioner’s Ex. B, RT pp. 7-8.) Real party asserts that nothing in this record showsthatthe trial court or the prosecutor was put on notice that petitioner was additionally challenging her prosecution as barred by the statute of limitations. Without an objection specifically on the basis ofthe statute of limitations, there was no opportunity to develop or present any additional facts, such as whether or when a warrant issued and the information contained therein, relevant to this issue. The failure to object on the basis of the statute of limitations or to object to the arrest warrant on this case constitutes a forfeiture of this claim. 12 Real party denies petitioner’s claim in ArgumentIII of the Petition that when petitioner appeared in court on July 27, 2007, the offense charged in the 2002 complaint was time-barred by the statute of limitations. (Petition, p. 22.) Real party asserts that the complaint on its face does not show that the offense of failure to appear was time-barred by the statute of limitations at the time the complaint wasfiled. The face of the complaint states that on July 23, 2002, petitioner committed the offense of failing to appear, a violation of Vehicle Code section 40508. The face ofthe 11 complaint further showsthat the complaint was on August 13, 2002. Real party asserts that the face of the complaint showsthat the prosecution of the offense was commencedwithin the one-year statute of limitations set forth in sections 802, subdivision (a) and 804, subdivision (b). 13 Real party asserts that with the issuance of the arrest warrant on August 13, 2002, the prosecution of the offense was commencedwithin the one-year statute of limitations set forth in sections 802, subdivision (a) and 804, subdivision (d). 14 Realparty asserts that after petitioner’s demurrer on constitutional grounds was denied,petitioner entered a no contest plea to the charge of failing to appear (Veh. Code, § 40508, subd. (a)) as alleged on the face of the complaintin case no. 6200307. (Petition, Ex. B, RT pp. 8-10.) Petitioner’s no contest plea to a complaintthat wasfacially sufficient for purposesofthestatute of limitations admitted the sufficiency of that evidence and thereby forfeited her rightto litigate the factual question of whether the offense was time-barred. 12 In this Supplemental Return,real party prays: 1, That the request for writ ofmandate be denied; 2. For such other relief as this Court may deem just andproper. Dated: November 13, 2012 Respectfully submitted, CARMENA. TRUTANICH,Los Angeles City Attorney DEBBIE LEW,Assistant City Attorney Supervisor, Criminal Appellate Division By:(Chesczastl Wahorepec, KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE Deputy City Attorney Attorneys for Real Party in Interest PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 VERIFICATION STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) SS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES _) I, KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE,declare as follows: I am an attorney at law, duly licensedto practice in the courts of California, and I am employedas a deputy city attorney for the City ofLos Angeles, County ofLos Angeles. In this capacity, I represent real party in the foregoing supplemental return to petition for writ of mandate and I makethis verification on behalf of real party. Ihave read the foregoing supplemental return, the pleadings,record, and all pertinent documentsin this case, and I knowthe contents to be true as based upon my reading ofwhat I know tobetruecopiesof court documentsonfile in this action, the reporter’s transcript of the proceedings in this action, and documents in real party’s files for this matter. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 13th day ofNovember, 2012, at Los Angeles, California - - fihuinell Workeuger, TO Ty 7 9 KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE Deputy City Attorney 14 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ARGUMENT I There is No Violation of Due Process Whenthe Prosecutor Institutes A Prosecution By Approving, Authorizing, or Concurring in a Complaint Filed Underthe Process Provided By Section 959.1 Pursuantto this Court’s September 9, 2009,order,in its first return, real party addressed the issue of whether the constitutional doctrine ofthe separation ofpowers wasviolated by a court clerk filing a complaint for failure to appear pursuant to section 959.1. In that return, real party set out that, historically, the discrete act offiling a criminal complaint was not a core function of the executive branch that could only be performed by a prosecutor. (Real Party’s Return, pp. 14-27; see also Real Party’s Answer to District Attorney’s Amicus Brief, pp. 1-6.) Real party arguedthat evenif filing was within a core zone of the executive branch, the ability of court clerks, as complainants, to file complaints in three extremely limited situations did not violate the separation ofpowers doctrine becauseit did not impedethe prosecution’s ability to exercise its independentdiscretion on whether to authorize or concurin the prosecution of the charge. (Real | Party’s Return,pp. 27-30; see also Real Party’s Answerto District Attorney’s AmicusBrief, pp. 6-7.) Although a court clerk, as a complainant, has the ability to file a complaint without violating the separation ofpowers doctrine, whetherthat complaint can beeffective in initiating or commencing criminal proceeding is intertwined with the constitutional due process issue for which this Court has now askedforbriefing. 15 While underlimited circumstances,a citizen complainant canfile a complaint, fundamental fairness or due process precludesthatcitizen complainant from instituting a legally effective criminal prosecution without the approvalofthe prosecution. “Due process of law requires that criminal prosecutionsbeinstituted through the regular processesof law. These regular processes includethe requirementthatthe institution of any criminal proceeding be authorized and approvedbythedistrict attorney.” (Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 206.) [T]he Pellegrino court concluded that subjecting onecitizen to criminal prosecution upon the whim ofanothercitizen would deny the accused due process oflaw, since “all persons should be protected from having to defendagainst frivolous prosecutions and ... one major safeguard against such prosecutionsis the function ofthe district attorney in screening criminalcasespriorto instituting a prosecution.” (People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1204 (Viray), quoting Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App. 3d at pp. 205-206.) The facts in Pellegrinoillustrate how a prosecutor must approve, authorize or concur in a complaintfiled by a citizen in orderforthat complaint to institute or commencea legally effective prosecution. In Pellegrino, three private citizens (Pellegrino, Stromstad, and Bishop) were _ involvedin a neighborhood dispute. Bishop, who wasthe victim of a battery, signed and filed a misdemeanorcriminal complaint naming Pellegrino and Stromstad as defendants, andthe district attorney’s office reviewed andapprovedthe filing. Pellegrino, in turn, signed and attempted to have thedistrict attorneyfile a criminal complaint naming Bishop as defendant. However, thedistrict attorney refused to approvethefiling of her complaint. So, Pellegrino filed the complaint herself, had thetrial court disqualify the district attorney, and had her personal attorney appointed as “special prosecutor.” As a result, Bishop was charged with several criminal offenses that the district attorney had determined lacked merit and had 16 refused to authorize. (Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at pp. 195-197.) The Court ofAppeal ordered Pellegrino’s complaint dismissed. The court concludedthat“[t]he complaints filed by Pellegrino against Bishop without the district attorney’s authorization werenullities. The municipal court lackeddiscretion andin fact jurisdiction to do anythingin the matter except to dismiss.” (/d. at p. 206.) However, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court’s holding was not based on the fact that the complaint was issued and filed by Pellegrino rather than by the prosecutor. (Petition, pp. 19-20.) Instead,the court determined the complaint filed by Pellegrino was a nullity because it was issued andfiled without authorization by the prosecuting attorney. Conversely, the complaintissued andfiled under Bishop’s signature was not a nullity because its issuance andfiling were done with the prosecutor’s approval. (Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 196.) Thus, the form of the complaint — i.e., who signs, issues, orfiles it — is not dispositive of whethercriminal proceedings have beenlegally instituted. Rather, as explained by the Pellegrino court: By this holding we do not mean to imply that criminal complaints need take any different form than they presently do, but only that their filing must be approved, authorized or concurredin bythedistrict attorney before they are effective in instituting criminal proceedingsagainst an individual. (d. at p. 206; accord, Viray, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204 [the Pellegrino court did not foreclose the possibility that the filing ofa complaintby a private person might operate to commencea valid prosecution, ratherit held that the filing mustbe “‘approved, authorized or 299concurred in’” before the private person’s complaint can be effective in instituting criminal proceedings].) Atbar,as required by Pellegrino, the complaint was issued and filed by a complaining witness(herethe clerk of the court) pursuantto section 959.1 and the public prosecutor “approved, authorized or concurred”in that 17 complaint. As previously discussed in real party’s informal responsefiled in this Court, section 959.1 was added in 1988, to Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Penal Code, which governsthe “form”that an accusatory pleading may take. Consistent with the chapter’s focus on form, section 959.1 was added to accommodate advances in computer technology by permitting prosecutors and law enforcement agenciesto file the complaint with the court in the form of electronic data in placeofthe traditional physical document. Section 959.1 was amended in 1990 to approvefilings by a clerk of the court of complaints in three extremely limited situations — “failure to appear, pay a fine, or comply with an order ofthe court.” This amendmentof section 959.1 is consistent with the purpose and function of a complaint: section 959.1, subdivision (c), permits court clerks — who have personal knowledge of the commission of an offense — to file complaintsas complainants. A clerk of the court will either have personal knowledge or be in possession ofcredible information of the commissionofthe specific offense of failure to appear (or paya fine or comply with a court order). Thus,the clerk is the best possible complainantto issue a complaintstating facts supportive of those allegations. (See Real Party’s Informal Response, pp. 8-13.) Furthermore, having the clerk complainantissue andfile the complaintfor failure to appear meets the purpose of the 1990 amendmentof the statute, which was “to improve court efficiency by maximizing use of electronicfilings.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem.Bill No. 3168 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) June 19, 1990.) Asthe record reflects, the City Attorney is aware ofthe clerk’s practice ofutilizing the complaintfiling process authorized by section * The Appellate Division took judicial notice ofthe legislative history pertaining to the 1990 amendmentofsection 959.1 (Stats. 1990, ch. 289, § 1). (Petition, Ex. F, Memorandum Judgmentofthe Appellate Division, pp. 5-6, fn. 3.) For this Court’s convenience, real party has attached as Exhibit 4 to this supplementalreturn, the June 19, 1990, Senate Committee report cited by the Appellate Division in its memorandum judgment. (Real Party’s Supplemental Return, Ex. 4, pp. 54-55.) 18 959.1. There is nothing in the record to suggest the City Attorney opposes or objects to any ofthese filings, includingthefiling in this case. Rather, the record showsthatthe filings are done with the prosecution’s tacit approval. Asthe prosecutor stated below, the City Attorney’s Office: approve(s] and concur[s] [with] this complaint as wellas all the other complaints that arefiled in all the other cases in this courthouse. We knowthe practice exists where a complaintis generated via a notice to appear in which a personcited in the notice to appear has failed to appear. Wehave not asked the Court and/or its clerk to stop. [] Moreover, we have notfiled a motion to dismiss in this case. Additionally, when the case waspresented to our office [on July 27, 2007], we reviewed the complaint and made an offer on that particular case. Therefore, based uponall those actions, we also not only explicitly approve and concur in this complaint, but our actions in this case andall other cases demonstrate, unless otherwise indicated that we approve and concurin these complaints. (Petitioner’s Ex. B, RT pp. 6-7.) Asthere is no record showingthat the City Attorney objected to or otherwise opposed the complaintin this case, it was approved. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 430 [defense counsel was aware of court’s decision not to answerjury’s question, thus counsel “maybe held to have given tacit approvalofthe trial court’s decision”]; People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048 [“Tacit approval”ofthe court’s response, or lack of response(to jury question), may be found wherethe court makesclear its intended response and defense counsel, with ample opportunity to object, fails to do so.”].) Given the approvalby the prosecution of complaintsfiled pursuant to section 959.1, the complaintat bar waseffective in instituting criminal proceedings against petitioner at the timeit wasfiled.*? Furthermore, in addition to the * In Pellegrino, the reason Pellegrino’s complaint did not effectively institute a criminal prosecution was not based onthe fact that it was signed and filed by a complainant. It was ineffective in instituting criminal proceeding becausethe prosecution madeit knownit would not approve, authorize or concurin the complaint. Because the lack of prosecutorial 19 tacit approval of the complaint at the time of filing, the record in this caseis very clear that the City Attorney expressly approvedthis individual complaint in open court the day appellant reappeared and plea negotiations apparently began soon thereafter. (Petition, Ex. B, RT p. 5.) Thus,at bar, criminal charges wereeffectively instituted by the prosecution. As a result, there was no dueprocessviolation in this case. Petitioner, however, claims that the prosecution cannot properly exercise its discretion to institute charges unless it conducts a case-by-case review ofthe facts of every individualfailure to appear “before that charge is filed.” She maintains that due processis violated absent a prosecutorial review conducted in that manner. (Petition, pp. 12, 15-18, underliningin . original.) Petitioner cites no authority to support this argument. Indeed, in Sundance v. Municipal Court(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101 (Sundance), this Court rejected a similar argumentattempting to challenge the mannerin which the prosecution exercisedits charging discretion. The plaintiffs in Sundance sought to enjoin on constitutional grounds the enforcementof section 647, subdivision (f), which prohibits being ‘drunk in public. The Los Angeles PoliceDepartment (“LAPD”) used a “Short Form Arrest Report” when making arrests for a violation ofthe statute. The arresting officer would check off on the arrest report form the objective symptoms of drunkennessthat were observed. In general, the narrative portion of the form waslimited to the following brief statement: “Defendant observed drunk in public unable to care for himself.’” A carbon copyofthe report served as the misdemeanor complaintfiled against the section 647, subdivision (f) arrestee. (Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. approval rendered the complaint a nullity, the trial court “lacked discretion and in fact jurisdiction to do anythingin the matter except to dismiss.” (Pellegrino, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at pp. 196-197, 207.) Thus, ifa prosecutorial agency was opposedtothefiling of complaints pursuantto section 959.1, and it refused to approve, authorize, or concur in complaints filed underthat section, then, as in Pellegrino, those complaints would be nullities and the trial court would have no option but to dismiss them. 20 1108-1110.) More than half of the section 647, subdivision (f) cases that were still pending on the day of trial were dismissed becausethe information in the short form report was sobriefthat it either did not refresh the officer’s recollection of the arrest or the prosecutor concluded that the officer’s testimony would not establish that the defendant was so intoxicated that he could not care for his own safety or the safety of others. (7d. at p. 1113.) The plaintiffs argued that the prosecutor’s “systemic failure to exercise prosecutorial discretion in section 647(f) cases violates due process.” They maintainedthat the “defendantcity attorney’s office routinely filed section 647(f) charges without attemptingto screen out cases that could not be successfully prosecuted. The criminal complaintsin section 647(f) cases were simply carbon copies of the LAPD’sshort form arrest report.” (Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1132.) The plaintiffs asserted that “the city attorney’s failure to exercise ‘meaningful’ prosecutorial discretion violates due process.” (Ibid.) This Court rejected the plaintiffs’ due process argument and affirmedthetrial court’s decision not to grant injunctiverelief. Prosecutors have broad decisionmaking powerin charging crimes. [Citation.] “The judiciary historically has shown an extraordinary deference to the prosecutor’s decision-making function.” [Citation.] Although reliefmay be available if a defendant can demonstrate selective prosecution [citation] or vindictive prosecution [citation], reversals on these grounds are rare. [Citation.] Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that the prosecutor’s failure to exercise sufficient, or indeed any, discretion in determining whetherto file charges constitutes a denial of due process. (Ibid.) Likewise, at bar, petitioner’s due process claim must berejected. It is entirely premised onherdissatisfaction with the manneror the extent to 21 which the prosecution has exercised its discretion by approving, authorizing, or concurring in complaints filed by clerk complainants without conducting a case-by-case review ofthe facts of each individual case. Petitioner does not claim, and the record does not show,that there was any selective or vindictive prosecution. Thus, under this Court’s reasoning in Sundance,there is “no authority for the proposition that the prosecutor’s failure to exercise sufficient, or indeed any, discretion in determining whether to” approve or concur in the clerk’s filing of the failure to appear “charges constitutes a denial of due process.” (Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1132; see also People v. Adams (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 697, 707-708 [rejecting defendant’s due process claim that § 496 gave prosecution unlimited discretion to decide to file a felony rather than a misdemeanoroffense, prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is neither reviewable by the appellate process, nor can a court controlthis exercise of power by mandamus].) In fact, there is little to no discretionary review that is required to determine whethera failure to appear offense has been committed. There are nolegal issues to evaluate. The evidenceis indisputable because the defendant has either honored his or her promise to appear,or has not. There are also no witness problemsto evaluate; a clerk of the court will have personal knowledgeofthe failure to appear offense or the court’s own official records themselves will constitute evidence of the crime. In today’s computerized era, as the clerk makes a computerized entry in the docket whena defendantfails to appear, a complaint based on the samereliable information could concurrently be issued. Such seemsto betheplain legislative intent of section 959.1. It would be unnecessarily burdensometo require court clerks to submit documentation of thousandsof failure to appear offenses to the prosecutor; no further investigation would be needed in as muchastheofficial court records themselves ~ identical in every case — would constitute complete evidence of the crime. Such an unnecessary 22 and burdensome exchange of documentation would defeat the intent ofthe Legislature to provide an efficient and resource saving procedure consistent with the technological advancesofour times. Given the narrow range of the offenses set forth in section 959.1, the volumeofthose violations, and the presumedreliability of the clerk complainants andthe court records,it is imminently reasonablefor the prosecution,in the exerciseofits discretion, to forego a case-by case review and instead approveand concur in all failure to appear complaints filed by the clerks through the process provided by section 959.1. Therefore, where as here, the prosecution approves, authorizes, or concurs in the complaints filed pursuantto the process provided by section 959.1, there is no violation of due process and criminalprosecution is effectively instituted. After the prosecution has been instituted, the prosecution, as part of its executive function,still retains the power to deem a prosecution inappropriate and seek termination of the action. Section 1385 authorizes the prosecution to move for a dismissal when it determines that such a dismissalis in the interest ofjustice. Section 1385 does not vest the judiciary with unfettered power to deny such a request. Rather, a court would abuseits discretion to deny a prosecution request for a dismissal where the prosecution has articulated good faith reasons supporting such a dismissal. Instructive here is the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cowan (5th Cir. 1975) 524 F.2d 504 (Cowan). Cowan looked at the interplay of the powers and functions of the judicial branch and the executive branch when a motion to dismiss was madebythe prosecution under rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 48(a) provides that “[t]he government may, with leave ofcourt, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint.” (Italics added.) Thus, similar to section 1385, federal prosecutors do not 23 have absolute powerto dismiss filed charges — a dismissal can only be granted if the court grants leave. The Cowan court noted that the purpose of granting the court the powerofsupervision over the termination ofa prosecution wasto protect defendants from harassment and to protect the public interest in the fair administration ofjustice. (Jd. at pp. 509-512.) But, the Cowan court ruled that Rule 48(a) does not vest the courts with absolute authority to deny a prosecutorial motion for a dismissal. [T]he phrase “by leave of court” in Rule 48(a) was intended to modify and condition the absolute power ofthe Executive, consistently with the Framer’s concept of Separation of Powers, by erecting a check on the abuse of Executive prerogatives. But this is not to say that the Rule was intended to confer on the Judiciary the powerandauthority to usurp or interfere with the good faith exercise of the Executive power to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The rule wasnot promulgated to shift absolute power from the Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a powerto check power. The Executive remains the absolute judge of whethera prosecution shouldbeinitiated and the first and presumptively the best judge ofwhether a pending prosecution should be terminated. The exerciseofits discretion with respect to the termination ofpending prosecutions should not be judicially disturbed unlessclearly contrary to manifest public interest. In this way, the essential function of each branch is synchronized to achieve a balance that serves both practical and constitutional values. (Cowan, supra, 524 F.2d at p. 513.) The Cowan court concludedthat the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the government’s motionto dismiss, because nothingin the record overcamethe presumption that the government motion was made in goodfaith for substantial reasons sufficiently articulated in the record. (/d. at pp. 513-515; see also In Re United States ofAmerica (7th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 450, 452-454 [appellate court held purpose of Rule 48(a) is to protect a defendant from government harassment byrepeatedly filing and dismissing charges. Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals held that under Rule 48(a) a trial court could condition a 24 dismissal on its being with prejudice, but it would exceed the limits of judicial power under the Constitution if it refused to grant leave to dismiss a criminal charge “merely because [the court] was convincedthat the prosecutor wasacting in bad faith or contrary to the public interest.”].) Here,too, the prosecution, in the exercise ofits executive function, would be the best judgeto determineif a pending prosecution should be terminated if it were to learn that a defendant had not committed the failure to appearoffense wilfully or there was someotherdefect in the prosecution. If the reasons for the dismissalare sufficiently articulated, a court should not deny that request unless it was contrary to the interests ofjustice. In the unlikely eventthat a court refused a prosecution request to dismiss when “society as represented by the People”did not have a “legitimate interest” in the prosecution ofthe offense, the court would have overstepped the bounds ofits judicial function andits ruling would be reviewable as an abuse of discretion. (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945-951; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-532.) Therefore, the prosecution’s approval of complaints filed underthe process set forth in section 959.1 does not violate due process or the separation ofpowers doctrine. Il The Prosecution in This Case Was Commenced within the Statute of Limitations The complaintin the instantcase, filed on August 13, 2002, and alleging a failure to appear offense committed on July 23, 2002, shows on its face that the prosecution was timely commenced within the one-year statute of limitations. The record also showsthat the arrest warrant, issued on August 13, 2002, likewise timely commencedthe prosecution. Yet, in 25 herpetition, petitioner claims that the prosecution in the instant case was barred by thestatute of limitations. Attempting to go behindthefacially sufficient complaint, she claimsthat “a complaint filed absentprior screening and prior authorization by the public prosecutoris a nullity.” She concedes that once a complaint is screened and authorized,then it is effective as a charging document. However, she maintains that the statute of limitations expired because, while the complaint at bar was filed in 2002, it was not approvedandtherefore noteffective as a charging documentuntil 2007. (Petition, p. 22, underlining in original.) The record showsthat petitioner did notraise the statute of limitations as a ground of her demurrer in the trial court and, as a result, no evidence relevant to this issue was developedin thetrial court. Consequently, petitioner has forfeited her statute of limitations claim on appellate review. In any event, petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. “Oncethe statute of limitations for an offense expires without the commencementofprosecution, prosecution for that offense is forever time- barred.” (People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1112 (Robinson).) Section 802 sets forth the generally applicable statute of limitations for misdemeanoroffenses. It provides in pertinentpart, (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), or (d), prosecution for an offense not punishable by death or imprisonmentin the state prison shall be commenced within one year after commission ofthe offense. Thus, a violation of Vehicle Code section 40508, must be commenced within one year of the offense, because it is a misdemeanoror an infraction offense that is not punishable in state prison. (§§ 19, 19.6, 19.8; Veh. Code. § 40508, subd.(a).) Section 804 defines when “commencement”of a prosecution occurs for purposesofthe statute of limitations. It states: Except as otherwise providedin this chapter, for the purposes 26 of this chapter, prosecution for an offense is commenced whenany ofthe following occurs: (a) An indictment or informationisfiled. (b) A complaint is filed charging a misdemeanoror infraction. (c) The defendantis arraigned on a complaint that charges the defendant with afelony. (d) An arrest warrant or bench warrantis issued, provided the warrant namesor describes the defendant with the same degree ofparticularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint. At bar, petitioner’s prosecution was timely commenced undersection 804. First, the prosecution was timely commenced under subdivision (b) of section 804 when the complaint wasfiled. Atthe time ofhertraffic stop on June 8, 2002, petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear indicating that she had violated Vehicle Code section 4000, subdivision (a)(1) (driving a vehicle with expired registration, Vehicle Code section 12500, subdivision (a) (driving without a driver’s license), and Vehicle Code section 16028, subdivision (a) (driving without proof of insurance). Petitioner signed the Notice to Appear, promising to appearin court on July 23, 2002. (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Notice to Appear.) However, on July 23, 2002, petitioner failed to appearin court as promised. On August 13, 2002,a complaint wasfiled charging petitioner with failure to appear on July 23, 2002, in violation of Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision(a). (Petitioner’s Ex. A, Complaint; Record on Appeal, BR046020, Complaint.) Thus, the face of the complaint indisputably showsthat the prosecution commenced within the one-year statute of limitations as governed by sections 802, subdivision (a) and 804, subdivision (b). Because she cannot show that the August 13, 2002, complaintonits face wastime-barred bythe statute oflimitations, petitionertries to go behind the face of the complaint. She maintainsthat the complaint was a 27 “nullity” on constitutional grounds and therefore any “belated screening and approval”ofthe charge in the complaint in 2007 was time-barred becauseit did not occur within the statute of limitations. (Petition, p. 22.) Petitioner’s claim should be rejected as forfeited because she did not raise the statute of limitations as a ground ofher demurrerin thetrial court and she entered a no contest plea to a complaintthat was facially sufficient for purposes of the statute of limitations. . In People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335 (Williams), this Court clarified that a statute of limitations claim can be forfeited for failure to raise it in the trial court. The Williams court notedthe failureto raise the statute of limitations in thetrial court does not forfeit a defendant’s right to raise it on appellate review, when “the prosecutionfiles a charging documentthat, on its face, indicates the offenseis time-barred.” However, the claim will be forfeited if the charging documentis facially sufficient. (Ud. at pp. 344-345.) As this Court explained, the nonforfeiture rule does not apply to an information that, as it should,either showsthat the offense was committed within the time period or containstolling allegations. Although, underourcases, defendants may notforfeit the statute of limitationsif it has expired as a matter of law, they maycertainly losetheability to litigate factual issues such as questionsoftolling. This point was explained in People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218 [185 Cal.Rptr. 903]. There the information alleged discovery of the crime within the limitationsperiod, an allegation that, if true, would makethe prosecution timely. The defendant pleaded nolo contendere, then sought to assert the statute of limitations on appeal. While recognizing the McGeeline ofcases, the appellate court held the defendant had waivedhis right to litigate the factual question whether the offense was time-barred. “[W]henthe pleading is facially sufficient, the issue of the statute oflimitationsis solely an evidentiary one. The sufficiency of the evidence introduced on this issue does not raise a question ofjurisdiction in the fundamental sense.” [Citation.] “By pleading nolo contendere, defendant admitted the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the statute of limitations wastolled 28 .... Having admitted the sufficiency of that evidence by his plea, he cannot now challenge it with a forked tongue on appeal.” [Citation.] (Williams, supra, 2\ Cal.4th at pp. 344-345.) Atbar, petitioner did not raise the statute of limitations in her written demurrer or in any of her arguments at the hearing on the demurrer. Although defense counsel argued that the prosecution’s approval or concurrence in a complaint filed by a private person “hasto be timely,” and that in 2007,“it was too late” for the prosecution to concurin a complaint filed in 2002, defense counsel was notraising a statute oflimitations claim. (Petitioner’s Ex. B, RT pp. 7-8.) Rather, the context of defense counsel’s argument showsthat he wasstill arguing that there wasa violation of due process unless the prosecution had screened and approvedofthe complaint prior to or at the momentit wasfiled. Defense counsel’s argument was in reply to the prosecutor’s assertion that due process was satisfied under Pellegrino becausepetitioner’s complaint had been approvedby notfiling a motion to dismiss and reviewing the complaint whenit waspresented to a prosecutor on July 27, 2007. Defense counsel responded, It is too late for the City Attorney to concur. If the City Attorney wished to concur in a complaint that was previously filed by a private judicial or quasi-judicial entity, specifically the clerk of the court, the City Attorney needed to concur at that time. Otherwise, your Honor, this Court will invite privateparties to file criminal complaints en mass and have those individuals arrested and brought before the Court and then wait for the City Attorney to concur or not to concur in those complaints. (Petition, Ex. B, RT pp.7-8, italics added.) Consistent with the written demurrer, defense counsel’s concern was withthe filing of complaints without prosecutorial approval. Hence,it was his position that approval mustbe given before or “at that time”offiling to avoid the due process problem of personsbeing arrested without prior prosecutorial review of the 29 charges. This is the identical due process argumentpetitioner repeats in ArgumentI of her petition in this Court. (Petition, pp. 12-18.) Petitioner wasnot claiming that the statute of limitations had run in this case. Thus, by pleading no contest to a complaint that was facially sufficient, petitioner admitted the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the statute of limitations was timely commenced. (Williams, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 344-345; People v. Padfield, supra, 136 Cal.App.3dat pp. 224-227.) In any event, petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. As set forth in ArgumentI, ante, the prosecution approved of complaints alleging failures to appear, including the instant complaint, filed by the clerk under the process provided by section 959.1. There is simply no authority for petitioner’s assertion that the complaint wasnot an “effective charging document”unless and until it underwent a prior individual screening process by a prosecutor — a process she contends did not occur until 2007. Thus, the complaint, filed on August 13, 2002, with the prosecution’s approval, notonly instituted criminal proceedingsat the timeofits filing for purposes of due process, but also “commenced”the prosecution under section 804, subdivision (b) for purposesofthestatute of limitations. The prosecution commenced well-within the one-year statute of limitations of section 802, subdivision(a). Second, in additionto the filing of the complaint, the prosecution wasalso timely commenced undersection 804, subdivision (d) when the warrant was issued on August 13, 2002, for her failure to appear offense. Vehicle Code section 40504 allows a person stoppedfora traffic violation to secure his or her release by signing a written notice promising to appear in court on a future date. Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision(a), makesit a separate misdemeanoroffense to violate that promise to appear. Vehicle Code section 40515 grants a magistrate authority to issue an arrest warrant for the commissionofthe offense offailure to appear. Vehicle Codesection 40515, declares in part: 30 (a) Whena personsigns a written promise to appear. . at the time and place specified in the written promise to appear. . . and has not posted full bail . . . , the magistrate may issue and have delivered for execution a warrantfor his or her arrest within 20 daysafter his failure to appear before the magistrate... , or if the person promises to appear before an officer authorized to accept bail other than a magistrate and fails to do so on or before the date on which he or she promised to appear, then, within 20 daysafter the delivery of the written promise to appear by theofficer to a magistrate having jurisdiction overthe offense. (b) Whena person violates his promise to appear before an officer authorized to receive bail other than a magistrate, the officer shall immediately deliver to a magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged the written promise to appear and the complaint, if any, filed by the arresting officer. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion in her Reply to Preliminary Opposition (p. 12), no complaint for a violation of section 40508, subdivision (a) is required before the magistrate may exercisehis or her authority under Vehicle Code section 40515 to issue a valid arrest warrant for the failure to appear offense. The Court of Appealin People v. Superior Court ofSan Diego County (Copeland) (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 283, 285, held that Vehicle Code section 40515 by [its] language [does] not require a magistrate to determine from a complaint if an offense occurred and if reasonable grounds implicate the defendant, as generally required by Penal Code section 813. The offense, failure to appear, occurs in front of the magistrate, satisfying the requirements of Penal Code section 813, and People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418. In fact, the Copeland court upheld a warrantasvalidly issued without a judge ever seeing the warrant where the warrant was generated by a computer following a clerk’s docket entry that the defendant failed to appear. (/d. at pp. 284-285.) Relying on Copeland, the Attorney General rendered an opinion that a magistrate could issue a valid warrant under the 3] authority of Vehicle Code section 40515 withoutalso filing a complaint. (56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 165 (1973).) The offenses here being examined [Vehicle Code section 40515 and Penal Code section 853.8], however, occur in front of the magistrate,if notliterally, at least to the extent that they are documentedin the court’s own records. In other words, and contrary to the usualsituation, the magistrate does not need to be independently persuaded asto the defendant’s guilt. No judicial discretion is involved or required. [W]e conclude that no complaint need be filed in conjunction with issuing an arrest warrant for either offense. Obviously, this result is not intended to preclude complaints for these offenses from being filed with the court in jurisdictions which desire to do so. Rather, we conclude only that such complaints are not required under the law asit exists today. (56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 166.) At bar, petitioner secured her release on June 8, 2002, by signing the Notice to Appear. Herviolation on July 23, 2002, of this written promise to appear constituted the separate misdemeanoroffense of Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision (a). The ETRSshowsthat a valid arrest warrant issued on August 13, 2002, underthe authority of section 40515, for petitioner’s misdemeanoroffenseof failure to appear. The warrant was recalled when petitioner was brought before the court on July 27, 2007. (Record on Appeal, BR046020, Case Action Summary dated 7/27/07.) The ETRS,which reflected the issuanceofthe warrant, described petitioner by her name, address, date of birth, and driver’s license number — the same description on the citation and the complaint. Therefore, under section 804, subdivision (d), the prosecution was timely commencedfor purposesofthe statute of limitations on August 13, 2002, when a warrantissued. (Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1111-1115, 1129-1130, 1142-1143 [under section 802, subdivision (d) “the prosecution in this case was 32 properly commenced within the six-year statute of limitations by the filing of the John Doearrest warrant that described the person suspected of committing the offenses” by his DNAprofile].)* Therefore, because the issuance ofthe arrest warrantsatisfied commencementofthe prosecution for purposesofthe statute of limitations, the failure to appear offense set forth in the complaint was not time-barred regardless ofwhether the complaint wastacitly approved by the prosecution whenit wasfiled or expressly approved on July 27, 2007,at the time petitioner finally appeared in court and the warrant wasrecalled. (People v. Price (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 987, 996-998, including fn. 10 [because the prosecution’s augmented documents on appeal showed a warrant issued “well within any applicable limitations period,” appellate court foundit unnecessary to resolve whether charging documenton its face was sufficient to satisfy statute of limitations].) Finally, related to the statutory commencementofthe action under * Petitioner has waived any challenges to the warrantbyfailing to object below. The warrant was issued 21 days after petitioner committed her failure to appear offense. Butthere is no statutory sanction should a magistrate delay in complying with the direction in Vehicle Codesection 40515 that the warrant “may be issued and delivered for execution . . within 20 days”after the failure to appear. (Compare People v. Valenzuela (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 427, 430 [dismissal of a criminal case under Penal Code section 825, which provides that a criminal “defendant mustin all cases be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay,” was reversible error because section 825 does not “contain language authorizing or requiring a dismissal of a prosecution by reason of delay in arraignment”] and Woods v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1266-1272 [where statute contained no sanction for the DMV’sfailure to timely comply with the statutory time requirement to hold a hearing within 30 days of driver’s demand, there was nolossofjurisdiction or invalidation of the order of suspensionthat issued at the belated hearing], with § 40805 [statute expressly provides court is without jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction if evidence is based on a speed trap].) Petitioner also did not object to the sufficiency of the warrant’s description of her as required by section 804, subdivision (d). Because petitioner failed to raise the statute of limitations evidentiary claim in the trial court, she lost “the ability to litigate [the] factual issue[]” of whether the arrest warrant described her with sufficient particularity. (Williams, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 344.) 33 subdivision (d) of section 804,petitioner’s fugitive status precluded her from relying on thestatute of limitations as a bar because she failed to submitherself to the authority of the court. In People v. Abayhan (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 324 (Abayhan), the Court ofAppeal applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to the statute of limitations. In Abayhan,a felony complaint was filed on February 10, 1970, for crimes committed on February 8, 1970. The defendant was held to answer on April 9, 1970, and his trial was set for June 17, 1970. The defendantfailed to appear on the day oftrial and a bench warrant wasissued for his arrest. For over 10 years and three months the warrant remained outstanding,until the defendant surrendered and the warrant wasrecalled on October 27, 1980. The matter wascalled for trial on January 21, 1981, but was dismissed on that date under section 1385 when the People were unable to proceed due to a missing witness. The felony complaint wasrefiled on February 13, 1981, and the defendant was held to answer on April 17, 1981. After the defendant was unsuccessful in having the informationset aside as barred by the statute oflimitations, he was convicted at a court trial. (Id. at pp. 327- 328.) On appeal, the defendant claimed the 1981 information was barred by the statute of limitations and should have beenset aside because it was not filed within three years of the commission of the offense. (Abayhan, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 328.) The Abayhan court upheld thetrial court’s ruling that the defendant, who had been a fugitive from justice, was not now in a position to take advantage ofthe bar of the three-year statute of limitations. Applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the Abayhan court held, The conceptthat as a fugitive from justice in a pending criminal prosecution a defendantis disentitled to call upon the resources of the court or processes of the law for a determination of his claims, has long existed. It reflects the invocation by the courtsoftheir inherent equitable powers to 34 refuse to extend their resourcesor processes to an absconding defendantin a pending criminal prosecution,a rationale later codified by statute in 1981 (§ 802.5, Pen. Code)... , Any argumentthat now that he has voluntarily surrendered he may claim the benefits ofthe time statute that ran against the People while he was a fugitive is specious. If an absconding defendant could notcall upon the resources of the court while he was a fugitive it simply makes nosense to permit him now, after flouting the processes of the law for over 10 years by refusing to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, to invoke them to his benefit to bar the criminal prosecution he sought in this mannerto avoid. (Abayhan, supra, 161 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 331-332.) Thus, althoughthefirst information — which had been timely filed shortly after the offense was committed — had been dismissed and the second information wasnotfiled until over 11 years later, the Court ofAppeal found that the defendant was notentitled to claim the benefit ofthe statute of limitations for the 10-year and 3-month period that the defendant wasa fugitive. Thus, after excluding the time that the defendant was a fugitive, the court held that the new information wasfiled well within the three-yearstatute oflimitations. (Jd. at pp. 333-334, including fn. 4.) Atbar, petitioner, likewise, should not be entitled to invoke the statute of limitations during the period that she had absconded from the court’s jurisdiction. Having signed the promise to appear, petitioner was well awareofthe date, time, and location she wasto appear in court. Petitioner did not appear on the July 23, 2002, date as promised, and refused to submit herself to the jurisdiction ofthe court for five years until the warrant was recalled on July 27, 2007. Thus, under the reasoning of Abayhan,petitioner cannot claim the benefit of the statute of limitations for ° Formersection 802.5, which related to the tolling of time limitations for the commencementof criminalactions upon the issuance of an arrest warrant or the finding of an indictment, was addedbyStats. 1981, ch. 1017, § 3, and repealed by Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, § 1. The substance of formersection 802.5 is now containedin section 804, subdivisions (a) and (d). 35 the five years she was a fugitive. Consequently, the complaint timely commenced the prosecution within the one-year statute of limitations, regardless ofwhether it was approved bythe prosecution in 2002 or 2007. CONCLUSION Penal Code section 959.1, subdivision (c)(1), is a legislative effort to increase court efficiency with a resource-saving procedure that permits clerk complainants to file complaints in a very narrow class of offenses of a special nature: failures to appear, pay a fine, orcomply with a court order. The statute’s limited filing authorization does not violate the separation of powers becauseit does not materially infringe on a core function of the executive branch that can only be performedby a prosecutor. Due process is not violated because nothing in the statute interferes with the prosecution’s right to approve, authorize, and concur in the complaintsfiled pursuantto the process provided in section 959.1. Reading section 959.1, as we must, in harmony with the separation ofpowers doctrine and the due processclause, the dispositive factor is not who physically issues andfiles a complaint, or even whether each complaintis individually reviewed by a prosecutor before it is filed. The dispositive question is whether the prosecutor has “approve[d], authorize[d], or concur[red]” in the complaint that was issued and filed. Here, the record showsthat the prosecution was well-aware of the clerk’s utilization of the process provided by section 959.1 and tacitly approved, authorized, and concurred in complaints filed under that process. Furthermore, because a complaint and a warrant were issued on August 13, 2002, the prosecution was timely commencedwithin the one-year statute of limitations. Based on the arguments madein its informal response, real party’s initial return, and in this supplemental return, real party urges this Court to 36 deny the petition for writ of mandate. DATED: November 13, 2012 Respectfully submitted, CARMENA. TRUTANICH,Los Angeles City Attorney DEBBIE LEW,Assistant City Attorney Supervisor, Criminal Appellate Division By: hase 4: UWeefesagee’ T H. C Z Deputy City Attorney Attorneys for Real Party in Interest PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 37 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Counsel of record forreal party, People of the State of California, herebycertifies that pursuantto the California Rules of Court, rules 8.204(c) and 8.486(a)(6), the Supplemental Return in this action contains 10,473 words, excluding the coversheet, tables, verification, and supporting documents. Counsel relies on the word countofthe WordPerfect X3 program usedto preparethisbrief. fithasicsdocacge Katharine H. MacKenzie 38 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS Exhibit1: Exhibit 2: Exhibit 3: Exhibit 4: Declaration ofKatharine H. MacKenzie Facsimile containing Expanded Traffic Record System printout, dated August 12, 2008, and Consolidated Criminal History System report dated August 12, 2008. - Printout of Expanded Traffic Record System screen dated November9, 2012. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Assembly Bill No. 3168 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) dated June 19, 1990. 39 DECLARATION OF KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE I, KATHARINE H. MACKENZIE, am a Deputy City Attorney for the City of Los Angeles assignedto the Criminal Appellate Division and in that capacity declare as follows: I am the attorney assigned to prepare the supplemental return in the instant matter (“Steen”). In 2008, I was the attorney who wasinitially assigned to handle the appealbefore the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. In August 2008, I requested. from thetrial branch ofmy office at the Metropolitan Courthouse copies ofreports for petitioner from the Expanded Traffic Record System (“ETRS”) and the Los Angeles County Consolidated Criminal History System (“CCHRS”), which would show the existence of an arrest warrant for petitioner’s failure to appear in case number 6200307. I received a facsimile (“fax”) copy of those reports on August 12, 2008. That complete fax is attached as Exhibit 2 to this supplemental return. It is a 10-page document. Onthetop of each page, the fax machine printed the page number, the words “LA City Attorney,” and the fax machine phone numberforthetrial branch office that sent the fax. From 2008 through the present date, that fax was retained in the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office Criminal Appellate Division casefiles for petitioner. The ETRSreport I received in 2008 for petitioner’s case no. 6200307, sets out the proceedingsthat occurred onthis matterin thetrial court. It contains an entry of “AW”on the date of “081302” documenting the issuanceof an arrest warrant for petitioner on August 12, 2002. (Ex. 2, ETRSp. 44.) The CCHRSreport showsthat petitioner had a failure to appear warrant for case no. 6200307 and wasarrested on that warrant. (Ex. 2, CCHRS,pp. 45, 51.) Exhibit 1, page 40 On November 9, 2012, I requested that the trial branch obtain a more recent copy of the ETRS from the Metropolitan Courthouse in Los Angeles, so that I could supply a current copy to this Court as an exhibit to the instant supplemental return. However, I was informed by the supervising attorney of the trial branch at the Metropolitan Courthouse that the ETRS record for case no. 6200307 could not be found. Attached as Ex. 3 to this supplemental return is a copy of the screen capture using petitioner’s case no. 6200307. It showsthat “Cit/Case 6200307”“was not found.” (Ex.3, p. 52.) This document wascertified by the clerk of the court as part of 63 documents that were on file at the Metropolitan Courthouse in case no. 6200307. (Ex. 3, p. 53.) Consequently, I am attaching the 2008 fax copy of the ETRS, which is a true and correct copy of the documentI received on August 12, 2008, because I am unableto attach a more recent copy of that document. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 13th day of November, at Los Angeles, California. KiboMVrcucgee KATHARINEH/MACKENZIE Exhibit 1, page 41 Keceived LA CITY ATTORNEY Aug 4Fax :2134858243 Aug FAX COVER SHE LOS ANGELES CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE METROPOLITAN BRANCH 1945 S. BOLL STREET, ROOM 501 LOSANGELES, CA 90007 Waldom2yy10:ae Pred (nA OV 2los FROM: MESSAGE: PAGES(1 CTR o& Crtrnes 4. 4 2 2008 03:41pm 12 2008 17:00 P.O1 ET : (213) 485-8243 VOICE: (213) 978-2400 C \ew Naren ete NCLUDING TRUS ONE): \ 9 THIS MESSAGEIS INTENDED ONLYFORTI ENTITYTO WHICHIIJS ADDRESSED AND I$ PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEN of this messageis not the intendedrecipicnt or an the messageto the intended recipient, you are herd or copying ofthis communicationis strictly prohit Redcar J, Delyadtitty communication in sror, please notify us immediat HE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR MAY CONTAININFORMATION THAT MPT FROM DISCLOSURE. If thereader tmployee or agent responsible for delivering by notified that dissemination, distribution, ited. If you have received this ely by telephone and rectum theoriginal Defies nf the Cle hitmen message to us by mail. Thank you. Exhibit 2, page 42 Received LA CITY ATTORNEY Fax ?2134858243 EXPANDED TRAFFIC RECORD SYSTEM - NUM CIT/CASE 6200307 LEA/COURT 1942 LAM ABSTRACT Y I NAME JEWERELENE STEEN OL ADDRESS 2703 S COCHRAN ST LOS ANGELES CA 90 VIO-DATE APR-DATE ENT-DATE VIOL 1 VIOL 2 V 060802 072302 013008 40508A 29 RECPT NO. 3 75.00 § $ PR CNT 0 PP FINE 0.00 W/O PROOF 0.00 ST AP DSP CMPL DATE 072707D AMT JUD J50 BAIL 1174.00W BASE 425.00 PA 731.00 NC 1.00 WA a ACT DATE SEQ DPT CASE/TD# RECEIPT# AMT PALD ENTRY DATE P CD/DATE CS 011209 011408 RS 010809 060 0100A040 080107 AT 013008 APP SETTLED 013008 CS 011608 ERROR 011408 SC 092507 064 AHEARING 091207 PS 082807 APP STATMENT 090607 AP 082707 APP APPEAL 090607 AR 072707 066 CUSTODY 072707 ee THERE IS MORE INFORMATION DEPRESS "PAI" KEY FOR NEXT PAGE PF1-NAME PF2~-OLND PEF3-NMBR PF4-CITN PE5-DMVM PF6-RSRV PF7-DSPO PF8-WRNT Pk9-CONT PE1O-CCAL PF11-TMEN PF12-ACME * NMBR * Aus 12 2008 03:41pm Aug 12 2008 17:00 P.Q2 BER RESPONSE D# 07213D052 VLN 4LOF62? N PO741447 OLN ST CA 0163319 DOB 041038 T/s N TOL 3 VIOL 4 SPEED S CONV T/S AMT 0.00 COMHAZ DUE 1174.00 RE 7 SB P/C/WA 10.008 Preeememea Exhibit 2, page 43 Received Aug 4 LA CITY ATTORNEY Fax?2134858245 Aug 2 2008 03:42pm 12 2008 17:00 P.03 EXPANDED TRAFFIC RECORD SYSTEM - NUMBER RESPONSE CIT/CASE 6200307 LEA/COURT 1942 LAM ABSTRACT Y ID# 07213D052 VLN 4LOF622 NAME JEWERELENE STEEN OLN P0741447 OLN ST CA ADDRESS 2703 S COCHRAN ST LOS ANGELES CA 900163319 DOB 041038 T/S N VIO-DATE APR-DATE ENT-DATE VIOL 1 VIOL 2 VIOL 3 VIOL 4 SPEED 060802 072302 013008 40508A 29 | RECPT NO. § 75.00 § $ S CONV PR CNT 0 PP FINE 0.00 W/O PROOF 0.00 |T/S AMT 0.00 COMHAZ ST AP OSP CMPL DATE 072707) AMT JUD J50 DUE 1174.00 RF BAIL 1174.00W BASE 425.00 PA 731.00 NC 1.00 WA 7 SB p/C/WA 10.00H eeeeaeeneeee|eeaeeeeeeeeeeeeee ACT ACT DATE SEQ DPT cASE/TDN RECEIPT# AMT PALD ENTRY DATE P CD/DATE AW 081302 063 | 081302 +t NO MORE INFORMATION AVAILABLE: oe PF1-NAME PF2-OLND PF3-NMBR PF4-CITN PFS-DMVM PF6-RSRV PF7-DSPO PF8-WRNT PF9-CONT PFIO-CCAL PF11-TMEN PF12-ACME * NMBR + Exhibit 2, page 44 eceivedR LA CITY ATTORNEY LOS ANGELES COUNTY CONSOLIDATED CRIMINAL HISTORY SYSTEM Fax:2134858243 Aug 12 2008 03:42pm CRIMINAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT FOR OFF INFORMATION FINGERPRINT VERIFIED UNLESS OTHERWISE NO’ Aug 12 2008 17:00 P. 04 Page 1 Gate: 08/12/2008 Time: 16:32 ICE USE ONLY - UNAUTHORIZED USE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE TED BY AN ASTERISK(*) Key Name:(4) STEEN, JEWERELENE SID/CII: 423979323 MAIN: 01051845 etree 2ene 07/24/2007 ARN: Date Name First Used: FBI: 1672851TC5 Requested By: LTCA132 ACHSDafa Included: YESSARMIENTO, ELLEN | Agency: CAQ1 9741A Mu. ti-Source Record: NO LACA - HILL STREET BRANCH Reason: 6200307 TIX Search Search Type: Other ID Criteria: Identifier: BKG; ID Number: 9877912: State: CA DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND OMVMAYHAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUMMARY Bookings Convictions Juvenile Warrants Probations a INS Felony: 1 Felony: 0 Sustained: 0 Bench: 0 Open: 0 Deport: “4 “4Misa: 0 Misd: 0 Dismissed; 0 Arrest 0 Expired: 0 Removal: "4 Infract.(FTA) 0 illegal Entry: LATEST INFORMATION "Probation Latest Name: STEEN, JEWERELENE Date Name Last Used: 07/24/2007 Sex Race Hair Eves Hot Wet bos Updated Female BLACK RED BROWN 503 208 04/10/1938 08/01/2007 Latest Address: 2703 S COCHRAN AVE LOS ANGELES CA Type SiartDate End Date Charge/Description Case Number Updated “PROBATION 06/16/2008 05/15/2013 467(A) KONBAIZ450302 09/1 7/Z008FRML Registration Reg Number Location | Reg Date iPALM PRINT ON FILE A23979323PLM 01/01/0001DNA/DOTS COLLECTED 23979323 08/11/2008 Exhibit?Spel “ees ieae eeEE.oo[ee] me Sataewe : | dev ive. Tazo} ES a TI AM. (We. Aga) : | .AQTHESS AE COOENGE OE FINANCIAL EtSPORGSENLITY ELIGIBLE FOR GISMISRAL (vo 4O6TDT LL BOORING RROUIFEN (Cy CONSTHUGTION ZOuc“ES NOD STISLATIONS HONAIGE OF SEATBELI ca 27508 (pve. FO PEELE,RDP MB OG e270 eA CES GBC: MOTELfk LIS | PERT HAE EC. AEGtleDD= i BPD, Sas BETH SEPT LIMIT GecuR Cp: pe ae, (FORM igenGARG ME TIF Oh D ‘- o AT TWH, GR NEAREST CROSS St,ge IEE re iN GY OFLAS (D3 ANGELESCLERK'S OFFICE OF THE SUBEAJQA COURT, = pra ,ON OR BEFORE. : et = 20SRS(NIGHT COURT SESSION AVATABLEY” Qo 900 THIRD) $1. SAN FERNANDO, #1340CT) S08 SO CENTRE St, SAN PEDAD, grzayC1 11701 80. Lé CIENEGABIVD., LOS ANGELES, ansi 14400 FAWIN STHEET MALL, ZNO FLOCK. VAN NUYS*, 91401CI 1839 PURDUE AVE. LOS ANGELES. g025maT948 $0. HILL, 8, LOS ANGELES", seau7CC] 21001 SHERMAN WAY NO. 12, CANOGAPASH, a1ace INFORMAL JUVENILE& THAFEIG GOURT {ACCOMPANIED BY PARENT OR GUARDIAN) ON, a+ 20AT 8:30 AM. OA 1:30 PM. {CIRCLE APPEARANCE TIME)(] 1945 30 HILL St, aTH FLOOR, LOS ANGELES (1 625) SYLMAR AVE WAN NILYS{J 1725 MAIN SIL. S&NTA MONIGA (7 415 WW OOCEAN BL. Lowe BEACHFORM APPROVED MY THE MOICIAL COUNCIL OF CAUFORNIA HEY (-1-90 VOHES9) 405719161 ane! PC. neg£1 ¥INCADONS NOT COMMITTED IN MY PRESENCE, DECLARED) ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF| DECLARE UNOER PENALTY OF ein ANDER THE LAWS OF THE ATATE OF CALIFORNIATHAT THE FOREGOING15 TRUE REC. f =>eeneee ns WSCapia,«aL. AEA GORTAIL UsST ShABLE OAIES EeGOUAT TiMe: NSf /) MLIE TI CI irs ay ond cy‘Reouesizn = | W WTHOUT ADMITTINGBUILT TM BAaIMGETS APREATTST TAEJUME Om FLAGE CHECAKECY Eyyur x SIGNATLIRE ‘. i AA. tet, iMOC a Monier irom meyelat este certify true and-correct copy of the oral SpeaLNE S___ onfile in thisoffice consisti ng of pages. JOHN A. CLARKE, Executive Officer/Clerk of the ales.Superior Court of Callfornia, County of Las ome).ey , Deputy Exhibit 3, page 53 CA AB 3168 11/26/90 Page 2 SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY Bill Lockyer, Chairman 1989-90 Regular session AB 3168 (Frazee) As introduced Hearing date: June 19, 1990 Penal Code Gww/jm CRIMINAL PLEADINGS - ELECTRONIC FILING - HISTORY Source: Association of Municipal Court Clerks Prior Legislation: AB 3864 (1988) - Chaptered Support: Unknown Opposition: No Known Assembly Floor vote: Ayes 67 - Noes 0 | KEY ISSUE SHOULD GOURT CLERKS BE ALLOWED TO FILE CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS ISSUED FOR THE OFFENSES OF FAILURE TO APPEAR, FAILURE TO PAY A FINE, OR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF THE COURT, IN AN ELECTRONIC FORM? PURPOSE Existing law permits accusatory pleadings to be filed electronically by prosecutors and law enforcement agencies. These pleadings include the complaint, the information, the indictment, and any citation or notice to appear issued on a form approved by the Judicial Council. Existing law also permits a notice of parking violation or a notice to appear to be received and filed by the court in electronic form. This bill would allow court clerks to file electronically complaints issued for the offenses of failure to appear, failure to pay a fine, or failure to comply with an order of the court. The purpose of this bill is to improve court efficiency by maximizing use of electronic filings. COMMENT 1. Stated need According to the author, some courts are in the process of Exhibit 4, page 54 2451 CA AB 3168 | | . | 11/26/90 developing automated systems that eliminate the need for hardpaper. To maximize the savings from an automated system,Proponents assert that court clerks should also be permitted tofile an electronic complaint for offenses of failure to appear,pay a fine, or comply with a court order. The proponent pointsout that a notice to appear may already be filed electronically,| and asserts that it logically follows that acomplaint for failing to appear in response to the noticeshould also be capable of being filed electronically. Finally, the proponent contends that electronic filing shouldincrease court efficiency by streamlining the filing ofpleadings by court clerks. Conditions for electronic filing Under the bill and existing law, a Magistrate or court would beauthorized to receive and file complaints issued for the specified offenses and orders only if’ (a) the magistrate orcourt has the facility to electronically store the accusatorypleading for the statutory period of record retention, and (b)the magistrate or court-has the ability to reproduce theaccusatory pleading in physical form upon demand and payment ofany costs involved. END OF REPORT ! | | | | Page 3 Exhibit 4, page 55 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA STEEN V. APPELLATE DIVISION, Case No. $174773 (Ct. of App. No. B217263, App. Div. Sup. Ct. No. BR046020, Trial Court No. 6200307) I, the undersigned, am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the above-referenced action. Mybusiness address is 200 North Main Street, 500 City Hall East, Los Angeles, California 90012. I am readily familiar with the practice of the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office, City Hall East, for collection and processing correspondence for mailing © with the United States Postal Service. In the ordinary course of business, correspondenceis deposited with the United States Postal Service the samedayit is submitted for mailing. On November13, 2012, I served the following document SUPPLEMENTAL RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; EXHIBITS by placing a true copyin sealed envelope(s) for collection and mailing, following ordinary business practice, at 200 North Main Street, 500 City Hall East, Los Angeles, California 90012. The person(s) served, as shown on the envelope(s), are: John Hamilton Scott Deputy Public Defender Appellate Division 590 Hall of Records 320 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attorney for Petitioner, Jewerelene Steen Joseph Lane, Clerk of the Court California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division 4 2™ Floor-North Tower 300 South Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 Clerk of the Court Appellate Division Los Angeles Superior Court Department 70, Room 607 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Honorable Lee Smalley Edmon Presiding Judge Los Angeles Superior Court Department One 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Honorable Elizabeth Munisoglu Commissioner of the Superior Court Beverly Hills Courthouse Department 5 9355 Burton Way Beverly Hills, CA 90210 Office of the Attorney General State of California 300 South SpringStreet 5" Floor-North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013 Office of the Los Angeles District Attorney Phyllis C. Asayama Deputy District Attorney 540 Hall of Records 320 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attorney for Amicus Curiae, in support of Real Party Frederick Raymond Bennett Court Counsel, Los Angeles Superior Court 111 North Hill Street, #546 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Paul Fogel Reed Smith 101 Second Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94105-3659 Attorney for Respondent I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoingis true andcorrect. Executed on November13, 2012, at Los Angeles, California. i / 1 9 . h VAT - ¢ YOLANDA FLORES,Secretary