115 Cited authorities

Apprendi v. New Jersey
530 U.S. 466 (2000) Cited 26,625 times 100 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
Blakely v. Washington
542 U.S. 296 (2004) Cited 16,609 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority”
Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (1966) Cited 60,240 times 64 Legal Analyses
Holding that statements obtained by custodial interrogation of a criminal defendant without warning of constitutional rights are inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment
Chapman v. California
386 U.S. 18 (1967) Cited 23,461 times 28 Legal Analyses
Holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
Delaware v. Van Arsdall
475 U.S. 673 (1986) Cited 7,273 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding that a restriction on defendant's ability to crossexamine witness in violation of Sixth Amendment was non-structural error
Arizona v. Fulminante
499 U.S. 279 (1991) Cited 5,281 times 20 Legal Analyses
Holding that involuntary confessions are subject to harmless-error review
Holmes v. South Carolina
547 U.S. 319 (2006) Cited 1,897 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that a rule that categorically barred evidence of third-party guilt when strong forensic evidence of the defendant's guilt was presented "is arbitrary in the sense that it does not rationally serve the end that ... [it was] designed to further"
Pulley v. Harris
465 U.S. 37 (1984) Cited 3,441 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that the petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to a proportionality review that would "compare Harris's sentence with the sentences imposed in similar capital cases"
Wainwright v. Witt
469 U.S. 412 (1985) Cited 3,273 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that juror bias determination is a question of fact, even though "[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"
Lockett v. Ohio
438 U.S. 586 (1978) Cited 3,737 times 53 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Ohio death penalty statute, which required imposition of the death penalty once a defendant was found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one of seven specified aggravating factors, unless one of three specified mitigating factors was established by a preponderance of the evidence, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the statute limited the range of mitigating factors that the sentencer could consider
Section 11
Cal. Const. art. VI § 11 Cited 304 times
Authorizing the taking of such evidence

PEOPLE v. WALL

115 Cited authorities

Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”

Holding that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority”

Holding that statements obtained by custodial interrogation of a criminal defendant without warning of constitutional rights are inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment

Holding that error is harmless only if "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"

Holding that a restriction on defendant's ability to crossexamine witness in violation of Sixth Amendment was non-structural error

Holding that involuntary confessions are subject to harmless-error review

Holding that a rule that categorically barred evidence of third-party guilt when strong forensic evidence of the defendant's guilt was presented "is arbitrary in the sense that it does not rationally serve the end that ... [it was] designed to further"

Holding that the petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to a proportionality review that would "compare Harris's sentence with the sentences imposed in similar capital cases"

Holding that juror bias determination is a question of fact, even though "[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"

Authorizing the taking of such evidence