P2f Holdings Llc v. Vicini America, Inc. et al

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint ; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

C.D. Cal.November 14, 2016

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 MOTION TO DISMISS BRYAN CAVE LLP S. Patrick McKey (ProH acVice) patrick.mckey@bryancave.com 161 North Clark Street, Suite 4300 Chicago, IL 60601-3315 Telephone: (312) 602-5000 Facsimile: (312) 602-5050 BRYAN CAVE LLP Nancy Franco (California Bar No. 294856) nancy.franco@bryancave.com 120 Broadway, Suite 300 Santa Monica, CA 90401-2386 Telephone: (310) 576-2100 Facsimile: (310) 576-2200 Attorneys for Defendants Vicini America, Inc. and Vicini S.p.A. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA P2F HOLDINGS, LLC, a California limited liability company doing business as MADALUXE, Plaintiff, vs. VICINI AMERICA, INC., a New York corporation; VICINI, S.p.A., an Italian company; DOES 1 thorough 10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 8:16-cv-01399-CJC (SKx) Assigned To Hon. Cormac J. Carney NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES [Filed Concurrently With (Proposed) Order and Affiant Declarations] Date: December 12, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Courtroom: 9B Complaint Filed: July 28, 2016 Trial Date: Not yet scheduled Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 27 Page ID #:228 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 1 NOTICE OF MOTION TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 12, 2016, at 1:30 p.m., before the Honorable Cormac J. Carney, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, located at Ronald Reagan Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 411 W. Fourth Street, Santa Ana, CA, 92701, Courtroom 9B, Defendants Vicini America, Inc. and Vicini, S.p.A., appearing specially for purposes of contesting jurisdiction only, will and hereby do move the Court to dismiss the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff P2F Holdings, LLC pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue; and Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a party under Rule 19. This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, the supporting Declarations, all pleadings and papers on file in the action, and such other matters as may be adduced upon hearing. This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 which took place on November 7, 2016 by telephone. Dated: November 14, 2016 BRYAN CAVE LLP S. Patrick McKey Nancy Franco By: /s/NancyFranco Nancy Franco Attorneys for Defendants Vicini America, Inc. and Vicini S.p.A. Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 27 Page ID #:229 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND..............................................................................2 III. LEGAL STANDARD .........................................................................................4 IV. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED ..............4 A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Vicini S.p.A.....................4 1. There Is No Basis For General Jurisdiction .................................5 2. There Is No Basis For Specific Jurisdiction .................................7 a. There Has Been No Purposeful Availment ........................8 b. This Suit Does Not Arise Out of Forum-Related Acts ......9 c. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Is Unreasonable..................11 B. Venue Is Improper In The Central District of California .....................13 C. MadaLuxe Failed To Join Bungar and Incorp As Necessary Parties ...15 1. Madaluxe Cannot Be Afforded Complete Relief Without Joining Bungar and Incorp .........................................................16 2. Joinder Is Not Feasible ...............................................................17 3. The Action Should Thus Be Dismissed......................................17 V. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................19 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 27 Page ID #:230 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Cases AmericanGreyhoundRacing,Inc. v. H ull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Arizona 2001) ..............................................................15 AmericanTel. & Tel. Co. v. CompagnieBruxellesLambert, 94 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................10 AsahiMetalIndus. Co. v. SuperiorCourtofCalifornia,SolanoCty., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) ...................................................................12 Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) .....................................................................4 Bancroft& Masters,Inc. v. AugustaNat’l,Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) .........................................................................5, 6, 7 BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) .....................................................................4 Boschettov. H ansing, 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008) .............................................................................4, 8 BurgerKingCorp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985).......................................................................5 CertifiedBldg. Prods.,Inc. v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1976) ...................................................................................9 CollegeSource,Inc. v. AcademyOne,Inc., 653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011) ...............................................................................11 ConfederatedTribesoftheChehalisIndianReservationv. Lujan, 928 F. 2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1991) ..............................................................................16 Cty. SanitationDist. No. 2 ofLosAngelesCty. v. InlandContainerCorp., 803 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986)................................................................18 Current,Inc. v. StateBd. ofEqualization, 24 Cal. App. 4th 382 (1994) ..................................................................................10 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 27 Page ID #:231 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014)................................................................................................6 DataDisc,Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs.,Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977) .................................................................................5 Dawavendewav. SaltRiverProjectAgricultralImprovementandPowerDistrict, 276 F. 3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................17 EEOC v. PeabodyWesternCoalCo., 610 F. 3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) ..............................................................................16 EldoradoStone,LLC v. RenaissanceStone,Inc., No. 04CV2562 JM LSP, 2005 WL 5517732 (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2005)...............10 Fed. DepositIns. Corp. v. British-AmericanIns. Co., 828 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) ...............................................................................12 H arrisRutsky& Co. Ins. Servs.,Inc. v. Bell& ClementsLtd., 328 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................9 H elicopterosNacionalesdeColombia,S.A. v. H all, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 (1984) ............................................................9 H ollandAmericaLineInc. v. WartsilaNorthAmerica,Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................7 InternationalShoeCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945)..........................................................................5 Katzir’sFloor& H omeDesign,Inc. v. M-MLS.COM, 394 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................10 LeattCorp. v. ExceedH oldings(PTY)LTD , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75543 12-15 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) ..........................10 MakahIndianTribev. Verity, 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................15 MavrixPhoto,Inc. v. BrandTechs.,Inc., 647 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................5 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 5 of 27 Page ID #:232 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES McCowenv. Jamieson, 724 F. 2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1984) ..............................................................................15 Pac. Atl. TradingCo., Inc. v. M/VMainExp., 758 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) ...............................................................................11 Paiute-ShoshoneIndians. v. CityofLosAngeles, 637 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................17 Plattenv. H G BermudaExemptedLtd., 437 F.3d 118 (1st Cir. 2006)..................................................................................10 Ranzav. Nike,Inc., 793 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................6 RepublicofPhillipinesv. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008)...........................................................................................17 Schwarzeneggerv. FredMartinMotorCo., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................8 SeirraClubv. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985) ........................................................................15 Shropshirev. Canning, 2012 WL 13658 (January 4, 2012 N.D. Cal.)........................................................16 Swartzv. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................4 Tuazonv. R.J. ReynoldsTobaccoCo., 433 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................6 Vasquezv. LosAngelesCty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................4 World-WideVolkswagenCorp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) ..........................................5 Statutes Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 410.10 ........................................................................................5 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 6 of 27 Page ID #:233 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ...........................................................................................2, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) ...........................................................................................2, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) .............................................................................................14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) .............................................................................................14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19...............................................................................................2, 4, 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) ............................................................................................14, 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)..............................................................................................15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A) ........................................................................................15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) ............................................................................................15, 16 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 7 of 27 Page ID #:234 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 1 MOTION TO DISMISS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION The case before the Court is part of an international dispute over designer shoes that were sold and purchased in Italy. In 2014, Defendant Vicini S.p.A., an Italian entity, sold certain shoes to a third-party company, Bungar CSC (“Bungar”), who, upon information and belief is an Armenian entity, from Italy to Bungar in Italy. According to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Bungar’s affiliate, Incorp SAL (“Incorp”), who, upon information and belief is a Swiss entity, then sold the shoes to Plaintiff P2F Holdings, LLC doing business as MadaLuxe (“MadaLuxe”). A dispute between the parties arose when MadaLuxe allegedly sold the shoes to Neiman Marcus, but Neiman Marcus later purportedly cancelled the sale. MadaLuxe brings this action against Defendants Vicini America, Inc. (“Vicini America”) and Vicini S.p.A. (collectively referred to herein as the “Vicini Defendants”). This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Vicini S.p.A.; venue is improper; and MadaLuxe failed to join Bungar and Incorp as necessary parties. Vicini S.p.A. specially appears in this action to contest the jurisdiction of the Court. It is not registered in California and neither conducts business in California nor purposefully availed itself of the rights and privileges of doing business in California. Vicini S.p.A. does not own property or bank accounts in California, does not maintain offices or a registered agent in California, and does not have any employees working in California. As conceded by the FAC, Vicini S.p.A. is “an Italian company headquartered in Italy.” FAC ¶ 2. Therefore, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Vicini S.p.A. Fundamental notions of due process and fair play require that Vicini S.p.A. not be required to litigate in the State of California. The FAC does not allege that Vicini America was involved in the underlying transaction. Rather, MadaLuxe seemingly names Vicini America as a defendant in Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 8 of 27 Page ID #:235 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 2 MOTION TO DISMISS an effort to improperly litigate the case in this forum based on an alter ego theory of liability. However, MadaLuxe fails to allege facts sufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form and holding Vicini America liable for the purported actions of Vicini S.p.A. In asserting its claims against the Vicini Defendants, MadaLuxe failed to name two necessary parties that were active participants in the underlying transaction, Bungar CSC and Incorp SAL. As MadaLuxe cannot be afforded complete relief without the Court determining the individual liability of Bungar and Incorp to MadaLuxe for its alleged damages, Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires their joinder or dismissal of the action if their joinder is not feasible. Therefore, the Vicini Defendants respectfully request this Court to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to join necessary parties. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Vicini S.p.A. is “an Italian company headquartered in Italy.” FAC ¶ 2. Among other luxury fashion lines, Vicini S.p.A. owns the Giuseppe Zanotti label. FAC ¶ 20. “Vicini America is a subsidiary of Vicini S.p.A.” Id. Vicini America “is a New York Corporation, with its principal place of business in New York, New York.” FAC ¶ 13. The FAC alleges “on information and belief” that “Vicini S.p.A. is doing business in California through. . . Vicini America.” FAC ¶ 14. MadaLuxe alleges “Defendants are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction.” FAC ¶ 18. “The Giuseppe Zanotti shoes at the heart of this case were. . . goods that Vicini S.p.A. sold directly to. . . Bungar CSC.” FAC ¶ 2. “Incorp obtained the shoes from its affiliate, Bungar CSC, which purchased the shoes directly from Vicini S.p.A. in Italy in or about September 2014.” FAC ¶ 21. “In October 2014, MadaLuxe purchased 4,775 pairs of Giuseppe Zanotti women’s shoes from Incorp Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 9 of 27 Page ID #:236 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 3 MOTION TO DISMISS SAL.” Id. Incorp then delivered the goods to MadaLuxe in the United States. See FAC ¶ 22. “In or about November and December 2014, MadaLuxe sold more than 4,600 pairs of Giuseppe Zanotti shoes to Neiman Marcus” and “Neiman Marcus began marketing and selling the shoes on its website in or about February or March 2015.” FAC ¶ 23. MadaLuxe alleges that Neiman Marcus cancelled a sale of the Giuseppe Zanotti shoes that MadaLuxe had purchased from Incorp “due to Defendants’ wrongful conduct.” FAC ¶ 1. The FAC alleges “Vicini America represented to Neiman Marcus that Vicini America was the only company authorized to distribute those goods in the United States” and that “the retail prices listed on Neiman Marcus’ website for the Giuseppe Zanotti shoes were inaccurate.” FAC ¶ 4. “In or about April 2015, Vicini America’s CEO, Alain Baume, contacted Neiman Marcus and threatened to send Neiman Marcus a cease-and-desist letter to stop Neiman Marcus from selling the Giuseppe Zanotti shoes that Neiman Marcus purchased from MadaLuxe.” FAC ¶ 25. Due to “Vicini America’s claims and accusations. . . Neiman Marcus cancelled its purchase of the shoes and demanded that MadaLuxe provide a full refund and payment of all related shipping costs.” FAC ¶ 8. The FAC alleges that Vicini S.p.A. “knew (or reasonably should have known) that the shoes would be resold in the United States.” FAC ¶ 2. The FAC further alleges that Vicini S.p.A. “provided a list of suggested retail prices in U.S. dollars for the U.S. market” (FAC ¶ 2), but these had been “provided to Bungar and Incorp” by Vicini S.p.A. SeeFAC ¶ 31. MadaLuxe informed the Vicini Defendants that it “intended to bring suit against both companies for interference with MadaLuxe’s relationship with Neiman Marcus. . . .” FAC ¶ 9. Thereafter, MadaLuxe “negotiated with Defendants for months,” including “traveling twice to Milan, Italy to meet in person with Defendants’ principals.” FAC ¶ 9. An informal resolution was not reached. Id. Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 10 of 27 Page ID #:237 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 4 MOTION TO DISMISS III. LEGAL STANDARD “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).). A plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if amendment would be futile. SeeVasquezv. LosAngelesCty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007). IV. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED The FAC should be dismissed pursuant to (a) Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction; (b) Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue; and (c) Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a necessary party under Rule 19. A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Vicini S.p.A. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may assert lack of personal jurisdiction by motion. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(2). Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. SeeSwartzv. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007). “[M]ere ‘bare bones’ assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal conclusions unsupported by specific factual allegations will not satisfy a plaintiff’s pleading burden.” Id. “In opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.” Boschettov. H ansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). To do so, MadaLuxe must establish that jurisdiction is proper under Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 11 of 27 Page ID #:238 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 5 MOTION TO DISMISS both California state law and federal constitutional due process. Id. at 1015-16. A court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if it has either general or specific jurisdiction. Bancroft& Masters,Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l,Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). If a defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction, a court has personal jurisdiction only if the action arises from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Id. For personal jurisdiction over a non-resident to exist, it must be found under the forum state’s long-arm statute, and must comport with the constitutional principles of due process. SeeDataDisc,Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs.,Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977). “California’s long- arm statute, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 410.10, is coextensive with federal due process requirements, so the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” MavrixPhoto,Inc. v. BrandTechs.,Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal due process requires that a non-resident defendant must “have certain minimal contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International ShoeCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945) (citations omitted). In order to find such minimal contacts, “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” BurgerKingCorp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985) (citation omitted). “[T]he defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-WideVolkswagenCorp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980) (citations omitted). 1. There Is No Basis For General Jurisdiction “The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is ‘fairly high,’ . . . and requires that the defendant’s contacts be of the sort that approximate physical Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 12 of 27 Page ID #:239 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 6 MOTION TO DISMISS presence.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086 (internal citations omitted). Even engaging in commerce with residents of a state fails to establish general jurisdiction because it is not the “kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s borders.” Id. at 1086. “‘[G]eneral jurisdiction requires affiliations so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in the forum State, i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.’” Ranzav. Nike,Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015). “Such contacts must be ‘constant and pervasive.’” Id. “The paradigmatic locations where general jurisdiction is appropriate over a corporation are its place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” Id. General jurisdiction is available in other locations only in an “exceptional case.” Id. In evaluating general jurisdiction, the Court considers, among other factors, “whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there.” Tuazonv. R.J. ReynoldsTobaccoCo., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086). “It is the nature and extent of the contacts that determines whether they are ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic.’ Longevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence, and integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets are among the indicia of such a presence.” Id. When the case involves a foreign defendant and arises in a transnational context, courts should not employ an expansive view of general jurisdiction. See DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 750 (2014) (“Finally, the transnational context of this dispute bears attention . . . . The Ninth Circuit, moreover, paid little heed to the risks to international comity posed by its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed.”). MadaLuxe baldly alleges that “Defendants are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction.” FAC ¶ 18. Yet, the FAC acknowledges that Vicini S.p.A. is “an Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 13 of 27 Page ID #:240 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 7 MOTION TO DISMISS Italian company headquartered in Italy” and it sold the shoes at issue to a third-party located in Armenia from Italy. FAC ¶ 2. The FAC does not plead any facts that would establish that Vicini S.p.A. is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court, nor can it. Vicini S.p.A. has no consequential contacts with the State of California. SeeDeclaration of Werner Lorenzini (“Lorenzini Decl.”). It is not registered in California and does not conduct business in California. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. Vicini S.p.A. does not own property or bank accounts in California, does not maintain offices or a registered agent in California, and does not have any employees working in California. Id. at ¶ 3. Moreover, Vicini S.p.A. does not sell or ship its products to California. Id. The fact that a foreign subsidiary, Vicini America, may be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court does not subject Vicini S.p.A. to jurisdiction. SeeH olland AmericaLineInc. v. WartsilaNorthAmerica,Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here a parent and a subsidiary are separate and distinct corporate entities, the presence of one . . . in a forum state may not be attributed to the other.”). Vicini S.p.A. does not have contacts with the State of California “of the sort that approximate physical presence” under Bancroft; there is, therefore, no general jurisdiction over Vicini S.p.A. 2. There Is No Basis For Specific Jurisdiction If a defendant has not had continuous and systematic contacts with the state sufficient to confer general jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction only when certain requirements are met. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a three-part test to determine whether to exercise specific jurisdiction: “(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 14 of 27 Page ID #:241 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 8 MOTION TO DISMISS protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016. “The plaintiff bears the burden on the first two prongs.” Id. If the plaintiff establishes the first two prongs, the defendant must make a “‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. “But if the plaintiff fails at the first step, the jurisdictional inquiry ends and the case must be dismissed.” Id. a. There Has Been No Purposeful Availment MadaLuxe must establish Vicini S.p.A. “purposefully availed” itself “of the privilege of conducting activities in California.” Schwarzeneggerv. FredMartin MotorCo., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). Such a showing “consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as executing or performing a contract there” by which “a defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Id. In return for these “‘benefits and protections,’ a defendant must—as a quid pro quo— ‘submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum.’” Id. (citations omitted). Per the allegations contained in the FAC, prior to the litigation, the parties attempted to reach an informal resolution of this dispute, but these discussions took place either via telephone or in-person in Italy. SeeFAC ¶ 9. These settlement negotiations arose from the underlying sale of shoes, in Italy, by Vicini S.p.A. (an Italian entity), to Bungar (a third-party in Armenia). SeeFAC ¶¶ 21–24. These discussions concerning an alleged interference with this underlying transaction which occurred abroad, between foreign entities, cannot be characterized as purposeful availment of the benefits of California laws. Moreover, an agreement was not ultimately entered into between the Vicini Defendants and MadaLuxe. See FAC ¶ 9. Therefore, there was no transaction within California or a resident thereof. Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 15 of 27 Page ID #:242 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 9 MOTION TO DISMISS b. This Suit Does Not Arise Out of Forum-Related Acts Under the second prong, the issue is “whether the claims made against [the defendant] arise out of their California-related activities.” H arrisRutsky& Co. Ins. Servs.,Inc. v. Bell& ClementsLtd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003). MadaLuxe cannot establish that its complaint against the Vicini Defendants “is related to or ‘arises out of’ defendant’s contacts with the forum.” H elicopteros NacionalesdeColombia,S.A. v. H all, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 (1984). MadaLuxe has not met its burden of proof to establish that Vicini S.p.A. purposely established minimum contacts with California or that the underlying sale of products in Italy to another foreign entity, Bungar, were directed to California. Vicini S.p.A. has no systematic or continuous contacts with California, nor has it purposely availed itself of the privileges and laws of this state. As discussed above, it does not conduct business or make sales in California. SeeLorenzini Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3. Vicini S.p.A. does not own property or bank accounts in California, does not maintain offices or a registered agent in California, and does not have any employees working in California. Id. at ¶ 3. Vicini S.p.A. does not sell or ship its products to California. Id. The FAC does not allege any specific conduct on the part of Vicini S.p.A., rather it asserts allegations against “defendants” collectively or Vicini America alone. SeeFAC ¶¶ 1, 4, 8, 25. In an effort to improperly litigate this action in the Central District of California, MadaLuxe seeks to hold Vicini S.p.A. liable solely on an alter ego theory. If one corporation is the alter ego of another, courts may “pierce the corporate veil” jurisdictionally and attribute “contacts” accordingly. SeeCertified Bldg. Prods.,Inc. v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 968, 969 (9th Cir. 1976). However, in order to disregard the corporate entity for jurisdictional purposes, MadaLuxe must make out a prima facie case under appropriate substantive law to establish alter ego liability. This involves a showing that there is such unity of interest and ownership that in reality no separate entities exist; and that failure to disregard the separate identities Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 16 of 27 Page ID #:243 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 10 MOTION TO DISMISS would result in fraud or injustice. AmericanTel. & Tel. Co. v. CompagnieBruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying California law). The FAC alleges nothing more in this regard than Vicini America is a subsidiary of Vicini S.p.A. and that Vicini America does business in California. SeeFAC ¶¶ 14, 20. “The mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is the sole owner of the subsidiary. There is a presumption of corporate separateness that must be overcome by clear evidence. . . .” Plattenv. H G BermudaExemptedLtd., 437 F.3d 118, 139 (1st Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); seealsoKatzir’sFloor& H omeDesign, Inc. v. M-MLS.COM, 394 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004) (showing that a subsidiary is controlled by a parent corporation will not “eviscerate the separate corporate identity that is the foundation of corporate law”). It is a “fundamental principle of corporate law that the parent corporation and its subsidiary are to be treated as separate and distinct legal persons. . . .” Current,Inc. v. StateBd. of Equalization, 24 Cal. App. 4th 382, 391 (1994). MadaLuxe does not, and cannot, establish the requirements for alter ego liability, such as a commingling of funds or assets, use of the entity as a shell or conduit for the affairs of the other, inadequate capitalization, disregard of corporate formalities, or lack of segregation of corporate records. Seeid. Instead, MadaLuxe alleges “on information and belief” that “Vicini S.p.A. is doing business in California through. . . Vicini America” (FAC ¶ 14) and “Defendants are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction.” FAC ¶ 18. These allegations are mere boilerplate and no substitute for facts. SeeEldoradoStone, LLC v. RenaissanceStone,Inc., No. 04CV2562 JM LSP, 2005 WL 5517732, at *25- 26 (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2005) (dismissing generic “alter ego” and “subsidiary” allegations, and noting that “conclusory allegations, standing alone, may indicate that the plaintiff is engaging in a fishing expedition”); seealsoLeattCorp. v. Exceed H oldings(PTY)LTD , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75543, at *12-15 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s “boilerplate recitation of alter ego liability, couched in Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 17 of 27 Page ID #:244 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 11 MOTION TO DISMISS conclusory language”). Alleged damages arising from the sale of products by Vicini S.p.A., in Italy, to a nonparty foreign company, cannot be litigated in California because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Vicini S.p.A. and MadaLuxe cannot establish jurisdiction on the basis of alter ego liability through Vicini America. c. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Is Unreasonable The third prong of the Ninth Circuit test for specific jurisdiction is that the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. To determine reasonableness, several factors are considered: “(1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful injection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.” CollegeSource,Inc. v. AcademyOne,Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). Even where a defendant enters into a contract with a California company related to a transaction in California, it must still be demonstrated that a defendant sought to invoke “the benefits of California laws.” Pac. Atl. TradingCo., Inc. v. M/VMainExp., 758 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985) (no “purposeful availment” in foreign company’s guaranty relating to a contract made in California where the defendants had not “invoked the benefits of California laws”). In PacificAtlantic TradingCo., the Ninth Circuit held that the exercise of jurisdiction over a Malaysian company was unreasonable because the company “maintain[ed no] offices, employees, agents, or property in California” and “did not interject any products or services into California. . . .” Id. at 1329. The most “efficient forum” was in Malaysia because “the entire transaction took place in Malaysia, and [the defendants’] only contacts with [plaintiff’s] agents were in Malaysia.” Id. at 1331. Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 18 of 27 Page ID #:245 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 12 MOTION TO DISMISS In addition, the plaintiff had not shown that “effective relief would be unavailable in Malaysia” and the “burden of defending in California appear[ed] considerable.” Id. at 1330-31. Similarly here, exercising personal jurisdiction over the Vicini Defendants would be unreasonable. The Vicini Defendants did not enter into any agreement in California and the underlying transaction took place in Italy, between foreign companies. Vicini S.p.A. would be subjected to a significant burden if required to litigate in California. The documents and the witnesses that will be necessary for discovery and trial will be either in New York or Italy – not California. Witnesses crucial to the Vicini Defendants’ defenses to MadaLuxe’s claims, including Vicini S.p.A’s employees who were involved with the sale of the products to Bungar, reside in Italy and may not be compelled to participate in discovery or attend trial in this matter. The sovereignty factor also weighs in favor of finding unreasonableness because “a foreign nation presents a greater sovereignty barrier than another state within the United States.” Fed. DepositIns. Corp. v. British-AmericanIns. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1987). The burden of a defendant is increased when it is ordered to defend itself in the foreign legal system of another country. SeeAsahi MetalIndus. Co. v. SuperiorCourtofCalifornia,SolanoCty., 480 U.S. 102, 115, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). “[G]reat care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” Id. The court in Italy has a particular interest in adjudicating this dispute because it arises out of the sale of products from Italy, by an Italian entity. SeeFAC ¶ 21. Without factual support, MadaLuxe contends that Vicini S.p.A. “knew (or reasonably should have known) that the shoes would be resold in the United States.” FAC ¶ 2. The FAC also alleges that Vicini S.p.A. “provided a list of suggested retail prices in U.S. dollars for the U.S. market” (FAC ¶ 2), but these were “provided to Bungar and Incorp,” Armenian and Swiss entities, respectively, not to Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 19 of 27 Page ID #:246 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 13 MOTION TO DISMISS MadaLuxe. FAC ¶ 31. Moreover, any representations that were allegedly made to Bunger and Incorp by Vicini S.p.A. took place entirely in Italy, Armenia or Switzerland, and did not involve MadaLuxe or California. By contrast, the local interest in California is slight because the only real connection to this forum is that MadaLuxe is a resident of California. SeeFAC ¶ 12. Given the attenuated contacts of Vicini S.p.A. with the State of California, it would be unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction over it in California. Accordingly, MadaLuxe has failed to satisfy its burden to establish that Vicini S.p.A. is subject to specific jurisdiction in this Court. B. Venue Is Improper In The Central District of California Venue is improper in California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the Vicini Defendants are not residents of California and the underlying events did not occur in California. A party may move to dismiss an action for improper venue. Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(3). “A civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Or, the action may be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Neither provision applies here. MadaLuxe argues venue “is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events, acts, or omissions giving rise to MadaLuxe’s claims occurred in this District. . . .” FAC, ¶ 18. First, the Vicini Defendants are residents of New York and Italy – not California. SeeFAC, ¶ 17. Vicini America is a New York corporation, with its principal place of business located in New York. SeeDeclaration of Alain Baume (“Baume Decl.”), ¶ 2; see alsoFAC, ¶ 13. Vicini S.p.A. is an Italian entity, with its principal place of business located in San Mauro Pascoli (Forli-Cesana), Italy. SeeDeclaration of Eugenio Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 20 of 27 Page ID #:247 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 14 MOTION TO DISMISS Morselli (“Morselli Decl.”), ¶ 2; seealsoFAC, ¶ 2. Moreover, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted in the FAC did not occur in California. The nature of this action is the determination of rights to sell and distribute certain Giuseppe Zanotti shoes. As discussed above, the events giving rise to MadaLuxe’s claims arose in Italy, not California. “The Giuseppe Zanotti shoes at the heart of this case were. . . goods that Vicini S.p.A. sold directly to. . . Bungar CSC.” FAC ¶ 2. “Incorp obtained the shoes from its affiliate, Bungar CSC, which purchased the shoes directly from Vicini S.p.A. in Italy in or about September 2014.” FAC ¶ 21. “In October 2014, MadaLuxe purchased 4,775 pairs of Giuseppe Zanotti women’s shoes from Incorp SAL.” Id. Incorp then delivered the goods to MadaLuxe in the United States. See FAC ¶ 22. “In or about November and December 2014, MadaLuxe sold more than 4,600 pairs of Giuseppe Zanotti shoes to Neiman Marcus” and “Neiman Marcus began marketing and selling the shoes on its website in or about February or March 2015.” FAC ¶ 23. MadaLuxe does not and cannot allege that any of the foregoing underlying acts occurred in California. MadaLuxe complains of Vicini America’s representations to Neiman Marcus, but again, MadaLuxe does not and cannot allege that these communications occurred in California. The FAC alleges “Vicini America represented to Neiman Marcus that Vicini America was the only company authorized to distribute those goods in the United States” and that “the retail prices listed on Neiman Marcus’ website for the Giuseppe Zanotti shoes were inaccurate.” FAC ¶ 4. “In or about April 2015, Vicini America’s CEO, Alain Baume, contacted Neiman Marcus and threatened to send Neiman Marcus a cease-and-desist letter to stop Neiman Marcus from selling the Giuseppe Zanotti shoes that Neiman Marcus purchased from MadaLuxe.” FAC ¶ 25. Due to “Vicini America’s claims and accusations. . . Neiman Marcus cancelled its purchase of the shoes and demanded that MadaLuxe provide a full refund and payment of all related shipping costs.” FAC ¶ 8. Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 21 of 27 Page ID #:248 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 15 MOTION TO DISMISS On or about April 9, 2015, the Chief Executive Officer of Vicini America and a resident of New York, Alain Baume, received an email from Shaheen Manohar, Buyer – Designer Clearance & Flash Sales, for Neiman Marcus, from Dallas, Texas indicating that Ms. Manohar had purchased the shoes at issue from MadaLuxe, on behalf of Neiman Marcus. Baume Decl., ¶ 4. Ms. Manohar provided Mr. Baume with the contact information for MadaLuxe’s President, Adam Freede. Id. On April 9, 2015, at Mr. Baume’s direction, counsel of record, S. Patrick McKey, sent a cease and desist letter from Bryan Cave LLP’s office in Chicago to Mr. Freede’s office in New York. Id. at ¶ 5. Settlement negotiations took place between MadaLuxe and the Vicini Defendants on or about April 6, 2016 and May 11, 2016 in Milan, Italy, not California. SeeMorselli Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Therefore, because the Vicini Defendants are not residents of California and the events giving rise to this action occurred in Italy, New York, Texas, and Chicago – but not California – this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). C. MadaLuxe Failed To Join Bungar and Incorp As Necessary Parties Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a suit may be dismissed for a plaintiff’s failure to join a party required under Rule 19. See SeirraClubv. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 320 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (“Ordinarily, of course, the issue of non-joinder is brought to the court’s attention by a motion to require joinder or dismissal.”). A motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(7) can be raised at any time, including at trial. SeeF. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); seealsoMcCowenv. Jamieson, 724 F. 2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The issue is sufficiently important that it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings — even suasponte.”). Adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(7) motion is a fact-intensive and flexible inquiry.” AmericanGreyhoundRacing,Inc. v. H ull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1043 (D. Arizona 2001) (citing MakahIndianTribev. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990)). Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 22 of 27 Page ID #:249 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 16 MOTION TO DISMISS “A motion to dismiss based on Rule 19 requires the court to engage in three successive inquiries.” Shropshirev. Canning, 2012 WL 13658 at *3 (January 4, 2012 N.D. Cal.) (citing EEOC v. PeabodyWesternCoalCo., 610 F. 3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010)). “First, the court must determine whether a nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a).” Id. Second, if the nonparty meets the requirements of Rule 19(a), the court must “determine whether it is feasible to order that absentee joined.” Id. Third, if joinder is not feasible, the court must determine “whether the case can proceed without the absentee or whether the action must be dismissed.” Id. “There is no precise formula for determining whether a particular nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a). . . the determination is heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Peabody, 610 F. 3d at 1081. 1. Madaluxe Cannot Be Afforded Complete Relief Without Joining Bungar and Incorp Rule 19(a) mandates a “required party” to be joined in the action if “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” F. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). “The relevant question for Rule 19(a) must be whether success in the litigation can afford the plaintiffs the relief for which they have prayed.” ConfederatedTribesoftheChehalisIndianReservationv. Lujan, 928 F. 2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). Without adding Bungar and Incorp as defendants, the Court cannot determine whether the Vicini Defendants breached any duty to MadaLuxe or engaged in any alleged wrongdoing in the underlying sale of the products, and thus cannot afford complete relief to MadaLuxe. This includes, for instance, any representations regarding the suggested retail prices in U.S. dollars, why they were provided, and whether they were accurate. SeeFAC ¶¶ 2, 31. Bungar and Incorp are thus required parties - and not mere fact witnesses - and must be joined under Rule 19(a). Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 23 of 27 Page ID #:250 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 17 MOTION TO DISMISS 2. Joinder Is Not Feasible If a person is deemed a “required party,” they must be joined if their joinder is considered feasible, meaning they are “subject to service of process and [their] joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. . .” F. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). On information and belief, Bungar and Incorp are foreign entities. As such, unless they consent to jurisdiction, their joinder may not be feasible. 3. The Action Should Thus Be Dismissed If joinder is not feasible, “the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” F. R. Civ. P. 19(b); seeRepublicofPhillipinesv. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 2189 (2008). Factors the court should consider include: (1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. F. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Under Rule 19(b), the court considers at least four interests: “(1) the plaintiff’s interest in having a forum; (2) the defendant’s interest in not proceeding without the required party; (3) the interest of the non-party by examining ‘the extent to which the judgment may as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect [its] interest in the matter’; and (4) the interests of the courts and the public in ‘complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.’” Paiute-ShoshoneIndians. v. CityofLosAngeles, 637 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). If the equitable factors are met, the case cannot proceed, and the party is considered “indispensable.” Dawavendewa v. SaltRiverProjectAgricultralImprovementandPowerDistrict, 276 F. 3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002). Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 24 of 27 Page ID #:251 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 18 MOTION TO DISMISS All four factors are met in this case. First, a judgment rendered in Bungar and Incorp’s absence would prejudice the Vicini Defendants because their liability, if any, cannot be fully stated without first examining the individual breaches of duties of Bungar and Incorp to Madaluxe (or Vicini S.p.A.), or any representations made to Bungar by Vicini S.p.A. during the underlying sale that may or may not have been thereafter communicated to MadaLuxe. Second, the prejudice could not be lessened or avoided by protective provisions, shaping relief, or other measures because any monetary judgment against the Vicini Defendants, regardless of qualification, would not account for the liability of Bungar and Incorp. Third, a judgment rendered in the absence of Bungar and Incorp would not be adequate because MadaLuxe may be owed more or less damages depending on the liability of Bungar and/or Incorp as active participants in the underlying sale. Fourth, MadaLuxe would have an adequate remedy if the action was dismissed because the dismissal would not operate as an adjudication upon the merits, and thus not bar re-filling wherever the missing party is subject to jurisdiction. SeeFRCP 41(b); seealsoCty. Sanitation Dist. No. 2 ofLosAngelesCty. v. InlandContainerCorp., 803 F.2d 1074,1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986). In other words, if either Bungar or Incorp is deemed a required party, which cannot be feasibly joined, and the Court orders dismissal, MadaLuxe can re-file this action, in the proper forum, and add Bungar and Incorp as necessary parties. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the First Amended Complaint because Bungar and Incorp are required parties, whose joinder would be infeasible. /// /// /// /// /// /// Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 25 of 27 Page ID #:252 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 19 MOTION TO DISMISS V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Vicini Defendants respectfully request the Court to grant the Motion to Dismiss. Dated: November 14, 2016 BRYAN CAVE LLP Patrick McKey Nancy Franco By: /s/NancyFranco Nancy Franco Attorneys for Defendants Vicini America, Inc. and Vicini S.p.A. Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 26 of 27 Page ID #:253 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1164828.6 1 PROOF OF SERVICE PROOF OF SERVICE I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 120 Broadway, Suite 300, Santa Monica, California 90401-2386. On November 14, 2016, I served the foregoing document, described as: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, as follows: Mark T. Cramer William Miller Aaron M. Levine Buchalter Nemer 1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500 Los Angeles, CA 90017-2457 Email: mcramer@buchalter.com wmiller@buchalter.com alevine@buchalter.com Phone: (213) 891-0700 AttorneysforPlaintiffP2FH oldings, LLC dbaMadaluxe BY CM/ECF NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING: I caused said document(s) to be served by means of this Court’s electronic transmission of the Notice of Electronic filing through the Court’s transmission facilities, to the parties and/or counsel who are registered CM/ECF Users set forth in the service list obtained from this Court FEDERAL - I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 14, 2016, at Santa Monica, California. /s/ Lorena Lazheztter Lorena Lazheztter Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28 Filed 11/14/16 Page 27 of 27 Page ID #:254 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:255 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:256 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-1 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:257 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:258 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:259 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-2 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:260 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-3 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:261 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-3 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:262 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-3 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:263 Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-3 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:264 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1170869.1 [PROPOSED] ORDER BRYAN CAVE LLP S. Patrick McKey (ProH acVice) patrick.mckey@bryancave.com 161 North Clark Street, Suite 4300 Chicago, IL 60601-3315 Telephone: (312) 602-5000 Facsimile: (312) 602-5050 BRYAN CAVE LLP Nancy Franco (California Bar No. 294856) nancy.franco@bryancave.com 120 Broadway, Suite 300 Santa Monica, CA 90401-2386 Telephone: (310) 576-2100 Facsimile: (310) 576-2200 Attorneys for Defendants Vicini America, Inc. and Vicini S.p.A. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA P2F HOLDINGS, LLC, a California limited liability company doing business as MADALUXE, Plaintiff, vs. VICINI AMERICA, INC., a New York corporation; VICINI, S.p.A., an Italian company; DOES 1 thorough 10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 8:16-cv-01399-CJC (SKx) Assigned To Hon. Cormac J. Carney [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [Filed Concurrently With Notice of Motion and Motion To Dismiss and Affiant Declarations] Date: December 12, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Courtroom: 9B Complaint Filed: July 28, 2016 Trial Date: Not yet scheduled Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-4 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:265 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1170869.1 1 [PROPOSED] ORDER The Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Vicini America, Inc. and Vicini, S.p.A. (the “Vicini Defendants”) came for hearing on December 12, 2016, the Honorable Cormac J. Carney presiding. Appearances were as stated on the record. Having read and considered the Motion to Dismiss and all pleadings and papers submitted by the parties in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and having heard and considered the argument of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The Motion to Dismiss is granted in its entirety pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue; and Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a party under Rule 19; and 2. The First Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: ______________ Honorable Cormac J. Carney United States District Judge Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-4 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:266 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 , S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1170869.1 1 PROOF OF SERVICE PROOF OF SERVICE I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 120 Broadway, Suite 300, Santa Monica, California 90401-2386. On November 14, 2016, I served the foregoing document, described as: [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, as follows: Mark T. Cramer William Miller Aaron M. Levine Buchalter Nemer 1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500 Los Angeles, CA 90017-2457 Email: mcramer@buchalter.com wmiller@buchalter.com alevine@buchalter.com Phone: (213) 891-0700 AttorneysforPlaintiffP2FH oldings, LLC dbaMadaluxe BY CM/ECF NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING: I caused said document(s) to be served by means of this Court’s electronic transmission of the Notice of Electronic filing through the Court’s transmission facilities, to the parties and/or counsel who are registered CM/ECF Users set forth in the service list obtained from this Court FEDERAL - I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 14, 2016, at Santa Monica, California. /s/ Lorena Lazheztter Lorena Lazheztter Case 8:16-cv-01399-CJC-SK Document 28-4 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:267