Pettigrew v. Atlanta Independent School System

REPLY BRIEF re MOTION for Summary Judgment

N.D. Ga.February 28, 2017

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION KAREN PETTIGREW, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. ) ATLANTA INDEPENDENT ) 1:15-cv-2360-TWT SCHOOL SYSTEM a/k/a ATLANTA ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ) ) Defendant. ) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant Atlanta Public Schools (“APS” or “District”), submits this Reply in supports of its Motion for Summary Judgment, showing this Honorable Court the following: I. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS Plaintiff has failed to offer any competent evidence of discriminatory animus of age discrimination, such that is sufficient to defeat Defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment. Consequently, ccontrary to Plaintiff's argument, there is no evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find that discrimination was the real reason for Plaintiff's nonrenewal, or any action would Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 1 of 18 2 she has alleged was adverse, in spite of its disqualification from being an actionable adverse action. The Court should not consider Plaintiff’s pattern of mistreatment argument - or Plaintiff's “me too” evidence. Plaintiff's response is absent evidence of comments or conduct by Principal Wheeler, or any other employee of APS, that would allow a reasonable jury to find that age discrimination was in any part the real reason for her employment nonrenewal. As Plaintiff's argument is a weak stretch toward overcoming summary judgment, Plaintiff attempts to compensate for her lack of evidence for her own age discrimination claims by relying on “me too” evidence, of which she suggests creates the inference that Maureen Wheeler possessed a discriminatory animus toward older employees at Hope-Hill. This argument, however, is meritless. Determining whether evidence of discrimination of a plaintiff’s coworkers should be admitted “requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008). But so-called “me too” evidence, whether offered to establish a prima facie case or show pretext, is suspect. Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 (S.D. Ala. 2012). A district court may exclude “me too” evidence “if it is unduly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or cumulative.” Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014). “[M]ore often than not,” courts should deem “me too” evidence inadmissible “because the probative value of such evidence is judged to Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 2 of 18 3 be ‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’” Andazola v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc., 2013 WL 2355350, at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 24, 2013). For instance, in Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Company, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s “me too” evidence was admissible under Rules 402 and 404(b) “to prove the intent of Bagby Elevator to discriminate and retaliate.” 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008). In contrast to Goldsmith, in Godwin v. Wellstar Health Systems, Inc., this Court excluded statements from the plaintiff’s coworkers alleging they too suffered discrimination. 2015 WL 7313399, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2015). The Court held that determining the admissibility of “this kind of speculative evidence” would necessitate “a mini-trial to litigate whether the witnesses were, in fact, ‘discriminated’ against.” Id. The Court further explained that although the plaintiff could present “concrete ‘me too’ evidence,” such as conduct or comments directed at others that reflect discriminatory animus, she could not introduce “testimony about a witness's views and beliefs regarding the reasons for the witness's own termination.” Id. at *5. This Court should similarly reject Plaintiff’s proffered “me too” evidence. As Plaintiff's purported evidence and opinions of her former coworkers of alluded to age discrimination are not probative of any alleged discriminatory animus by Maureen Wheeler. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 3 of 18 4 Plaintiff relies upon the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F. 3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff summarizes that in Damon, a new supervisor engaged in numerous actions toward employees that were at least forty (40) years of age, which the court found to be reflective of discriminatory animus probative of age discrimination. However, the instant case is distinguishable from Damon, rather than "strikingly similar" as asserted by Plaintiff, and the Circuit's decision was based on so much more than that presented in Plaintiff's selective summary of the Circuit's ruling. As shown below, there was a pile of issues in Damon that caused the Court real concern – issues that do not exist in this case in both numerosity, principle and substance. First, while the new supervisor in Damon, Soto, within a one-year period, terminated or demoted four older, highly experienced store managers, there were only seven managers total under the supervisor's direct supervision. To this fact, the Eleventh Circuit specifically stated "[w]hile not direct evidence of discriminatory animus, we believe that this pattern of firing and demoting so many older workers and replacing them with younger workers, by the relevant decision- maker during the same time period, constitutes probative circumstantial evidence of age discrimination." (emphasis added). This quantity argument simply does not exist in this case, and even if it did, the Court did not consider this solo in determining that Appellants had shown an inference of discrimination. Further, Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 4 of 18 5 Soto conceded, “[I]t certainly turns out that what has occurred is that older managers were either fired or demoted and replaced by younger people,” and that “in every instance the older store managers had more years of experience than the people that replaced them.” Such is not the case here, and nowhere has Plaintiff challenged the experience or qualifications of any younger employees. Plaintiff conceded in her testimony that years of service does not correlate to effectiveness in the classroom. There are no such concessions in our case, and Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of such a concession or the inference that it represents. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit also considered that around the time of the challenged personnel actions, Fleming began advertising and interviewing for new store managers even though there were no managerial vacancies at the time; and the supervisor's remark to the younger successor of a displaced employee that he wanted “aggressive, young men” like himself to be promoted to both be highly suggestive circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer discriminatory animus. Plaintiff has produced no evidence of any remarks by Ms. Wheeler or any other person in this case that are circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus; and even if she had (which she has not), such remark, not at all direct evidence of discriminatory animus, would be a stray remark explainable by the testified to circumstances surrounding the commencement of Principal Wheeler's tenure at Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 5 of 18 6 Hope-Hill. There is simply no evidence in this case that Ms. Wheeler or any other APS representative had any ageist preference for younger employees. In addition, the Court in Damon considered that the Appellants produced evidentiary support by which a reasonable jury could conclude that the specific reasons for termination given by Fleming were a pretext because they showed that other employees outside the protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not similarly treated. Plaintiff's response, and the record, foregoes any similarly situated argument at all. Rather, Plaintiff, who testified that she has never been an administrator, had never evaluated other employees, could use improvement in her performance, had never worked under Ms. Wheeler, needed help in doing some things, and was being evaluated for only the first or second time under the more comprehensive new teacher evaluation rubric, simply quarreled with the reasonableness of Principal Wheeler's, and as the records shows – and others – assessment of her performance and her eventual termination by the Atlanta Board of Education. The Damon Court concluded that based on the totality of evidence, not speculative and selective information such as in the instant case the Appellants Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 6 of 18 7 introduced sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on their age discrimination claims.1 Notwithstanding that Plaintiff's purported "me to" evidence is prejudicial, it also holds absolutely no probative value. On Page 10 of Plaintiff's response (Doc. 36), Plaintiff argues that following Ms. Wheeler's first year at Hope-Hill, seven (7) employees of at least forty (40) years of age "either voluntarily or involuntarily", were replaced by employees under 40, and this is probative of discrimination. Among the holes in this argument that cause it to sink, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any information regarding the total number of employees at Hope-Hill; and thus, even with the other problems in this argument, seven employees being "voluntarily or involuntarily" replaced holds no substantive value or relevance to this case. Plaintiff simply has not established that involuntary departures were the result of age discrimination – and thus certainly cannot argue that such involuntarily departures were the result of discriminatory animus. Plaintiff provided that Court with a list of names and ages – and nothing more. This will not suffice. Moreover, unlike the Appellants in Damon, Plaintiff has put forth no 1 In considering the totality of evidence, the court in Damon flatly rejected Appellant's allegation that the implicated supervisor stated that he wanted “a younger influx of blood.” The Court found that there was no record evidence that Soto ever made this comment; and the only evidence of such comment was double hearsay and inadmissible as such, and the Court refused to consider it as probative evidence. See Zaben v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455-57 (11th Cir.1997). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 7 of 18 8 evidence to show that the replacement teachers for those that both voluntarily and involuntarily left were inexperienced, that they were failing to perform their duties or that they were not qualified for the positions to which they were hired by APS. Further, Plaintiff has failed to expound upon the circumstances of any of these alleged voluntary and involuntary departures out of a mystery total number of employees assigned to Hope-Hill. This speculation is not evidence of anything probative in this case and fails to show that any departures of employees of at least 40 show that any of Maureen Wheeler's decisions were motivated by age bias. Thus the totality of circumstances that allowed the Damon Appellants to be successful is simply lacking in this case. Similarly, Plaintiff's argument is without merit that Maureen Wheeler had a pattern of providing negative written reviews and reprimands to older employees. Plaintiff argues that Ms. Wheeler gave she, Ms. Jackson and Mr. Whitaker, out of a mystery total number of employees assigned to Hope Hill, less than satisfactory reviews. Again, while this allegation provides absolutely no probative inference of age discrimination, Ms. Pettigrew quarreling with write ups and Ms. Jackson's complaints regarding the same are a far far cry from an alleged "Pattern of providing negative reviews and reprimands to older employees with above average performance history". The quarreling of Plaintiff and her former coworkers, Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 8 of 18 9 without more as in Damon, is simply speculation and lacks any probative value regarding whether Ms. Wheeler's motivation was age bias related. In addition, unlike the Appellants in Damon, who were parties to the case and questioned the veracity of certain allegations of work rules violations (which is a much easier measure than a performance observation), Plaintiff is asking the Court to accept in this case that which it has consistently rejected with respect to "me too" evidence - the opinion declaration of her former coworkers - evidence that would require such litigation-within-litigation on grounds that it would run afoul of Rule 403. See King v. Volunteers of Am., N. Alabama, Inc., 614 F. App'x 449, 456 (11th Cir. 2015) (excluding “me too” evidence that “was not relevant, was unduly prejudicial, or could create a series of mini-trials about other witnesses' potential claims” against the defendant); Hughes v. City of Lake City, 2015 WL 846543, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2015) (finding that even if “me too” evidence was somewhat relevant, “such relevance would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice, as well as the waste of time that would result from holding mini- trials on whether each complainant was discriminated against.”); Linn v. ST Mobile Aerospace Eng'g, Inc., 2008 WL 2945558, at *6 (S.D. Ala. July 25, 2008) (excluding “me too” evidence that would cause the defendant’s motion for summary judgment to “devolve into a de facto mini-trial” about whether the plaintiff’s coworker experienced discrimination). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 9 of 18 10 Finally, Plaintiff's allegation that discriminatory animus can also be inferred from Ms. Wheeler allegedly mistreating older employees fails. Plaintiff's argument that a few employees over 40 out of an unknown total number of employees over 40 at Hope –Hill and an unknown number of employees, both over and under 40 at Hope- Hill, must evidence discrimination is simply unfounded and prejudicial. Unlike Damon, Plaintiff has presented nothing more than a few statements – she even lacks the numbers the court considered in Damon. Even if Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence had some probative value (which it does not at all), its miniscule evidentiary worth is outweighed by the virtual certainty it would be prejudicial to APS and confusing and misleading to a jury. As a result, it would not be admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence inadmissible at trial cannot be used to avoid summary judgment.” Hegre v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 (S.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd, 275 F. App'x 873 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Broadway v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 530 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1976), Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff's purported “Me too” evidence is the sole pillar propping up her age discrimination claim; which without that alleged evidence, she cannot at all raise any genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of her age discrimination claim. Plaintiff has not overcome Defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's nonrenewal of employment. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 10 of 18 11 Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, there is simply no independent evidence to suggest that the real reasons for Plaintiff's nonrenewal of employment was pretext for alleged age discrimination. The application of applicable law to the evidence in this case, even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff demands a judgment for the Defendant here as a matter of law. First, as background, this Honorable court can take judicial notice of the fact that the nonrenewal process related to Plaintiff's employment was governed by Georgia's Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940 et seq. ("FDA"). The FDA provides a list of bases on which certain disciplinary action can be proposed against an educator. Under the FDA, there is nothing that requires that an employer prove all the bases (i.e. incompetence, insubordination, willful neglect of duties, etc.) for all factual incidents set forth in the charge letter before disciplinary action, including termination, can be sustained. In fact, proof of only one bases may be sufficient to result in a finding subjecting an employee to disciplinary action. Notwithstanding, in spite of Plaintiff's disagreement with her nonrenewal, evidence supporting these justifications includes Principal Wheeler's affidavit and supporting documentation the Notice of Hearing and Charges provided to Plaintiff (Plaintiff Dep. Ex 13) and the Findings of Fact issued by the FDA Hearing Tribunal (Plaintiff Dep. Ex 14), each of which references the deficiencies and performance issues referenced Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 11 of 18 12 by Defendant as justification for Plaintiff’s dismissal. Plaintiff challenged her nonrenewal in a full due process hearing, where she was represented by an attorney, presented witness and documentary evidence and had the legal right and opportunity to appeal the adverse decision of the Atlanta Board of Education to appellate bodies including, the Georgia State Board of Education, the Superior Court of Fulton County and the Georgia Court of Appeals. Thus, the nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s nonrenewal are fully supported by competent admissible, documentary and testimonial evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument is without merit that her students' success on the CRCT creates a triable issue of fact related to her Incompetency. Even if Plaintiff's students increased their scores, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any rubric, fact or standard that suggests that she cannot be found incompetent in the face of such scores, and along with other factors. Plaintiff is asking the Court to make a leap that is unsupported by anything beyond Plaintiff's conclusion and speculation. The record is unequivocal that Plaintiff has no experience, history or wherewithal regarding evaluating teachers, she never served as an administrator, and she herself testified that the evaluation rubric under which she was evaluated in 2013-2014 had only been in place for about one prior school year. Thus, her prior evaluations are irrelevant to this action, as are her students' alleged CRCT scores to underscore her adjudicated incompetence. While Plaintiff attempts to bolster the importance Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 12 of 18 13 of her CRCT scores, she clearly ignores Maureen Wheeler's testimony that Plaintiff's "benchmark data and baseline data indicated that her students were not progressing and performing like they should have been", so they had to divide some of Plaintiff's responsibilities to other teachers and push in additional reading support to Plaintiff's students. (Wheeler Dep. 212:2-13; 213:12-25; 221:1-224:1). Further, Ms. Wheeler testified that because of all the supports that Plaintiff's students received regarding ELA/language arts instruction, she could not identify that an increase in CRCT scores would "in part" (as inquired by Plaintiff's counsel) be a reflection upon the quality of instruction those students received in fifth grade. (Wheeler Dep. 230:16 – 232:5). Similarly, Robin Glenn testified that Plaintiff had problems implementing the balanced literacy format for her instruction; did not put together a good lesson plan prior to her lesson; tried to plan at the last minute – and needed a lot of help; and that student CRCT scores cannot be said to be a determining factor as to a teacher's competence because students may receive other supports (including at home) that is not directly related to that teacher. Glenn Dep. 26:1-22; 36:18-21; 54:21-56:21). Thus, this argument is simply a theory advanced by Plaintiff that cannot overcome summary judgment. Likewise, Plaintiff's argument fails that APS improperly found that she failed to complete her PDP. Ms. Wheeler testified that Plaintiff's Performance Development Plan (PDP) was extended only so that they could add a Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 13 of 18 14 professionalism component to it and allow the associated tasks to be completed – as a result of several events that had taken place that in her discretion and experience, required professionalism to be added. (Wheeler Dep. 209:2 – 210:19). Plaintiff has failed to put forth anything to suggest that the extension or modification of the PDP was in any way related to or shows an inference of age discrimination. Similarly, Plaintiff now asserts that she made it to every meeting with Ms. Crawford – however, even if she made every meeting, as stated in herself serving assertions, she has no evidence that such shows an inference of discrimination related to her age. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that APS improperly found that Plaintiff failed to submit lesson plans. However, she testified that she submitted them late, and Ms. Wheeler testified that submission of lesion plans was a clear duty. Thus, whether such violated policy, practice or directive, does not change the fact that her plans were late. (Plaintiff Dep. 167:9-13). With respect to the Black History door decoration, Ms. Wheeler testified that Plaintiff's African American History door decoration was not adequate – not that Plaintiff did not do it. (Wheeler Dep. 150 – 157). Plaintiff experienced an adverse action. But she has failed on all front to tie that to her age. Her attempt to salvage her claim with "me too" evidence also fails and Defendant respectfully requests that summary judgment be granted on Plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 14 of 18 15 II. PLAINTIFF'S HOSTILE WORK CLAIM FAILS Plaintiff has presented no competent evidence to demonstrate that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her age, under the burdensome rubric required by the law in this Circuit. Jones v .UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012). Specifically, Plaintiff has not shown that she was subjected to any frequent, severe, physically threatening or humiliating action which unreasonably interfered with her job performance because of her age. Defendant has not cited to any instances of alleged harassment suffered by Plaintiff, because she did not in fact suffer any. Plaintiff's response to this claim is to repeat her "me too" evidence –which falls flat. In spite of Plaintiff's conclusion, she failed to meet her burden to establish an objectively – reasonable person standard - hostile work environment claim. Her allegations establish no severity, frequency or pervasiveness, and are too vague and insufficient to allege harassment that was severe and pervasive. Further, out of the many teachers staff assigned to Hope Hill, Plaintiff, nor her colleagues can draw any connection between age and the supposedly hostile and harassing acts she claimed to have endured. See Dunaway Dep. 32:3 – 33:12; Trimble Dep. 69 – 70:18 . Accordingly, Defendant requests summary judgment and costs on this claim, and all claims in its favor. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 15 of 18 16 Respectfully submitted this 28th day of February, 2017. /s/ MARQUETTA J. BRYAN Marquetta J. Bryan Georgia Bar No. 074315 Brandon 0. Moulard Georgia Bar No. 940450 Attorneys for Atlanta Public Schools NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP Atlantic Station / 201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 Atlanta, GA 30363 Phone: (404) 322-6000 Fax: (404) 322-6050 marquetta.bryan@nelsonmullins.com brandon.moulard@nelsonmullins.com Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 16 of 18 17 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that the foregoing was prepared using Times New Roman font, 14-point type, which is one of the font and print selections approved by the Court in L.R. 5.1(B). This 28th day of February, 2017. /s/ MARQUETTA J. BRYAN Marquetta J. Bryan Georgia Bar No. 074315 Brandon 0. Moulard Georgia Bar No. 940450 Attorneys for Atlanta Public Schools NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP Atlantic Station / 201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 Atlanta, GA 30363 Phone: (404) 322-6000 Fax: (404) 322-6050 marquetta.bryan@nelsonmullins.com brandon.moulard@nelsonmullins.com Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 17 of 18 18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have on this 28th day of February, 2017, served the following persons in this matter with a copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT via CM/ECF notification to: D. Barton Black BARTON BLACK LAW, LLC Five Concourse Parkway Suite 2600 Atlanta, GA 30328 /s/ MARQUETTA J. BRYAN Marquetta J. Bryan Georgia Bar No. 074315 Brandon 0. Moulard Georgia Bar No. 940450 Attorneys for Atlanta Public Schools NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP Atlantic Station / 201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 Atlanta, GA 30363 Phone: (404) 322-6000 Fax: (404) 322-6050 marquetta.bryan@nelsonmullins.com brandon.moulard@nelsonmullins.com Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45 Filed 02/28/17 Page 18 of 18 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION KAREN PETTIGREW, Plaintiff, v. ATLANTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL SYSTEM a/k/a ATLANTA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE TO BE TRIED Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1B.(3), Defendant Atlanta Public Schools (“APS” or “District”), files this Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts as to Which There Is a Genuine Issue to Be Tried (Doc. 37-1), showing the Court as follows: 1. Admitted. 2. Admitted. 3. Admitted. 4. Admitted. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 1 of 31 2 5. Admitted. 6. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds that they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). In addition, the scores Plaintiff received on performance evaluations from the 1998-1999 to the 2012-2013 school years are irrelevant because Plaintiff’s claims relate exclusively to events that allegedly took place during the 2013-2014 school year. Evidence relating to performance evaluations conducted prior to that year are irrelevant and inadmissible. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a); Fed. R. Evid. 401(b). 7. Admitted. 8. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are immaterial. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 9. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 10. Admitted. 11. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 12. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 13. Admitted. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 2 of 31 3 14. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 15. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 16. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 17. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 18. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 19. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 20. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 21. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 22. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 3 of 31 4 23. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 24. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 25. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 26. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 27. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 28. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 29. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 30. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 31. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 4 of 31 5 32. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 33. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 34. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 35. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 36. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 37. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 38. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 39. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 40. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 5 of 31 6 41. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 42. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 43. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 44. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 45. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds that Plaintiff’s “good performance history” prior to the 2013-2014 school year is both irrelevant and immaterial. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 46. Admitted. 47. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 48. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 49. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 6 of 31 7 50. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 51. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 52. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 53. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 54. Admitted. 55. Admitted. 56. Admitted. 57. Admitted. 58. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 59. Admitted. 60. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 61. Admitted. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 7 of 31 8 62. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 63. Admitted. 64. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 65. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds that they are not supported by the cited evidence. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(b). By Plaintiff’s own admission, she did not meet with Ms. Crawford to plan for the model lesson. Even though Plaintiff falsely claims that Ms. Crawford was never available, the fact remains that Plaintiff never carried out Ms. Wheeler’s instructions to meet with her. 66. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 67. Admitted. 68. Admitted. 69. Admitted. 70. Admitted. 71. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are immaterial. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 8 of 31 9 72. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are immaterial. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 73. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are immaterial. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 74. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 75. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 76. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 77. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 78. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, Ms. Jackson’s assertion that Ms. Wheeler issued her letters of direction “without any factual justification” is argumentative. 79. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 9 of 31 10 80. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 81. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 82. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 83. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 84. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 85. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 86. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 87. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, Ms. Whitaker’s assertion that her “experience, competency, and seniority appeared to threaten Ms. Wheeler, and she therefore inserted herself into my work and admonished me,” is not based on personal knowledge, and therefore, is Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 10 of 31 11 inadmissible. Testimony presented in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that ‘affidavits’ that support or oppose summary judgment motions ‘shall be made on personal knowledge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.’”). Ms. Whitaker could not possibly have personal knowledge of Ms. Wheeler’s subjective feeling of being “threatened.” Her testimony on that point is inadmissible. 88. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 89. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 90. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, APS objects to Ms. Whitaker’s testimony that Ms. Wheeler “did not want [her] to succeed as the Parent Liaison and because she feared and felt threatened [sic] my existing relationships with the parents in the community,” on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 11 of 31 12 91. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 92. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 93. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 94. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 95. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). In addition, the cited portion of Ms. Dunaway’s deposition constitutes inadmissible hearsay. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. A party may not use hearsay to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322. 96. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). 97. Admitted. 98. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 12 of 31 13 99. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are not material. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(c). In addition, the cited portion of Ms. Dunaway’s deposition constitutes inadmissible hearsay. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. A party may not use hearsay to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322. 100. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 101. Admitted. 102. Admitted. 103. Admitted. 104. Admitted. 105. Admitted. 106. Admitted. 107. Admitted. 108. Admitted. 109. Admitted. 110. Admitted. 111. Admitted. 112. Admitted. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 13 of 31 14 113. Admitted. 114. Admitted. 115. Admitted. 116. Admitted. 117. Admitted. 118. Admitted. 119. Admitted. 120. Admitted. 121. Admitted. 122. Admitted. 123. Admitted. 124. Admitted. 125. Admitted. 126. Admitted. 127. Admitted. 128. Admitted. 129. Admitted. 130. Admitted. 131. Admitted. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 14 of 31 15 132. Admitted. 133. Admitted. 134. Admitted. 135. Admitted. 136. Admitted. 137. Admitted. 138. Admitted. 139. Admitted. 140. Admitted. 141. Admitted. 142. Admitted. 143. Admitted. 144. Admitted. 145. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 146. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 147. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 15 of 31 16 148. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 149. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 150. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 151. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 152. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 153. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. Further, APS objects to Ms. Pettigrew's testimony that she received a Letter of direction for a simple incident that "wheeler blew out of proportion.” on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 16 of 31 17 154. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 155. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 156. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 157. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 158. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Pettigrew's testimony that Ms. Wheeler would "get so worked up" on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 159. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 160. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 17 of 31 18 161. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Pettigrew's testimony that Ms. Wheeler "came into Ms. Pettigrew's personal space to intimidate her" on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 162. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 163. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. Further, APS objects to Ms. Pettigrew's testimony that "Ms. Wheeler bullied and intimidated Angela Jackson right from the start of the 2013-2014 school year. on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 164. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 18 of 31 19 does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 165. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 166. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 167. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. Further, APS objects to Ms. Jackson's testimony that "teachers were afraid to speak out about harassment and mistreatment from Ms. Wheeler" on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 19 of 31 20 168. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 169. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 170. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 171. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Mr. Whitaker's testimony that "Ms. Linda Blasingame was extremely upset after Ms. Wheeler left her classroom" on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 172. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Plaintiff's paraphrase of Mr. Trimble's testimony that "Ms. [Wheeler] was attempting to make it hard for Mr. Trimble to depart his employment from Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 20 of 31 21 Hope-Hill" on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 173. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 174. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. 175. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "No teacher at Hope-Hill ever did anything to justify mistreatment by Ms. Wheeler" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 176. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "There is nothing that a teacher at Hope-Hill Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 21 of 31 22 could have done that would justify Ms. Wheeler causing that teacher to cry " on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 177. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 178. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 179. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "Ms. Dunaway heard through the halls in the school that staff stated that Ms. Wheeler had bullied them" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 180. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 181. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 22 of 31 23 182. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 183. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 184. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 185. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 186. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 187. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 188. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 189. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 190. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that Ms. Wheeler mistreated Ms. Pettigrew on the Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 23 of 31 24 grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 191. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "Ms. Wheeler thought that she was above reproach and exhibited arrogance" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 192. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). In addition, that allegation does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B., because it is merely a legal conclusion couched as an assertion of fact. Id. Further, APS objects to Ms. Jackson's testimony that "teachers were afraid to speak out about harassment and mistreatment from Ms. Wheeler" on grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 193. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "The climate at Hope-Hill is cold and Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 24 of 31 25 uninviting. It is apparent as you walk the halls" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 194. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "Ms. Wheeler...brought chaos and confusion to Hope Hill" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 195. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "Ms. Wheeler was very intimidating nd bullying to Mr. Whitaker and treated him horribly from the start of the 2013-2014 school year" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 196. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Ms. Dunaway's testimony that "Mr. Whitaker felt that Ms. Wheeler did not treat him fairly" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 25 of 31 26 197. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 198. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 199. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 200. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 201. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 202. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Mr. Trimble's testimony that "Ms. Pettigrew felt overwhelmed because she was just trying to please the administration at Hope-Hill and make sure that’s he was doing everything that was asked of her" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 203. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 26 of 31 27 204. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 205. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 206. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 207. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 208. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 209. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 210. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Mr. Trimble's testimony that Angela Jackson was crying "because she was concerned about whether she was going to continue to have a job at Hope-Hill to be able to provide for her daughter to go to college" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 27 of 31 28 211. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 212. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Further, APS objects to Mr. Trimble's testimony that "Mr. Whitaker was generally a nice person who was well-liked throughout the school" on the grounds that it is not based on personal knowledge and, therefore, is inadmissible. Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1322-23. 213. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 214. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 215. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 216. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 217. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 28 of 31 29 218. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). 219. APS objects to the assertions in this paragraph on grounds they are neither material nor relevant. L.R. 56.1B.(3)(a), (c). Respectfully submitted this 28th day of February, 2017. /s/ MARQUETTA J. BRYAN Brandon O. Moulard Georgia Bar No. 940450 Marquetta J. Bryan Georgia Bar No. 074315 Attorneys for Atlanta Public Schools NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP Atlantic Station / 201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 Atlanta, GA 30363 Phone: (404) 322-6000 Fax: (404) 322-6050 marquetta.bryan@nelsonmullins.com brandon.moulard@nelsonmullins.com Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 29 of 31 30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that the foregoing was prepared using Times New Roman font, 14-point type, which is one of the font and print selections approved by the Court in L.R. 5.1(B). This 21st day of February, 2017. /s/ MARQUETTA J. BRYAN Brandon O. Moulard Georgia Bar No. 940450 Marquetta J. Bryan Georgia Bar No. 074315 Attorneys for Atlanta Public Schools NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP Atlantic Station / 201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 Atlanta, GA 30363 Phone: (404) 322-6000 Fax: (404) 322-6050 marquetta.bryan@nelsonmullins.com brandon.moulard@nelsonmullins.com Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 30 of 31 31 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have on this 28th day of February, 2017, served the following persons in this matter with a copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE TO BE TRIED via CM/ECF notification to: D. Barton Black BARTON BLACK LAW, LLC Five Concourse Parkway Suite 2600 Atlanta, GA 30328 /s/ MARQUETTA J. BRYAN Brandon O. Moulard Georgia Bar No. 940450 Marquetta J. Bryan Georgia Bar No. 074315 Attorneys for Atlanta Public Schools NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP Atlantic Station / 201 17th Street, NW / Suite 1700 Atlanta, GA 30363 Phone: (404) 322-6000 Fax: (404) 322-6050 marquetta.bryan@nelsonmullins.com brandon.moulard@nelsonmullins.com Case 1:15-cv-02360-TWT-JCF Document 45-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 31 of 31