Revitalization Partners Llc v. Equinix IncMOTION for Summary JudgmentW.D. Wash.December 7, 2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax The Honorable James L. Robart UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE REVITALIZATION PARTNERS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. EQUINIX, INC., Defendant. No. 2:16-cv-01367-JLR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF EQUINIX, INC. Noted on Motion Calendar: December 30, 2016 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED The Court should enter judgment for Equinix because Equinix should not be compelled to pay twice for the same obligation. In 2012, Equinix paid Lighthouse Electrical Group in full for work performed by Lighthouse. Equinix was instructed by a duly appointed officer of Lighthouse to make certain payments by direct deposit into a personal bank account. Lighthouse authorized the officer to direct Equinix to make payments into the specified account to ensure the funds paid by Equinix would not be taken by a bank and would instead remain available to pay taxes and other expenses incurred by Lighthouse. The Court should enter judgment for Equinix under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for three reasons: First, Equinix paid Lighthouse in full for all services provided by Lighthouse. Equinix should not be compelled to pay twice for the same obligation. Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 1 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax Second, Equinix is not liable for following instructions given by an agent of Lighthouse, who was vested with actual and apparent authority to direct Equinix to make payments into the specified account. Third, Equinix was under no obligation to verify the authority bestowed on the agent of Lighthouse. Nor did Equinix owe any duty of care to Lighthouse. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Equinix paid Lighthouse for electrical services. Lighthouse provided Equinix with various electrical contracting services. In 2011, Equinix engaged Lighthouse to perform electrical contracting work on property located in Seattle, Washington. Between December 2011 and January 2012, Lighthouse provided the services and issued invoices to Equinix for the work performed. (Anderson Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) As agreed between Equinix and Lighthouse, Equinix paid Lighthouse by direct deposit. (Anderson Decl., ¶ 5.) In 2010, Lighthouse asked Equinix to make payments into an account maintained with Columbia State Bank (the “CSB Account”), by completing an ACH Payment Authorization Form prepared by Equinix. (Id., Ex. B.) Under the terms of the ACH Payment Form, this procedure for making payments would remain in place until Lighthouse notified Equinix of its termination or change. (Id.) On January 26, 2012, Sandra Blackburna Vice President of Lighthouse, and the wife of the company’s founder and presidentinformed Equinix that Lighthouse had changed its bank account, and would accordingly supply Equinix with new payment instructions. (Anderson Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. C.) Ms. Blackburn completed an ACH Payment Form with Equinix providing the new account information. (Id. at ¶ 7, Ex. D.) Pursuant to this ACH Payment Form, Lighthouse intended Equinix to make payments into an account maintained with Key Bank (the “Key Bank Account”). (Id.) Although this was a personal account, Ms. Blackburn made the request in her capacity as a Vice President of Lighthouse and for corporate purposes. (Id.; S. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 4.) Ms. Blackburn was authorized to act for Lighthouse when she Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 2 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax directed Equinix to satisfy its obligations to Lighthouse by making payments into the Key Bank Account. (M. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 3.) As instructed by Lighthouse, Equinix made payments to Lighthouse by directly depositing funds into the Key Bank Account. Equinix submitted a payment on February 10, 2012, in the amount of $120,681.05, a second payment on February 17, 2012, in the amount of $11,070.46, and a third payment on February 24, 2012, in the amount of $187,169.45, for a total of $318,920.96. (Anderson Decl., ¶ 8.) B. Revitalization Partners is appointed as the receiver, and is given information showing that Equinix made payments to Lighthouse. The next month, Lighthouse was placed into a receivership by Columbia State Bank. Revitalization Partners was appointed as the receiver for Lighthouse on March 5, 2012. (Compl. Ex. A (ECF No. 1).) Revitalization Partners reviewed the books and records of Lighthouse and determined that certain receivables with Equinix appeared to be unpaid. (Dorsett Decl. Ex. A (Neupert Decl.) ¶ 6.) On May 18, 2012, Anthony Neupert from Revitalization Partners contacted Equinix, requesting proof of payment for the receivables. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. B.) Equinix produced records showing that it had paid the outstanding receivables. (Id. ¶¶ 9-15.) Based on these records, Mr. Neupert was able to verify that Equinix made the payments and that the funds were deposited into the Key Bank Account. (Id. ¶ 16.) On February 6, 2013, Revitalization Partners took the depositions of Ms. Blackburn and Mr. Blackburn in another case. During her deposition, Ms. Blackburn testified that she directed Equinix to make payments into the Key Bank Account because that was the best way to ensure Lighthouse had sufficient funds to pay its business expenses. (Dorsett Decl. Ex. B (S. Blackburn Dep.) 56:4-6 & 15-25; 57:1-24.) Lighthouse was concerned that any funds deposited into the CSB Account would be taken by Columbia State Bank, and Lighthouse needed to pay other expenses. (Id.) During his deposition, Mr. Blackburn confirmed Lighthouse directed Equinix to make payments into the Key Bank Account to make funds available to pay Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 3 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax expenses of Lighthouse, including taxes and payroll. (Dorsett Decl. Ex. C (M. Blackburn Dep.) 37:12-25; 38:1-10.) Importantly, Mr. and Ms. Blackburn both testified that the funds paid by Equinix were in fact used for business-related expenses of Lighthouse, even though the money was deposited into the Key Bank Account. Q What happened to the Equinix funds that were deposited into your personal accounts? [S. Blackburn] At some point we had to pay taxes. Q Taxes for what? [S. Blackburn] Business taxes. Department of Revenue. . . . Q Were those taxes owed on behalf of Lighthouse or --? [S. Blackburn] Yes. I don’t recall the exact amounts. What I do recall is that this money was paid out to folks on behalf of Lighthouse. (Dorsett Decl. Ex. B at 61:14-25; 63:16-25; 64:1-20.) Mr. Blackburn also testified that the funds were used to pay expenses of Lighthouse. Q Did you know what the money, the Equinix money, was used to pay? [M. Blackburn] Taxes, payroll. (Dorsett Decl. Ex. C at 38:11-13.) Mr. Blackburn was the founder and president of Lighthouse. (M. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 2.) Ms. Blackburn was the Vice President of Special Projects for Lighthouse (S. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 2), and she held authority to handle accounts payable and other related accounting tasks (Dorsett Decl. Ex. B at 15:7-16; 19:8-25). As Vice President of Special Projects for Lighthouse, Ms. Blackburn had the authority to direct Equinix to make payments into the Key Bank Account. (S. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 4; M. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 4.) Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 4 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax Both Mr. and Ms. Blackburn confirm the payments made by Equinix into the Key Bank Account constituted payment in full satisfaction of Equinix’s obligations to Lighthouse. (S. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 6; M. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 5.) Despite the authority given to Ms. Blackburn to act on behalf of Lighthouse and the testimony and documents showing payments made by Equinix and receipt of those funds by Lighthouse, Revitalization Partners argues that Equinix still owes money for an obligation that Equinix already paid. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court should enter summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.” Trade Assocs., Inc. v. Fusion Tech., Inc., 2011 WL 1485491, at * 1 (W.D. Wash. April 18, 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (court should grant summary judgment if party fails to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”)). To defeat this motion, Revitalization Partners must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to support each element of its claims. In re Brazier Forest Products, Inc., 921 F.2d 221, 223 (9th Cir. 1990). Revitalization Partners has the burden to prove that Equinix breached its agreement with Lighthouse by failure to pay Lighthouse. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Dally, 148 Wn. App. 739, 745 (2009) (plaintiff must show an agreement between the parties, a party’s duty under the agreement, and a breach of that duty); see also Baldwin v. Silver, 165 Wn. App. 463, 475 (2011) (plaintiffs failed to meet their burden on summary judgment that insurance company failed to properly pay for contractors’ work in support of their breach of contract claim). Revitalization Partners also has the burden to show that Equinix Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 5 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax owed a duty to Lighthouse under any negligence theory. Id. Revitalization Partners may not rest on the allegations of the pleadings, but must produce specific facts showing a genuine issue of fact. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1986). Revitalization Partners cannot meet its burdens because the uncontroverted evidence shows that Equinix paid Lighthouse, Lighthouse received the funds paid by Equinix, and Equinix did not owe any duty to verify the authority of Ms. Blackburn. Equinix is entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. III. ARGUMENT A. The Court should dismiss all claims because Equinix already paid Lighthouse for the services provided. Equinix paid Lighthouse in full for the services provided in 2011 and 2012. “Payment is the discharge of an obligation by the actual or constructive delivery of money or its equivalent by an obligor or by someone for the obligor for the purpose of extinguishing an obligation, wholly or partially, and the acceptance of it by the obligee.” 60 Am. Jur. 2d Payment § 1 (2016). Payment requires both receipt of funds by the creditor and the intention on behalf of both parties that the funds should constitute payment. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Whitney, 119 Wn. App. 339, 348 (2003). Where the parties agree on the manner and place of payment, the court will effectuate that intent. See Thrifty Supply Co. v. Deverian Builders, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 425, 429 (1970). Equinix properly tendered payment for the services provided by Lighthouse. At the direction of Lighthouse’s Vice President, Equinix deposited funds into the Key Bank Account to satisfy all outstanding obligations Equinix owed to Lighthouse. Lighthouse and Equinix both intended that the funds received by Lighthouse by direct deposit into the Key Bank Account would constitute payment in full satisfaction of the outstanding invoices owed by Equinix. Revitalization Partners concedes that Equinix made payments for the services provided, and in fact verified that payments made by Equinix were deposited into the Key Bank Account. Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 6 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax (See Compl. ¶¶ 2.9, 2.10, 2.11; Neupert Decl., ¶ 16.) Rather, Revitalization Partners argues that because the funds were deposited into the personal account of Mr. and Ms. Blackburn, the funds were not “received” by Lighthouse. That argument fails. Ms. Blackburn testified that she acted at the direction of Lighthouse—for company purposes—to change the account to ensure that Lighthouse’s “employees were paid” (Dorsett Decl. Ex. B at 57:23), and to pay taxes owed by Lighthouse (Id. at 61:14-25, 64:16-20), among other things. Ms. Blackburn was authorized by Lighthouse to direct Equinix to make payments to the Key Bank Account for Lighthouse to pay certain business expenses. (See id. at 57:4-24; S. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 5.) It does not matter that the Key Bank Account was the Blackburns’ personal account because Ms. Blackburn was authorized by Lighthouse to direct the funds into that account and did so for corporate purposes. Mr. Blackburn, the founder of Lighthouse, substantiated Ms. Blackburn’s testimony. He also explained that Lighthouse directed Equinix to make payments into another account so that Lighthouse could meet its payroll and tax obligations. (Dorsett Decl. Ex. C at 37:24-25; 38: 1-2 & 11-13; M. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 4.) Both Mr. and Mrs. Blackburn confirm receipt of funds from Equinix in satisfaction of all obligations Equinix owed to Lighthouse. (See S. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 6; M. Blackburn Decl., ¶ 5.) Equinix paid Lighthouse, as directed by a duly appointed and acting officer of Lighthouse, in full for the services Lighthouse provided. Lighthouse received these funds because according to the testimony from officers of Lighthouse, the funds paid by Equinix were used for expenses incurred by Lighthouse. B. Equinix followed payment instructions given by Ms. Blackburn, an authorized agent of Lighthouse. Equinix is not liable for following payment instructions from Ms. Blackburn. As Vice President of Special Projects, Ms. Blackburn had both actual and apparent authority to direct the manner of payments made by Equinix on account of its obligations to Lighthouse. Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 7 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax “An agent can bind his or her principal to a contract when the agent has either actual or apparent authority.” Steadman v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2015 WL 2085565, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2015) (citing King v. Riveland, 125 Wn.2d 500, 507 (1994)). “[A]n agency relationship results from the manifestation of consent by the principal that the agent shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, with a correlative manifestation of consent by the agent to act on his behalf and subject to his control.” State v. Garcia, 146 Wn. App. 821, 827 (2008). “[W]hen a principal has vested an agent with general authority to engage in a class of transactions, subject to limits known only to the agent and the principal, third parties may reasonably believe the agent to be authorized to conduct such transactions and need not inquire into the existence of undisclosed limits on the agent’s authority.” Udall v. T.D. Escrow Services, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 903, 914 (2007) (citations omitted). See also Walker v. Pac. Mobile Homes, Inc., 68 Wn.2d 347, 351 (1966) (“Authority to perform particular services for a principal carries with it the implied authority to perform the usual and necessary acts essential to carry out the authorized services.”). The doctrine of apparent authority also protects third parties from accusations that the agent lacked actual authority. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 (2006). Apparent authority is present where the principal’s objective manifestations (1) “cause the one claiming apparent authority to actually, or subjectively, believe that the agent has authority to act for the principal,” and (2) “the claimant’s actual, subjective belief is objectively reasonable.” Udall, 159 Wn.2d at 913 (2007) (citing Riveland, 125 Wn.2d at 507 (1994)). “A principal may ‘make a manifestation by . . . placing an agent in a position within an organization, or placing an agent in charge of a transaction or situation.” Id. (citing Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 3.03 (2006), cmt. c at 174). Lighthouse vested Ms. Blackburn with actual authority to direct the manner of payment by Equinix. Mr. Blackburn, the founder and president of Lighthouse, confirms that Ms. Blackburn had authority, as Vice President of Special Projects, to act for Lighthouse when she Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 8 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax directed Equinix to make payments into the Key Bank Account. (See M. Blackburn Decl., ¶¶ 3- 4.) Additionally, Lighthouse designated Ms. Blackburn as Vice President of Special Projects and made an objective manifestation that Ms. Blackburn had the authority to direct payment. Equinix had no reason to question Ms. Blackburn’s authority to act on behalf of LighthouseEquinix followed instructions given by a Vice President of Lighthouse, who was specifically authorized to direct the manner of payment for the benefit of Lighthouse. Accordingly, Equinix is not liable for following instructions given by an authorized agent of Lighthouse. As Ms. Blackburn’s principal, Lighthouse is bound by Ms. Blackburn’s actions. See Steadman, 2015 WL 2085565, at *6; Riveland, 125 Wn.2d at 507. C. Equinix was under no obligation to verify Ms. Blackburn’s authority, nor did it owe any duty of care to Lighthouse. Equinix had no duty to verify Ms. Blackburn’s authority to direct the manner of payment. Under common law, a duty to use reasonable care may be imposed if: (1) the defendant poses a risk of harm to the plaintiff by actively creating or increasing peril and exposes the plaintiff to it; or (2) the defendant is found to have a duty to prevent the injury to the plaintiff, either because the defendant voluntarily assumed such a duty, or such a duty has been imposed by statute. Id. 436-37. However, as a general rule, “‘in the absence of a special relationship between the parties, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another.’” Robb v. City of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 427, 433, (2013) (quoting Tae Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143 Wash.2d 190, 195 (2001)). Similarly, a third party does not have a duty to question whether the action of the agent was authorized by the principal when the principal’s manifestations provided the third party with an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the agent had authority to act for the principal. Udall, 159 Wn.2d at 914 (2007). Equinix was under no obligation, as a customer of Lighthouse, to verify that Ms. Blackburn had authority to act on behalf of Lighthouse. Equinix did not assume any duty for Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 9 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax Lighthouse as its customer, nor did any special relationship exist between Equinix and Lighthouse that would require Equinix to act with a certain level of care as a matter of law. Moreover, because Ms. Blackburn was vested with actual and apparent authority by Lighthouse to direct Equinix to make the payments into the Key Bank Account, Equinix was under no obligation to question Ms. Blackburn’s authority. As a customer of Lighthouse, Equinix is not liable for following instructions it received from an authorized agent of Lighthouse to submit payments to the specified account. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Equinix respectfully requests the Court to enter summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. Equinix brings this motion before it has conducted any material discovery because it believes there is no reasonable dispute about the material facts of the case, and no reason to incur additional expense or delay through discovery. (Importantly, Revitalization Partners has already taken substantial discovery in connection with prior related matters, including depositions of the principals of Lighthouse.) To the extent the Court denies this motion, Equinix reserves the right to move for summary judgment again after conducting discovery. DATED this 7th day of December, 2016. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP Attorneys for Equinix, Inc. By /s/ Lauren Dorsett Hugh McCullough, WSBA No. 41453 Lauren Dorsett, WSBA No. 43110 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, Washington 98101-3045 206-622-3150 (telephone) 206-757-7700 (fax) hughmccullough@dwt.com laurendorsett@dwt.com Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 10 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30369886v6 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on December 7, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of the filing to the following: • Heidi C. Anderson: AndersonH@LanePowell.com • Charles R. Eckberg: EkbergC@LanePowell.com Signed in Seattle, Washington this 7th day of December, 2016. s/ Lauren Dorsett Lauren Dorsett Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11 Filed 12/07/16 Page 11 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30872227v1 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax The Honorable James L. Robart UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE REVITALIZATION PARTNERS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. EQUINIX, INC., Defendant. No. 2:16-cv-01367-JLR ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF EQUINIX, INC. THIS MATTER came before the Court on Equinix, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 7, 2016. The Court considered the motion, as well as each paper submitted in support of, and in opposition to, that motion. The Court finds that the relief requested in the motion is warranted, and hereby ORDERS: 1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Equinix, Inc. is GRANTED. 2. The Court hereby dismisses all claims and causes of action asserted by Revitalization Partners LLC against Equinix, Inc. with prejudice. Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11-1 Filed 12/07/16 Page 1 of 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 (2:16-cv-01367-JLR) DWT 30872227v1 0093271-000002 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax DATED this ____ day of __________________________, 2016. _________________________________________ Judge James L. Robart United States District Court Western District of Washington Presented by Davis Wright Tremaine LLP Attorneys for Equinix, Inc. By /s/Lauren Dorsett Hugh McCullough, WSBA No. 41453 Lauren Dorsett, WSBA No. 43110 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, Washington 98101-3045 206-622-3150 (telephone) 206-757-7700 (fax) hughmccullough@dwt.com laurendorsett@dwt.com Case 2:16-cv-01367-JLR Document 11-1 Filed 12/07/16 Page 2 of 2