Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, et al., v. Glaser et al

MOTION for JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

E.D. Cal.November 1, 2012

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD STEPHAN C. VOLKER (CSB #63093) 10.497.02 JOSHUA A. H. HARRIS (CSB #226898) JAMEY M.B. VOLKER (CSB #273544) M. BENJAMIN EICHENBERG (CSB #270893) LAW OFFICES OF STEPHAN C. VOLKER 436 14th Street, Suite 1300 Oakland, California 94612 Tel: 510/496-0600 Fax: 510/496-1366 Attorneys for Plaintiffs PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS, et al. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS, CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANCE, FRIENDS OF THE RIVER, SAN FRANCISCO CRAB BOAT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., THE INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, and FELIX SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. DONALD R. GLASER, Regional Director of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, and SAN LUIS & DELTA- MENDOTA WATER AUTHORITY, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civ. No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Date: November 30, 2012 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 3, 15th Floor Judge: Hon. Kimberly J. Mueller Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 1 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- i - TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -ii- NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS . . . . . . . . . . . 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 III. LEGAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 V. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. THE GRASSLANDS BYPASS PROJECT FITS ALL OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S NPDES PERMIT CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. Defendants’ Operations Constitute Discharges from a Point Source . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Defendants’ Discharges of Polluted Groundwater Do Not Constitute “Discharges Composed Entirely of Return Flow From Irrigated Agriculture” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. The San Luis Drain and Mud Slough Constitute Waters of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. No NPDES Permit Covers the Discharges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 B. THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE EXCEPTION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO THE DISCHARGES AT ISSUE HERE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. Statutory Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 a. Interpretation of CWA Exemptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 b. Plain Meaning Versus Legislative Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Under the Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language, Defendants’ Discharges of Polluted Groundwater Do Not Constitute “Discharges Composed Entirely of Return Flow From Irrigated Agriculture” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. The CWA’s Legislative History Demonstrates That Polluted Groundwater Is Not Exempt from NPDES Permitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 a. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 b. Legislative History Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 C. DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT PRECLUDE THIS COURT FROM RULING ON PLAINTIFFS’ 12(C) MOTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 2 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- ii - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Aldridge v. Williams 3 How. 9, 11 L.Ed. 469 (1884) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander 473 F.Supp. 525 (D.La. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Campbell v. Allied Van Lines Inc. 410 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Community Ass'n for Restoration of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy 65 F.Supp.2d 1129 (E.D.Wash. 1999), affirmed, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain 503 U.S. 249 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 Conroy v. Aniskoff 507 U.S. 511 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc. 575 F.3d 199 (2nd Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Association 532 U.S. 1 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. 545 U.S. 546 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Fleming v. Pickard 581 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Fishermen Against Destruction of Environment, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc. 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church 887 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. 484 U.S. 49 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 189 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 3 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- iii - In re Hedrick 524 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon 661 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp. 493 U.S. 146 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S. 820 F.Supp. 478 (N.D.Cal. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Miranda v. Anchondo 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. E.P.A. 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C.1975), aff’d sub nom, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 10, 13, 16, 17 Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Development Co. 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7 Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg 496 F.3d 99 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. den. sub nom. City of Healdsburg, California v. Northern California River Watch 552 U.S. 1180 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 10 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 523 U.S. 75 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Perrin v. United States 444 U.S. 37 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology 511 U.S. 700 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Regions Hospital v. Shalala 522 U.S. 448 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Rybachek v. EPA 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 4 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- iv - Sierra Club v. Union Oil Company of California 813 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10 Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. 660 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 541 U.S. 95 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 6-7 Strigliabotti v. Franklin Resources, Inc. 398 F.Supp.2d 1094 (N.D.Cal. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Turner v. Cook 362 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 United States v. Akers 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 United States v. Begay 622 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 United States v. Eidson 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 United States v. Deaton 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 United States v. First City National Bank 386 U.S. 361 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc. 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc. 487 F.Supp. 852 (D.Pa. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane 545 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co. 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 United States v. TGR Corp. 171 F.3d 762 (2d Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 United States v. Wright 625 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman 101 U.S. 112 (1879) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 5 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- v - FEDERAL STATUTES United States Code, Title 33 § 1251(a) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 § 1251(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 § 1311 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 9 § 1311(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4, 5, 9 § 1312 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 § 1316 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 § 1317 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 § 1328 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 § 1342 (Clean Water Act) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim § 1342(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 § 1342(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 § 1342(l)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15 § 1344 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 § 1362(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 14 § 1362(12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 § 1362(14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 9, 11, 13 § 1365 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 5 § 1365(b)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 FEDERAL RULES Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 12(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5, 18 REGULATIONS 40 Code of Federal Regulations § 122.3(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11 § 125.4 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 § 125.53(a)(2) (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 § 125.53(a)(2)-(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17 OTHER AUTHORITIES Federal Register, Volume 41 28,493-28,496 (July 12, 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17 Congressional Record Vol. 123, p. 39, 210 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 H.R.Rep. No. 92-911 (1971) § 125 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed. 1980) p. 1402 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Sen. Rep. No. 95-370 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code & Congressional Administrative News at pages 4326, 4360 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-18 Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 6 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- vi - Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) (1971) p. 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 p. 758 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 p. 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 p. 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 7 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1When Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, it set the goal of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Congress included a citizen suit provision to help achieve this important goal. Id. at § 1365. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 1 - NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 10:00 a.m. on November 30, 2012, or as soon thereafter as this matter may be heard in Courtroom 3 of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, located at 501 I Street, Sacramento, CA 95814, plaintiffs Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, et al. will, and hereby do, move the Court for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the reason that defendants, the Bureau of Reclamation, et al., failed to comply with section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. section 1342. This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and records on file in this matter, and on such argument of counsel as may be heard at the hearing on this motion. Counsel met by phone on November 1, 2012 to discuss the substantive merit and procedural context of this motion, and were unable to reach agreement on its merits but did agree that it was appropriate to have this motion heard at the same time as the Bureau of Reclamation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, November 30, 2012. Dated: November 1, 2012 Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICES OF STEPHAN C. VOLKER /s/ Stephan C. Volker STEPHAN C. VOLKER Attorney for Plaintiffs PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATION, et al. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs brought this citizen suit1 under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. section 1365, to compel defendants to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit, required by sections 301(a) and 402 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. section 1311(a) and 1342(a), for the Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 8 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 2 - discharge of pollution from the Project into the waters of the United States. Specifically, defendants’ operation of the Grassland Bypass Project (“Project”) violates the CWA by discharging water laden with pollutants, including selenium, boron, and salt, from the Grasslands Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain and then into Mud Slough. Both San Luis Drain and Mud Slough are waters of the United States that flow into the San Joaquin River and thence into the San Francisco Bay-Delta (“Bay-Delta”). None of the pertinent facts is disputed by the parties. Accordingly, plaintiffs move this Court for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed: 1. The Grasslands Drainage Area is a 97,400 acre “agricultural region on the west side of California’s San Joaquin Valley.” Answer of Federal Defendants filed January 9, 2012 (Dkt. #15) (“Fed. Ans.”) 1:18. 2. Defendants United States Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) and the San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority (“Authority”) jointly administer the Project. Fed. Ans. 2:14 (“the Project is jointly administered by Reclamation and the Authority”); Authority Answer to Complaint filed September 21, 2012 (Dkt. #49) (“Authority Ans.”) 9:9-12 (permit for “[t]he conveyance of agricultural drainage water into Mud Slough from the San Luis Drain” is held jointly by the “Bureau of Reclamation and the Authority”). 3. The Project conveys water from the area’s tile drainage systems. Fed. Ans. 7:16-20; Authority Ans. 12:21-25. 4. The area’s tile drainage systems consist of a network of perforated, parallel drain laterals installed six to nine feet deep. The horizontal spacing varies, but the drains are typically set 100 to 600 feet apart. Fed. Ans. 8:16-20 (“tile drainage systems underneath agricultural fields in the Grassland Drainage Area are located between 6-9 feet below the surface such that shallow groundwater may be collected in such systems, and consequently be conveyed . . . from the Grassland Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain, which connects into Mud Slough”); 8:22-23 (admitting allegations of same in plaintiffs’ Complaint); Authority Ans. 10:24 to 11:2. Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 9 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 3 - 5. Water collected in these tile drains consists in part of groundwater, or water from the “perched water table” underlying the Grassland Drainage Area (hereinafter “groundwater”). Fed. Ans. 7:18 (tile drains collect “shallow groundwater”); Authority Ans. 11:10-12 (“[t]he water that flows into the tile lines is the pooled water consisting of recently applied irrigation water and water already perched beneath the surface”); 11:12-17 (“subsurface agricultural drainage inherently consists of water applied to the surface of the ground, either through irrigation or rainfall, which percolated into the perched water table, sometimes years before collection. [] The water picked up in tile drainage systems is subsurface agricultural drainage water resulting from irrigation of crops with water applied to the surface of the ground, and/or rainfall.” (Emphasis added.)). 6. Drainflow increases as the water table rises, decreases as the water table declines, and is zero when the water table is below the drain laterals. Fed. Ans. 7:22-23 (admitting allegations of same in plaintiffs’ Complaint); Authority Ans. 12:13-14 (same). 7. The water collected in the tile drains flows into ditches that empty into the San Luis Drain and subsequently into Mud Slough. Fed. Ans. 6:15-17; 6:20-22; 7:16-20; 8:4-10; 9:4-6 (“Federal Defendants admit that the agricultural drainage water collected pursuant to the Project is eventually conveyed from the Grassland Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain, which connects to Mud Slough”); Authority Ans. 9:9-12; 12:3-4; 12:22-26. 8. From Mud Slough, the water flows into the San Joaquin River and the Bay-Delta. Fed. Ans. 3:9-10 (“agricultural drainage water in Mud Slough flows into the San Joaquin River, which flows eventually into the Bay-Delta). 9. The water collected in the tile drains, transported through the Project, and released into Mud Slough contains various pollutants, including selenium, salt, and boron. Fed. Ans. 8:16-18; Authority Ans. 13:2-4. 10. The water collected in the tile drains, transported through the Project, and released into Mud Slough contains high concentrations of selenium. Fed. Ans. 6:20-22 (“agricultural drainage water conveyed into Mud Slough from the San Luis Drain has high concentrations of selenium (typically 30 – 60 parts per billion)”); 7:20-21; 8:10-11. Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 10 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 4 - 11. Water is conveyed through the tile drainage systems and into the San Luis Drain and Mud Slough throughout the year. Fed. Ans. 8:4-11; Authority Ans. 12:22-25 (“drainage water is conveyed throughout the year at differing volumes from privately owned tile drains within the Grassland Drainage Area through ditches to the Grassland Bypass Channel and into the San Luis Drain”). 12. Neither Reclamation, nor the Authority, has obtained an NPDES permit authorizing discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States. Fed. Ans. 8:28 to 9:1 (“Federal Defendants admit that the Project’s conveyance of agricultural drainage water is not authorized by an NPDES permit”); Authority Ans. 13:28 to 14:1 (same). III. LEGAL BACKGROUND Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, later renamed the Clean Water Act in 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the “Clean Water Act”, or “CWA”), in order to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” by replacing water quality standards with point source effluent limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998). The CWA prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by any person” unless done in compliance with the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The CWA “requires dischargers to obtain permits that place limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that can be released into the Nation's waters.” South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102 (2004) (“Miccosukee”), citing section 402 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Section 402 of the CWA requires a permit for the discharge of pollutants from point sources such as pipes and ditches into navigable waters. Id. at § 1342(a)(1). In the language of the CWA, a permit is required for “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). An addition occurs when a point source introduces into a navigable water (or its tributary) a pollutant that would not exist there in the same form or concentration but for the addition from the point source. Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285-1286 (9th Cir. 1990); cf., Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting “addition” under CWA § 404); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); and United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (same), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987), Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 11 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 5 - readopted in relevant part, 848 F.2d 1133 (11th Cir. 1988). Based on these parameters, the requirements for an NPDES permit can be broken down into four elements: “the discharge of” (1) “any pollutant,” (2) “from a point source,” (3) “into navigable waters of the United States,” (4) “without an NPDES permit.” Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Brown”), quoting Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Development Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003). In its 1977 amendments to the CWA, Congress exempted “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture” from the NPDES permit program. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, this exemption does not extend to defendants’ discharges of polluted groundwater through the area’s tile drains, as shown below. The current action has been brought under 33 U.S.C. section 1365, the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. In compliance with the CWA’s notice requirements for citizen suits, 33 U.S.C. section 1365(b)(1)(A), on June 8, 2011, plaintiffs gave notice of the defendants’ ongoing violations of the CWA and of plaintiffs’ intent to sue to all applicable parties. A copy of this 60-day notice was attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint filed by plaintiffs on November 9, 2011 (Dkt. #2). Defendants have discharged and are continuing to discharge pollutants into the waters of the United States without a permit, in violation of sections 301(a) and 402 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. sections 1311(a) and 1342. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing motions made pursuant to Rule 12(c), courts “must accept all factual allegations” in the non-moving party’s pleading “as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id., citing Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. /// /// Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 12 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 6 - V. ARGUMENT The narrow question presented here is whether defendants’ discharges of polluted groundwater are exempt from the NPDES permit program as “return flows from irrigated agriculture” pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1). They are not, for the simple reason that these discharges are not limited to return flows from irrigated agriculture. Rather, the drains discharge polluted groundwater, which is not covered by the irrigation return flow exemption. As demonstrated below, defendants’ discharges of pollutants from a point source into waters of the United States are subject to the NPDES permit program and are not exempted therefrom as “return flows from irrigated agriculture.” A. THE GRASSLANDS BYPASS PROJECT FITS ALL OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S NPDES PERMIT CRITERIA There are at least two separate illegal discharges of polluted groundwater associated with defendants’ jointly administered Grasslands Bypass Project. First, tile drainage facilities and agricultural ditches and drains, including the Grasslands Bypass Channel, illegally discharge groundwater contaminated with selenium, boron, and other pollutants into the San Luis Drain. Because this discharge is polluted and because the San Luis Drain is a water body of the United States, an NPDES permit is required. Second, after the contaminated groundwater flows down the San Luis Drain, defendants discharge the polluted water directly into Mud Slough, which is likewise a water body of the United States. As with the discharge into the San Luis Drain, the discharge into Mud Slough requires an NPDES permit. From Mud Slough, the polluted discharge flows into the San Joaquin River and eventually into the Bay-Delta. 1. Defendants’ Operations Constitute Discharges from a Point Source Defendants continuously discharge contaminated groundwater through the tile drainage system and associated ditches – both point sources – first into the San Luis Drain, thence into Mud Slough, and ultimately into the San Joaquin River and the Bay-Delta. Fed. Ans. 6:15-17; 6:20-22; 7:16-20; 8:4-10; 9:4-6 (“Federal Defendants admit that the agricultural drainage water collected pursuant to the Project is eventually conveyed from the Grassland Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain, which connects to Mud Slough”); Authority Ans. 9:9-12; 12:3-4; 12:22-26; Fed. Ans. 3:9-10 (“agricultural drainage water in Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 13 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 7 - Mud Slough flows into the San Joaquin River, which flows eventually into the Bay-Delta). A “point source” is defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). “[A] point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollutant to . . . ‘waters of the United States.’” Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105. Here, the Project’s canals and ditches that transport water from the drainage area to the San Luis Drain and then into Mud Slough are exactly the type of “discrete conveyance[s]” that are covered by the NPDES program. Id. (emphasis in the original). 33 U.S.C. 1362(14) (defining “point source” to include “ditch[es],” and “channel[s]” among other things). 2. The Discharges Contain Pollutants Defendants do not dispute that the groundwater that is collected by the tile drains and then flows through the Project contains pollutants, including selenium, salt, and boron. Fed. Ans. 8:16-18 (“Federal Defendants admit that the agricultural drainage water at issue contains selenium, salt, and boron”); 6:20- 22 (“agricultural drainage water conveyed into Mud Slough from the San Luis Drain has high concentrations of selenium (typically 30 – 60 parts per billion)”); 7:20-21; 8:10-11; Authority Ans. 13:2- 4. The term “pollution” is defined in the CWA as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19). Courts consider the definition of “pollution” in determining whether discharged water is a “pollutant.” PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994); Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Development Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003). As noted, defendants admit that the Project discharges pollutants such as selenium, salt, and boron into the San Luis Drain and Mud Slough. Fed. Ans. 6:15-17; 6:20-22; 7:16-20; 8:4-10; 9:4-6 (“Federal Defendants admit that the agricultural drainage water collected pursuant to the Project is eventually conveyed from the Grassland Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain, which connects to Mud Slough”); Authority Ans. 9:9-12; 12:3-4; 12:22-26; Fed. Ans. 3:9-10 (“agricultural drainage water in Mud Slough flows into the San Joaquin River, which flows eventually into the Bay-Delta”). Because defendants’ discharges alter “the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of” the San Luis Drain and Mud Slough, they thus constitute discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 14 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 8 - 1362. 3. The San Luis Drain and Mud Slough Constitute Waters of the United States The Project discharges to waters of the United States in two ways. First, it discharges to the San Luis Drain. Fed. Ans. 6:15-17; 6:20-22; 7:16-20; 8:4-10; 9:4-6 (“Federal Defendants admit that the agricultural drainage water collected pursuant to the Project is eventually conveyed from the Grassland Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain, which connects to Mud Slough”); Authority Ans. 9:9-12; 12:3- 4; 12:22-26. Second, the Project discharges into Mud Slough, which in turns flows into the San Joaquin River and the Bay-Delta. Id.; Fed. Ans. 3:9-10 (“agricultural drainage water in Mud Slough flows into the San Joaquin River, which flows eventually into the Bay-Delta). “A ‘stream which contributes its flow to a larger stream or other body of water’ is a tributary.” Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Random House College Dictionary 1402 (rev. ed. 1980). “[R]egulable waters of the United States include tributaries of traditionally navigable waters.” Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“River Watch”), cert. denied sub nom. City of Healdsburg v. Nothern California River Watch, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008); United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997) (tributaries are “waters of the United States,” and manmade ditches and canals that flow intermittently into creeks may be tributaries); United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1999) (non-navigable tributaries flowing into navigable streams are “waters of the United States”); United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979) (unnamed tributary of creek that is tributary to river is “water of the United States”). The Project’s canals, including the Grassland Bypass Channel and the San Luis Drain, are waters of the United States because they are tributaries of Mud Slough, the San Joaquin River, and the Bay- Delta. Fed. Ans. 6:15-17; 6:20-22; 7:16-20; 8:4-10; 9:4-6 (“Federal Defendants admit that the agricultural drainage water collected pursuant to the Project is eventually conveyed from the Grassland Bypass Channel into the San Luis Drain, which connects to Mud Slough”); Authority Ans. 9:9-12; 12:3- 4; 12:22-26; Fed. Ans. 3:9-10 (“agricultural drainage water in Mud Slough flows into the San Joaquin River, which flows eventually into the Bay-Delta). The San Joaquin River and the Bay-Delta constitute “traditionally navigable waters.” River Watch, 496 F.3d at 997. Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 15 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 9 - Accordingly, the Project’s canals, ditches, and drains including the San Luis Drain are waters of the United States, as is Mud Slough into which the Project drains. And, of course, the watercourses into which Mud Slough drains – the San Joaquin River and the Bay-Delta – are likewise waters of the United States. 4. No NPDES Permit Covers the Discharges Defendants’ ongoing discharges are not authorized by any NPDES permit. Fed. Ans. 8:28 to 9:1 (“Federal Defendants admit that the Project’s conveyance of agricultural drainage water is not authorized by a NPDES permit”); Authority Ans. 13:28 to 14:1 (same). The Project thus collects polluted groundwater and discharges it into the San Luis Drain, Mud Slough, and eventually into the San Joaquin River and the Bay-Delta without a valid NPDES permit. B. THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS’ DISCHARGES FROM THE PROJECT Although agricultural return flows are exempt from the CWA’s NPDES permit requirements (33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(f)), the CWA only exempts “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (emphasis added). Defendants’ discharges in question consist mostly of groundwater, not agricultural return flows. Thus, the agricultural return flows exemption does not apply and defendants are in violation of the CWA because they have not obtained an NPDES permit. Both the plain meaning of the statutory language and legislative intent underlying the Clean Water Act support a reasoned limitation of the exception for return flows from irrigation. As the Ninth Circuit ruled 25 years ago in its seminal decision strictly enforcing the NPDES permit program, “‘it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.’” Sierra Club v. Union Oil Company of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987), quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). In furtherance of this goal, Congress declared that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful” “[e]xcept as in compliance with . . . sections [1311,] 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this Title [i.e., Title 33].” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Sierra Club, 813 F.2d at 1483. To achieve the CWA’s broad remedial purposes, the Ninth Circuit has consistently rejected attempts by Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 16 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 10 - dischargers to broaden the Act’s narrow exemptions from its jurisdiction and permitting requirements. Sierra Club, 813 F.2d at 1486-1492; River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1001. In this case, under the plain language of the statute, the CWA’s requirement for an NPDES permit clearly applies. Moreover, the legislative history underlying the pertinent language of the Act fully supports the CWA’s requirement for an NPDES permit here, as the following discussion demonstrates. 1. Statutory Interpretation a. Interpretation of CWA Exemptions “Claims of exemption, from the jurisdiction or permitting requirements, of the CWA’s broad pollution prevention mandate must be narrowly construed to achieve the purposes of the CWA.” River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1001, citing United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir.1986) (emphasis added); Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 820 F.Supp. 478, 481 (N.D.Cal. 1992); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander, 473 F.Supp. 525, 535 (D.La., 1979). Particularly when interpreting exemptions to statutes like the CWA that protect the public’s interests, courts read such exemptions narrowly to fulfill the statute’s underlying remedial goals. Specific exemptions should not be allowed to “obscure the basic polic[ies]” of statutes that protect the public’s interest, and, “[a]ccordingly, these exemptions ‘must be narrowly construed.’” John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989). “The House and Senate committees made clear that the [CWA’s] term ‘point source’ was not to be interpreted narrowly.” Brown, 640 F.3d at 1071-1072, citing H.R.Rep. No. 92-911, at 125 (1971). The Clean Water Act’s sharply “limited exemptions do not obscure the . . . dominant objective of the Act.” Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Association, 532 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2001). The term “point source” includes “the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter waters of the United States.” Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 219 (2d Cir. 2009). Defendants bear a heavy burden to prove that any of the narrowly construed exemptions under the CWA applies to their particular discharges. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1001, citing United States v. First City National Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967); Sierra Club, 813 F.2d at 1486-1492. Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 17 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 11 - b. Plain Meaning Versus Legislative Intent Under the “standard tools of statutory analysis,” courts “start with the plain meaning of the statute’s text.” In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011), citing United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 2010); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (“the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself”). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded the lower courts, “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). “‘[U]nless otherwise defined, words [of a statute] will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’” Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Thus, “[u]nder the ‘plain meaning’ rule, ‘[w]here the language [of a statute] is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.’” Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Campbell v. Allied Van Lines Inc., 410 F.3d 618, 620–621 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted, alterations in original) Accordingly, courts and litigants should not use a “statute’s legislative history to manufacture ambiguity in this otherwise clear language.” Miranda, 684 F.3d at 849. “Resorting to legislative history as an interpretive device is inappropriate if the statute is clear.” Id., citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); accord United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts must “interpret and apply statutes, not congressional purposes.” In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir.2008); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed”). This is because we are “governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993), quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24, 11 L.Ed. 469 (1884). “If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history.” Id. The use of legislative history is like “entering a Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 18 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1996 (1971) (defining “irrigate”). 3Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 44 (1971) (defining “agriculture”). PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 12 - crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.” Id. An analysis of the plain meaning of the statute should thus be the primary inquiry here, with resort to legislative history a secondary and inferior methodology for statutory interpretation only when it has been conclusively demonstrated that there is significant ambiguity in the language of the statute itself. 2. Under the Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language, Defendants’ Discharges of Polluted Groundwater Do Not Constitute “Discharges Composed Entirely of Return Flow From Irrigated Agriculture” The CWA exempts from the NPDES permit program “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1); see also § 1362(14) (defining “point source” and exempting “return flows from irrigated agriculture” from that definition) and 40 C.F.R. 122.3(f) (stating that “[r]eturn flows from irrigated agriculture” do not require NPDES permits). To determine the scope of the exemption, this Court must interpret the plain meaning of the exemption’s three requirements: “irrigated agriculture,” “return flow,” and “entirely.” If any one of these three criteria is not met here, the exemption fails and an NPDES permit is required. The first requirement, that discharges be from “irrigated agriculture,” is not met. The term “irrigated agriculture” denotes the activity of “suppl[ying] (as land or crops) with water by artificial means (as by diverting streams, digging canals, flooding, or spraying)”2 “to cultivat[e] the soil, harvest[] crops, and rais[e] livestock . . . .”3 Thus, the discharges that are contemplated by the exemption are the result of supplying land with water by artificial means – not the result of draining lands that are drainage impaired. As defendants admit, the discharged water at issue here consists of polluted groundwater. Fed. Ans. 7:18; 8:16-18; 6:20-22; 7:20-21; 8:10-11; Authority Ans. 11:10-12; 11:3-14; 13:2-4. Drainage (or as the Bureau puts it, “agricultural drainage water” (Fed. Ans. 2:21)) is not the same as water that is produced and discharged during irrigation. Drainage impairment is a wholly different agricultural obstacle than a lack of reliable rain water. Thus, folding drainwater into an exception for water from “irrigated agriculture” is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the term “irrigated agriculture.” Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 19 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1941 (1971) (defining “return”). 5 See also Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-116 (1879) (“We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon's Abridgment, sect. 2, it was said that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ This rule has been repeated innumerable times”). PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 13 - The second requirement, that the discharges be from “return flow,” is likewise not met. The word “return” means “to go or come back again (as to a place, person, or condition), or “to pass back to an earlier possessor.”4 In the adjective form, it is frequently used to denote “a trip back,” as in the term “return trip.” Id. “Return” thus connotes re-entry into a “former place.” Id. Accordingly, the term “return flow” means water that is re-entering a former location. Taking the simplest example, a farmer sets up a pump on a river adjacent to her field. She connects the pump to her irrigation system and turns it on. The water irrigates her field and then returns by gravity to the adjacent river through drainage ditches. This is “return flow.” The water comes from and returns to the nearby river. In the present case, water that is used for irrigation in the Grasslands Drainage Area is taken from the Delta, applied to agricultural fields, and then returns to, or re-enters, the Delta via drainage ditches, the Grasslands Bypass Channel, the San Luis Drain, Mud Slough, and the San Joaquin River. Fed. Ans. 6:15-17; 6:20-22; 7:16- 20; 8:4-10; 9:4-6; 3:9-10; Authority Ans. 9:9-12; 12:3-4; 12:22-26. Water that does not originate from the irrigation process cannot be categorized as return flows because it is not re-entering “a former place,” e.g. the Delta. The contaminated groundwater at issue here does not originate in the Delta. Hence it cannot be said to be “returning” there. Under the plain meaning of “return,” polluted groundwater is not “return flow.” Indeed, if the exemption were read any other way, the term “return” would be meaningless and confusing. “It is an unacceptable interpretation which causes the critical words of the text to be (1) meaningless and (2) confusing.” Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 468 (1998).5 Defendants may wish that the exemption included all discharges “from irrigated agriculture.” Congress, however, only exempted “return flows.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1). The third requirement, that the discharges be “entirely” from return flows from irrigated Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 20 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 758 (1971) (defining “entirely”). PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 14 - agriculture, similarly is not met. The word “entirely” means “wholly, completely, [or] fully.”6 The use of “entirely” in the exemption means that only “discharges composed [wholly, completely, or fully] of return flows from irrigated agriculture” are exempted. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1). Polluted groundwater that originates in the ground does not qualify as “return flow” or water that comes from “irrigated agriculture.” Thus, the drainwater here is not “composed [solely/exclusively] of return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1). Accordingly, it cannot be exempted from the NPDES program. There is a fundamental distinction between irrigated agricultural operations and farms that are drainage impaired. The statutory exemption applies, by its own terms, only to irrigated agriculture. It does not exempt discharges that are necessary to drain lands that have significant drainage problems. Indeed, there are many farms that irrigate and do not have tile drains. On those farms, water is applied to the fields and then it runs over the surface of the land back to its source, without any underground drainwater from tile drains mixing with the runoff. Unlike the drainage at issue here, such flows would be exempt because they are made up “entirely” of “return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1). If Congress had intended to exempt polluted flows from drainage impaired lands, it would have exempted polluted flows from drainage-impaired lands. Instead, it only exempted “return flows” produced “entirely” from “irrigated agriculture.” Id. Indeed, many types of discharges related to crop production are not exempt under the “return flow” exemption. For example, the CWA’s definition of pollutant includes “agricultural waste discharged into water,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6), and thus agricultural waste discharged into water is not exempt from the NPDES permit requirement. Similarly, the discharge of water used to wash farm vehicles is not exempt as a return flow. Community Ass'n for Restoration of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1151 (E.D.Wash. 1999), affirmed, 305 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Likewise, the application of agricultural pesticides is a discharge of a pollutant subject to the NPDES program. National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. E.P.A., 553 F.3d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 2009). And, the use of waste water to irrigate fields also requires an NPDES permit. United States v. Oxford Royal Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 21 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7Conservation Groups’ position would not block the exemption in all cases in which irrigation water is mixed with “rainfall or other forms of precipitation.” Id. For instance, “agricultural stormwater discharges” are specifically exempt from NPDES regulation. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); Brown, 640 F.3d at 1070. Obviously, every farm that irrigates is not required to obtain an NPDES permit. United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010) (“interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available”). However, in this case it is uncontested that a significant quantity of polluted groundwater is being discharged from the tile drains. Fed. Ans. 7:18; 8:16-18; 6:20-22; 7:20-21; 8:10-11; Authority Ans. 11:10-12; 11:3-14; 13:2-4. That is the discharge for which an NPDES permit is required. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 15 - Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (D.Pa. 1980). Farm vehicle maintenance, pesticide application, and irrigation with waste water are all activities that are related to crop production, but are activities that nonetheless require a permit. Thus, while the activity of draining polluted water from underneath fields is often related to agriculture, the discharge of polluted groundwater is clearly not exempt as “return flow from irrigated agriculture.” This conclusion is compelled by the CWA’s plain language, particularly in light of pertinent case law and cannons of statutory interpretation that require a narrow interpretation of exemptions from the CWA’s permitting process.7 See section V.B.1.a, “Interpretation of CWA Exemptions,” supra, pp. 9-10. Although the CWA exemption for return flows from irrigated agriculture has never been squarely addressed in the present context, a district court in Florida did briefly examine the exemption. Fishermen Against Destruction of Environment, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Closter Farms”). According to the Closter Farms Court, only water directly utilized in the “irrigation process” is exempt as return flow from irrigated agriculture. Id. at 1297. Under the facts of the Florida case, groundwater mixed with surface water was not exempt from the NPDES program absent its direct use “to irrigate Closter Farms’s sugar cane farm through the process of ‘flood irrigation,’ in which water is forced into the sugar cane fields by raising the water levels in the canals.” Id. Flood irrigation is a process that is vastly different from draining polluted water from underneath agricultural operations because irrigation is directly involved in the discharge. As this Court correctly held, Closter Farms did not address “the status of conveyances designed to catch both surface irrigation as well as polluted groundwater.” Order filed August 31, 2012 (Dkt. #47) (“Order”) 11:10-12. Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 22 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 16 - 3. The CWA’s Legislative History Demonstrates That Polluted Groundwater Is Not Exempt from NPDES Permitting If, despite the unambiguous language of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) that specifies that only “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture” are exempted from the NPDES permit program, and despite the general common law preference for avoiding the use of legislative history, this Court resorts to legislative history to interpret the statutory exemption, it will find, as it did in its Order, that this history supports Conservation Groups’ interpretation. Congress intended to exempt surface irrigation return flows, not polluted drainwater from tile drains. In its Order denying the Authority’s motion to dismiss, this Court held: [the] history leading to enactment of the irrigation return flows exemption focuses expressly on surface water and noticeably omits any reference to groundwater or subsurface drainage. This accords with the colloquial use of the term “irrigation,” which is generally understood to refer to the application of water to crops, not the drainage of excess groundwater from crop root zones. Order, 10:4-8. Accordingly, the Court refused to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim that “intentional drainage of contaminated groundwater” is not “subsumed in the irrigation return flows exemption.” Id. at 11:14-15. The Court’s determination relied in large part on the legislative history underlying the passage of the agricultural return flow exemption. Id. at 8-11. Plaintiffs ask the Court to go one step further and rule as a matter of law that the water produced from the Grassland Drainage Area’s tile drainage systems is not exempt from the NPDES permitting program because it is not “entirely” return flow from irrigated agriculture. a. Background As discussed by the Court in its Order (8-10), in crafting the first iteration of the CWA, Congress initially considered exempting activities related to irrigated agriculture from the NPDES program, but in the end did not include such a provision in the final version of the statute. See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1072- 1073. The EPA then issued regulations exempting return flows from irrigated agriculture on parcels less than 3000 acres. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975). This regulatory exemption was challenged as exceeding EPA’s authority; and the district court hearing the case agreed. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), aff’d sub nom, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 23 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 17 - With the appeal on that case pending and in accordance with the Train Court’s order, EPA reversed its position. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,493-28,496 (July 12, 1976); see also Brown, 640 F.3d at 1074. EPA issued revised regulations that (1) broadly included all point sources from irrigated agriculture in the NPDES regulatory program and (2) specifically defined “irrigation return flow” as “surface water, other than navigable waters, containing pollutants which result from the controlled application of water by any person to land used primarily for crops, forage growth, or nursery operations.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.53(a)(2) (1976). The regulations also defined “surface water” as “water that flows exclusively across the surface of the land from the point of application to the point of discharge.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.53(a)(3) (1976). The regulations specifically placed all agricultural “pollution sources amenable to effective regulatory control within the NPDES permit program . . . .” 41 Fed. Reg. 28,493-28,495 (July 12, 1976). Approximately one year later, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision in Train. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1369. Congress then responded to the appellate decision in Costle by enacting the irrigation return flow exemption at issue here. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1085 (“[I]n 1977, Congress exempted return flows from irrigated agriculture to alleviate the EPA’s burden in having to permit ‘every source or conduit returning water to the streams from irrigated lands’ . . . .”). The accompanying Senate report made clear that Congress intended to adopt EPA’s definition of irrigation return flows as including surface water only: “These [irrigation return] flows have been defined by the Environmental Protection Agency as conveyances carrying surface irrigation return as a result of the controlled application of water by any person to land used primarily for crops . . . .” S. Rep. No. 95-370 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4360 (emphasis added). b. Legislative History Analysis The above language from Senate Report 95-370 specifically addresses the key question in this case. The report unequivocally states that Congress’ intent was to define “return flows from irrigated agriculture” in harmony with the EPA’s contemporaneous regulation, which included only “conveyances carrying surface irrigation return as a result of the controlled application of water by any person to land used primarily for crops.” Sen. Rep. No. 95-370, at 3, emphasis added. Thus, Senate Report 95-370 supports Conservation Groups’ plain language interpretation by emphasizing that return flows are defined Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 24 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 18 - as “surface” flows that are caused by the “application of water” to farmland. Id. The report does not mention tile drainage, the discharge of subsurface groundwater, or any other type of agricultural drainwater because Congress did not contemplate a broad exemption of all types of farm discharges. As Senate Report 95-370 makes clear, Congress limited the exemption to surface return flows caused by irrigation. Id. Nowhere does Congress indicate a desire to exempt the uncontrolled discharge of contaminated groundwater from drainage impaired agricultural facilities. If Congress had meant to exempt all flows from tile drains from NPDES permitting, it would have, at the very least, mentioned such flows in the statute – or at a bare minimum in the legislative history. It did not. Indeed, the legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to level the playing field between irrigated and non-irrigated agriculture so as to “correct[] what has been a discrimination against irrigated agriculture.” 123 Cong. Rec. 39,210 (1977) (emphasis added). No document indicates its intent was also to exempt farmers on drainage- impaired land from the CWA’s NPDES permit requirement. Accordingly, the fact that the irrigation return flow exemption specifically targets irrigated crop production – and not drainage-impaired farmlands – further demonstrates that defendants’ tile drainage in this case requires an NPDES permit. By referring to EPA’s contemporaneous definition of “irrigation return flows,” Senate Report 95- 370 demonstrates that Congress did not contemplate a broad exemption for all discharges that are in some remote sense related to irrigated agriculture. The much more narrowly crafted exemption only includes surface water return flows that are a direct consequence of irrigation. Defendants’ discharges challenged herein are neither. C. DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT PRECLUDE THIS COURT FROM RULING ON PLAINTIFFS’ 12(C) MOTION In certain instances, a well-pled affirmative defense may preclude a plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, unlike in General Conference, defendants’ answers do not contain any affirmative defenses that are tied to specific facts. Rather, both answers contain affirmative defenses that have already been considered and rejected by this Court or are boilerplate defenses unsupported by any alleged facts. Fed. Ans. 10:26 to 11:11; Authority Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 25 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 19 - Ans. 16:2-14. If the Court, however, determines that one or more of defendants’ affirmative defenses preclude the granting of this motion, plaintiffs request a partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. Strigliabotti v. Franklin Resources, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1097 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (“While Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not expressly provide for partial judgment on the pleadings, neither does it bar such a procedure”). VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Conservation Groups are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on each claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek orders from this Court (1) declaring that defendants have failed to comply with the CWA’s NPDES permit system and (2) granting injunctive relief limiting further polluted discharges pending defendants’ compliance with the CWA. Plaintiffs also seek remedial relief, the imposition of civil penalties, and the award of costs, including attorney and expert witness fees. Dated: November 1, 2012 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Stephan C. Volker STEPHAN C. VOLKER Attorney for Plaintiffs PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS, et al. Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 26 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 20 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Stephan C. Volker, am a citizen of the United States. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action. My business address is the Law Offices of Stephan C. Volker, 436 14th Street, Suite 1300, Oakland, California 94612. On November 1, 2012, I served the following documents by electronic filing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which sends notification of such filing to the email addresses registered in the above entitled action: PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: November 1, 2012. /s/ Stephan C. Volker STEPHAN C. VOLKER Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 27 of 27